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Thesis abstract
The subject is the post-communist state, examined through an analysis of the break-up 
of Czechoslovakia. The thesis argues that the separation was not merely a symptom of 
the transition, of the multiple stresses afflicting the state, but that it was manufactured 
by the Czech right as a technocratic partition and sold to the Czech electorate as the 
cost of continuing reform. The thesis considers the Czech right’s definition of a 
‘functioning federation’, its basic insensibility to Slovak national grievances, its roots in 
neo-liberal conceptions of economic reform, and the impact of this definition in 
blocking constitutional negotiations. The research charts how Slovak party politics 
developed in response to this dominating Czech vision of the future state. Persistent, 
broad-based public opposition to separation is found to have been deflected and 
neutralised by the under-developed nature of party competition, by the profound 
weakness of the federal parliament and by the absence of constitutional norms.
The thesis opens with an introductory history. Chapter two provides a scene-setting 
account of the last six months of the Czechoslovak federation, the ‘endgame’ during 
which the separation was arranged and completed. The third chapter maps out six 
competing explanations for the split, to be tested in subsequent chapters. Chapter four 
considers the merits of a nationalist conflict analysis, and concludes that this theoretical 
emphasis tends to over-determine the separation, overplaying as it must the slim 
evidence of assertive nationalism in either republic. Chapter five argues that 
identifiably transitional imbalances in the party system prohibited the clear mediation of 
Czech Slovak relations. Chapter six examines the character of the constitutional 
deadlock up until June 1992. The penultimate chapter addresses economic aspects of 
the Czech Slovak conflict after 1989. The final chapter concludes.
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Chapter 1 
The Sources of Discontent
Introduction
On 1st January 1993, the Federative Republic of Czechoslovakia (CSFR) died. Its 
successor states were the two independent republics of Czechia and Slovakia. The 
decision to separate followed just over two years of negotiations over alternative state 
forms, which had ended in deadlock. The divorce occurred after the subsequent general 
election in June 1992. The new Czech and Slovak Premiers, Vaclav Klaus and 
Vladimir Meciar, settled the dispute at breakneck speed. No shot was fired and no 
borders questioned. So apparently punctilious and rapid was Czechoslovakia’s end, that 
it was set down as a model abroad: an exemplar of the frictionless parting of nations. 
This thesis will attempt to explain the break-up of post-communist Czechoslovakia, and 
to assess its alleged merits as the perfect divorce.
Surprisingly few authors have analysed Czechoslovakia in anything approaching its 
historical entirety^ (1918-1992), and until recently, anyone reading Czech Slovak 
history has faced an unusual burden of ideological ‘decoding’. As several post-Second 
World War studies pointed out, Slovakia had tended to be subsumed within histories of 
the First Republic (1918-1938) as if it represented no more than a province of the 
Czech dominated whole. Though a fair objection, this perception of neglect spurred an 
alternative but often equally polemical literature, particularly from émigré Slovaks and 
their descendants^. Within the country, a complete hijacking of the history of the state 
followed the communist takeover in 1948. Until communism’s collapse in 1989, 
analysis and analysts alike were dragged into a disinformational maze constructed by 
the Communist Party. While it might be instructive of the Central European experience 
to observe how the far left and far right have portrayed national differences over time, 
it is also important to note how ill-served would-be mediators in the national dispute
' The exceptions being Carol Skalnik Leff and Frederic Wehrle.
 ^ Frantisek Vnuk, a nationalist historian sympathetic to Slovakia’s wartime clerico-fascist regime stands at 
the more extreme end of the spectrum whilst Stanislav Kirschbaum, son o f a postwar émigré and author of 
one of the few comprehensive works in English on Slovak history, clearly has strong nationalist leanings.
7have frequently been by the overburdened narratives within Czechoslovakia’s school 
books.
F. Wehrle and C.S. Leff have done much to explain the foundations behind these 
evidently “diverging constructions of history” (Wehrle 1994:241), applying important 
anchors to the historical record with their explorations of both the Czech and Slovak 
sides to the story. Their attention has rested on the abiding constitutional and economic 
inequality of the two regions, and the repercussions in Slovak perceptions of the Czechs 
as colonisers and betrayers of the constitutional promise of equality, and in Czech 
readings of the Slovaks, conversely, as opportunistic and ungrateful ‘younger brothers’. 
The thesis presented here, though drawing a great deal on these same issues, does not 
represent just another consideration of Czech and Slovak relations but rather seeks to 
consider the national conflict as a vehicle for exploring the wider, and more regionally 
comparable issues of democratic consolidation following the collapse of communism in 
1989. By examining the dénouement, the separation process between 1989 and 1993, 
the thesis seeks to isolate ‘national’ from other underlying weaknesses in the structure 
of the new democratic state.
A history of stereotypes
This introductory chapter concentrates on the ostensibly all-important, stereotype- 
forming moments in the history of the state: on national provocations before 1989. By 
considering those affairs conventionally recognised as conflicting in Czech and Slovak 
memory the aim is to sensitise the reader to some of the fuller implications of political 
rhetoric after 1989. A first chapter thus structured implies a question: were these Czech 
and Slovak differences when democratically released an irreconcilable clash in a 
resurgent ethnonational conflict? Equally, how much did separation owe to the tired 
indifference of two peoples who, having endured war, fascism and communism, looked 
on in dismay at the bloody national conflict in Yugoslavia, and concluded ‘we have had 
enough’? In short, was there, in fact, any reasonable hope for a common state of 
Czechs and Slovaks? These questions run throughout this thesis. As we shall see, the 
answers must qualify many conventional explanations of secessions or partitions.
Czechoslovakia 1918-1938: The shot-gun marriage and the German-in-laws
“In actual practice it was a mixed state, in which the Czechs and Slovaks represented 
the ‘Will to the State, ’ while the existence o f important German and Magyar minorities, 
which only reluctantly accepted the accomplished fact, created a problem o f great 
delicacy, whose solution was likely to depend, and did actually depend, upon the extent 
to which Central Europe settled down, or relapsed into disorder, after the Great War. ” 
R.W. Seton Watson “History of the Czechs and Slovaks” (1965:313)
Before considering some of the controversies that afflicted the First Republic the 
context in which the state itself arose must be noted. The Czechoslovak Republic 
emerged in October 1918 as a successor state from the 1914-1918 European war: a 
union of regions from opposite sides of the Austro-Hungarian tracks. The industrially 
advanced Czech lands (Bohemia, Silesia and Moravia) emanated from the Austrian side 
of the now collapsed Habsburg empire, the still predominantly agrarian Slovakia, from 
Hungary^.
It was a significant, and as separation grew closer in 1992, much remembered fact that 
Czechs and Slovaks had been divided until 1918 not only legally, symbolically and 
territorially, but in myriad other facets of historical development, the Czech claim to 
ancient statehood not least amongst them. Czechs and Slovaks differed radically in the 
nature of their economies'^, in their social stratification, their traditions and religious 
affiliations (Bartlova 1995:160). Slovakia was predominantly Catholic, the Czech 
lands, both Protestant and Catholic, but philosophically anti-clerical. More simply, the 
weakness of the “Slovak element” in Czech collective awareness before 1918 would 
play an important role in the subsequent development of the state (Suda 1995:119).
 ^ Another region which eventually accrued to Czechoslovakia as an autonomous region was the former 
Hungarian territory of Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia). Ruthenia was administered by a Governor 
appointed by the Czechoslovak President and, though promised a separate Diet, this remained un­
established when the Czechoslovak Republic fell in 1938 (Seton-Watson 1965:324).
 ^ The Czech economy before the Great War was among the most progressive in the empire. It compared 
well with France and contributed disproportionately to the Austrian budget - the Czechs were responsible 
for some 60 per cent of overall taxation revenue. Slovakia’s economy remained predominantly agrarian 
(Bartlova 1995:161/2) and un-modernised under Hungarian rule, adding “underdevelopment to misrule” 
(Dubcek 1993:2).
9Slovakia under Hungarian rule had suffered relatively greater national repression and 
seclusion, including systematic attempts at Magyarisation which had all but crushed 
Slovakia’s mid-nineteenth century attempts at a national ‘revival’. The dawn of the 
twentieth century only worsened conditions for Hungary’s national minorities as the 
Magyars sought to eliminate emancipationist impulses root and branch. After 1907, 
Hungarian was the exclusive language of instruction in all schools: a potentially fatal 
blow to a Slovak national identity surviving in little else but language. ‘Slovakia’ was 
never at any stage before 1918 permitted even an administrative or economic 
recognition distinct from other Hungarian regions. It had also lacked a major urban 
centre (Johnson 1985:47) to which a nation-minded intelligentsia might have flocked. 
Slovakia’s miniature political and intellectual elites (for historical reason, 
predominantly and disproportionately Protestant^) were aware of their lack of historic 
claim and evidence for statehood, and saw little choice when the time came but to 
appeal directly to the vaunted but alarmingly un-assertable rights of self-determination.
The Czech lands by 1918 in contrast possessed a strong national tradition and discipline 
as well as a large educated class (Seton-Watson 1965:313). Bohemia’s Prague had long 
been a cosmopolitan and much admired European city, more restored of its political 
independence after the revolutions of 1848-9 than any other city under the Habsburgs 
bar Vienna and Budapest themselves. The Slovak voice was scarcely audible amongst 
the non-Hungarian nationalities represented by less than 10 per cent of members in the 
Hungarian parliament (Bartlova 1995:161). The Czechs meanwhile perplexed the 
authorities with their numerous calls to end pro-German electoral rules and for 
recognition by Vienna as an ancient independent state - on a par with Hungary. The 
Czech National Revival had proceeded apace from 1848 to the outbreak of World War 
I, and through its many associations had popularised the Czech aspiration to statehood.
 ^ Between 1910 and 1920 Bohemian Catholics began to leave the church in huge numbers, perceiving the 
Catholic hierarchy to be an instrument of Habsburg oppression. Equally, anti-Magyar Slovak intellectuals 
who had sought refuge in the Czech education system - the new national elite after 1918 - tended to be from 
Protestant backgrounds precisely because their Protestantism had rendered them relatively immune to 
Magyarisation, lending them the very dissatisfaction that had driven them into the arms o f die Czechs in the 
first place (Leff 1988:19).
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What brought two such apparently disparate nations together in 1918? The traditional, 
state-and-nation building explanation of Czechoslovakia is taken from the ideas of the 
national revivalist and pan-Slavic movements of the nineteenth century, and is based on 
the understanding that the neighbouring Slavs, Czechs and Slovaks, shared deep 
common roots of culture and language. Even these commonalities however, were a 
constant source of debate. The state’s founder, T.G. Masaryk (actually of 
Moravian/Slovak origin but viewed by Slovaks as a Czech), believed that “Slovaks and 
Czechs formed a single nation, separated only by differences in language, history and 
culture” (Skilling 1994:79) - a full set of distinctions which more than hints at incipient 
trouble. The less romantic but in 1918 the weightier explanation for Czechoslovakia’s 
existence comes from the calculations of Czech and Slovak political elites and the state- 
makers of the Paris Peace Conference, and their combined understanding of Germans 
and Magyars. Czechoslovakia was, to a critical degree, a product of its massive 
minorities^. During the 1914-1918 War, the previously limited business and culture 
oriented contacts between Czechs and Slovaks had moved to a different plane as groups 
within the two political leaderships joined in mutual support of their respective national 
claims. Masaryk, the principle initiator of this collaboration, had calculated early in the 
war that neither region was likely to achieve independent statehood alone (Bartlova 
1995:163), nor, if independence was achieved to sustain it well in the face of those 
minorities who would find themselves demoted, to paraphrase Seton-Watson, from 
overlords to underdogs.
There were certainly international pressures for the creation of a unified state, where 
the two nations would act reciprocally as the bulwark against minority strengths. As 
Johnson points out, however, “unless the Slovak people were proclaimed to be part of 
the Czechoslovak people, the Czechoslovak state would have been a state of 
minorities... The question would then have been asked why three million Germans 
should belong to such a state, and without the German territories, the economy of 
Czechoslovakia would have been severely wounded” (Johnson 1985:53). It was
 ^ The First Republic embarked on the interwar period with some three million Germans and three-quarter 
of a million Magyars - in a population of 13,600,000. By 1930 Czechs constituted 49.9 per cent o f the total 
population; Germans 21.9 per cent; Slovaks 15.9 per cent; Hungarians 4.7 per cent; Ukrainians, 
Ruthenians and Russians 3.7 per cent; Jews 1.3 per cent and Poles 0.6 per cent (Prucha 1995:45).
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undoubtedly with such questions in mind that Masaryk already in 1907 had made 
pointed references to the two million Slovaks in upper Hungary as “belonging to our 
nationality”, and as “co-nationals” (Skilling 1994:71).
The First Czechoslovak Republic began with a fundamental flaw. The failure to grant 
Slovaks significant autonomy throughout the First Republic marked Masaryk’s 
establishment notion of ‘Czechoslovakia’, with an irreducible defect for Slovak pride. 
Many Slovaks adjudged Slovakia to have been co-opted into a notion of ‘Czechoslovak’ 
identity only to safeguard the stability of a Czech dominated state. The interpretation 
arose once the rewards accruing to Slovakia for its Czechoslovak status were deemed 
inadequate, albeit for different reasons among different quarters. The logic of the 
state’s built-in flaw and the reasoning to which Czechs had recourse between 1918 and 
1938, was that granting any Slovak aspiration to administrative autonomy could trigger 
similar calls from both Germans and Hungarians, and so support irredentist claims^.
To complicate matters further the ‘Slovak question’ was ‘triangular’ i.e between 
Czechs, Slovak autonomists and Slovak integrationists (for a review of this 
interpretation see Leff 1988:193-211), and remained so with some variations to the 
state’s demise in 1992. The integrationist first generation of ‘Czechoslovakists’ (among 
them the bulk of Slovakia’s young Protestant intellectuals), believed that Slovakia could 
only benefit from the modernising and Westernising influence of the Czech territories 
and should adopt a suitably loyalist attitude. Czechoslovakia was nevertheless from the 
beginning a hostage to the fortune of its Slovak population, predominantly Catholic and 
agrarian as that population for the moment remained - an unlikely seedbed for the 
visions of progressive. Westernising, and secular intellectuals. Demography moreover 
was against the assimilationists. The Slovak population increased considerably after 
1918 through the combined effect of an increase in the Slovak birthrate, a decline in 
emigration and the re-Slovakisation of the Magyarised population. The 1921 census 
revealed the sweeping away of the apparent Hungarian majority in many Slovak cities.
 ^ The Hungarians and Germans rejected the invitation to participate in the pre-1920 “Revolutionary 
National Assembly” which wrote the 1920 constitution (Johnson 1985:60). They boycotted the Parliament 
hoping for re-union with Hungary and Austria respectively. When they eventually entered the legislature 
they were, of course, confronted by laws and principles completed by Czechs and Slovaks.
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Combined with a continuing process of urbanisation, concentrated in Bratislava and 
Kosice (Johnson 1985:84), and a comprehensive improvement in the entire education 
structure within Slovakia, conditions were clearly turning to favour those who wished 
to distinguish the Slovak national identity, not only in its own right, but as separate 
from the Czech.
Was the fate of Czechoslovakia sealed by such a mis-equation of minorities?* It is a 
tempting answer. The combined imperatives facing Czechoslovakia suggest a state 
besieged. To begin with, Slovak goodwill appeared considerable. On the plus side, the 
evidence is that the coexistence with and assistance of the Czechs was initially 
welcomed as the realisation of an ethnically ‘natural’, economically beneficial, non- 
assimilationist and relatively non-centralising Slavic state. In these early years 
Bratislava became the headquarters of new and resuscitated parties, newspapers, home 
to a national university and other diverse cultural and educational institutions, able to 
function with relative freedom (Bartlova 1995:169) and to stand as the marks of a 
‘capital’ city. Above all, in terms of its own cultural security, Slovakia had won formal 
demarcation as a distinct territory - for which it was undoubtedly grateful. On the down 
side, within a year of the Republic’s existence Slovakia found itself part of a “centrally 
governed multinational state, with numerically significant ethnic minorities from the 
former ruling nations who were much more politically aware, better organised and”, in 
a telling phrase which alludes to the all-important notion of a natural hierarchy 
bestowed by historic nationhood, “more mature in every respect” (Bartlova 1995:169, 
my italics).
The term Czechoslovakism could often be heard in Slovakia after 1989. When said in 
derogatory tones ‘Czechoslovakist’ was a shorthand expression for “someone who 
believes/ is clearly assimilated/ in a composite national identity, though historically this 
identity is merely a guise for Slovak assimilation into Czech culture” . The term had 
become a rich source of contention almost immediately following the state’s formation: 
“the emergence of the new state in October 1918 was not accompanied by a clear 
delineation of what the term Czechoslovak meant. Some persons thought it descriptive.
The sequel ‘imponderable’ is to ask whether the expulsion of ethnic Germans after the Second World War 
effectively removed all reason for the existence of Czechoslovakia.
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others saw it as prescriptive. Some thought it was related to politics, while others cast it 
solely into the ideological sphere. There was disagreement whether its significance was 
primarily internal or external. By 1938, the Czechoslovak concept was beginning to 
give way to recognition of distinct Czech and Slovak nations...” (Johnson 1985:50).
The derogatory implications of ‘Czechoslovakism’ in Slovak usage derived not just 
from the basic paradoxes in the state however, but from particular, and stereotype- 
forming political grievances to which we now turn. The essence of the problem was 
articulated at the time by Ferdinand Peroutka, in his encyclopaedic Budovani statu 
(‘Building the State’). How could Slovaks be other than antagonised he asks, when 
“there did not exist a Czechoslovak nation. How else could one refer to it other than as 
a demand?” (Peroutka 1:213 in Kirschbaum 1983:170).
National Stereotypes and their sources:
The Pittsburgh Agreement -1918
One of the most embittering experiences for Slovaks was that the language of 
‘fraternity’ prevailing before 1918 translated into a Czech attitude of the older brother 
from the moment the two cohabitated. Czechs wore their historic nationhood and 
economic success as a badge of maturity and deemed their goals the most appropriate 
model for Slovak development. On the reverse view many Czechs, including those 
more sympathetic to Slovak particularism, were dismayed at the seemingly endless 
demands of Slovaks for both improving conditions and greater equality. The Czech 
resentment of Slovak ingratitude and their surprise at the protectiveness and coherence 
of Slovak national characteristics provided fertile ground for unflattering stereotypes on 
both sides.
For a significant group in Slovakia’s political and cultural elite^, its young Catholic 
contingent in particular, the grievances over the term ‘Czechoslovak’ gathered like 
moss on the state’s foundation stone. The basic document of the state-union, the Martin
 ^Between 16 and 29 political parties participated in the elections of 1920, 1925, 1929 and 1935, though the 
spectrum of opinions was far more varied in the first post-war decade than the second, when takeovers and 
attrition narrowed the group (Bartlova 1995:171-179) - the term ‘Slovak parties’ is in fact inappropriate 
since there was only one Slovak, as opposed to statewide party, of any significance - Hlinka’s Slovak 
People’s Party (see below).
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Declaration of unity of October 30th 1918, was in many respects a vague expression of 
Slovak assent to the Czechoslovak Republic^^. It was nevertheless assumed by Czechs 
from the outset as legitimating not only a unitary, Prague-centralised state but 
membership in a “Czechoslovak nation” and use of a “Czechoslovak” language^ ^  
terms to be found throughout the 1920 constitution^^. When another document signed 
abroad, the Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918, became known in Slovakia in 
1919^^, it provided a focus for those who wished to reassert Slovakia’s equal status in 
the state^ "^ .
Signed by the future state President, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, and by Czech and 
Slovak émigré groups in the United States, the Pittsburgh Agreement had stipulated a 
separate administration, parliament, and even courts for Slovakia, (Jelinek 1983:5), 
propitious clauses for the quickly frustrated in Slovakia’s elite. According to Masaryk, 
however, the Agreement had been “concluded to appease a small Slovak faction which 
was dreaming of God knows what sort of independence for Slovakia... I signed the
The Slovak declaration endorsing Czech-Slovak unity included a resolution demanding the right of self- 
determination and another for significant Slovak National Council powers. It was, however, adopted two 
days after a proclamation of statehood by the Prague National Committee, to which the pro-Czech Slovak, 
Vavro Srobar, was the sole Slovak signatory. The 28th and not the 30th of October became the official 
anniversary date of the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic.
Other laws provided that state offices using the official state language in former Austrian territories were 
to use the Czech language, while those in Slovakia were to use Slovak and even that “matters presented in 
the Czech language and officially dealt with in Slovak or presented in Slovak and dealt with in Czech shall 
be deemed to have been dealt with in the language in which they were presented”. The idea of a 
Czechoslovak language was nonetheless prescriptive, since there existed a popular Czech notion that Slovak 
existed only as a backward form of Czech, which would soon dissolve as Slovak society passed through the 
social and economic modernisation already completed by Czech society (Johnson 1985:52-3).
In his opening address to the National Assembly on November 14th, 1918, Prime Minister Karel Kramar 
defined Czechoslovakia as a “Czech state”, welcoming the Slovaks as ‘lost sons’ who had now “returned to 
the nation’s fold, where they belong” (Benes, V. 1973:73-74).
If this seems like a tremendous delay it should be remembered that these were chaotic post-war times. 
Conditions in Slovakia were not conducive to transparent administration. Before the arrival of 
Czechoslovak legionnaires in December/January 1918-1919 (Bratislava was not occupied until 4 January 
1919), Slovakia’s economy had been ransacked. Entire factories, government records and even locomotives 
and rolling stock were expropriated to Hungary (Bartlova 1995:168/9). Border security between Slovakia 
and Hungary was not achieved until August 1919 and the collapse o f the five month old Hungarian 
Bolshevik regime under Bela Kun. The prolonged ambiguity over the border further embittered an already 
deeply frustrated Magyar minority in what was now definitively Slovakia, a situation not fully stabilised 
until the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920 (Seton-Watson 1965:322-4).
An earlier document, the Cleveland Accord (October 1915) had already been swept aside. The Accord 
was a joint declaration by émigré representatives of the Slovak League and the Czech National Association 
and it called for the formation o f an independent federated Czechoslovak state. The Accord provided for 
Slovak autonomy to the extent of its own financial and political administrations and total cultural freedom. 
As Johnson points out, the significance of the document was that the American Slovaks could claim to 
represent the Slovak cause in northern Hungary, effectively silenced by the war (Johnson 1985:47).
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Convention unhesitatingly as a local understanding between American Czechs and 
Slovaks upon the policy they were prepared to advocate” Ç^The Making o f a State'' 
1927, quoted in Leff 1988:152). Though cited by nationalists to expose the real 
measure of his attitude to Slovak aspirations, Masaryk’s interpretation was in fact 
supported by the concluding clause of the agreement, which stated that its U.S 
signatories were in no way competent to bind the nation to the Agreement’s contents, 
and that only the state itself, following independence, could decide its fate (Seton- 
Watson 1965:334).
The Agreement had nonetheless resonated within the Slovak People’s Party under 
Father Andrej Hlinka, a party hitherto preoccupied by Catholic rights and education. 
Hlinka had promoted and endorsed the principle of Czech Slovak unity on several 
occasions before 1918, but he had remained suspicious of Czech anti-clericalism 
(Mamatey 1973:9) and had argued passionately for Slovakia’s distinctiveness after the 
war. The Agreement tipped the party toward a defensive position of autonomism. This 
was expressed in the Zilina Morandum in 1922 which accused Prague, but Masaryk in 
particular, of a breach of faith in failing to implement either the Cleveland or 
Pittsburgh ‘Treaties’ - a status they had never had, but which in nationalist histories has 
been consistently claimed. Thereafter Hlinka campaigned to present Pittsburgh as the 
ideal and unfairly forsworn guidelines for the reform of the state and for the full 
recognition of the Slovak nation^^. The failure of Prague to acknowledge even the spirit 
of these two Agreements registered them as landmarks in Czech-Slovak relations. They 
appear in Slovak eyes as the first of several instances of broken Czech promises of 
constitutional change.
It is important to note that despite their solid Catholic pedigree and their attempts at 
agitation, the People’s Party (known as L’udaks or Populists) did not fair as well in the 
1920 election as nationalist and L’udak histories imply. The 1920 election, despite 
coinciding with the postwar recession, evoked some optimism. Both the Czech and
Hlinka began to agitate for the adoption of the Agreement, even making his way to Paris to lobby at the 
Peace Conference. On his arrival home Hlinka was arrested and, untried, was only allowed to return to 
Slovakia after his election to the Prague Parliament in 1920 (Kirschbaum 1983:165). As Johnson 
commented, “Czechoslovak nationalism had become intertwined with Czechoslovak state patriotism” 
(Johnson 1985:54).
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Slovak electorates favoured the left and 1920 represented the high point in interwar 
Social Democratic support. The social democratic left was loyalist as far as the state 
was concerned. More preoccupied with social than ‘narrow’ national questions, they 
supported multi-national states whilst opposing ‘nationalist particularism’. Somewhat 
more pragmatically, they too feared that prioritising Slovak national grievances would 
incite national tensions.
The evidence suggests that in the early twenties at least, more Slovaks were engaged by 
urgent socio-economic issues than were attracted by aspirations to threaten the only 
just-won order and relative freedoms of the unitary state. When the reality of 
Slovakia’s relative inequalities had sunk in however, the popularity of Hlinka’s Slovak 
People’s Party began to grow as the dividing line of those who opposed and supported 
Prague rule began to cut more clearly down religious lines. This development, in turn, 
shed a different light on the state’s inherited socio-economic differences^^. The 
profoundly conservative, parochial, and socially influential clergy had concluded early 
that it was they who would have to describe a convincing explanation for national 
inequalities, if Slovakia was not to be radicalised by secular ideas of class and secular 
emancipation.
Bureaucracy: the glass ceiling
No sooner had the Czechs arrived in Slovakia in 1918 it seemed, than they began to 
replace the Magyars as administrators and to choose Slovak Protestants to assist them, 
though Protestants represented a relatively small minority at 18.7 per cent of the 
population of Slovakia in 1910 (Leff 1988:21). Slovakia’s governance had immediately 
fallen to the so-called Slovak ‘Hlasists’^^ : close and predominantly Protestant followers 
of Masaryk. Though it was only a hastily constituted Slovak National Council which 
had initially empowered Vavro Srobar, a leading Hlasist and a Catholic, to represent its
Czech and Slovak Protestants could reasonably argue that the Catholic Church held a persistently 
questionable loyalty to the liberal Republic. However, in branding as Magyarone those Catholics who had 
worked for the Budapest government before the creation of Czechoslovakia, Prague appeared guilty of 
applying a double standard. No equivalent practice existed in the Czech lands against Czechs who had 
worked for the Viennese government, who were encouraged to offer their services to the new state.
The works of Masaryk greatly influenced and shaped the anti-Habsburg feeling o f many Slovak students 
in Prague during the 1890s. The newspaper Hlas (voice) was a mouthpiece o f the liberal democrats among 
the progressive student clubs advocating closer Czech Slovakia cooperation on the basis of their common 
roots.
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interests in Prague, Srobar became the sole Slovak representative on the so-called 
Czechoslovak National Council^* (Bartlova 1995:170). In the nationalist canon Srobar's 
decisive advocacy of Prague centralism, and its apparent administration of Protestant 
chauvinism marked him thereafter as a traitor to the national cause.
Returning as Minister for Slovakia in December 1918, Srobar abolished all too 
promptly the limited organs of Slovak administrative autonomy to have grown out of 
the grassroots. The scene was pictured optimistically by Seton-Watson, who claimed 
that Srobar “set up what was in effect a sub-Cabinet of thirteen prominent Slovaks, 
sitting at Bratislava from January 1919 onwards, and administering Slovakia on 
virtually autonomous lines” (Seton-Watson 1965:917). While it may have struck 
Czechs that this was so, Srobar used his powers in ways that could only increase the 
hostility to Prague of Slovaks already antagonised by the liberal, secularising and ‘one- 
nation’ principles of Czechoslovakism. Endowed with wide powers of decree but also 
with the units of the Czechoslovak legionnaires (Bartlova 1995:171), one of Srobar’s 
earliest actions was to dissolve the Slovak National Council (SNC). Reconstituted in 
May 1918 by the Slovak People’s Party, the Social Democrats and the Slovak National 
Party, the Slovak National Council was viewed domestically as the representative 
forum of Slovak political feeling. Further centralising inroads came with the abolition 
of the local councils in January 1919, formed under Slovak National Council auspices. 
Following the first parliamentary elections Slovakia’s special caucus was also dissolved 
in April 1920^^ - even Srobar’s own administration lasted only until May (Bartlova 
1995:171). Thereafter Slovak deputies seemed destined to gel indistinctly into the state­
wide parties, albeit representing Slovak wings of those parties.
Slovak nationalist historians have naturally made much of how the Hlasists appointed 
Czech Protestants to public positions in Slovakia, some of whom undoubtedly viewed
The latter acted as temporary government before the first sitting of the Czechoslovak National Assembly.
Before the first elections in 1920 the National Council apportioned mandates among existing parties 
according to their results in the last election to the (Habsburg) Reichsrat, held under universal suffrage. 
This method could not be applied to Slovakia because of the distorting Hungarian franchise, which had left 
Slovakia with only three deputies. The National Council therefore, acting on Srobar’s advice, nominated 
forty-one leading Slovaks, to whom a further fourteen were shortly added. This was later criticised, though 
at the time, according to Seton-Watson “it was universally accepted as a graceful compliment” (Seton- 
Watson 1965:317).
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themselves as “bringing enlightenment to a backward country” (Jelinek 1976:5). 
Though this was not another ‘iron centralism’ as the nationalists have claimed» the 
security-conscious Hlasists were indeed sufficiently dogmatic in their purging of 
‘Magyarone’ Slovaks - who, because of the past assimilationist role of the Church were 
predominantly Catholic - as to appear anti-Catholic as a matter of policy^^. From the 
Slovak point of view the regime appeared philosophically and legislatively anti-clerical. 
Czech politicians were clearly bent on separating Church and state, and were quick to 
nationalise primary and secondary education, previously the preserve of religious 
authorities. Agrarian reform also threatened the Church estates, and even anti-Magyar 
priests found themselves denied the flourishing parishes for which they had hoped. 
Peroutka concluded that “in probably the most complete way, they [the Protestants] 
excluded Catholic representatives from public service and the enjoyment of glory” 
(Budovani statu 11:1227 in Kirschbaum 1983:161).
There has been much debate as to the true basis of the pro-Protestant recruitment 
tendency and the disproportionate dominance of Czechs in the administration of the 
First Republic. Kirschbaum insists that the slur of Magyar apprenticeship not only 
deprived the state of many qualified people but created an influx of Czech personnel 
who were thereafter preferred (1983:162). Less anachronistic accounts {e.g. Seton- 
Watson and Leff) lean more to the conclusion that in the first years of the Republic, 
Slovakia straightforwardly lacked sufficiently educated and, in the terms of the day, 
politically reliable people to assure fair representation in the civil service - a fact 
resulting from Slovakia’s arrested development under Hungarian rule. By the time the 
reformed Slovak education system had produced large numbers of competent 
candidates in the Republic’s second decade, however, they too found themselves unable 
to penetrate into the central administration. Their frustration derived not Just from the 
few openings naturally becoming available - the abiding Czech explanation, but from a 
virtually impenetrable glass ceiling of real Czech bias in the by now re-centralised civil 
service.
Kirschbaum claims that over 80 per cent of the population were Catholic, Johnson, citing the Statisticky 
lexicon (1921) vol.Ill puts the figure at 70.89 per cent Roman Catholic and 6.46 Greek Catholic in 1921 
(Johnson 1985:27).
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This later and clear discrimination caused tension amongst Slovakia’s educated classes, 
newly swelled with Catholics as this class was^^ Some Czech politicians interpreted 
this as rank ingratimde for the comprehensive new ‘Czechoslovak’ education system 
that had so elevated them^^. Even accepting Seton-Watson’s argument, that the state’s 
centralising impulses were curbed in 1926 with the accession of a ‘bourgeois coalition’ 
to government which included Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, antagonistic policies had 
prevailed long enough for the “cleavage between the Clerical and Progressive elements 
in Slovakia” to have become fixed (Seton-Watson 1965:334).
Undoubtedly it was this cleavage that had supported the development of a Slovak Party 
belying notions of a singular Czechoslovak identification. Such a development in 
another age might have proved sustainable. In 1930s Czechoslovakia however, Slovak 
Catholic discontent was an Achilles heel. Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party had created a 
strong alliance of co-religionists, frustrated clergy. Catholic laymen, and also 
‘Magyarone’ Slovaks behind the cause of autonomy. Untried as it was, it seemed the 
idea holding the greatest hope of relief, if not a panacea.
The Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSPP)
According to Seton-Watson, Hlinka was a priest, “of the twelfth rather than the 
twentieth century” (Seton-Watson 1965:917). In Czech eyes, Hlinka was too overtly 
tolerant of the now officially despised Magyarone Slovaks, and even prone to 
Hungarian manipulation. In Catholic Slovakia, Hlinka was considered a patriot who 
had suffered for his efforts against Hungarian repression and had done little to deserve 
Czech animosity. Prague’s overt mistrust and the parliamentary tendency toward 
character assassination marked him out as Slovakia’s ami du peuple.
By hooking diverse grievances to perceptions of religious bias the clerically-based 
Slovak People’s Party was able to frame a national agenda as an article of faith. The
As late as 1938, a head count o f all those employed in the ministries, together with the office o f the 
president and executive council, totalled 10,825 positions, of which a staggering 123 were occupied by 
Slovaks (Bartlova 1995:173).
The view was encapsulated by Hubert Ripka in his book Munich: Before and After (Gollanz 1939), where 
he objected that “The [Slovak] autonomist demand was, in fact, to be exclusive master in a house which 
was built mainly by the Czechs” (quote in Leff 1988:157).
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HSPP’s main rivals lost their appeal through their relative abstraction from Slovak 
realities but also because of their unwillingness to touch contentious national issues 
under the circumstances of fragile inter-ethnic balance^^.
After Social Democracy divided into warring Communist and Social Democratic Parties between 1920 
and 1921 both groups seemed incapable of noting Slovak difficulties without first appraising them through 
the prism o f international Socialist strategy, a practice diminishing their initial support to a smaller, if 
consistent core. The Slovak section of the Agrarians (unified in 1922) might have laid claim to significant 
Slovak support had not their Slovak leader, Milan Hodza, established himself as one of Hlinka’s main 
adversaries at the same time as appearing deeply attached to his position and influence in Prague. In 1920, 
Hodza had gone so far as to prophesy that Czech and Slovak cultures would converge and their languages 
merge - an apparent recitation of the Czechoslovakist creed. More sensitive to the issue by the 1930s, 
Hodza nevertheless managed eventually to become an intermediary between the two regions (Benes, V. 
1973:83). Sramek’s Czechoslovak People’s Party might have laid claim to Slovak Catholic sympathies had 
it not fallen out with the HSPP in the early nineteen-twenties over religious education. As coalition 
kingmakers between 1921 and 1938, Sramek’s populists anyway held so great a stake in the establishment, 
hard won as it was, as to lose the disenchanted Slovak vote almost entirely to Hlinka’s L’udaks, though 
Sramek, unusually, defended Hlinka in Prague (Benes 1973:83).
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Party Strength in the First Republic: Elections results by region (% o f votes cast)
1920 1925 1929 1935
BOHEMIA ~
Agrarians 12.4 13.2 13.6 12.7
Social Democrats 22.4 10.4 13.8 12.9
National Socialists 11.2 11.7 13.9 11.6
Czechoslovak Populists 5.6 8.0 6.6 6.0
National Democrats 8.8 5.8 5.2 7.6
Small Tradesmen 2.4 5.2 4.6 6.4
Communists —  12.6 10.3 9.0
German Parties 32.5 27.0 26.1 28.7
MORAVIA
Agrarians 12.9 11.5 12.3 14.2
Social Democrats 22.0 9.6 14.8 13.3
National Socialists 6.2 7.0 9.7 9.8
Czechoslovak Populists 18.9 21.3 17.7 15.6
National Democrats 6.2 2.5 3.1 3.9
Small Tradesmen 2.9 4.6 4.3 6.1
Communists —  11.1 8.9 8.6
German parties 21.3 22.7 21.8 22.2
SLOVAKIA
Agrarians 18.0 17.4 19.5 17.6
Social Democrats 38.1 4.2 9.5 11.4
National Socialists 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.2
Czechoslovak Populists 17.5 1.3 2.6 2.3
Hlinka Slovak Populists —  34.3 28.3 30.1
Communists —  13.9 10.7 13.0
German-Magyar Christ. Soc. 18.5 6.9 15.9 14.2
Source-. C.S. Leff (1988:52)
For all but the period 1925-29 the Czechoslovak cabinet was constituted by Red-Green 
(Socialist-Agrarian) coalitions in which virtually everyone but the National Democrats 
and the communists was represented^"^. Green-Black (Agrarian-Clerical) coalitions
The governmentally prominent National Socialists, Eduard Benes’s party, it should be noted were not 
fascists but non-Marxist radicals with a constituency of the lower middle and working class. The party was 
however beleaguered by factional infighting. The secular evolutionary socialist party never gained a strong 
foothold in Slovakia (Leff 1988:57).
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governed only between 1925/7-29, and these included not only Sramek’s Czechoslovak 
Populists and for the first time the National Democrats and eventually the Hlinka 
Slovak People’s Party, but also, and again for the first time, representatives of four out 
of the seven German groups. Their cooption was brought at the triple price of 
“abandoning extreme centralism, of toning down anti-clerical tendencies and of 
stiffening tariffs in the interests of the Agrarians” , i.e. by “decentralisation, activism, 
protection, ecclesiastical peace” . The price seemed eminently worth paying to bring the 
hitherto uncooperative principal minority and the obstructionist HSPP into the state’s 
mainstream (Seton-Watson 1965:330). Neither, however, stayed long.
Having emerged definitively as the strongest party in Slovakia Hlinka’s Slovak People’s 
Party exacted a basic move toward greater decentralisation from the Prague 
government. In 1927, the county system was abolished and the administration 
reorganised along provincial lines, creating a “Slovenska Krajina” which transformed 
Slovakia from being only the object to being a source of power (Bartlova 1995:174)^^. 
Though the HSPP thereafter accepted participation in government (after a full two 
years of negotiations), the thin air of accord lasted only until the so-called Tuka 
affair^^, and the subsequent trial of Hlinka’s advisor. Dr. Adalbert Tuka. The case had 
a fateful impact on the political environment as a whole. It rocked HSPP support 
(which had wavered following its move into the state coalition) and caused a final 
breach between the HSPP and all mainstream groups, bar Sramek’s Populists, despite 
the rapprochement since 1926. Tuka’s imprisonment put an end to Hlinka’s attempt at
The reform was a welcome reversal of an unsuccessful reform in 1923. The 1927 Law endowed Slovakia 
with a Provincial President with wide powers and an elected Provincial Assembly. The latter was however 
a throwback to Hungarian practices in that it consisted of two-thirds elected representatives and one-third 
selected directly by the civil service (Seton-Watson 1965:335). This latter third favoured central 
administration and keeping in line with central government policies (Bartlova 1995:174) - a factor exposing 
it to the dissatisfaction o f the HSPP.
In 1928 Hlinka’s advisor. Dr. Adalbert Tuka, who had returned himself as a Magyar in the 1921 census, 
repeated in the Hlinka Party’s Slovak a long established myth, that there existed a potential legal vacuum as 
a result of a secret clause in the 1918 Martin declaration stipulating the right o f Slovaks, after ten years, to 
reconsider their decision to enter into a political union with the Czechs. He insisted that if autonomy was 
not granted by 31st October 1928, Slovakia might go its own way. Tuka was tried for treason as a 
Hungarian spy and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Seton-Watson states that Tuka was merely one 
among several ‘Magyar propagandists’ who had long expounded such a line, however controversy lingered 
long over the result o f Tuka’s trial. (Seton-Watson 1965:311). According to Kirschbaum it was “a harsh 
sentence that reflected the imaginary fears of the Prague government as well as its unrelenting pursuit o f a 
Czechoslovak nation” (Kirschbaum 1983:179). In fact it was only after the war that Czechoslovak 
historians were able to produce unequivocal evidence proving Tuka’s guilt (Jelinek 1976:10).
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constructive engagement with the establishment, and the case pushed the L’udaks into a 
more extremism-prone opposition than they had ever previously entertained^^. The 
Depression then proceeded to revive L’udak electoral fortunes, relatively well attuned 
to social and economic grievances in Slovakia as the Hlinka party had become (Jelinek 
1976:10).
Electoral fortunes in Slovakia in the First Republic
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The betrayal of Czechoslovakia
It was a mark of the coalition dynamics of the First Republic that it took until the mid- 
1930s before economic debate addressed regional disparities in any direct, and 
politically sensitive way (Johnson 1985:51). The assumption until then had been that 
Slovakia would catch-up economically of its own accord, despite the tendency of Czech 
industry to treat it as a colony. Left to provide agricultural products, labour and raw
In-fighting and Comintern dictates led the Communist Party at the time to engage in a leadership purge 
significant to postwar developments. The new elite centred on a Stalinist cadre around Klement Gottwald; 
“young fanatics, whose greatest qualification was their willingness to accept Moscow’s orders 
unconditionally” (Jelinek 17:1983). At the end of the 1920s Party propaganda held up before the Slovak 
working class the vision of a “Soviet Slovakia” and while highlighting the differences between the Party 
and the Populists, Gottwald clearly played on L’udak ground. Mere autonomy said the communists, would 
only subject the Slovak worker to the Slovak bourgeoisie. Despite this Slovakia’s branch of the Communist 
Party remained notoriously short of card-carrying members and functionaries during the Great Depression, 
whatever Slovakia’s theoretical ‘ripeness’ for revolt (Jelinek 1983:24/25) and despite the blip in L ’udak 
prestige. The latter lost five seats at the October 1929 election.
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materials, Czechoslovakia’s initial politics of laissez faire had done little positively to 
advantage Slovakia’s relatively underdeveloped economy. As it was, the state’s interest 
came far too late. By the mid-1930s, continuing economic inequality had helped create 
a convergence of Slovak grievances that looked set to pitch the entire state into crisis. 
Milan Hodza, though wise enough to attempt the cooption of L’udaks into a new 
government, failed in this endeavour, and the HSPP’s persistence as an outgroup 
assumed its full potential as a serious threat^^.
Hodza’s coalition negotiations revealed that the Hlinka party too had succumbed to the 
radicalisation sweeping Europe. The HSPP’s more constructive moderates were pushed 
aside by a faction intent on closing ranks with the Sudeten German party, the Slovak 
National party, the Czech Fascists and others of the extreme right. Since the mid-1930s 
Hlinka had acted as an arbiter between moderates who were more faithful to the 
Republic, led by the ideologist, Josef Tiso, and the party’s neo-fascist and separatist 
radicals. Both groups however, had flirted with Germany since 1936. In 1937, L’udak 
agitation increased and culminated in anti-Czech demonstrations and accusations that 
the government had Bolshevised the Republic^^, citing the May 1935 Soviet- 
Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Anti-Czech, anti-communist and anti- 
Semitic propaganda became the weaponry of the day (Jelinek 1976:11-16). Hlinka’s 
death on August 16, 1938, opened the party up completely to the factional contest, 
though the moderates appeared as good as defeated. The platform of the radicals was 
framed exactly to the demand for “national self-determination” to be invoked by 
Hitler’s Germany in the Saarland, Austria, and eventually in the Sudetenland - in the 
Czech lands. The HSPP had thus aligned itself with the spread of fascism (Dubcek 
1993:31).
When Hitler became German Chancellor in 1933 that other main outgroup, the Communist Party, 
comprehended at last the true scale of the fascist Nazi threat. Turning from its interminable attacks against 
the Social Democrats, the Party shifted its priorities to support the “bourgeois state” and voted for the first 
time in favour of parts of the state budget. Following Masaryk’s resignation in 1935, the communists voted 
for Edvard Benes (as did the L’udaks) rather than propose a candidate o f their own. The slogan “Soviet 
Slovakia” disappeared (Jelinek 27:1983), leaving the Hlinka party again alone in calling for Slovak 
autonomy, but this time with a new resonance.
In fact the Communist Party faced tremendous difficulties by this time: they had to criticise 
Czechoslovak capitalism and demand, amongst other things, pro-Slovak changes, for which they were 
accused o f unpatriotic and pro-L’udak behaviour. The minorities meanwhile rejected the communists’ 
brushing aside of self-determination and their apparent born-again Czechoslovakism. As Jelinek concludes; 
“Communism was in retreat in the last years of the Republic” (ibid. 1976:3).
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As the extreme right began to hold sway so Hodza had attempted a last and desperate 
acceleration of governmental reforms as a basis for negotiations with Germany. A 
commission of the coalition prepared a Statute of Nationalities and a statute of national 
autonomy, to be implemented at last within a framework of decentralising government 
(Bartlova 1995:175-6). Their discussion by the National Assembly nonetheless 
represented a hopeless stand - Czechoslovakia could not be reinforced. Unwilling to 
step beyond appeasement of the growing Nazi threat, France and Britain, despite the 
former’s treaty obligations, effectively signed away Czechoslovakia to the German 
sphere of influence through September 1938. The so-called ‘Munich dictât’ forced 
Prague to cede the Sudetenland territories to Germany, and left the remainder clearly 
without allied protection, and so in Hitler’s grasp (see Churchill 1948:250-289).
In Kirschbaum’s apologist account, as Czechoslovakia’s international position became 
more precarious, the Slovak People’s Party took upon itself the consideration of 
“various options to save the Slovak nation in the event of the government’s inability to 
guarantee the survival of the state” (1983:180). These included appealing to Germany 
directly. In the confusion following Munich, Hodza’s government fell and Benes 
requested that General Jan Syrovy attempt to replace it. Syrovy gave the Slovaks wide 
representation. However, on the heels of the Cabinet’s formation, Matus Cernak of the 
HSPP presented an ultimatum demanding immediate Slovak autonomy on pain of his 
resignation. Opposed by the remaining Slovak political elite (not least because the 
HSPP looked set to be sole beneficiary) Prague insisted on more time. Cernak duly 
resigned and left Benes to negotiate with Tiso. Benes himself resigned the Presidency 
on the 5th however, and left Czechoslovakia shortly afterwards (Jelinek 1976:17). On 
22, November 1938, Slovakia became autonomous, though still formally part of the 
now renamed “Czecho-Slovak Republic”.
Slovakia’s shotgun autonomy was fundamentally circumscribed under the now 
extremist-dominated HSPP, led, following Hlinka’s death, by Dr Jozef Tiso. Elections 
were held from which the communists were excluded, the Social Democrats dissolved, 
and all other parties merged with the L’udaks. Independent associations such as trade
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unions were brought swiftly under HSPP authority. Tiso meanwhile sought to hold off 
the independence so desired by the L’udak radicals (Mach, Tuka and Durcansky) so as 
to consolidate a measure of economic self sufficiency. As the historian Jan Rychlik 
points out “this meant the gradual construction of Slovakia’s independence, paid for by 
Czech taxpayers” (Rychlik 1995:182). The Czech’s response, of military intervention, 
the suspension of Tiso’s government and the introduction of martial law in Slovakia, 
only swiftened the fatal blow from Germany. Tiso was presented with a German 
ultimatum: Slovakia could claim full independence or suffer Hungary being given a 
free hand in her former territory. Slovakia duly declared itself separate - a Nazi puppet 
state in effect - and the following day Germany annexed what remained of the Czech 
lands, establishing the Reich’s “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” (ibid.).
The Slovak autonomy won in 1938 stunned Czechs as a betrayal not only of 
Czechoslovakia, but of the democratic principles that had flown about the masthead of 
the new state in 1918^°. The direction of Masaryk’s frequently overbearing Presidential 
influence had been toward fostering progressive and ‘state-building’ parties, whose 
priority would be ‘state’, rather than religious, ethnic or even party interests. The 
policies of the L’udaks had always represented an attack on the Masarykian philosophy. 
Tiso’s brand of clerico-fascism provided Czechoslovak history with proof of Slovak 
disloyalty and difference, and of a latent demonic nationalism. Czechs have rarely 
failed to allude to the ‘liberal’ state’s betrayal at moments of Czech Slovak tension, and 
for many years after they clearly expected acts of atonement and contrition.
For many Slovaks on the other hand, the events of 1938-9 buried even deeper 
Slovakia’s already too overlooked frustrations with the essential inequalities of Czech 
rule. Leff’s conclusion is exact and reflected in lasting stereotypes: “National trauma 
and successful Slovak assertion have historically gone hand in hand. Each Slovak 
advance of political significance has been coupled with a crisis in the life of the state.
This was a feeling shared by many Slovaks. Though the true level of public support for the HSPP is 
ultimately hard to judge, there is little evidence that a Slovak majority existed which preferred the 
resolution o f their differences by the dismemberment of the state, let alone Czechoslovakia’s crushing by 
outside forces dictating the installation of fascism. The early (if fleeting) enthusiasm of the Catholic 
majority can be put down to the realisation of their belief that Slovakia was competent to manage 
autonomy, or to their genuine hostility to all aspects of the first republic. There is evidence supporting both 
interpretations (Leff 1995:90).
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with systematic realignment, with tragedy and shame. The association has accordingly 
been costly for the Slovak cause” (Leff 1988:163-4).
The Second World War
Slovakia’s experience of the Second World War was very different to that of the 
Czechs lands, where open occupation resulted in greater repression, resistance and use 
of terror. The contrasts provided for one of the most durable slants in the historical 
record. As El Malakh has complained: “In most historical literature, Benes and Prague 
are viewed as clear-cut and powerless victims of Reich designs. The Slovak 
autonomists, conversely, are assessed at worse [sic in Malakh] as active and conscious 
agents of Germany and at best as inept, dull-witted pawns” (El Malakh, Ph.D. p.296, 
quoted in Leff 1988:165). Such interpretations, it has to be said, have been greatly 
aided by Slovak L ’udak nationalist histories, which have proven consistent apologists 
for a Slovak state of highly dubious virtue - the virtue most openly claimed for it being 
that it ‘safeguarded’ the Slovak nation.
Germany relied on the HSPP to arrange the particulars of Slovakia’s alliance, including 
the maintenance of ‘order’ and the subordination of the economy to German war needs. 
Economists of all political hues have agreed that the economy prospered under German 
tutelage - with certain undoubtedly popular spin-offs. Jewish property was given to 
‘Christian’ Slovaks rather than to the Germans (Myant 1981:41), and Slovakia 
remained unengaged in the war until 1941. Kirschbaum has argued unashamedly that 
“the Slovak Republic not only took the Slovak people far down the road of 
modernisation but it served the Slovaks well especially in the social and cultural field, 
and played an extremely important role in the development of the national 
consciousness of the people” . For the sake of his argument the Slovak people are 
portrayed as having been fully behind Tiso, relieved at ‘liberation’ from Czech 
domination - as if Tiso’s popularity might amount to proof of Slovakia’s benign intent 
(Kirschbaum 1983:287). Such single-minded belief in the goodness of the Slovak 
national idea per se has persuaded more than a few Czechs of the inability of 
nationally-minded Slovaks to recognise, let alone mind, fascism when they see it^\
Few writers on either side have identified the correspondingly constant trend (contradictory to the 
prevailing stereotypes), that liberal and even some leftist Slovaks, like today’s young liberal Germans, have
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The Tiso regime claimed in the early war years to represent the lesser of possible evils, 
and Tiso proved adept at keeping Germany at arms length from general domestic 
affairs. To this end, however, the L’udaks perjured the Christian values to which they 
supposedly aspired. Between March 25th and September 20th 1942 - arguably the year 
of the regime’s greatest confidence - over 57,000 Jews were deported: two-thirds of 
Slovakia’s Jewish population. Under the euphemism of ‘evacuation’, Slovakia’s Jews 
were delivered unequivocally into Nazi hands. Subsequent deportations were suspended 
for a while owing to pressure from the Lutheran but also some of the Catholic clergy - 
their concern contradicting the government’s claim to be ignorant of the Jews’ intended 
fate. Most of Slovakia’s remaining minority of 30,000 were deported in 1944 when the 
Germans occupied Slovakia (Rychlik 1995:198). By this stage the general sufferance of 
the regime was falling away, replaced by active resistance. In the last years of the war 
Slovakia’s partisans experienced connivance at the official level. Crucially, the Slovak 
army proved disloyal to the Tiso regime; it had little stomach for a fight with the 
Russians, historically seen as Slavic brethren (Rychlik 1995:186) and when 
circumstances improved, the army switched sides.
The Slovak National Uprising 1944 - Slovak redemption or nationalist conspiracy?
With the downturn of Hitler’s fortunes tactical considerations arose of how an anti­
fascist insurrection might be secured, and with whose assistance^^. Slovakia’s 
underground had begun to increase, swelling the ranks of army officers, Czechoslovak 
loyalists and communists who had formed its core (Jelinek 1976:125). Though a strong 
nationalist faction existed within the Slovak communist movement it was, under Soviet 
instruction in 1943, committed to restoring Czechoslovakia. The Agrarians too - the 
bulk of Slovakia’s underground democratic opposition or ‘Civic-bloc’ - supported
since tended to see harm in every ‘national’ idea - a hyper-conscientiousness that proved an important and 
problematic element in Slovak liberal policy after 1989.
 ^ In 1940 Czech and Slovak emigrants opposed to Benes’s ‘Czechoslovakist’ thinking had formed a 
“Czecho-Slovak National Council” with the goal of securing, in peacetime, a restoration of Czechoslovakia 
but on federative principles. In Benes’s favour, insofar as it secured him the British recognition decisive 
after the fall o f France, was his ability to offer to the allies an entire network of secret service operations in 
Central Europe. From July 1940 Benes's National Committee was duly recognised as the provisional 
Czechoslovak government in exile (Rychlik 1995:185-6). Slovakia’s hopes of being offered postwar choices 
were apparently sunk when on 22 July 1941 it joined Germany in the war against the USSR. When Tuka 
declared war on the USA and the UK (in December 1941) it secured US, UK and USSR recognition o f the 
Czechoslovaks in London (ibid. 186).
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Czechoslovakia’s restoration, and together with the communists they clandestinely re­
formed the Slovak National Council. The programme to emerge from the Slovak 
National Council, the so-called ‘Christmas Agreement’, called for a restoration of 
Czechoslovakia but as a federation, on the principle of ‘equal with equal’. More 
successful than Srobar’s centralists in penetrating the army, and aided by pro- 
Czechoslovak officers, the Slovak National Council prepared an anti-L’udak coup: its 
declared purpose, Czechoslovakia’s basic restoration, to be followed by the re­
construction of constitutional relations.
Soviet partisans were dropped into Slovakia in the summer of 1944, and when German 
troops entered Slovakia on the 29th August, the signal was given for the Slovak 
National Uprising (Rychlik 1995:187). Its bloody suppression, owing to Soviet non­
cooperation, the withholding of promised assistance, and, more bitterly still, to the 
Soviet veto of the proffered British support (Dubcek 1993:41-50) was, for Czech- 
Slovak relations, less important than the fact of the Uprising itself.
Following the war the Uprising’s main protagonists fell victim to communist historical 
revisionism and inner-Party tactics, and the consequences of the Uprising are much 
debated by Slovaks^^. For Czechs the contribution to the Slovak national stereotype 
remained unusually constructive - a redeeming act - even though the Party had 
variously claimed it as a Czech and even Russian-inspired event (Golan 1971:195). 
According to Jelinek the Uprising “saved Slovak nationalism”, acting as a purgative of 
the idea that Slovak nationalism was collaborationist or ‘Ustashist’ (Jelinek 1983:75). 
Future relations however, were hardly simplified, for Slovaks thereafter seemed to 
claim equality on two conflicting fronts. The Slovak state was taken to have 
demonstrated Slovakia’s competence at self-government, and yet the demise of that 
same state was assumed proof of the nation’s sense of moral responsibility.
Sounding ever more distinctly like an émigré L’udak, Kirschbaum argues that 1944 brought down a 
“tragedy” on the Slovak people and he calls the resistance “accomplices in the imposition on the Slovaks of  
a state structure and system that was fundamentally inimical to their survival as a nation” (Kirschbaum 
1983:291). Vnuk in another variant argues the “revolt was firmly in the hands of local communists with 
strong nationalist sentiments” - but that the Slovak communists failed: crushed, not by Stalinist strategy but 
only typically, by their Czech comrades (Vnuk 1983:316).
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Bolshevik Czechoslovakism 1945-1948
In March 1945, a still-powerful Slovak National Council had passed a resolution 
echoing the Christmas Agreement. The Standpoint and Requirements o f the Slovak 
Nation proposed that Czechoslovakia be formed as a loose federation - with only 
foreign trade, defence and foreign affairs to be under central jursidiction; temporarily, 
Slovakia was even to be separate in its customs and currency administration (Rychlik 
1995:189). When the Slovak National Council met to negotiate reconstitution with the 
Czechoslovak Government in Moscow in March 1945, it was evident that, while its 
role in the Uprising and Slovakia’s national individuality were recognised and 
acceptable, fédéralisation was not. It was the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 
moreover, that stood at the forefront of Czech efforts to reduce Slovak powers, despite 
its internal reassurances to the contrary. The Czechoslovak Communist Party was the 
only power that Slovak communists were unable, following the discipline and context 
of the time, to resist.
In a programme announced on 5th April in Kosice the Czechoslovak Government 
promised guarantees of Slovakia’s autonomous status. The exact divisions of 
competence remained to be resolved however, and this ambiguity turned out to be a 
false hope for the Slovak National Council. Against the Council - still constituted by 
the Slovak democrats and the communists - were ranged the implicit leverage of 
Czechoslovak Communist Party discipline but also financial considerations. Slovakia 
remained the weaker power at the bottom line and continued to rely on a Czech sense 
of principle and prudence for an equalising constitutional settlement. By the end of May 
1945, the Slovak Communist Party was outflanked. They lacked a robust ideological 
justification for their claims and perhaps more importantly still, they lacked the support 
of those now Prague-aligned Slovak communists who had not participated in the 
Uprising (Kirschbaum 1995:227). Fatally for Slovak interests in the future, a joint 
sessions decree resolved that the Communist Party of Slovakia would become only part 
of a united Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and be subject to a common leadership 
(Vnuk 1983:325). The first instruction to Slovak communists was that they drop their 
federalising proposals. They conceded, convinced that the favourable postwar 
environment made unanimity crucial.
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Follow-up negotiations to the Kosice Programme brought about successive ‘Prague 
Agreements’; the first on June 2nd, 1945, the second on 11th April 1946. These 
Agreements began the steady erosion of Slovak powers. An interim confederative 
arrangement enshrined in the first gave way to an extension of presidential powers to 
cover Slovakia in the second, though Slovak MPs maintained some rights of 
confederative veto (Rychlik 1995:191). Following the humiliation of the senior Slovak 
communists of the Uprising, Smidke, Husak and Novomesky^"^ (Jelinek 1983:92), the 
wartime common front of the Democratic Party and Slovak communists finally 
collapsed, leaving the way open to a Czech, and this time communist-led reassertion of 
centralised power.
The 1946 election revealed to Czech communists the convenient reality of 
communism’s relatively weaker support in Slovakia. For Slovak communists the results 
meant a fatal and doctrinally inescapable weakening of their still-harboured autonomist 
platform. On May 26th 1946, the communists triumphed in the Czechs lands with 
40.17 per cent of the vote, but were defeated in Slovakia even with 30.37 per cent. The 
Slovak victors with a massive 62 per cent were the Democratic Party, but a Democratic 
Party which had secured a deal with moderate L’udaks and so inherited the Catholic 
vote. In such circumstances the Slovak communists faced chairmanship over a 
Democratic Party dominated Slovak National Council, as well as their own Party 
instructions, pressures which made contesting the policy of recentralisation unthinkable. 
Shortly afterwards the Communist Party invited its partners in the Czech National 
Front (Social Democratic, National Socialistic and Czechoslovak People’s Party) to 
coordinate in restricting Slovak National powers and curtailing clerical influence (in 
Vnuk 1983:331).
This result of these events was the Third Prague Agreement of June 28th, which further 
restricted Slovak authorities to the point that the agreement was signed, not on behalf of 
the Slovak National Council, but the ‘Slovak National Front’ (Vnuk 1983:332). When 
the Agreement was ratified by the Slovak National Council on 16th July 1946, Lettrich,
One o f the Slovaks now preferred was Siroky; hostile to the ‘Uprising Generation’, and burdened, for 
Slovak audiences, with a thick Hungarian accent (ibid.).
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chairman of the Council and leader of the Democratic Party, proposed the motion on 
the understanding that “the Slovaks were making a big sacrifice in the interest of the 
Republic and expressed the hope that their gesture would find a ready response on the 
part of the Czechs” (Lettrich: Foreign Office 371/56004/N 9442 in Vnuk 1983:333). 
The Slovak understanding of ‘Czechoslovakism’ looked set be reconfirmed regardless, 
though this time by Czechs who decried the ‘bourgeois’ First Republic’.
Following the communist coup d ’Etat of February 25th 1948, the all-important 
Constitutional Committee fell to the disposal of the Party. Grounds for the coup had 
been prepared by Tiso’s trial and execution as a war criminal and the uncovering of a 
(fabricated) L’udak conspiracy at the centre of the Democratic Party. Prime Minister 
and soon to be President Klement Gottwald entrenched as far as possible the idea that 
Prague should maintain strict and central powers. The newly purged Constitutive 
Assembly abolished the Slovak right to a veto in Slovak affairs on April 16th and on 
May 9th 1948, it approved the new constitution. This removed those vestiges of 
autonomy left by the Third Prague Agreement and declared the Czechoslovak republic 
to be a state of “two Slav nations^^ possessing equal rights” (article II, 1948 
constitution in Pechota 1991:8)^^.
In practice, however, even Slovakia’s constitutional status had become an irrelevance, 
since legality was now the property not of parliament but of the Presidium of the 
Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and eventually, of its 
political secretariat. The democratic division of powers was at an end, and of greater 
significance for Slovakia than constitutional changes was the formal unification of the 
Slovak Communist Party and the Czechoslovak Communist Party into one in 
September 1948. Henceforth there would be no ‘outgroups’ in Czechoslovakia.
The statement about ‘nations’ and state was at least relatively accurate - following massive (and often 
brutal) transfers of Magyars and Germans from the country following the war. Though Slovakia remained 
heterogeneous, the Czechs lands became nationally, more or less homogeneous. Statewide the proportion of 
Czechs and Slovaks in the population rose from 64 per cent (1921) to 94 per cent (1950) (Leff 1988:93).
Centralisation increased further with the reorganisation of local government (January 1st 1949) and the 
unification of criminal and civil law in 1950 (Rychlik 1995:193).
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The assimilation of the Slovak Communist Party into the Czechoslovak Party occurred 
almost as a caricature of pre-war democratic developments, and it was viewed by some 
as an act of Czech revenge^^. Even after years of the strictest communist indoctrination 
it was evident that national perspectives filtered perceptions of communist ideology and 
practice. Those principles supposedly derived from scientific law, such as the belief 
that material equality dissolved national sensibility, were often readily explained as old- 
fashioned national manoeuvring. Just as the Stalinist model succeeded only in throwing 
into relief, rather than evaporating, the Polish and Hungarian national consciousness, 
so too Czech and Slovak political perspectives remained, at least in part, nationally 
codified.
After 1948 it was not the liberalising and state-building aspirations of Czechoslovakists 
that led to investment in Slovak infrastructure but the communist expectation that 
converging material wealth dissolved national sensibility, among other things. 
Preferential investment in Slovakia, which began in the 1950s but was particularly 
accelerated after 1968, was perceived stereotypically by Czechs as merely an 
intensification of Slovakia’s prewar tendency to exploit Czech idealism. On the Slovak 
side, the communist doctrine of democratic centralism and the leading role of the Party 
was seen as a minimal facade for continuing centralised rule from Prague. Once again 
the latter impressions had basis in fact.
The 1950s: show trials
The “Uprising Generation” of Slovak communists had come under the Czech 
communists’ whip hand as early as the Zilina Conference of July 1945, when 
‘Muscovites’ re-established control over Czechoslovak Party reins. Veterans at home 
and those who had spent the war in the West found themselves severely demoted in the 
Party hierarchy (Jelinek 1983:86). Demotion, it transpired, was mild when compared 
with the strategies inflicted on Party members and non-members alike after 1948, when
Viewed as the weak link in the Czechoslovak scene by Czech communists, Slovakia fell prey to some 
paradoxical tactics. In 1947 the Communist Party assisted in fomenting anti-communist activities in 
Slovakia - the logic being that these would hasten a final takeover (secured with the alleged L’udak 
conspiracy). “[Ejxtra-parliamentary activity, anti-Czech, anti-Czechoslovakia, anti-Communist, and anti- 
Jewish demonstrations and riots were grist to the Communist mill” (Jelinek 1983:99).
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communist leaderships across the region were under pressure to prove their obedience 
to Moscow.
The Prague leadership responded with the full Stalinisation of the Party and its tactics. 
When attempts to uncover the true scale of the ensuing political trials were inaugurated 
under Dubcek's liberalising offices in 1968, reports concluded that some 83,000 
citizens had fallen victim (Kaplan 1983:16), even before those persecuted through 
collectivisation were taken into account. The Catholic Church found itself under 
pressure at every level: clergy, laymen, believers, and even officials connected to 
charitable church institutions (Kaplan 1983:20-21). Of greater importance for the 
position of Slovaks within the communist polity, however, were the trials at the senior 
Party level.
In accordance with the Stalinist strategy of the time - random and targeted terror - 
Klement Gottwald purged the Party of those prominent Slovaks who had ever proposed 
improvements in Slovakia’s political status, and those whom the Party could usefully 
suspect of such a thing. Relatively unsurprising was the crushing of the Democratic 
Party - its membership of over 300,000 was reduced to a few hundred officials (Kaplan 
1983:9). More shocking was the swathe cut through communist veterans of the 
Uprising and the wartime partisan struggle. In Slovakia, all but three of the political 
commissars and commanders of the partisan movement were arrested and the army en 
bloc found itself ‘beheaded’ of its experienced officer corps (Kaplan 1983:21). Some 
273 top Party officials were tried between 1952-4, the two main characteristics of the 
trials being firstly that those Party-faithful who had helped establish the existing system 
and had been the Party’s backbone through the war were now in the dock, and 
secondly, that these trials were a direct reflection of Soviet international interests 
(Kaplan 1983:23). The trials of the early 1950s^* were directed at three distinct groups 
in senior Party positions: those who had spent time abroad (‘cosmopolitans’, ‘Titoists’), 
Jews (‘Zionists’) and Slovak ‘nationalists’ - (‘bourgeois nationalists’).
Often referred to as the ‘Slansky process’ after the trial’s most senior victim and supposed ringleader, 
Rudolf Slansky (Secretary General of the Party). The particular persecution of Jews reflected the USSR’s 
changing policy in the Middle East and the rising prevalence and exploitation of anti-Semitism in the USSR 
(Kaplan 1983:23).
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Top-level purges had begun in earnest when the Central Committee expelled thirteen 
members and two candidates of this senior Party organ in February 1951. Amongst the 
expellees were the veterans Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky and Karol Smidke - 
already reprimanded for “bourgeois nationalism” at the Ninth congress of the Slovak 
party in 1950 (Suda 1980:247). During trials designated for ‘nationalists’, Husak was 
jailed under a life sentence^^, and Novomesky sentenced to ten years for the 
“betrayal”, paradoxically, of the Slovak National Uprising. By associating these 
‘bourgeois nationalists’ with allegations of ‘Zionism’ (11 out of the 13 senior 
communists executed in the trials were Jews - testimony to the psychology of the 
spectacle), it has been suggested that, given Slovak anti-Semitism, efforts were made to 
discredit popular Slovak leaders before their coming to trial (Leff 1988:167). The cold­
bloodedly tactical nature of the purges, aimed first and foremost at appeasing Moscow, 
was nevertheless undeniably terrible for Slovakia, silencing many of its most respected 
leaders and coming as it did a mere five years after the constitutional promises 
following the end of the war. Any political expression of Slovak national feeling, 
grievance or aspiration, even, as it underwent forced heavy-industrialisation and 
collectivisation was rendered taboo not just through the 1950s, but for the foreseeable 
future.
Stalinism ensured that Slovaks experienced only the repression of the burning issues of 
their political culture - national recognition and equality of representation. Czech 
national chauvinism was arguably no longer necessary when assertions of national 
identity were systematically excluded. Though Slovaks would eventually rise to the 
very top of the communist ladder their experiences of the 1950s as a nation are 
essential in explaining how antagonistic were common Czech insinuations, after 1968 
and again after 1989, that communism had been a system somehow more of Slovakia’s 
making, more sympathetic to their putative ‘primitive political culture’ and supposed 
welfare-scrounger mentality.
An experience which, to Dubcek's lasting horror, did not prevent Husak from launching a second wave 
of purges and punishments when installed as First Secretary following the repression o f Prague Spring in 
August 1968.
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1968 - Bratislava Spring?
By 1963 it was clear that the Czechoslovak economy was beginning to stagnate. In such 
circumstances Slovakia looked set to lose the preferential investment that had 
revolutionised its economy in the 1950s, a prospect which could only draw together 
two taboo issues of nationality and systemic change. Events abroad underscored the 
potential for upheaval. When Nikita Kruschev went public with his denunciation of 
Stalinism at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October 
1961, even Czechoslovakia’s most habituated Stalinists could not withstand the pressure 
to acknowledge past excesses. Though thousands of victims of Stalinist injustices were 
discretely released the state as yet balked at the idea of public redress. Many in 
Novotny’s regime, including Novotny himself^^, were all too evidently implicated in 
the brutality they were now expected to unmask and criticise.
First Secretary Novotny had cremated Gottwald’s embalmed remains and had accepted 
that the massive statue of Stalin overlooking Prague be removed. Tokenism, however, 
was his limit. When the up-and-coming Slovak apparatchik Alexander Dubcek pressed 
for political rehabilitations and articulated the problems of Slovak underdevelopment, it 
seemed highly likely that Party hard-liners would teach him the lessons conventionally 
reserved for ‘nationalists’ (Dubcek 1993:83). Dubcek not only survived these attempts, 
testimony in itself to the growing weakness of the Novotny regime, but he even found 
himself on a commission investigating the political crimes of the 1950s.
When the shocking results of the Kolder Commission were presented to the Central 
Committee in April 1963, Dubcek again protested for comprehensive rehabilitations, 
including the clearing of all accused of ‘bourgeois nationalism’"^  ^ (Dubcek 1993:86). 
The report was made public in August 1963, and it added to the stir caused by 
Kruschev’s attempted reforms of the ‘model’ Soviet system. In April in Slovakia, 
Dubcek had sharply criticised the current Slovak First Secretary, Karol Bacilek, for his 
part in the repression and had been chosen as Bacilek’s replacement. Though Novotny
Novotny was a secretary of the Party, 1951-3 and first secretary, 1953-68, combining this with the 
Presidency o f the Republic after 19.11.1957.
These included Gustav Husak. Dubcek found Husak a place at the Slovak Institute o f History, where he 
applied himself to the history of the Slovak National Uprising (Dubcek 1993:93).
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tried to overwhelm him with placemen the Slovak party, having assimilated its success 
in defying Novotny, rallied to Dubcek (Dubcek 1993:87). Leffs assessment, that 
“weak as the KSS [Slovak Communist Party] and the Slovak National Council were in 
the years following 1948, both would retain the capacity to serve as nationalist time 
bombs” renders only one side of the development. Dubcek's rise in Slovakia 
undoubtedly carved out not only national, but reformist territory inside the always 
prone, too repressively centralised state.
The reaction of the Slovak press was increasing openness. In spring 1963, the weekly 
of the Union of Slovak Writers, Kulturny Zivot (Cultural Life) began to address the 
formerly taboo. With a circulation of over 100,000 Kulturny Zivot was one of the few 
publications with a state-wide circulation and readership. The Slovak Party paper 
Pravda also began to criticise Party policy (Dubcek 1993:89) - an unheard of apostasy. 
A war of attrition ensued between Dubcek, the growing body of Czech and Slovak 
reformers at his side, and the old guard. From 1963 onwards Dubcek’s activity could 
not but reawaken Slovak hankerings after a more routinised power"^ ,^ significant 
institutional change - even federalism'*^.
The Slovak writers congress in April 1963 brought forth bitter accounts of earlier 
repression and recriminations against their still high-ranking instigators'*'*. The growing 
debate in Pravda Prague considered the most heinous breach of discipline, and in June 
1963 Novotny instructed the Slovak Party to restrain this Party organ - an action 
acknowledging that Slovak structures had broken out beyond the control of the centre 
(Leff 1988:111). Though the reforming elite remained embattled for several years, the
In 1964 Dubcek succeeded in wresting a limited expansion of National Council powers - another sign of 
the holding operation underway at the centre. The remnants of Slovak national institutions left after 1948 
actually made Prague extremely prone to demands that they be operationalised when reformist moments 
arose (Leff 1988:112).
In August 1964 the Slovak National Uprising was accorded some real recognition, with Kruschev and 
Novotny attending celebrations. There was even some acknowledgement o f Slovak non-communist, as well 
as communist participation in the event (Golan 1971:195). Only months before his own downfall in October 
1967 Novotny resorted to visiting Slovakia in an attempt to improve his image there. The visit however, 
resulted in a catalogue of tactical disasters. Most extraordinary was Novotny’s suggestion that Matica 
slovenska move its museum to Prague. Matica slovenska or ‘Mother Slovakia’, was Slovakia’s main 
cultural organisation. Founded in 1861 it had since then safeguarded Slovak language/literature and was 
synonymous with national survival. As Dubcek observed with glee, following this spectacle “relations 
between Novotny and Slovaks of almost all stripes became irreparable” (Dubcek 1993:115).
A precursor to the far more famous and feted ‘Czechoslovak’ writers congress in June 1967.
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failure of censorship was a sign that when Novotny went, he would be swept by a tide. 
“By the end of 1963” Dubcek observed, “Slovakia continued to be a favourable 
environment for social and political criticism, one at which Czechs looked with envy” 
(Dubcek 1993:95). When the showdown was finally accomplished in 1967 
nevertheless, the Slovak question emerged as only one point in the catalogue of failure 
to which the regime was finally called to account (Leff 1988:119). Czechs fearful that 
Dubcek might come to the fore of the Party as a nationalist were reassured of his even- 
handedness within a few months of his eventual Party leadership, when they rated him 
highly (Leff 1988:171). The Central Committee duly elected Dubcek first Secretary on 
January 3, 1968, leaving Novotny the Presidency only until March 22nd.
‘Fédéralisation’ - a compromise
Since 1948 the idea of fédéralisation had obviously lingered in the shadow form of 
instimtional asymmetry i.e. the Slovak organs without Czech equivalents, and the 
Slovak branch of the Communist Party subordinate to the Czechoslovak Party. These 
circumstances had encouraged the already strong tendency of Czechs to identify 
Czechoslovak institutions as correspondingly Czech - a fact decried in 1968 in 
Dubcek’s Action Programme‘S^ - the agenda of the radical reformist period under 
Dubcek's leadership that has come to be known as the ‘Prague Spring’. On May 15th, 
1968, a committee was established to prepare a draft law on fédéralisation. The Slovak 
National Council unilaterally prepared a draft proposing two semi-independent states: 
the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, in which the federation was reduced to an 
‘umbrella construction’ with powers mainly over defence and foreign policy. The 
Czechs presented two different drafts. One suggested a strong federation, the other also 
proposed, remarkably and for the first time, a looser bond between the two republics, 
though in a version as yet unacceptable to the Slovaks (Rychlik 1995:196)"^ .^
This stated “that the very asymmetrical arrangement was unsuited by its very character to express the 
relations between two independent nations, because it expressed the standings o f the two nations differently. 
The difference was mainly in the fact that the Czech national bodies were identical with the national central 
ones.... This prevented the Slovak nation, to all intents and purposes, from taking an equal share in the 
creation and realisation of a country-wide policy” (Action Programme, reproduced in Remington, 
1969:107).
In his discussion of Slovak nationalism after 1989, Kusy argues that; “Just as in 1968, this nationalist 
wave included a whole series of communist activists and members and agents o f the former State Security” . 
The slur is disingenuous in the extreme - the participants in the radical Prague writers conference during 
the Prague spring was made up overwhelmingly of both Party members and intellectuals who had set their
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In June 1968 the National Assembly approved the “Constitutional Law on the 
Preparation of the Federation”, founding at last a Czech National Council as an 
equivalent institution to the Slovak National Council. Slovak rights of veto were also 
reintroduced for matters covering Slovak national interests - the principle previously 
cancelled by the Prague Agreements. The members of the new Czech National Council 
were not to be elected but ‘presented’ by the National Front however; a reflection, no 
doubt, of the continuing Czech perception that the Czech National Council could only 
be a useless body, so long as the state National Assembly continued to exist (Rychlik 
1995:196). Tragically, even this was put in doubt when on August 21st 1968, five 
armies of the Warsaw Pact occupied Czechoslovakia and Dubcek was taken, separated 
from his colleagues and blindfolded, to Moscow.
Though many among Dubcek’s supporters realised that there was no surer way to 
reinforce the state than by fulfilling Slovak aspirations as quickly as possible (Leff 
1988:124), clearly not all Czechs understood enlightened self-interest in the same way. 
In the commentary of the time it was not unusual to find the birth of the Czech republic 
interpreted as “an exigency to which the Slovaks have led us... Czech public opinion 
understands the fédéralisation of Czechoslovakia in no way as their victory, but as 
historical necessity” (J. Lederer, Reporter 23.1.1969, quoted in Leff 1988:125). The 
Czech right after 1989 were to take this sentiment only one stage further, and argue 
that the supposed heroism of the communist reformists had done nothing but create a 
selfish factional struggle that lead the whole country back to the Soviet administered 
Dark Ages.
The Soviets themselves nevertheless followed the lesson of the ‘Slovak’ time bomb, and 
applied their own experience of exploiting constitutional guarantees. Back in 1960 in 
Czechoslovakia a new constitution had been created for the sole purpose of signalling 
the supposed elevation of Czechoslovakia from the ‘socialist stage’ of development to 
that of its embarkation upon ‘communism’ proper. The constitution of July 11th 1960, 
had claimed that “socialism has triumphed in our country” (Declaration, in Pechota
youthful faith in communism. Kusy’s rhetoric is a good example of the outlandish stereotypical view that 
only Slovaks participated actively in ‘extremist politics’, i.e. nationalism and communism (Kusy 1995:142).
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1991:9) and through it a “socialist democracy” had replaced the vaunted “people’s 
democracy” of 1948"^ .^ An exercise in self-designated legitimation in the absence of any 
organic progress, the 1960 constitution had neglected to address Slovak autonomy even 
more than had its predecessor: it had even abolished the already powerless Board of 
Commissioners. Dubcek’s Action Programme had proposed a reconstitution of the 
emasculated Slovak National Council as a working legislature and the establishment of 
a Slovak Council of Ministers as an executive - both to be animated by an enhancement 
of Slovak competences (Pechota 1991:12). It was agreed, with Soviet encouragement, 
that the changes would be formally promulgated as of October 28th 1968.
As it transpired. Constitutional Act 143/1968 recognised the inalienable right of the 
Czech and Slovak nations to self-determination to the point of secession, but also 
explicitly and importantly for post-1989 discussions, the essential ‘sovereignty’ of the 
republics: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. The 
relationship of republic to federation was to be based formally on cooperation rather 
than subordination. The federal government and its organs could supposedly perform 
activities on the territory of the republics only given explicit legal authorisation 
(Hendrych and Jicinsky in Hendrych 1993:46). A federal bicameral parliament was to 
be the supreme legislative body of the state and this would become tricameral when 
considering constitutional legislation, which would have to pass by a three-fifths 
majority in both the Chamber of the People and the now nationally separated Chambers 
of the Nations. The constitution provided a consociational guarantee against 
‘majorizacie’ - the power of the majority nation to outvote the other on issues involving 
national interests.
The federal package to emerge was nevertheless even theoretically inconsistent. 
Though parity was a main characteristic of parliamentary structures, including 
committees, the principle was not applied to ministerial or government appointments, 
where majority rule continued (Leff 1988:127). As post-invasion ‘normalisation’ took
Article III of the 1948 constitution set out the principles of the new economy, based on the 
“nationalisation of mineral wealth, industry, the wholesale trade and o f finance”, empowering the state to 
direct “all economic activity by a uniform economic plan” (Pechota 1991: 9). Though ‘protected’ by the 
constitution, the private sector was practically eliminated by 1950.
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hold, the re-shaped Federal Assembly was also practically as toothless as those that had 
gone before. Though the Federation law was based on divided sovereignty ‘from 
below’, the pyramidal nature of the communist system once again dictated that power 
came from above - not from government, but from Party structures, according to the 
principle of democratic centralism (Rychlik 1995:197). The consociational virtues of 
the constitution protected nobody - and its confederative elements (foreign policy, 
defence, currency, federal material reserves and federal legislation were the only 
policies supposedly under the exclusive purview of federal organs (Rychlik 1995:196) - 
were likewise a facade. The 1968 amendments to the 1960 constitution, while rapidly 
overruled in practice, were also formally weakened by amendments in 1970 which 
further diluted the original division of competences. Even before 1970, a fatal blow had 
fallen with the Soviet-enforced prevention of the fédéralisation of the Party. Also 
proposed in the Action Programme, Communist Party fédéralisation had been seen as 
an essential condition for the real differentiation of policy, viewed by Slovak 
economists back in the early 1960s as vital for the revitalisation of the Czechoslovak 
economy as a whole. Through the 1970s and 1980s Czechoslovakia was reestablished 
as a pillar of orthodoxy, surpassed in its conservatism only by East Germany‘S*.
Between Scylla and Charybdis
Though public support for reform had become marginally deeper and better defined in 
the Czech lands than in Slovakia - an unsurprising consequence of the former’s longer 
history of self-government - 1968 was neither intrinsically nor solely a Czech 
phenomenon. The abiding Czech historical perception that it was, that democratic 
rather than structural reform impulses were essentially Czech, came from an important 
continuity in Czech political expectations. As Rychlik has concluded: “[t]he Czech 
population considered the Czechoslovak Republic to be their state and, in general, had 
no objections to the centralised system. Czech demands were for démocratisation” 
(Rychlik 1995:195). These same preconceptions have tended to blur the extent to which
Husak's post-invasion desertion to the forces of repression was a ready signal to many Czechs that 
Slovakia’s prior engagement with reform had been motivated by nationalist expedience rather than 
democratic instinct (Leff 1988:174).
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Slovaks perceived fédéralisation not just as a good in itself^^, a narrowly nationalistic 
demand, but as a peculiarly Slovak prerequisite for those same democratic goods 
supposedly desired only by the Czechs. Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak who had fought as 
a partisan during the National Uprising, and had as strong an awareness of anyone of 
Slovakia’s impoverished past, was also a socialist of almost Fabian instincts, with 
profound beliefs in the necessity of democratic freedoms. As he insisted subsequently, 
“I was not so naive as not to see that it would only take time before the changes we 
made yielded to a full multi-party democracy. I knew that, and Brezhnev knew that, of 
course. So why won’t the critics see it?” (Dubcek 1993:277). Despite this, 
‘normalisation’ worked retrospectively in terms of public sentiment. The particular 
conformism of the Slovak Party apparat following 1968 appears to have effectively 
eradicated from the Czech memory all recollection of the highly contrasting state of 
affairs in Slovakia in the early sixties.
More than any other period during communism, the aftermath of the so-called Prague 
Spring returned to the political surface existing national stereotypes and reinforced 
them for another generation. The phenomenon of reinforcement has been discussed by 
Leff, who points out that far from engendering new prejudices, the events of 1968 to a 
striking degree only reworked the old: recycling, rather than reinterpreting the past 
(Leff 1988:163). The despair felt by both reformist Czechs and Slovaks at the 
destruction of ‘socialism with a human face’ moreover, leant a distinct bitterness to the 
charges that emerged in the aftermath. Two of the most enduring views to emerge from 
the ‘68 experiment and its demise would greatly inform evaluations of the ‘other side’ 
during disputes in the democratic 1990s. As summarised below they are composites of 
several views, but on occasions the composites could be found consistently in both 
public sentiment and the political allusions prevailing after 1989:-
The Czech view
Though there was an attempt among Czech politicians of the right after 1989 to play 
down the popularity as such of the ‘68 reform movement, demoting it to a factional
The scale of Party efforts to suppress the notion of Slovak national identity can be seen from the fact that 
until 1968 Bratislava had no formal legitimacy as a Slovak political centre, or capital (Leff 1988:107). This 
omission o f institutional recognition reminded Slovaks of their predicament under Hungarian rule.
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battle between two Party cliques (see Klaus 1994), a second mainstream Czech view 
remained which maintained that the liberalising impulses of 1968 were intrinsically 
Czech. According to this view Czechs alone had called for cultural and political 
emancipation, and Prague had formed the centre of radical activity. Slovak reformers, 
this view insists, worried only about Slovakia’s status. As Petr Pithart, Czech Prime 
Minister between 1990 and 1992 put it; “The reform movement which culminated in 
1968 bore the distinct seal o f the Czech genius loci. Slovakia left its mark in its 
emphasis on a greater degree o f national self-determination, which could only mean a 
weakening o f the democrats' position” (1995:204). According to this reading, Slovakia 
remained more watchful and typically conservative, if not indifferent to rolling back the 
communist state. Slovakia’s real endeavours were opportunist and, worse still, selfishly 
nationalistic - as after Munich 1938, they had shamed not just their nation but also the 
state after 1968, by salvaging from its humiliation. Nationalism, according to an old, 
and now repeated Czech saw, always brought out the worst in the Slovak tendency 
toward primitive politics, vehemence and self-dramatisation, something the liberal and 
rational Czechs had always found hard to understand. Slovakia sought only 
fédéralisation out of the revolutionary flux in 1968, and engaged in a Faustian bargain 
to secure it with the Soviet occupiers while all other aspirations were crushed and 
buried under ‘normalisation’ (1968-1989). With fédéralisation secured, Slovaks 
exploited their ‘fifth column’ status to extract massive Czech subsidies for Slovak 
industry, and encouraged Soviet patronage and protection.
The Slovak view
Not surprisingly the Slovak version of events begs to differ. From their perspective, the 
events of 1968 amounted only to the fuller realisation of the Slovak reformist 
movement and Dubcek’s influence. These had already taken hold in Slovakia in the 
early 1960s, when Slovak economists insisted that the economy required liberalisation 
and a parallel, political opening. These facts were lost in an international 
glamourisation of 1968 which focussed entirely on Prague, more beautiful and 
sophisticated as that venue was. While the Czech Novotny still clamped down on the 
Czechs, Slovakia had enjoyed so much freedom in its publishing that censored Czechs 
had sought refuge in Bratislava publishing houses - another fact forgotten in the 1970s
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and 1980s, when the dissident movement was, for reasons far more complicated than 
can be expressed in the term ‘political culture’, disproportionately Czech.
Dubcek, Novotny’s undoing, the undisputed instigator of state-wide Party reform and 
the democratising April “Action Programme”, this exasperated view points out, was a 
Slovak. Not a Czechoslovakist Slovak or an opportunist Slovak, but a reasonable 
Slovak. The continued pursuit of fédéralisation was an attempt to wrest at least some 
good, and a good already long promised and repeatedly denied, from Czechoslovakia’s 
shattered sovereignty - relatively acceptable to the Soviets as the idea was. Finally, and 
crucially, though the Czechs never stopped complaining about it, fédéralisation under 
communism turned out to be a sham, a constitutional facade for continuing centralised 
power. Czechs remained in the driving seat and deep down still begrudged all Slovak 
attempts to build even economic equality, Slovakia’s only real compensation for being 
in the state in the first place. Fédéralisation of the Party had never been permitted and 
Slovaks had found themselves politically unarmed. After 1968 they could no longer 
even demand ‘fédéralisation’ since formally it existed, and the national issue had once 
again become taboo.
Czech-Slovak political debate after 1989 was shot through with allusions to national 
characteristics and aspirations as if they had been defined forever by these past events. 
Though such allusions were commonly used to give rhetorical weight to pragmatic 
requests, their influence over the general national discourse remained strong and, as 
expressions of morally absolutist conviction, inimical to negotiation. To the observer 
who recognises in this discourse the very hallmarks of nationalism, the unfolding of the 
full story may prove surprising. Stranger still than a thorough nationalist certitude was 
the cool facility, the episodic and glib manner, with which many Czech and Slovak 
politicians engaged in the theatrical use of nationally-referenced and nationalist rhetoric 
in the new, and supposedly democratic era. After 1989, as we shall see, the expression 
of national concerns was recognised as one of the few available ways of forestalling 
and manipulating political debate, not just about the state, but about the nature of 
communism, justice, capitalism, liberalism and even democracy.
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Chapter 2
Ends Justify Means - Arranging the Czechoslovak Separation
Introduction
In the anti-communist tide which erupted and swept across East Central Europe at the 
end of 1989, few political transformations inspired as much optimism as the ‘velvet 
revolution’ in Czechoslovakia. The installation in that state’s presidency of a bona fides 
philosopher king, Vaclav Havel, exemplified the tale: the dissident playwright who for 
years had been exhorting his countrymen to retrieve their moral integrity and to ‘live in 
truth’ had finally won the castle\ This redemptive beginning, however, was all too 
soon overshadowed by decidedly earthly crises: economic collapse, social uncertainty 
and political fragmentation. Under such pressures even the almost notoriously 
unprejudiced Havel could not keep the state from finally splintering along the fault-line 
of its national divisions.
Czech and Slovak anti-communist elites were confirmed in government in free elections 
in June 1990, after which all agreed that the state itself must be reestablished in a 
democratic form. Beyond the recognition of this basic need, however, Czechs and 
Slovaks could not agree. Their initially consensual decision to create new constimtions 
for both the federation and each of the constiment republics launched a series of inter­
governmental and cross-party talks which ended in deadlock, broken only through the 
general election of June 1992. The 1992 election evicted the former dissident elite from 
office and brought into government more pragmatic and populist politicians who had 
made their reputations in the brief interval of ‘transition’. This chapter describes in 
detail their response to the national question, the six-month ‘endgame’ from June to 
December 1992 during which the separation was decided upon, arranged and 
completed. A blow-by-blow account is essential if one is to make any sense of the 
highly theatrical rhetoric of the time. The purpose of the chapter is to establish the 
character of the divorce which the remainder of the thesis then endeavours to explain.
' For an analytical account of the revolutionary period across Eastern Central Europe see Banac, I. (1992), 
which includes Tony Judt’s excellent summary of Czechoslovak developments.
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The blueprint for divorce was decided within weeks of the June 1992 election by the 
leaders of the victorious parties - former factions within the anti-communist successor 
movements - the right-wing Czech Civic Democratic Party (CDF) led by the 
economist, Vaclav Klaus, and the populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(MDS), led by the lawyer, Vladimir Meciar. An examination of this post-1992 election 
period suggests that government accountability, as it reflected public opinion, was 
virtually nil. Federal, Slovak and to a lesser extent, Czech parliamentary machineries 
were overwhelmed by the speed of CDP-MDS decisions, which proceeded after the 
election unchecked by constitutional constraints such as the constitutionally required 
referendum, or a veto by the constitutional court - despite the public’s opposition. The 
resulting separation as fa it accompli revealed more explicitly than at any other time 
since the revolution the systematic weaknesses in Czechoslovakia’s democratic 
institutions.
The new Slovak leader, Vladimir Meciar, had insisted when post-election talks began 
in Brno on June 8th 1992 that Slovak independence was “not a point in the MDS 
programme” . However, Vaclav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party had campaigned 
before the June election against the republican erosion of federal powers and for a 
return to a centralised status quo. A vote for the confederalist-sounding model being 
touted by Meciar in Slovakia, Klaus had argued, would amount to a Slovak vote for the 
division of the state. As this chapter reveals, the Czech right’s position of centralised 
‘federation or bust’ duly emerged in negotiations as an absolute, and before June was 
out Meciar admitted “if we talk about independence it is not because we want it, but 
because we must” {Rude pravo 25.6.1992:3). Meciar’s belief that the Czechs might 
have been strong-armed into some form of confederation had proved baseless.
As negotiations progressed seemingly inexorably toward separation, Meciar, without a 
mandate to split the state, attempted to postpone the full public disclosure of the 
decisions being made and, more riskily, to adjust and delay their execution. As holders 
of all significant concession-giving power, Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party indulged the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia only insofar as doing so smoothed the selling of 
separation to a disappointed Slovak population. If Klaus was indifferent to Meciar’s
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rag-bag of strategic hold-ups he was not indifferent to Meciar’s ability to deliver the 
final outcome. Indeed, it is the historical paradox of the Czechoslovak divorce that it 
was the Czech and not the Slovak will to state separation which finally proved 
implacable. To undermine Czech claims that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
had always been schemingly secessionist, the reincarnation of prewar Slovak 
separatism, one need only observe the pantomimic state to which the Slovak party was 
reduced when faced by Klaus in power in the Czech republic. As Theodore Draper 
observed, “it was as if Meciar pounded at Klaus’s door without really wanting to knock 
it down; to Meciar’s surprise, Klaus opened the door, and Meciar fell in” (1993:26).
June 1992
The post-election agenda consisted of the appointments for federal and republican 
governments, ministries and institutions on the one hand, and negotiations over the 
future state structure on the other. Klaus maintained that his Civic Democratic Party 
saw “scope for negotiations” with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and argued 
that “manoeuvring space exists on both sides” {Prostor 8.6.1992:1). He also warned 
that the country would split if negotiations failed, implying that both parties would 
indeed manoeuvre. In fact, as throughout the constitutional talks which had begun in 
1990 and continued in various forms until their collapse in February 1992, two issues 
put these new post-election negotiations into instant and familiar gridlock: the 
recognition of Slovak sovereignty and the indivisibility of economic policy across the 
republics.
According to Meciar the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had succeeded in 
Slovakia because of its criticism of federal economic policy, a policy which in contrast 
to Czech conditions had “deepened the general economic crisis in Slovakia” . Following 
the June 1992 election Meciar proposed a delay in the creation of a federal government 
in order to attain two “structural changes” . In the first, an interim government would 
be formed to function until a referendum. In the second, new bodies would be 
constituted on the basis of the referendum’s results. “The crucial thing”, Meciar 
determined, “is whether Czecho-Slovakia will become two states or not. We insist on a 
treaty of cooperation which would respect the existence of the two legal entities from
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the viewpoint.of international law”. Underlining this demand for an apparently loose 
confederation, Meciar also suggested that a provision for the post of Slovak President 
be included in a Slovak constitution to be approved by the end of August {Pravda 
8.6.1992:1,2). The Civic Democratic Party, without any stomach for any such 
unprecedented state re-engineering, even as an opening gambit, dug in its heels and 
waited.
When Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the (Slovak) Party of the 
Democratic Left (PDL) and Jozef Prokes’ Slovak National Party (SNP) took the most 
obvious path and cooperated in the Federal Assembly over representation they 
provoked full-blown conspiracy-theorising in the Czech press. Czech commentary 
insisted that a Slovak leftist/nationalist government would give Meciar the upper-hand 
in negotiations, where, with a “broad smile” , he could “dictate the conditions” , 
warmed by the “admiring glances... from Czech left-wing forces, mainly the 
Communists” (Ivo Slavik, in Mlada Fronta dries 9.6.1992). Another commentator, Jiri 
Leschtina, warned that Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Party of the Democratic 
Left and Slovak National Party unity in the Federal Assembly was intended to “assure 
left-wing control over Parliament”; a real bogey in the light of the now likely Slovak 
veto of Vaclav Havel as Federal President^ (Mlada Fronta dues 12.6.1992). Klaus in 
turn engaged the Czech right, whom he trusted not to retreat in the event of any 
showdown between a common state and the continuation of unmodified economic 
reform: the Christian Democratic Party (Christ.DP), the Christian Democratic Union- 
Czechoslovak People’s Party (CDU-CPP) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 9.6.1992:1). He also appealed to ‘constructive’ prejudices and 
stressed the cost of protracted negotiations^.
The details of the first round of Civic Democratic Party-Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia talks, in Brno on June 8th, emerged amid acrimony. Meciar’s spokesman 
announced that Klaus’s CDP had demanded either a federation with a uniform economy
 ^ As later chapters will clarify, Havel’s presidency had become increasingly unpopular in Slovakia, where 
he was seen as aloof, patronising in relation to Slovakia’s national preoccupations and neglectful of 
Slovakia’s concerns.
 ^ Though Klaus did not resist the claim that while the Czech right struggled for consensus the Communists 
exploited the situation to recover power (Lidove noviny 18.6.1992:1,3).
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or a state split and “sanctions against Slovakia” . “A complete lie” according to Klaus, 
who said that not only was the term “sanctions” never used but the Slovaks had 
dropped the term ‘confederation’ for ‘economic and defence community / union’ {Rude 
pravo 11.6.1992:1,2). Undisputed differences had centred on Klaus’s definition of a re- 
centralising ‘functioning federation’, the continuation of radical economic reform and 
the re-election of Vaclav Havel as Federal President. The only agreement was on the 
need to reduce the size of the Federal government and the powers of the Federal 
Assembly Chairman (Cesky denik 15.6.1992). According to the pro-Civic Democratic 
Party Czech newspaper Telegraf the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had 
proposed an interim federal government to transfer responsibilities from federal to 
republican bodies, with parity membership and without executive responsibilities; two 
independent states with a common leadership of two independent armies; the 
continuation of a common currency with two issuing banks; the declaration of 
sovereignty at the first session of the Slovak National Council (23rd June); approval of 
a Slovak constitution and finally, election of a Slovak president - in sum, a division of 
the state, according to Vaclav Klaus {Telegraf W .6 .\992).
As it turned out, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was ill-prepared to be taken 
literally on any of the above. If their agenda is interpreted as an opening strategy, a 
starting bid for the highest possible stakes, Meciar had acted on a fatal miscalculation 
of Klaus’s amenability to anything short of Slovakia’s full capitulation. On the question 
of forming new governments, the Civic Democratic Party’s Jan Strasky had assured 
that his party would wait on the outcome of “at least” two rounds of talks before 
distributing its forces. With this minimal commitment however, he had also delivered 
an unambiguous warning message. “In the case of a partition [5zc] of Czechoslovakia” 
said Strasky, “Vaclav Klaus will lead a strong Czech government” {Mlada Fronta dues 
11.6.1992:1,2).
Before the next round of talks, in Prague on June 11th, the Civic Democratic Party’s 
Miroslav Macek maintained that “we are due to discuss a full federation or the division 
of the state. Not a third way” {Cesky denik 15.6.1992). As this round of talks 
concluded Klaus lamented the lack of progress, while Meciar remained
50
uncharacteristically silent. The negotiations had stalled again on the possibility of 
international personality for Slovakia (permitting membership in international 
organizations such as the United Nations, a point much cited by the Czech side), but 
also over the deadline for the formation of a Federal government and Czechoslovak 
presidential elections. The session had become further mired in a discussion of separate 
central banks and a single currency, rejected by Klaus as leading inevitably to 
economic and currency collapse. On the Slovak side, the MDS Vice-Chairman Michal 
Kovac insisted that his party programme made no provision for splitting the state and 
did not aim for that end. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, according to 
Kovac, wanted a free union of two ‘sovereign’ states and demanded a referendum to 
decide the matter - the referendum promised in the MDS election campaign - which 
would ask citizens if they wished to live in the federation, a free union, or in an 
independent state. Klaus’s response was to claim wariness of ‘continuing uncertainty’ 
and to suggest that a referendum be held in Slovakia alone, making Slovakia potentially 
the seceding nation; he even offered to assist in hastening the deadline for its 
declaration. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, fearing for its successor rights, 
retreated, objecting that a referendum could not be rushed but was being considered for 
the end of 1992 (Lidove noviny, Mlada Fronta dues 12.6.1992:1,2). Despite Strasky’s 
warning, Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia thus squandered the last 
purportedly ‘open’ round of talks.
Having had his opening terms dismissed as preposterous Meciar stressed that his 
party’s interests were to find a form of coexistence beneficial to both republics, 
claiming he ‘did not understand’ Klaus’s doubts as to whether the Czechs would wait 
for the results. In Bratislava Meciar again declared to journalists “neither the Civic 
Democratic Party nor the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has a mandate to divide 
the state!” {Prace 13.6.1992). Backpedalling swiftly on the prerequisites for forming a 
Federal government Meciar claimed that the MDS now agreed with the CDF in the 
sphere of central monetary policy but differed on tax, customs and pricing policy, 
which they maintained should be implemented at the republican level (Svobodne slovo, 
Lidove noviny 13.6.1992).
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Both sides had agreed to continue negotiations on the following Sunday but the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia cancelled, broadcasting their confusion. Meciar 
told his party’s presidium that if the Czechs continued to seek the status quo he would 
favour partition, a stand he later vociferously denied {Mlada Fronta dues 15.6.1992). 
Though Meciar was clearly happier to bargain from a position of obstinacy if not as a 
credible negotiator the strategy carried a high degree of political risk. Given Klaus as 
an opponent this strategy would make divorce inevitable, and the Movement, as Meciar 
had pointed out, possessed no mandate for separation. In addition to public dismay, the 
prospect of a split appalled many of Meciar’s own most able and senior colleagues 
within the party. In this dire predicament, the MDS presidium nevertheless instructed 
its deputies to oppose Vaclav Havel’s re-election. They also issued an open letter to 
their ‘fellow-citizens’, thanking them for their support in spite of “slanders, crude 
invectives and intimidation spread in pro-federal and some foreign media...” . The letter 
promised that talks would lead to results acceptable to both sides {Mlada Fronta dnes
15.6.1992).
Only days after the second round the Party of the Democratic Left retreated from its 
alliance with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, despite its long-stated interest 
in a federation with confederative elements. Balking at Meciar’s already obvious 
inability to ‘manoeuvre’ without completing a volte face, the Democratic Left declared 
that it had quite different opinions on tackling mutual relations with the Czech Republic 
and that a full confederation did not constitute a common state. As it transpired, Meciar 
was determined to form a government alone (with 74 seats in the Slovak National 
Council he was only two votes short of an absolute majority), confident as he remained 
of the basic support of both the Democratic Left and Slovak National Party {Svobodne 
slovo, Lidove noviny 13.6.1992). The Czech opposition Left Bloc (LB), meanwhile 
expressed the state of general bewilderment among the Czech left, and protested to 
President Havel that the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia had both exceeded their electoral and constitutional mandates {Lidove noviny 
13.6.1992:8). The President met with Meciar on the 15th, and though Meciar 
expressed his party’s willingness to tackle economic issues, he refused to compromise 
on Slovakia’s international legal personality, the cornerstone of the loose confederative
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arrangement. Dismayed, Havel promoted the calling of a referendum in both republics 
as soon as possible, maintaining that this was an issue for the citizenry (Mlada Fronta 
dnes 16.6.\992)\
The third round of talks took place on June 17th at the Civic Democratic Party’s 
Prague headquarters. Before the meeting the CDP declared itself for an unambiguous 
decision either to create a federal coalition or a caretaker federal government to 
oversee separation. The CDP also proposed that the week’s meetings should constitute 
the final political negotiations (Telegraf 17.6.1992). In the midst of the talks Klaus was 
reported to have explicitly reproached the Slovak side for seeking “Czech finance for 
Slovak independence” and to have asked “[a]re you a proud nation or are you not?” , to 
which Meciar is said to have replied: “Each for himself”. This retort is supposed by 
many commentators to have been the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s ultimate 
admission of implacable separatism (Vodicka 1993:94) and the motivation behind 
Klaus’s subsequent decision to become Czech premier. This interpretation however, 
confuses real Czech decisions with the opportune moment for their announcement. The 
Rubicon had clearly been crossed before the meeting, arguably before negotiations had 
even begun, since compromise depended not only on the Slovaks’ but on the Czechs’ 
willingness to soften their demands^. It must be borne in mind that those Slovak (as 
opposed to Hungarian minority) parties of the centre-right that had accepted Klaus’s 
course of re-centralising constitutional reform had failed to secure a single seat in the 
recent election in either of the chambers of the Federal Assembly or the Slovak 
National Council. It had been made abundantly clear in June 1992 that Klaus’s vision 
was electorally unsustainable in Slovakia.
Following the announcement that Klaus would take up the Czech premiership Meciar 
called the decision “a wise step which will lead to good cooperation between the Czech
 ^Havel’s undiplomatic spokesman, Michael Zantovsky, stated that in the event o f agreement “remaining 
impossible” Havel would agree with Klaus to proceed without protraction. He added for good measure that 
when one looked at how Czechoslovak bonds abroad had dropped by 10 per cent it represented “an 
incentive for an accelerated course of action” {Mlada Fronta dnes 16.6.1992:2). According to the 
Czechoslovak State Bank the price o f bonds was in fact quite stable {Hospodarske noviny 16.6.1992:1).
 ^ A decision was acknowledged at least the day before, when CDP Vice-Chairman Macek suggested that 
the talks be seen as procuring a “velvet split” {Telegraf, Mlada Fronta dnes 17.6.1992). Following the first 
talks Klaus had declared “I am not interested in chairing a self-liquidating Federal Government” {Mlada 
Fronta dnes 10.6.1992:1,2).
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and Slovak governments” . He, as expected, took up the Slovak post. The subsequent 
agreement on government formation resembled the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia’s earlier proposals; a federal government of ten members with five members 
from each republic. It survived, however, at crossed purposes; Meciar described the 
future interim federal government as a “working one”, likely to last a minimum one 
and a half years.
In talks with President Havel the Party of the Democratic Left now expressed itself for 
a “loose federation” and Alexander Dubcek’s Slovak Social Democrats appealed for 
the transfer of talks to parliament. Together with the Czech left, Slovak federalists now 
began to comprehend the need to array themselves appropriately in the light of a 
potentially lengthy and unpopular dissolution. Federal trade union representatives 
clearly recognised that Klaus had the upper hand and presumably with an eye to future 
labour relations, endorsed the CDP strategy wholeheartedly. Rather than draw attention 
to the scissoring performance of the Czech and Slovak economies in the previous two 
years, and the idea that diverging economic conditions might underscore Slovak 
grievances, the union echoed Klaus, asserting simply that “a prospering economy was 
the best social guarantee for employees” {Prace 19.6.1992:1).
The fourth round of negotiations began in Bratislava on June 19th. The fourteen hour 
talks confirmed that the new federal government would consider its mandate temporary 
and would seek to “prepare, if it is empowered to do so, conditions for the smooth 
functioning of two sovereign states with international personality” (Mlada Fronta dnes 
22.6.1992:1,2). It was also agreed in writing that “the government will support a quick 
solution of the constitutional problem on the basis of an agreement between the two 
National Councils” - a startling agreement in that it apparently raised the authority of 
the National Councils above that of the Federal Assembly and thus stood in breach of 
the existing constitution. A Civic Democratic Party recommendation to arrive at 
agreement by the end of September 1992, “at the latest” , was also included {Telegraf 
25.6.1992:14). Both parties agreed that in the event of separation the National Councils 
would approve laws on the incorporation of members of the Federal Assembly into the 
legislative bodies of the two republics {Mlada Fronta dnes 22.6.1992:1). Clearly
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Klaus’s CDP had done its homework on the schedule of a rapid and uninhibited 
partition, in this case preempting any objections that might arise from federal deputies 
acting for reasons of their own job security. Klaus’s persuasive case was that the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had “refused CDP compromises” by persisting in 
the demand for international legal personality. As he insisted: “a Slovak compromise 
on this point would be to withdraw it. Non-withdrawal means the split of the state into 
two” (Lidova demokracie, Mlada Fronta dnes 22.6.1992).
The Civic Democratic Party’s budgetary policy now prevailed and the redistribution of 
finances through the Federal Budget was set to end from the beginning of 1993 
{Telegraf 25.6.\992’AA). Though affirming that the Slovak National Council would 
declare sovereignty at an early (though no longer the first) session, Meciar insisted 
again that “this should not mean the split of the state” {Mlada Fronta dnes 
22.6.1992:1,2)^. President Havel endeavoured to count the blessings of the talks during 
his regular Sunday broadcast. The process toward divorce, he argued, would at least be 
civilised {Lidove noviny 22.6.1992:8). The Federal government line-up was leaked to 
the press on June 24th. Jan Strasky (CDP) was to be Federal Prime Minister, Rudolf 
Filkus (MDS) Federal First Deputy Prime Minister, and Miroslav Macek (CDP) with 
Antonin Baudys (Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People’s party) Deputy 
Prime Ministers. Jozef Moravcik (MDS) was to be Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 24.6.1992:1)^.
When Havel next met with Czech parliamentary party leaders his already faltering 
resistance to a purely elite process was further weakened. Though referenda were 
supported as the valid, constitutionally required method of separation, most parties, 
according to Vaclav Benda (Christian Democratic Party), emphasised “other forms of 
possible split, not dictated by the constitution, which would be suitable for a quicker
 ^After a meeting of the Democratic Left council Weiss announced that his party would not support Havel’s 
candidacy {Mlada Fronta dnes 20.6.1992:2) thus guaranteeing the blocking of his re-election in the Federal 
Assembly.
 ^ In the Slovak National Council, the Christian Democratic Movement protested that the MDS had pushed 
for undemocratic majorities in major committees. In reply, two Christian Democratic Movement members 
were demoted from the Security Committee to Education, and Christian Democratic Movement Chairman 
Jan Carnogursky was demoted from Foreign Affairs to the Environment. Even Pavol Kanis o f the Party of 
the Democratic Left objected, insisting that the “tooth for a tooth” principle was inappropriate to politics
(Pravda 24.6.1992:1,2).
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and problem-free split”, i.e. parliamentary agreement. One-sided steps, such as a 
Slovak declaration of sovereignty, Benda insisted, would also render referenda 
superfluous since “there would be nothing to decide” {Telegraf 24.6.1992.1). On June 
25th, President Havel tried for the last time to convince the Assembly that referenda 
remained the only constitutional option. The appeal was half-hearted however, and he 
conceded that the Assembly as the highest legislative body could invent another method 
which he would respect. In admitting this Havel collapsed the notion of profound 
constitutional constraint, resolving in a sentence any government fears that he might 
again take his cause to the people*.
As the decisive month drew to a close, the former Czech premier, Petr Pithart 
concluded that the “basic problem of Slovakia is that it does not know what it wants” 
{Telegraf 2)0.6.1992.2). While this was hard to verify Meciar evidently saw the need to 
manufacture a version of Slovak desires. Slovak television introduced its own current 
affairs programme on the national channel at 7 pm on the 27th, having reported to 
Czechoslovak Television that it could no longer process shots from federal television, 
including the weather {Hospodarske noviny 30.6.1992:2). Whatever the facade, 
however, Slovakia’s bold advances toward increased autonomy within a common state 
had nonetheless been thoroughly corralled. The very predictability of the impasse 
between the conflicting visions of Klaus and Meciar had lent, under Klaus’s direction, a 
great momentum to the Czech and Federal governments’ decisions. It was already 
settled that the federal system would be shrunk to the working minimum necessary to 
oversee the divorce: the number of federal ministries would be reduced from 12 to 5: 
Finance, Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Economy. The Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia could only briefly attempt to portray this as a victory against the 
centre and the beginning of a drawn-out process of compromise. Changes such as the 
preclusion of a federal budget for 1993 made it clear that whatever the legitimacy of 
the process, a separation was not in doubt.
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia suggested to the Party o f the Democratic Left and Slovak 
National Party on the 27th that a referendum on constitutional arrangements be held in December, though 
all three objected to the current referendum law insofar as it enabled only one republic to withdraw from 
the federation and so risked Slovakia’s successor status {Mlada Fronta dnes 19.6.1992:1).
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Meciar’s tactic of overbidding, of asking for confederation from a Czech government 
that others appeared to have recognised as resolutely centrist, afforded the very alibi 
Klaus would need for hastening the split of the state. Klaus’s CDP could charge that 
Meciar’s vision of confederation flew in the face of political realities, that the Czech 
parliament could never endorse such a misalignment of administrative rights and 
financial liabilities and that, far from a Yugoslav scenario, Czechs preferred to aid and 
abet Meciar who was currently only mismanaging his own secessionist impulses. To 
avoid censure Klaus, citing Czech subsidy of the Slovak economy (estimated at 25 
billion Czechoslovak crowns in 1992), could plead the political insanity of his Slovak 
opponents.
July
At the beginning of July the now nervous Slovak government pursued its own placatory 
measures. Government members offered their May salary increase for charity purposes 
and Labour Minister Olga Keltosova suggested changing the Slovak budget to the 
advantage of social benefits^ {Mlada Fronta dnes 1.7.1992:6). On July 1st the Czech 
coalition partners - Civic Democratic Alliance, Christian Democratic Union- 
Czechoslovak People’s Party, Christian Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic 
Party - signed their consent to the transfer of federal responsibilities to the republics 
and urged the establishment of a Czech constitution and constitutional court. Agreed on 
the indivisibility of Czechoslovakia’s legal personality they concluded that questions of 
alternative union would be solved post-independence {Rude pravo 2.7.1992). Their 
consensus is striking in the light of Slovak dismay, but also in the light of an IVVM 
opinion poll of the time. This reported that more than two-thirds of Czechs felt 
themselves to have good or very good personal relations with Slovaks and vice versa 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 2.7.1992).
Premier Strasky (CDP) was typically proactive in keeping federal deputies to Klaus’s 
agenda, as was Milan Uhde, the CDP Chairman of the Czech National Council. When 
a dispute arose over whether the Council presidium should be formed on the basis of 
party proportional representation, Uhde objected that such a ‘forum’ would be too
fortnight later Keltosova admitted that funds reserved for unemployment benefits in the 1992 Slovak 
budget had already been exhausted {Mlada Fronta dnes 14.7.1992:2).
57
discursive to represent an effective “head of state” at this stage (Mlada Fronta Dnes 
2.7.1992:2)^®. Addressing the Council Klaus declared that he considered building the 
“firm foundations of Czech statehood... a positive and creative task” adding “we do 
not only want to adopt a defensive position, as the former government often did” 
(Telegraf 3.1 , \9 9 2 A Ÿ \
On July 3rd the Federal Parliament failed to elect the new Czechoslovak President, 
even in repeated rounds of voting. Vaclav Havel, the only candidate, was rejected by 
the House of the People and the Slovak section of the House of Nations; the repeat 
round eliciting only reduced support in the latter. A second election with new 
candidates was scheduled for July 16th {Mlada Fronta dnes 4.7.1992:1,2). Klaus 
concluded that the “Czech public will interpret the non-election of Mr. Havel as a 
further step toward questioning the common state” (ibid.). Later he added that, in the 
event that no-one was elected as Federal President, Havel would become the logical 
and CDP-endorsed candidate for the imminent Czech Presidency {Telegraf 1.1 A992).
On the same day a Bill on the Sovereignty and State Symbols of the Slovak Republic, proposed by the 
Slovak National Party, was withdrawn from the Slovak National Council presidium agenda. The draft 
provided for the right to veto Federal laws. The Party of the Democratic Left objected that this would 
introduce an unacceptable legal dualism {Mlada Fronta dnes 2.7.1992:1).
' ' Two interviews illustrate how differently the two leaders depicted the motivation to separate. In Mlada 
Fronta dnes Klaus claimed to have opted for the Czech Premiership on June 17th. “At that time I 
understood that the efforts of [our] Slovak partners to attain independence for Slovakia were final and 
irreversible...that it was not simply pre-election rhetoric” but the profound aspiration of “all MDS 
representatives”. He claimed to see the symptoms of the split most visibly “in the economic sphere... The 
already existing non-homogeneous economies in Bohemia and Slovakia have been irreversibly moving away 
from one another. I caimot imagine a political force which would manage to thwart this process” - a 
statement completely at odds with his previous, positive assessments of economic parity. Acknowledging 
that “public opinion polls among citizens do not speak unequivocally about the split” Klaus nevertheless 
described developments as if observing a meta-political process beyond help; “I am only afraid that the 
dividing processes about which I have just spoken are beyond the hands o f Mr. Meciar”. Personally, he 
said, “I define a viable nation differently” {Mlada Fronta dnes 3.7.1992:7). Interviewed by the French 
daily. Le Monde (6.7.1992) Meciar claimed: “[w]e do not want independence, we are being pushed into 
it” , and dated this pressure from the first meeting in Brno. According to Meciar, Klaus’s delegation had 
decided on state dissolution after a forty minute debate, yet since then Slovakia had withdrawn its request 
for a central bank and had admitted that Slovakia was unprepared to form its own currency. “Slovakia 
wants to continue the economic reform but with a new strategy, heeding regional specifics, and on the basis 
of more advantageous distribution o f foreign investment. The Czechs keep rejecting this”, he explained 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 9.7.1992). Unfortunately for the Slovak cause, the credibility of Meciar’s claims was 
instantly undermined by his appraisal of Hungarian ambitions in Slovakia. In the same interview Meciar 
identified a “badly masked” Hungarian scenario wherein the minorities would gain territorial independence 
and be annexed by Hungary with appeal to the right o f self-determination - an interpretation hastily 
amended by the more diplomatic Moravcik, the new Foreign Minister.
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Only days after considering the threatening deep disruption of the Slovak economy 
{Pravda 8.7.1992) the presidium of the Slovak National Council discussed two draft 
declarations on the sovereignty of Slovakia in the expectation that one be approved on 
the 17th July. The first draft declared a national-cultural sovereignty - a statement of 
principle, the second, the state-legal sovereignty of Slovakia i.e. international legal 
personality {Mlada Fronta dnes 9.7.1992:2). Despite the weaker alternative the Civic 
Democratic Party only recited its policy that relations with Slovakia were no longer at 
issue until after independence {Mlada Fronta Dnes 9.7.1992:1).
The assumption of injured innocence was one of the few postures remaining available 
to Meciar in Slovakia, and at a Slovak press conference he called on the Czech 
government to publish its ‘secret’ timetable of separation steps. While admitting that 
Slovakia was not prepared for a split in the common market, currency and even in the 
realm of human rights, Meciar also compared the present coverage of Slovakia in the 
Czech and world press to a cold war determined by the Prague view {Telegraf
10.7.1992). Something of a cold war atmosphere had indeed developed. Meciar 
resorted to the most blatant conspiracy-mongering whilst the Czech Telegraf in turn 
reported the beginning of ‘political purges’ in Slovak ministries. Representatives of the 
Association of Slovak Journalists meanwhile, together with the Congress of Slovak 
Intelligentsia and the Slovak cultural organisation Matica slovenska (‘Mother Slovakia’) 
declared that celebratory bonfires would be lit across Slovakia in the event that 
sovereignty was declared {Mlada Fronta dnes 14.7.1992:1).
The Slovak National Council debate on the government’s policy statement revealed 
Meciar’s growing political isolation. The draft was criticised by both the Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia’s allies, the Party of the Democratic Left and the Slovak 
National Party. The nationalists reproached it for the lack of comment on the market 
economy. The Democratic Left criticised the statement as too dirigist; “one cannot 
wish for a conunon currency and draw up a policy which rules this out” , complained 
Peter Weiss. Further disagreement came when the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia and the Slovak National Party together proposed that the vote on Slovak 
Sovereignty be by roll-call. The Christian Democratic Movement’s (CDM) Frantisek
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Miklosko objected that the proposal positively invited the nationalistic harassment of 
parliamentary deputies and the Party of the Democratic Left, the Hungarian Christian 
Democratic Movement (HCDM) and the latter's coalition partner, Coexistence agreed 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 15.7.1992:1,2). Continuing the debate next day, Jan Carnogursky 
(CDM) called the policy statement “the vaguest set of intentions submitted by post- 
November governments”, and noted that while the activity of the government tended 
toward the state’s separation the statement disregarded this completely. Meciar closed 
the debate with an epic plea. Present world changes amounted not only to the collapse 
of Communism, but the birth of a new civilisation he said; “adaptation to [this motion] 
means the struggle for survival”. The speech degenerated further into the grandiloquent 
when Meciar again claimed to have read a ‘horrific secret report’ outlining retaliatory 
steps against Slovakia, prepared by the Czech presidium. These steps, Meciar railed, 
amounted to racism “as a programme”. “If the new governments do not collect enough 
courage to disassociate themselves from the positions of the former government, the 
Slovak government reserves the right to make the whole affair public internationally. 
Let people know how an exodus of Romanies to Slovakia on the occasion of the split 
was p r e p a r e d H e  continued, now appealing tq the deputies’ increasing sense of 
fatalism; “you do not have to express confidence in this government. But I ask you - 
have you got a better one? ... Please, give your confidence to this government. The 
citizens have already done so” {Pravda, Telegraf, Mlada Fronta dnes 16.7.1992).
Klaus too had turned to domestic issues, instructing the Czech government to submit a 
draft constitution {Hosposdarske noviny 14.7.1992:1). His tactics however, revealed a 
political leverage far superior to Meciar’s. As before the election his preferred strategy 
was to harass the Czech left with accusations of ‘disloyal opposition’. Though the left 
claimed the government was acting unconstitutionally, Klaus described their approach 
as “incomprehensibly negative” and indicative of “the fragility of our democracy” 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 15.7.1992:1,2).
Petr Pithart explained that a so-called “catastrophic scenario” had indeed been prepared when a Slovak 
Declaration o f Sovereignty first seemed possible - Slovak deputies had known of the report at the time and 
it carried no plans of deportations. Strasky, one o f the authors, retorted that the only ‘horrifying’ document 
he had seen concerned the economic risks of a Slovak secession (ibid.).
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The second round of presidential elections followed with only one candidate, the 
extreme right Republican leader, Miroslav Sladek, but he remained un-elected in either 
of two votes. A third round was planned, again with new candidates. The Federal 
Assembly nevertheless approved the federal government’s policy statement and the vote 
secured. President Havel announced his intention to resign on the 20th {Lidove noviny
17.7.1992). On the same day, Friday 17th, the Slovak National Council approved a 
Declaration of Sovereignty - to Czech media eyes a coincidence of calamities which 
heralded the end of all hope for Czechoslovak statehood. In his resignation letter Havel 
had explained that he feared becoming an obstacle “to the emancipation efforts of the 
Slovak Republic, which found political reflection in the Declaration on sovereignty 
approved today” {Lidove noviny 18.7.1992:1,8).
In the vote - by roll call - 113 of the 147 Slovak National Council deputies present had 
supported the milder version of the declaration of Slovakia’s sovereignty - 
zvrchovanost: Slovakia’s right to pursue its own national life. All deputies of the 
Christian Democratic Movement and 7 of the allied Hungarian Christian Democratic 
Movement - Coexistence voted against the declaration. All deputies of the Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia and Slovak National Party voted for it. In a speech notable 
for its relative dignity, Meciar concluded that: “The Declaration expresses the level of 
intellectual and social maturity of a Slovakia which is able to take its destiny into its 
own hands. The Declaration is a political and not a constitutional act, it does not mean 
an independent state but it is a clear signal for those abroad that we are taking into our 
own hands the intention to form our own statehood. The development so far means that 
the Federal Constitution will become invalid in Slovakia on the day when the Slovak 
constitution comes into force” Members of the Christian Democratic Movement 
asked for protection, and were flanked by the police on exiting the parliament {Mlada 
Fronta, Svobodne slovo 18.7.1992).
The Declaration: “We, the democratically elected Slovak National Council, declare ceremoniously that 
one thousand years worth of efforts of the Slovak nation for sovereignty have been fulfilled. In this 
historical moment we declare the natural right of the Slovak nation for its self-determination as it is 
anchored in all international agreements and contracts on the rights of nations for their self-determination. 
Recognising the right of nations for their self-determination, we declare that we want freely to create the 
way and form of our national and state life while respecting the rights of all, of each citizen, nations, 
national minorities and ethnic groups, and the democratic and humanistic legacies of Europe and the world. 
By this Declaration the Slovak National Council declares the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic as a basis 
of a sovereign state o f the Slovak nation” {Svobodne slovo 18.7.1992:1).
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Unlike his coalition colleagues, Klaus considered the Slovak move insignificant. It 
could hardly change the situation created by the ‘absurdities’ of the 1968 constitution, 
he commented {Mlada Fronta dnes 18.7.1992:1), nor more importantly, the process he 
had set in train. Not missing the opportunity to identify Slovakia as secessionist Klaus 
nevertheless pointed to “the fact that the Declaration... does not mention the word 
‘Czech’ as very surprising and significant” {Mlada Fronta dnes 18.7.1992:1). Even so, 
the Czech government waited to consider the Slovak declaration in its normal session: a 
level of indifference overlooked in later commentaries. When the Czech National 
Council met on July 20th the presidium announced itself “convinced of the necessity 
for accelerated negotiations” toward two independent states {Hospodarske noviny 
21.7.1992:2). In his broadcast from Lany Havel considered separation a now 
irreversible development {Mlada Fronta dnes 20.7.1992:2).
At the 5th round of MDS-CDP talks in Bratislava, on the 22-23rd July, the two 
delegations agreed to the “delimitation variant” ; having preliminarily confirmed the 
split of the federation into two independent republics they focussed on “the optimal 
course” for its demise (Klaus in Lidove noviny 23.7.1992:1). The talks thus shifted 
significantly away from substantive decisions and toward procedural issues. Meciar and 
Klaus told journalists “we shall together initiate, in the Federal Assembly, the Law on 
the Manner of the Dissolution of the Federation and on the settlement of property and 
other matters” . In case their proposals failed they pledged “to maintain peace and 
regulate alternative processes for the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation”. 
Klaus expressed the hope that “all of this process will be discussed, approved and 
developed in the National Councils by August 31st i.e. one month earlier” than already 
timetabled.
In connection with tax and monetary policy the two representatives had spoken only of 
the potential for coordination - an ambiguity that raised Slovak fears for financial 
stability. Klaus had commented that “we are not sure whether it is possible or even 
purposeful and necessary to assure unity between the budgetary, tax and financial 
policies of the two republics. It would be irresponsible to say whether we will be able
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to maintain a common currency” . When Meciar professed uncertainty when asked 
about a date for the dissolution, Klaus reckoned on December 31st, when the 1992 
budget would cease to be valid. “It is an important moment irrespective of whether we 
wish it or not” {Mlada Fronta dnes 24.7.1992:1) he said.
Meciar had argued that republican presidents should be elected before the federal one, 
a scenario which looked increasingly unavoidable since none of the three federal 
candidates gained the requisite votes in the third election round on the 30th. A Civic 
Democratic Party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia amendment allowed for 
presidential elections to be postponed by eight weeks if the next round, the fourth, 
again proved fruitless {Mlada Fronta dnes 31.7.1992). Fruitless it proved to be - since 
no candidates stood {Mlada Fronta dnes 4.8.1992:1)^'^. At the close of the month 
Carnogursky’s Christian Democratic Movement submitted a bill to the Assembly 
demanding a referendum and the question; “are you for the continuation of the 
common Czechoslovak state and for the declaration of new parliamentary elections?”. 
The Civic Democratic Party rejected out of hand the idea that “with the help of the 
referendum it is possible to return life to the concept of a federation” (spokesman J. 
Schneider) {Mlada Fronta dnes 31.7.1992:2). According to an Institute for Public 
Opinion Research (IVVM) poll at the time only 16 per cent in each republic positively 
favoured a dissolution of the state. An entire 85 per cent of voters said they would 
participate in a referendum {Mlada Fronta dnes 24.7.192:2).
August
Meciar’s obsession with the appearance of victory was by August pulling apart his own 
party’s executive. At the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia presidium meeting. 
Federal Foreign Minister Moravcik warned that “full disintegration has no meaning for 
us” . Rudolf Filkus protested the serious economic impact of continuing on Meciar’s 
course and on the question of common currency and monetary policy he pleaded “a 
compromise must be found. We could make an agreement with the Czech Republic on
The Social Democrats announced the candidacy o f Jan Sokol (of the now extra-parliamentary liberal 
Civic Movement) for the fifth round of Presidential election - a widely respected and serious contender. 
Sokol was doomed by Slovak opposition, and on the 11th September he withdrew his candidacy {Cesky 
denik 12.9.1992:2).
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cohabitation and define common interests” {Narodna obroda 3.8.1992). Meciar 
however, was confident of a different strategy. Within days these more forceful 
ministers were outflanked, not only in negotiations but within their respective 
portfolios, and Meciar turned instead to his own more reliable if less competent cabal, 
a cadre whose priorities were only to entrench the MDS’s power. His increasingly 
autocratic strategy could also be seen beyond the party. Answering public complaints 
about the lack of media coverage Meciar said that “the Slovak government does not 
place sufficient confidence in the media to inform them about its most confidential 
activities” . Newspapers, he said, citing an age-old anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, 
behaved like “money-makers” with information (Lidove noviny 8.8.1992:2).
Yet while Meciar’s spurned colleagues genuinely hoped for continuing strong economic 
links with the Czech republic and met with the Czech opposition to try and secure a 
referendum, they too were seen as culpable, if only for seeking a marriage of 
convenience (Mlada Fronta dnes 5.8.1992:1). According to the right, both the 
consensus-seekers within the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Czech left 
saw in a sustained deadlock or a less than heavily centralised federation only a tactical 
lever for softening Klaus’s reforms. Moreover, as things stood it was highly uncertain 
that a referendum would do more than confirm the conflict of interests established by 
the election.
The next meeting of the Federal Assembly dissolved in chaos as the Civic Democratic 
Party coalition and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia locked horns over 
candidates for committee chairmen. CDP and MDS deputies continued to obstruct the 
Assembly by non-attendance, sabotaging the second joint meeting of the Assembly - the 
third not scheduled until September 22nd-25th. The quarrel had erupted when Vaclav 
Benda’s Christian Democratic Party had accused both Czech and Slovak left of 
attempting a coup d'etat (Prace 8.8.1992). Klaus too had attacked Meciar’s reference 
to Civic Democratic Party ‘hawks’ with unusual ferocity; what did exist was “the 
understandable impatience of CDP deputies” intent on progress and disquieted by “the 
limitless arrogance and aggression of deputies from left-wing parties” he countered 
(Mlada Fronta dnes 11.8.1992:1). The signal of Klaus’s ending patience had the
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desired effect however. Fearing that he may have pushed Klaus too far again, Meciar 
re-emphasised the importance of the MDS-CDP agreements in future developments. He 
even asserted that on the question of state dissolution he himself had warned the left 
that whatever their actions, the federal parliament would still cease to exist {Narodna 
obroda 11.8.1992:8).
Addressing clubs of deputies, Klaus emphasised that no alternatives existed to 
separation since, in hindering Slovak desires, these would actually sour relations. To 
comments that the Slovaks had clearly been retreating in their demands, inviting the re­
negotiation of the common state Klaus insisted that “Slovak representatives... started to 
realise there were concrete problems and became more realistic. They do not 
[however] change their basic standpoints and we must respect them”. To the opposite 
view, that Slovakia had withdrawn and should reap the consequences, Klaus replied “it 
seems to me impossible to push Slovakia into the role of unilateral liquidator. It would 
be unwise from the viewpoint of the future coexistence and our own interests” {Lidove 
noviny 19.8.1992)^^. The first draft of the Bill on Dissolution of the Federation was 
thus duly prepared, but objected to by Klaus’s CDP for the faux pas of not including all 
those conditions agreed between the CDP and the MDS, namely the four official 
options for a split: a referendum, agreement between the National Councils, a Federal 
Assembly law and the withdrawal of one republic {Mlada Fronta dnes 20.8.1992:1,6).
The Civic Democratic Party was, if anything, swift to remind the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia that it should press on with looking self-determined. In the Slovak 
National Council, meanwhile, Milan Knazko angrily rejected complaints that time 
pressures would impair the Slovak constitution’s quality {Mlada Fronta dnes 
20.8.1992:2). The MDS’s desperate haste was nevertheless palpable, doing little to 
stimulate sympathy in either republic. The Slovak government was particularly 
unwilling to admit what was already lost, that they had already failed to secure a single 
currency to bind the two economies in the future. It was left to the Czechs to reveal 
that divergent policies precluded agreement on tax or budgetary coordination, the 
indispensable conditions of prolonged monetary union. The MDS’s eventual
Among these interests was clearly the amicable appearance of separation. Klaus, it should be noted, is 
married to a Slovak, and frequently employed this fact when quizzed by journalists.
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explanation was suitably incongruous. Slovakia, claimed Slovak Finance Minister 
Julius Toth, had moved too far to the right for the regressive Czechs. “The policy of 
the Slovak government, when you take its orientation and acts, is more right-wing than 
that in Bohemia” {Lidove noviny, Narodna obroda 21.8.1992), he argued. Meciar 
again tried to switch his role to that of persecuted hero of common statehood: “with 
three more voices they [the CDP] could block the whole parliament” he declared, 
claiming the MDS had prevented a division of the federation no less than six times in 
the last two months {Rudepravo 22.8.1992:1,2).
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia avoided the meeting scheduled for the 27th. 
Having cited among other grievances the Civic Democratic Party’s failures to make 
good certain personnel changes, notably in the FBIS (the security services), Meciar 
concluded that negotiations could only continue when these agreements were fulfilled. 
To Klaus he nevertheless wrote “you are the only politician in the Czech Republic in 
whom the Slovak side can place trust”. Klaus replied that these were matters too trivial 
to justify delays. He rejected Meciar’s claim that the Czechs were resolving Czech 
party battles at Slovakia’s expense and listed his agenda for discussion, including 
clearing-up “our attitudes over the draft principles of the Law on the Manner of 
Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”. Meciar reiterated his letter and continued to call off 
the meeting. After speculating publicly that Meciar aimed at a unilateral Slovak 
secession, one further phone call from Klaus nonetheless secured the earlier date of the 
26th (Mlada Fronta dnes, Lidove noviny, Narodna obroda 25.8.1992).
The 6th round of talks took place in Brno. Meciar and Klaus met face to face for two 
and half hours, mending party relations. “The Czech and the Slovak Republics should 
come into existence as independent states on January 1st 1993,” declared Meciar to the 
assembled press. The timetable was brisk; by the end of September the Federal 
Assembly should have approved the Law on the Manner of Dissolution of the 
Federation, and in October it should approve the division of property. In November the 
National Councils should have discussed a basis for the future cooperation between 
Czech and Slovak Republics. In December, the MDS and CDP would “tackle their 
mutual problems”.
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The Federal Assembly’s agenda had been developed almost entirely by Klaus’s CDP. 
From their pre-talk grievances the MDS secured only the right to propose a nomination 
for the head of the FBIS - and the GDP’s Miroslav Macek could hardly resist noting 
that proposals to abolish the FBIS would be submitted at the Assembly’s next session 
{Svobodne slovo. Nova obroda 27.8.1992). Now quite patently in need of Klaus’s 
favour the MDS had also agreed to a programme for ensuring ‘transparency and 
cooperation’. This stipulated that deputies from the two parties would only submit 
matters to the Assembly already discussed by club representatives. Secondly, they 
would prefer to table questions concerning the constitutional arrangement. Thirdly, 
important agreements would always be recorded in writing and party chairmen would 
meet before important institutional meetings, including those of the policy committees 
of both parties. Lastly, and uninhibited by the democratic conventions of parliamentary 
opposition, both agreed that these principles should be applied by all other political 
parties (Mlada Fronta dnes 4.9.1992).
In another proposal bearing the hallmarks of Civic Democratic Party authorship, Klaus 
explained that a common currency would continue to exist in Czechoslovakia after 
January 1st 1993, and that a “crown zone” would be introduced from that date, 
controlled by a pared down version of the current State Bank. In the second stage the 
Czech and Slovak currencies should become independent with a firmly fixed rate of 
exchange. At the beginning this would be at the ratio 1:1, though this could not be 
maintained permanently. Klaus suggested that cooperation should start from the 
agreement on a customs union and this transitional model of monetary union. After the 
split, he insisted, there would be many common policies. Even so, the MDS’s 
subsequent declaration, that Slovak citizens would be glad that they had retained all 
rights in the other republic bar that of voting, was patently misleading {Mlada Fronta 
dnes, Hospodarske noviny, Cesky denik. Nova Obroda 28.8.1992).
September
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The Slovak constitution was passed on the 1st September, after Meciar rejected all 
Hungarian amendments as resulting from a failure to understand the constitution^^. Of 
the 134 present in the Slovak National Council, 114 had voted in favour, 16 deputies of 
the Christian Democratic Movement against, and 4 Hungarian deputies from the Party 
of the Democratic Left abstained. The Slovak half of the Czechoslovak anthem was 
sung and a festive programme announced for the following evening. Remarkably few 
papers commented on the event, though columnist Ivo Slavik ascribed to Meciar a 
“wantonness... bordering on contempt” {Mlada Fronta dnes 2.9.1992). The occasion 
was overshadowed at least in part by the news of a road accident involving the Slovak 
Social Democratic chairman, Alexander Dubcek, an obvious candidate for the Slovak 
Presidency. Meciar had recently turned against Dubcek for his federalism and the 
suspicion that the still-popular champion of 1968 had been ‘silenced’ hung heavily in 
the air. An IVVM poll taken a week later, between September 8th-14th, revealed that 
more than 80 per cent of those polled in both republics now considered a split 
inevitable {Mlada Fronta dnes 30.9.1992:2).
The Slovak constitution was signed on the evening of the 3rd, attended by the CDP’s 
Jan Strasky and Milan Uhde but not by Klaus. Though the CDP was content not to see 
the signing as a violation of CDP/MDS agreements their coalition partners, the Czech 
Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party, were purportedly outraged. 
Deputy Chairman Jan Kasai argued that Slovakia had withdrawn from the Federation 
and should face the consequences {Mlada Fronta dnes 4.9.1992:2). The signing 
certainly heralded a new belligerence in Meciar’s tactics. Journalists were lectured on 
the rules of “ethical-self regulation” and the liberal (and Jewish) politician Fedor Gal 
was threatened with a section of the penal code prohibiting the ‘spreading of 
inflammatory news’ {Mlada Fronta dnes 5.9.1992:1). The Hungarian Christian 
Democratic Movement and Coexistence movement in the National Council accused the
The constitution failed to protect Hungarian rights - most obviously because it established Slovakia as the 
‘state of the Slovak people’ as opposed to a state of the citizens of Slovakia. The Christian Democratic 
Movement objected to various provisions it deemed undemocratic, un-Christian and at variance with the 
valid constitution. Among the latter were clauses stipulating the establishment o f a Slovak customs zone and 
a Slovak central bank {Cesky Denik 1:31.8.1992). The final vote was once again by roll-call. Meciar called 
it “a constitution which stems from the ideas within our society, one which rejects fascism, anti-Semitism, 
and nationalism, being a guarantee o f democracy, freedom and respect for law” {Pravda. Mlada Fronta 
dnes 1.9.1992).
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MDS leadership of a similarly escalating hostility toward members of the Hungarian 
minority and its leading politicians (Lidove noviny 8.9.1992:16).
Slovak events were juxtaposed to the now opposite strategy from Klaus, who had 
embarked on a less aggressive cooption of the parties arrayed against him. Meeting 
with Left Bloc deputies Klaus lobbied for a joint decision on separation by the two 
republican National Councils. He also publicly rejected any accusations that the left 
might be non-democratic, his own favoured allegation, as “pre-election rhetoric” 
(Mlada Fronta dnes, Prostor, Rude pravo 9.9.1992). To avoid controversy over the 
economy Klaus had announced that the Bankruptcy Law would not come into effect on 
1st October but six months later and in a weaker version (Prostor 9.9.1992). Despite 
his efforts however the opposition still held out for a referendum and the incorporation 
of Assembly deputies into the negotiation process. CDP Federal Prime Minister Jan 
Strasky objected that a referendum was unrealistic and likely to draw the state nearer to 
a Yugoslav-style crisis. Klaus too adopted the argument against chaos, accusing pro­
referendum politicians of adopting the principle “worse is better” (Metropolitni 
Telegraf 23.9.1992:2).
When the draft Czech constitution was rejected by committee however, even Civic 
Democratic Party deputies said that it had vested excessive powers in the hands of the 
premier - Vaclav Klaus, such as would be justifiable in a state of emergency (Mlada 
Fronta dnes 22.9.1992:1,2). Legislation was also delayed in the Federal Assembly. The 
Bill on the Maimer of the Dissolution of the Federation was stuck at the committee 
stage while opposition parties insisted that draft amendments of the Law on Referenda 
and the carefully entitled ‘Bill on the Division of Property if the Federation Becomes 
Dissolved’ be discussed first (Lidova demokracie, Mlada Fronta dnes 16.9.1992). The 
Federal parliament was in fact buckling under the strain as an efficient legislature. The 
bill on changing the structure of the state administration (dissolving ministries) was 
approved by chance, despite opposition deputies walking out before the vote in protest - 
an effective action endowed by the supermajority requirement on constitutional 
legislation. The necessary quorum was rescued by two opposition deputies taking
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minutes and another who returned to the meeting room to fetch his briefcase {Mlada 
Fronta dnes and Zemedelske noviny 24.9.1992).
Preparing for October’s legislation negotiators had agreed the ratio 2:1 as a guiding 
principle governing the division of federal property, another being the ‘territorial 
principle’ for the division of real estate, whereby buildings became the property of the 
state in which they were situated {Mlada Fronta dnes and Rude pravo 10.9.1992). 
Klaus had rejected the Slovak ideas of a defence union and common army {Mlada 
Fronta dnes 11.9.1992) but Federal Defence Minister Imrich Adrejcak had asked the 
premiers to leave this issue until later {Mlada Fronta dnes, Metropolitni Telegraf
15.9.1992). As it transpired the more the CDP cut the ties that the MDS had assumed 
would bind the two republics, the more the MDS resorted to obstructing property 
agreements in the hope, presumably, that Klaus would then offer further concessions to 
keep the process on schedule^^ {Mlada Fronta dnes, Hospodarske noviny 17.9.1992). 
First Deputy Federal Prime Minister Rudolf Filkus (MDS) objected that the intention to 
divide the army was a change from the original CDP/MDS accords. Meciar called for a 
middle version: two armies and two ministries which would agree on common services, 
he also echoed Andrejcak’s belief that the division would take years rather than months 
{Mlada Fronta dnes, Narodna obroda 17.9.1992). The Czech response to this Slovak 
‘challenge’ merely re-emphasised their superior leverage however. The CDP’s 
Miroslav Macek announced the army was “behaving as a third force in the state” and 
that its division was becoming the most difficult problem in the separation {Metropolitni 
Telegraf 1,3, 21.9.1992). The accusation was pitched to call the army to order and in 
little over a week Andrejcak had revised his agenda and publicised his hope that the 
army would be divided according to the 2:1 ratio and the territorial principle when the 
ratio could not be applied {Hospodarske noviny 1.10.1992:2). Chief of Staff General
At this time Meciar’s attempts to distract from events at home with events abroad became seriously 
counter-productive for Slovak international relations - ratification o f the European Community Association 
Agreement, it should be noted, had been made conditional on Slovakia’s maintenance o f good foreign 
relations. After visiting Bavaria, Meciar declared himself for a new Slovak treaty with Germany, one 
which would tackle the unresolved problem of war reparations {Metropolitni Telegraf, Prace, Lidova 
demokracie 25.9.1992). To Koridor Meciar had suggested “we should consider pre-1948 for compensation 
to affected Slovak citizens for war damages, burnt-out villages, lost lives, concentration camps and other 
things” {Nova obroda 12:29.9.1992). German Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hans Schumacher replied 
unequivocally: Germany did not wish to and would not negotiate new treaties with either republic - the very 
reasoning behind ratification of the current treaty. Slovak violation of the federal treaty would release 
Germany from all its contractual obligations to Slovakia {Mlada Fronta dnes, Narodna obroda 28:9.1992).
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Karel Pezl suggested forces could technically split even before December 31st, 
revealing that he had at his disposal a document in which all three Prime Ministers had 
earlier expressed consent with the ratio 2:1 for dividing army property {Mlada Fronta 
dnes 1.10.1992:1).
It being the end of September, Presidential election time had come around again in the 
Federal Assembly. This time Jiri Kotas was not elected as President of Czechoslovakia 
(only 16 deputies of the House of the People and 24 of the House of Nations voted for 
him). A sixth round was scheduled for the 2nd October, the day after the Slovak 
constitution would come into force {Pravda 25.9.1992:1). Asked under what 
circumstances he would not wish to become President of the Czech Republic, Havel 
stressed “I would not like to be a president who is doomed to wear a tie from morning 
till evening, to lay bouquets on memorials, make festive speeches on anniversaries and 
attend innumerable lunches and dinners...” {Mlada Fronta dnes 25.9.1992:24).
At a meeting of the State Defence Council Meciar rejected the territorial principle for 
any property under negotiation and then walked out, despite the MDS’s prior 
agreement to the principle earlier in September. He told journalists, “if they want to 
play children’s games I have no time for them, so I apologised and left the meeting” 
{Metropolitni Telegraf and Mlada Fronta dnes 29.9.1992). His headline-grabbing 
actions took on the quality of farce when next day Jiri Pospisil, First Deputy Federal 
Minister of Defence pointed out that the Council had rejected Meciar’s proposals for a 
joint defence institution and a non-aggression pact because it had no mandate to accept 
them - both were constitutional issues subject to the talks, as was the division of 
property. Briefing the exasperated Slovak government, Meciar denied that he had 
caused uproar, insisting that he had in fact saved Slovakia billions of crowns. He also 
attacked Filkus’s property proposals and the MDS’s Federal ministers in general as in 
error in abandoning the idea of a financial settlement, though this had long been flatly 
refused by the Czech side {Mlada Fronta dnes 30.9.1992:1,2).
When Klaus again intervened, phoning Meciar and announcing that “I have mixed 
feelings on whether we shall succeed in discussing the Bill on the Dissolution of the
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Federation by September 30th, as originally agreed” his doubts at least appeared to 
have been calmed. The Federal Assembly opened its debate on the 29th {Pravda 
30.9.1992:2). Meciar’s rejection of the property principle was nonetheless practically 
disruptive. The Federal government had been preparing the Bill on the Division of 
Federal Property for three weeks and was galled by Meciar’s late rejection of its basic 
premise {Hospodarske noviny 30.9.1992:2). Next - for he was clearly closing the 
month with a campaign - Meciar queried the exchange rate projections, the fixed rate 
of 1:1 which he had already publicly endorsed, and proposed a floating rate. Slovak 
Finance Minister Toth broadcast that Slovakia had no means of introducing her own 
currency soon and was “not preparing to do so”, suggesting that the introduction of a 
Slovak currency would need a 200 million dollars subsidy to maintain its convertibility 
{Mlada Fronta dnes, Metropolitni Telegraf 30.9.1992).
October
Though Klaus had chosen to disregard Meciar’s protestations and queries in late 
September {Mlada Fronta dnes 10.1992:1) there was a brief moment in early October 
when it seemed Meciar might actually railroad the Czech Civic Democratic Party into 
more radical concession-giving. The Federal Assembly failed to pass the Bill on the 
Dissolution of the Federation but passed instead, by one vote, a motion requiring the 
presidium to prepare a commission for drafting a bill on the transformation of the 
Federation into a Czech-Slovak Union. With opposition deputies, the MDS had voted 
for the motion, proposed by Milos Zeman of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. 
Reacting in the Assembly, Klaus called the action a threat to democratic development. 
Returning to ‘pre-election’ language he stressed that the unexpected support of the 
MDS for a motion submitted by the Czech left represented not only a violation of CDP- 
MDS cooperation (and he noted that Czechs could likewise rescind all settlements), but 
a threat to the foundations of post-November (1989) changes. As for the process of 
separation he spelled out the CDP’s assessment so as to leave no doubts. “The existing 
division of tasks, according to which federal institutions manage the split of 
Czechoslovakia and republican institutions are responsible for the new arrangements, 
has been seriously questioned. We shall have to seek alternative solutions” ... “For 
three years we have been resisting almost constant Slovak pressure for the destruction
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of the common state of Czechs and Slovaks. We sincerely deplore the actual split but 
we repeat that we shall not allow any farcical transformation into a semi-detached 
house or Czecho-Slovak union. Such a form of state is not in the interests of the 
citizens of the Czech Republic and we shall not create it under any circumstances” 
{Mlada Fronta dnes, Hospodarske noviny, Metropolitni Telegraf 2.10.1992). The 
Assembly had been shown its place; when Klaus had finally designated the federal 
government a caretaker role he had expected the legislature to likewise consider itself 
temporary. If federal deputies now rejected dissolution he would describe them as 
instruments of leftist recidivism and would write them out of the process altogether^*.
Federal government members were given until Wednesday 7th to submit their final 
opinions {Svobodne slovo 3.10.1992:1). The Slovak government in turn postponed the 
joint meeting under preparation for Zidlochovice and informed the Czechs that it 
should be held only after the amendments to the Laws on Responsibilities were passed 
by the Federal Assembly - laws devolving competences that the Slovaks needed 
urgently. They also proposed that the MDS and CDP delegations meet at Zidlochovice 
as parties. Though not ruling it out Klaus commented; “the Slovak side is putting itself 
in a complex situation as it is developing several games and will have problems in 
keeping them under its control” {Mlada Fronta dnes, Pravda 5.10.1992). This was 
undoubtedly true. Meciar, it appeared, was attempting to hold the state to ransom. 
Klaus and Meciar agreed to meet on the 9th, but before then Meciar expressed his 
regret that “[t]he arrival of Mr. Klaus at the Parliament resulted in the cancellation of 
all agreements, i.e. between the CDP and MDS” . Meciar also claimed to have warned 
the CDP that without compromises the Dissolution Bill would be blocked, that the 
preservation of a union remained an issue prior to the manner of state dissolution, and 
that a MDS-led coalition existed to defend this idea. Lastly, Meciar had suggested that 
the MDS might overcome its reservations about property division with mumal 
agreement, explaining: “[w]e do not care whether we lose a billion or 5 billion, but we 
are not ready to lose everything” {Mlada Fronta dnes, Pravda 6.10.1992). Klaus’s 
judgement as to what constituted a credible threat however, remained unmoved.
The following day the Assembly also failed to propose a candidate for the sixth round presidential 
election. The seventh would take place on the 26th November.
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Klaus’s considered public reply exuded resolve. “At this moment” he maintained, 
“decisions are made about our future, the cards have been given out and the slightest 
hesitation, slightest weakness on our side, could have catastrophic consequences for the 
future of the Czech state and the Czech nation”. To the point, Klaus explained that he 
had the document necessary for the declaration of Czech independence “in his 
drawer” , and could use it at any time. In suggesting that Czech independence was an 
obvious solution, if complex so long as the Federal Assembly still functioned 
{Metropolitni Telegraf, Mlada Fronta dnes 6.10.1992), Klaus made it plain that 
Meciar’s powers of obstruction were an irritant at most. The Czechoslovak Social 
Democrat chairman Jiri Horak swiftly disassociated his party from the union idea 
{Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik 7.10.1992).
At Jihlava it was confirmed, after eight hours, that the federation would be dissolved on 
January 1st, 1993. Klaus said the talks had opened the way to making the Assembly 
and other Federal bodies ‘operative’ and treaties would be discussed between the two 
governments within the week and passed to the National Councils. Asked if the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia still supported a union, Meciar replied that the 
CDP had refused to accept either confederation or union and the MDS had decided to 
“respect” this fact, as it had also abandoned thoughts for a 1993 budget. Klaus 
confirmed that the Assembly might now pass the Competence Law. Both sides had 
agreed to support the Bill on the Dissolution of the Federation in the Federal Assembly 
and on CDP initiative, both had signed a communiqué:
“Against its original viewpoint, CDP had come to respect, during the first-post- 
electoral negotiations, MDS disagreement with the continued existence o f the 
Federation o f the Czech and Slovak Republic, and has expressed its disagreement with 
transforming the federation into a confederation. Therefore it did not, and does not 
adhere to the existing Federal arrangement. Similarly MDS respects the fact that CDP 
disagrees with the formation o f a union o f the Czech and Slovak Republic, and with 
efforts to transform the Federation into a confederation. Both sides have assured one 
another that they will only proceed further in this matter on the basis o f mutual 
agreement. MDS and CDP will promote the conclusion o f partial agreements such as a
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customs union, a monetary and payment agreement, etc. which should come into force 
on 1st January 1993” (Mlada Fronta dnes 7.10.1992:1).
How had Klaus persuaded Meciar of the futility of attempts to form a Czech-Slovak 
union, so soon after he had staked CDP cooperation and all previous CDP-MDS 
agreements on the opposite? Before the Jihlava meeting began Klaus had told 
journalists “nothing can be agreed upon unless the Slovak side completely changes the 
approach it has been following in the past few days” ... “[a]n elementary honesty is 
needed on the part of the Slovak side”. The CDP had then handed the MDS the 
communiqué at the beginning of the meeting together with a written pledge to desist 
from promoting a union, and had explained that they, the CDP, would leave the 
meeting unless the MDS signed. Anticipating, correctly, that Meciar would resist, 
Klaus had been careful to offer him a way out, even though the communiqué excluded 
the word ‘Union’ - the chief term of the MDS election campaign. The communiqué’s 
final sentence permitted Meciar to say with satisfaction that “one union with a capital U 
has been replaced by several unions each with a small u”, his expressed and prescient 
fear being that Vaclav Klaus would renege on these later {Mlada Fronta dnes 
9.10.1992:8).
The communiqué had not, however, mentioned property and Meciar hung on to this 
Bill as still unacceptable - Slovakia would demand financial compensation. Property, he 
confided to the press, was the real cause of the current dispute and, bizarrely, he 
offered asylum to any Czechs fleeing that republic when the situation there “got worse” 
{Mlada Fronta dnes, Narodna obroda 7.10.1992). Czech Finance Minister Ivan 
Kocarnik reminded Meciar of the gravity of his economic situation, pointing out that on 
the 5th October the Slovak deficit had reached 5 billion Czechoslovak crowns and that 
the situation was becoming critical - foreign banks had ceased loaning money to 
Slovakia and government bond sales had collapsed. “Arguments over each crown are a 
dangerous game” he said, emphasising the generosity of the 2:1 ratio still being offered 
by the Czechs {Hospodarske noviny, Mlada Fronta dnes 7.10.1992).
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The Bill on the Devolution of Responsibilities was passed on the 8th October. This 
stipulated that in the interim there would only continue to be six Federal ministries, the 
Ministry of Inspection being added to the original five {Hospodarske noviny 
9.10.1992:1,2). Defending himself against charges from his own party that Jihlava 
represented a betrayal, Meciar once again promised a referendum {Rude pravo 
8.10.1992:1). On a television panel discussing the first 100 days of the Slovak 
government Meciar again protested that the CDP had stepped beyond their original 
agreements: “I managed to claw at least two months back, otherwise the Czech and 
Slovak Federative Republic would not have been in existence now” {Mlada Fronta dnes 
9.10.1992:1) he explained.
The two republican governments met at Prague-Kolodeje castle on the 10th October. 
Within only six hours the elementary principles of cooperation between the two 
independent republics had been agreed, including the establishment of a customs union. 
Some 90 per cent of the drafts had been submitted by Prague. As for future monetary 
arrangements it came out in the familiar three stages first promoted by Klaus, Meciar 
even echoing that the duration of the crown zone would depend on financial conditions. 
The debate foundered this time on new citizenship rules (Mlada Fronta dnes, 
Metropolitni Telegraf 12.10.1992).
The Federal government issued an extended policy statement, its agenda and priorities. 
These were entirely economic, true to the fixedly pragmatic role it had been assigned. 
The Federal government considered “as its main priorities the maintenance of macro- 
economic stability throughout the entire territory, a continuation of quick privatisation 
and the prevention of a deficit in the state budget” . In its only allusion to the public’s 
interest the statement promised to settle constitutional questions without jeopardising the 
savings of citizens, their property, or the property belonging to enterprises. Until 
completion of the constitutional arrangement the government pledged to ensure united 
action on foreign affairs and in international relations generally (Hospodarske noviny 
13.10.1992:2)^^. Adopting a non-confrontational response. Assembly Chairman Michal
This last pledge came to haunt the Government when conflict over the Gabcikovo Nagymyros dam 
erupted. The project had been agreed in 1977 but was condemned by democratic Hungary as a border 
change. The dispute forced the Federal Government to intervene and cooperate with international
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Kovac (MDS) asked only that the government submit to the parliament a programme of 
the legislative activity of the Cabinet, and that the national legislatures meet more 
adequately the needs of the Assembly in evaluating Bills.
In Slovakia Meciar permitted himself another breach of the federal constitution. 
Though according to the Slovak constitution the Premier would inherit presidential 
powers in the absence of an appointee his government conferred on Meciar the 
immediate right to represent Slovakia abroad, to conclude and ratify international 
treaties, to receive and appoint ambassadors, to declare amnesties and most ominously, 
to appoint the General Procurator and members of the Constitutional Court. Federal 
Premier Strasky confessed himself surprised (Pravda, Mlada Fronta dnes 14.10.1992). 
Klaus dismissed it as “a unilateral act which is about as important as the approval of the 
Slovak constitution” {Hospodarske noviny 15.10.1992:1). In a memorandum for 
presentation to European Community President John Major the two governments 
pledged at their Javorina meeting (25th-26th^®) to maintain a high level of economic 
integration and to apply the principles of free market and pluralist democracy. At the 
same time Klaus hedged as to the duration of a Czech/Slovak single currency with the 
statement that conditions would “not only be implemented by states, banks or 
governments, but by all citizens in their handling of the Czechoslovak crown”^^  
{Hospodarske noviny, Mlada Fronta dnes, Pravda 27.10.1992).
Only limited demonstrations, for and against the separation, marked the state-founding 
anniversary. During his speech following the presentation of the T.G . Masaryk Orders, 
Jan Strasky regretted that “in intoxication from newly-acquired freedom and renewing
arbitration {Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik and Narodna obroda 20.10.1992 Telegraf 21.10.1992:6) 
leaving Meciar free to threaten ‘force’ even though he excluded military aggression. Germany and the EC 
threatened Slovakia with diplomatic non-recognition {Mlada Fronta dnes and Rude pravo  24.10.1992) and 
the dispute did much to bolster the Czech reputation as the honourable party in the divorce.
With 15 prepared draft agreements approved; customs union, cooperation over monetary questions, 
employment, social security, the environment, education, public health, cooperation of security bodies, 
legal aid, proceeding for evidence, and several on border questions. Having rejected the Slovak proposal 
for dual citizenship the CDP also prevailed at Javorina with the decision that each republic would regulate 
the issue separately.
Earlier, several thousand attended the celebration of the renewal o f the Czech state, organised by the 
CDP at Prague’s Vysehrad. Uhde observed that the Czech state was not being established at the choice of 
its inhabitants. “The Slovak nation did not feel free with us and we decided to respect that feeling”. Klaus 
was applauded when he said “Good relations with Slovakia are more important than haggling about a 
couple of billions” {Lidove noviny 26.10.1992:1).
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democracy, the common state has gradually been questioned and dismantled with 
excessive ruthlessness” and he appealed for Czech “grandeur” throughout the divorce 
{Hospodarske noviny 29.10.1992:1,2). Klaus told journalists that to hold a post­
independence election for the proposed Czech second chamber, the Senate, implied a 
huge waste of time, confirming that the “CDP is in favour of designing a method of 
transferring Federal Assembly deputies” {Mlada Fronta dnes 30.10.1992:2)^^. In an 
IVVM poll from the second week of October, 90 per cent of respondents in both parts 
of the country considered the split of Czechoslovakia certain. {Mlada Fronta dnes 
30.10.1992:2). In an early November poll 50 per cent of Czechs and 40 per cent of 
Slovaks considered the dissolution of the Federation ‘necessary’, and 43 per cent of 
Czech and 49 per cent of Slovaks ‘unnecessary’ {Mlada Fronta dnes, Svobodne slovo 
27.11.1992:1).
November
November was dominated by assertions of republican government authority and by 
horse-trading over legislation. Assertions of government authority in Slovakia were 
both relatively less assured and more arbitrary than in the Czech Republic. 
Representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left and even the Slovak National Party 
stated publicly that Slovakia was not prepared for independent existence and that legal 
chaos loomed^^ {Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik 4.11.1992). After meeting with 
Coexistence the PDL’s Pavol Kanis concluded that both parties considered Slovak 
conditions anti-democratic^'^. “The government does not respect the decisions of 
Parliament and the Slovak National Council is pushed to the wall” said Kanis, claiming 
that all parties bar MDS had “been raped”. Though he speculated that his party’s 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary meetings might create a consolidated opposition, 
such coherent action was not forthcoming {Mlada Fronta dnes, Narodna obroda.
^^Having agreed that it was important for politicians to avoid creating an atmosphere of confrontation 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 31.10.1992:1,2) Klaus and Havel personified the deal on TV’s “This Week’s 
Outcome” . Complementing each other and expressing their joint interests in the new Czech Republic, 
Havel even acknowledged his defeat on direct presidential election {Rude pravo  2.11.1992:1,2). Later 
Klaus further reduced his powers {Mlada Fronta dnes 6.11.1992:2).
When the Party of the Democratic Left leader, Peter Weiss, offered a coalition if “MDS changes the 
policy statement and admits its errors” {Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik 4.11.1992) Meciar only accused 
the Party o f the Democratic Left of endangering the “calm domestic atmosphere”.
The Bratislava Division of the Federal Police had stopped criminal investigation of St.B. (Communist 
secret police) files stolen from Trencin, a case that had loomed against Meciar before the election {Lidove 
noviny 6.11.1992:1).
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Metropolitni Telegraf 5.11.1992). Alexander Dubcek, the one broadly respected pro- 
federal voice in Slovak public life, died of his injuries on the 8th November, aged 71 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 9.11.1992:1).
The 5th joint meeting of the Federal Assembly failed to approve not only the Bill on the 
Dissolution of the FBIS (secret services) but also the policy statement of the 
Czechoslovak government - both blocked by the Slovak part of the House of Nations. 
Those MDS deputies present had voted for the statement (those from the Christian 
Democratic Movement, Party of the Democratic Left and Social Democratic Party of 
Slovakia against) but almost a quarter were absent at the vote. {Svobodne slovo, Mlada 
Fronta dnes 6.11.1992). Federal Premier Strasky was concerned: the rejection of the 
policy statement signalled a potential delay to the major bills of separation.
The republican governments meeting at Zidlochovice in the meantime agreed to sign a 
framework treaty on friendly relations and cooperation. Valid for 15 years and unless 
renounced by either party automatically extended for another five years, Klaus 
described it as a “standard treaty” which “resounded more as a friendly pact” than a 
treaty between two foreign states. The two sides continued to disagree over a defence 
treaty but expressed their desire for the early discussion of the Constitutional Law on 
the Division of Federal Property {Mlada Fronta dnes, Lidove noviny 10.11.1992). Even 
so, both the Dissolution and Division of Property Bills were supported only by 
government parties and the Slovak National Party. Deputies of Czechoslovak Social 
Democracy, the Left Bloc, Left Social Union, Party of the Democratic Left, Christian 
Democratic Movement, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and Coexistence 
continued to insist on the declaration of a referendum, somewhat paradoxically, as a 
condition of their consent to the law on Dissolution.
On the 13th the Federal Assembly, after the third vote, approved the law on the 
Division of Federal Property, to come into force after the endorsement of dissolution. 
Of a total estimated at 633,700 million Czechoslovak crowns, the Czech Republic 
would get 430,000m and the Slovaks 202,000m. The Law was opposed by the far right 
Republicans, Coexistence, a substantial part of the Left Bloc, the Party of Democratic
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Left and several Czechoslovak Social Democracy and Left Social Union deputies. The 
Assembly also approved the dissolution of the FBIS and an amendment to the Law on 
Large Privatisation, separating a further round of coupon privatisation {Mlada Fronta 
dnes 14.11.1992:1,2 and 16.11.1992:,1). During a telephone conversation on the same 
day Meciar and Klaus re-confirmed that the mandate of the Federal deputies would 
vanish with the federal state and that the National Councils would decide these 
deputies’ future. Designed for this purpose, the job transfer to a new second chamber 
in each independent state was now offered as a bribe for ratification of the end of the 
state. J. Horak objected that this was both legally and politically impossible. More of a 
realist, the Communists’ J. Svoboda described it as “a form of corruption” {Mlada 
Fronta dnes 14.11.1992:2). Three days later Havel announced his candidacy for the 
Czech presidency with the words “we must by all means strengthen the culture of 
mutual relations, the civic culture, the culture of a free economic life and of course the 
political culture” {Lidove noviny 17.11.1992).
Meetings of the National Councils passed concurrently and without delay the 
Constitutional Bill on the Dissolution of the Federation. The Czech National Council 
passed the resolution by 106 votes where 67 opposition deputies were against. Two 
draft amendments were rejected: the right-wing Civic Democratic Alliances’s, giving 
the Republics the right to conclude treaties before the dissolution, and the 
Czechoslovak Social Democrat’s, providing that the dissolution be confirmed in a 
referendum. In the Slovak National Council the bill was passed by 73 to 16 votes 
against with 42 abstentions. The council rejected Carnogursky’s (CDM) referenda 
amendment but passed that tabled by the Slovak National Party’s J. Prokes, which 
insisted that those states succeeding the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic must not 
use its symbols. The version of the Bill going to the Federal Assembly included a 
provision that legislative power in the two republics would belong to legislative 
assemblies consisting of deputies elected to the Federal Assembly and the respective 
National Councils {Hospodarske noviny, Mlada Fronta dnes 18.11.1992). The bribe to 
the federal deputies thus remained on the table. On the anniversary of the November 
revolution (November 17th) there were public demonstrations in Prague by two groups.
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cordoned off from one another, one advocating independence, the other federation 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 18.11.1992:1,2).
In the Federal Assembly the government Bill on the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia was 
approved on the 18th only by the House of the People and the Czech section of the 
House of Nations. In the Slovak section, where 45 votes were needed, 42 voted for it, 
18 against and 11 abstained. In the House of the Nations the Bill had been 
unequivocally supported by the deputies of the Civic Democratic Party, Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party and Christian Democratic Union- 
Czechoslovak People’s Party. Conversely the deputies of the Christian Democratic 
Movement, Slovak Democratic Left, Coexistence, Left Bloc, Czechoslovak Social 
Democracy, Slovak Social Democracy and the Republicans either voted against or 
abstained. In the House of the People, the Deputies of the Civic Democratic Party, 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak 
People’s Party, Left Social Union and parts of Czechoslovak Social Democracy and the 
Slovak National Party supported the Bill. The Bill was rejected on the grounds of the 
government’s unwillingness to compromise over a referendum. A committee was 
elected for further negotiations and a re-vote on the 24th November. The Czechoslovak 
Social Democrat’s Ivan Fisera again put forward a referendum amendment which Klaus 
resolutely opposed; “none of those proposing a referendum mean it seriously” he 
protested {Mlada Fronta dnes 19.11.1992:1,2).
Having reminded journalists that the decision over dissolution could fall to the National 
Councils, Klaus stressed the importance of the Constitutional Bill on Measures 
Connected with the Dissolution of the Federation, already approved by the Czech 
government. Though formally dependent on the Dissolution Bill, Klaus suggested that 
this Czech legislation was applicable for any form of constitutional division. The Bill 
on Measures enabled the Czech Republic to function as an independent state while 
guaranteeing continuity over its existence within Czechoslovakia. Besides continuity in 
the legal system it tackled the responsibilities of the basic state institutions, the transfer 
of rights and obligations and continuity in foreign policy and succession. If approved in 
the National Council, this Bill would come into effect on the day of promulgation and
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not on the first day of independent statehood (Hospodarske noviny 19.11.1992:1,2). 
Klaus thus made it clear yet again that if the Assembly was going to cause delays, its 
authority would be hollowed out.
On the 19th, the Czech National Council approved a resolution echoing Klaus’s point: 
“The Czech National Council is motivated by an effort to ensure calm progress in the 
constitutional situation, particularly progress which is orientated towards forming an 
independent Czech state from January 1st, 1993. Aware of its responsibility to the 
citizens of the Czech Republic, the Czech National Council has declared that together 
with the Czech government, it accepts full responsibility for continuing state power 
throughout the Czech Republic and for the protection of the interests and the needs of 
the citizens of the Czech Republic”. It was approved by 109 votes (from a government 
coalition of 105 in a chamber of 200). Their ‘mandate’ confirmed, Czech deputy 
premier Kalvoda (the nationalist-leaning leader of the Civic Democratic Alliance) 
insisted that from now on the Czech National Council and the Czech government had 
the right to approve, irrespective of the views of federal bodies, laws and measures 
which would ensure the fiill functioning of the independent Czech Republic from 
January 1st, 1993 {Mlada Fronta dnes, Hospodarske noviny and Lidove noviny
20.11.1992).
A highly contrasting but equally instructive scene was being played out in Slovakia, 
where the 8th meeting of the Slovak parliament finally approved the government bill on 
referenda. According to the law, Slovak radio and television would give ten 
broadcasting hours to a referendum campaign, equally divided among parliamentary 
parties (thus excluding the pro-federalist Public Against Violence-Civic Democratic 
Union, from which Meciar’s MDS had first sprung as a populist faction) (Lidova 
demokracie 20.11.1992:1). The Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the 
Slovak National Council, M. Secansky declared it impossible to call a referendum by 
the end of 1992, however, since it would cost Slovakia lOOmillion Kcs {Mlada Fronta 
dnes 23.11.1992:2). The long-promised law was thus provided, along with justification 
for its permanent delay^^ .
In continuing talks between the presidia o f the Czech and Slovak governments in Bratislava (Klaus was 
absent due to a tennis injury) Meciar and Kocarnik continued to disagree over the division o f the real estate
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As the 5th joint meeting of the Federal Assembly reconvened it became clear the 
negotiations committee had failed. Government parties needed one more vote in the 
Czech section and three votes in the Slovak section of the House of Nations, and two 
more in the House of the People. The Slovak opposition in particular continued to 
block the Bill through several negotiating rounds, until all were confronted by a version 
of the Bill which lacked the bribing clause transferring federal deputies to their new 
national second chambers {Svobodne slovo 25.11.1992:1). Presented with this 
essentially private-interest ultimatum, eventually all three chambers approved the Law 
on the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 25th November, including the decision that no 
referendum on the dissolution would occur
The vote was met by stormy applause from the gallery and deputies. Klaus observed 
that it was an important sign to other countries who had feared a Yugoslav-type 
collapse. “I believe that the voting represents a gesture of calmness to the whole 
world” . Vaclav Havel approved of the endorsement of the highest legislative body. 
Meciar commented that when Parliament had appeared at the threshold of its self- 
destruction, it became aware of its importance and approached the vote reasonably^^. 
Federal premier Strasky concluded drily that it implied the “maintenance of a political 
culture” .
With dissolution assured, the Czech side hardened its stance on property negotiations 
and threatened to bring coupon privatisation into the equation if the Slovaks persisted in 
questioning agreed principles'^. The Czech government meanwhile met on the 27th and
property o f Federal institutions. They did however agree that no common military doctrines would exist, so 
ending any vestiges of military union.
The Law included Article four which confirmed; “legislative power in [both republics] will be 
transferred to a legislative body, consisting of deputies elected in the 1992 elections in [both republics] to 
the Federal Assembly of the CSFR, and those elected to the [National Councils]. The detailed conditions of 
this legislative body will be set in harmony with Article 7. Article 7 endowed the National Councils with 
the right, before the dissolution of the CSFR but having no effect earlier than 1.1.1993, to approve 
constitutional and other laws, which would ensure the activities transferred to the Czech and Slovak 
republic according to article 2 ”{Mlada Fronta dnes, Narodna obroda, Hospodarske noviny, Svobodne 
slovo, Lidove noviny and Rude pravo  26.11.1992). Realising the promise of transfer was now in the hands 
o f the respective National Councils.
During the four rounds of coupon privatisation so far, Slovak holders o f investment coupons and Slovak 
investment privatisation funds had gained stocks of Czech enterprises amounting to Kcs 18,800 million
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approved the draft budget for 1993 {Mlada Fronta dnes 28.11.1992:1). At a press 
conference Kocarnik announced “the first budget of the independent Czech Republic 
will be balanced” and reported that Czech inflation was the lowest among the post­
communist countries and would not exceed 12 per cent by the end of the year {Mlada 
Fronta dnes, Rude pravo and Lidove noviny 1.12.1992).
The 6th meeting of the Federal Assembly was inquorate owing to absentees in the 
Slovak section of the House of the Nations. Fatalism had finally set in. The Houses 
recommended that yet another round of presidential elections could now, at last, be 
cancelled {Svobodne slovo 28.11.1992:1). Asked whether any new complications had 
arisen in the Czecho-Slovak Commission for the Division of Federal Property Strasky 
said no; “no new complications... The Czech side resolutely insists on the territorial 
principle of the division of federal real estate, without any further financial settlements. 
Slovakia reacts as always by playing the card of yet another enterprise which should be 
reassessed and its division adjusted” {Mlada Fronta dnes 30.11.1992:1,2).
December
In the last month of the federation the republican governments turned to face the 
domestic issues sidelined over the previous months. The need to ratify a new Czech 
constitution demanded much of the Civic Democratic Party’s attention since the 
proposals were causing friction even within the governing coalition. In its last days, the 
Federal Assembly continued its task of dissolving the administrative centre - when it 
was not made inquorate by absentee Slovak deputies {Mlada Fronta dnes, Svobodne 
slovo, Cesky denik 3.12.1992). In Slovakia the political situation degenerated further as 
the government sought to prosecute journalists hostile to the Meciar regime {Mlada 
Fronta dnes and Zemedelske noviny 1.12.1992:2). In a statement lifted verbatim from 
the communist era, Meciar warned that “anyone who attacks the government, attacks 
the whole Republic and its citizens” .
Despite Klaus’s calls for a smooth transfer of power the Movement for Self-Governing 
Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia, the Republicans and Left Bloc deputies in
whereas Czechs had sought out only some Kcs 4,500 million of Slovak property {Mlada Fronta dnes 
27.11.1992:1).
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the Czech National Council still opposed the transfer of federal deputies, they also had 
sympathisers, though they were overmled, in the coalition Civic Democratic Alliance. 
Alive to such problems however, the Civic Democratic Party had carefully separated 
the transfer issue from ratification of the draft constitution^* {Hospodarske noviny 
4.12,1992:2 Mlada Fronta dnes 5.12.1992:1,2)^^. Having first approved the reception 
law enabling the smooth transfer of federal legislation and powers {Mlada Fronta dnes, 
Slobodne slovo 16.12.1992:1) the Czech National Council approved the Czech 
constitution on the 16th. Of 198 deputies present, 172 voted for it, 16 against and 10 
abstained. Klaus described the endorsement as the “logical result of the whole political 
development since the moment when the Czech public rejected the Communist regime” 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 17.12.1992:1,2): a remarkable verdict indicating that Klaus was 
unsurprised by the impact of democratic and radical market policies on Czech and 
Slovak coexistence, his previous statements notwithstanding.
The Federal Assembly marked the end of its activity on the 17th by singing the 
Czechoslovak anthem. In his closing speech Strasky declared that Czechs had regarded 
Czechoslovakia as the state which could fulfill their ideas about democracy, whereas 
the different attitude of the Slovaks had always been present, even before November 
1989. Since then, he said, the Slovaks had shown their dissatisfaction. He congratulated 
the Czechs for their recognition of Slovakia’s natural right to independence, concluding 
that “Czechs owe nothing to Slovaks, and I venture to claim that Slovaks are aware of 
this fact” . Federal Assembly Chairman Kovac (MDS) confirmed that Czechoslovakia 
had indeed fulfilled the idea of Czech national statehood but pointed out that “Slovaks 
could only start to fulfill their aspirations after the 1992 elections”, and emphasised the 
considerable achievement represented by the peaceful and ‘constitutional’ end to the 
state {Mlada Fronta dnes 1,2, Cesky denik 18.12.1992:1).
Meciar’s proposal to form a second chamber with federal deputies was rejected by the MDS Council, the 
Movement’s advisory body, and later by the MDS presidium, meeting on the 12th. Meciar, unperturbed, 
said the establishment of a second chamber would have anyway been too complicated {Mlada Fronta dnes 
14.12.1992:2). As for the presidency Meciar announced a likely election in January 1993, the anticipated 
candidate being Michal Kovac (MDS) {Cesky denik 5.12.1992:2).
By way of a reminder representatives of all clubs of deputies in the Federal Assembly (excepting the 
Republicans) wrote to the Czech National Council that: “A calm birth of the Czech state with full successor 
rights would be questioned if the Czech National Council disassociated itself from the constitutional Laws 
of the Federal Assembly set for the dissolution of the federation” {Mlada Fronta dnes 5.12.1992:2).
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The Czech National Council approved the Law on state symbols on the 17th but, with 
some emphasis, broke the Slovak National Party’s constitutional amendment in the 
process. Having barkened to Strasky’s sentiments it was decided that the Czech 
Republic would continue to use the current federal flag without any change to the blue 
(‘Slovak’) wedge, along with other traditional symbols {Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky 
denik 18.12.1992:1). By their decision the Czechs had “confirmed that they had 
regarded Czechoslovakia as the Czech lands and that Slovak had always been playing 
second fiddle” concluded Ivan Gasparovic, Chairman of the Slovak National Council. 
In retaliation Slovaks could also declare the Czechoslovak state flag as the Slovak flag, 
he suggested, though he assured that they would not {Mlada Fronta dnes 
18.12.1992:2).
In these last weeks the Slovak government appeared harassed from all sides by the 
secretive manoeuvres of its own leader and a collapse of official information. Slovak 
ministers learned belatedly of Meciar’s meeting with Russia’s Victor Chernomyrdin. 
They also found themselves considerably beneath the Czechs in the estimation of 
international organisations. The majority of states did not reckon with opening 
diplomatic missions in Bratislava; ambassadors accredited to Slovakia would reside in 
either Prague or Vienna. Pavel Bratinka, Czech Minister of International Relations, 
told the European Parliament that the federation was dividing solely because most 
Slovaks had felt no loyalty towards the Czechoslovak Republic {Metropolitni Telegraf 
2.12.1992:3)^^. When Klaus announced that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
quotas would be divided in the ratio 2.29:1 and not 2:1, (the quotas affecting the 
granting of credits) H. Koctuch, chairman of the Slovak Budgetary Committee 
complained that they had not received the IMF Special Report at all. Koctuch’s 
objections must have provoked wry comment in the Czech Republic. The document, 
Koctuch complained, should have gone to the Federal Premier, since “Czechoslovakia 
still exists” {Mlada Fronta dnes 19.12.1992:2).
Slovakia’s reputation fell under further scrutiny when an operative bugging device was found in the U .S. 
consulate in Bratislava {Telegraf, Mlada Fronta dnes 7.12.1992). Meciar claimed that the discovery was 
orchestrated by Prague to discredit the Slovak state and that, according to available information “a bug is to 
be discovered at the offices of the Christian Democratic Movement and the government is to be accused of 
bugging political parties or their leaders. Other provocations are under preparation. Of course we shall 
reject and withstand them” {Mlada Fronta dnes 12.12.1992:1,2). Few doubted that Meciar’s forces were 
responsible.
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A meeting of the Federal Assembly presidium agreed the mandate of federal deputies 
would not end following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, since mandates could only 
be abolished by elections and not by the National Councils. They also decided that 
deputies’ legal immunity should be dissolved by elections in 1996, though conceded 
that their material benefits were a matter for the successor states. Strasky responded to 
these federal musings with an abrupt letter to the presidium declaring the Assembly’s 
autumn session closed (Mlada Fronta dnes 1,2, Rude pravo 23.12.1992:2). With the 
ultimate fate of federal deputies still in Czech government hands, it was agreed that 
National Council Chairman Milan Uhde could invite them to the planned gala meeting 
in Vladislav Hall on January 1st, 1993, as a mark of the public’s appreciation of their 
work (Mlada Fronta dnes. Rude pravo, Cesky denik 23.12.1992:1).
The planned celebrations for independence were sedate, to be marked with speeches 
from Uhde and Vaclav Klaus, an ecumenical mass at St.Vitus’s Cathedral and a gala 
concert of the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra at the Dvorak Hall in Prague: all to be 
broadcast on television and transmitted onto screens in Jan Palach Square (Rude pravo 
22.12.1992:2). In Slovakia the National Council agreed that, together with the 
diplomatic corps and government they would attend a gala meeting on independence 
day with speeches from the Council chairman and premier Meciar (Hospodarske noviny 
23.12.1992:2). On December 18th moreover, the Slovak government released 25 
million Crowns - 5 crowns per capita - for the celebrations of the first day of Slovak 
independence. These finances would be covered by government reserves, set for 
extraordinary expenditures (Lidove noviny 31.12.1992:2).
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Chapter 3
Competing and Complementary Explanations of the Partition
Introduction
This chapter sets out some theoretical perspectives with which to advance a deeper 
investigation of how and why the Czechoslovak state separated. Apart from the 
essential question ‘why?’, the end of Czechoslovakia poses two additional and in the 
circumstances of state separation, highly unusual questions - ‘why did it fall apart so 
quickly?’ - i.e. without any serious attempt at an alternative configuration, and ‘why 
did it fall apart in such a nice way?’ - i.e. without violence.
The circumstances in which the state collapsed, moreover, just three years after the re- 
emergence of democracy following the communist collapse, offers many possible 
approaches to these questions. Nationalism, the ambiguous nature of the state, the 
double political and economic transition, state-building, institutional failure, relative 
deprivation, latent grievances and populism were all present to some degree in post- 
1989 Czechoslovakia.
It is the post-communist political environment that constitutes the main focus of this 
thesis. The aim is, as far as is possible, to analyse the critical arguments, conflicts and 
decisions which hastened Czechoslovakia to its end. From these the thesis attempts to 
filter out those phenomena manifestly peculiar to a communist collapse and to consider 
their relative importance as causal factors in the separation. My method is to examine 
the available evidence as closely as possible whilst limiting the assumptions about the 
‘transition’ from communism. Many transition theorists have tended to presume a 
developmental trajectory toward democracy. ‘Return of history’ arguments at the other 
extreme have tended to assume the return of the ‘worst’ history, i.e. authoritarianism 
and genocidal national conflict. As far as possible I try to avoid assumptions regarding 
expected developmental paths. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter to explain 
some of the theory-based approaches which might simplify the puzzle. (For some basic 
comparative context see Appendix I)
The argument
The difficulties peculiar to the post-communist state and their causal relation to the 
state’s demise may clearly be exaggerated. The coincidence of the socialist and federal 
collapse may be all too easily mistaken for a complete explanation: post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc - ‘it followed therefore it was caused by it’. It is nevertheless the claim of 
this thesis that one may demonstrate that the critical steps to separation resulted from  
elite-level disagreements over issues exclusive to the reform period rather than from  
elite responses to historic, mass-level societal conflicts.
Though these elite disagreements fell most distinctly along the national fault-line in 
Czechoslovakia, it is a further claim of this thesis that analysis o f the conflict as a 
‘nationalist’ or ‘ethnic conflict’ is deeply misleading. This assertion, however, leads us 
to the problematic issue of whether a defence of ‘national interest’ in other than 
‘nationalist’ terms e.g. ‘protecting democracy’ or ‘economic necessity’ may be sensibly 
designated as a nationalist impulse. As the thesis argues, the two leading political 
parties most important to the dispute, Vladimir Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia and Vaclav Klaus’s Czech Civic Democratic Party, can not be compressed 
into any meaningful category of nationalist party, even though both proved skillful at 
manipulating the nationalist idiom, national stereotypes and even national grievances. 
The deeper and more problematic characteristics of both these parties lay precisely in 
their rootlessness in terms of constituency, in Klaus’s continuing attachment to a 
technocratic sociology of reform, and the corresponding willingness of both leaders to 
adopt short term issues of the transition as the basis of their political programmes and 
electoral strategies.
My core argument - that the separation was caused by the distinctive politics of the 
transition period - rests upon two main pillars. The first is that Vaclav Klaus’s dogmatic 
definition o f a ‘functioning federation’ - a definition derived from neo-liberal 
conceptions o f economic reform - proved the main barrier to agreement in 
constitutional talks over the future o f the state. The definition carried ‘an imperative’ of 
a strong and sovereign ‘federal’ centre, and permitted of no confederal rights for the 
two republics. The definition promised a reversal in Slovakia’s constitutional fortunes
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at the very time when Slovaks expected some radical adjustment in their favour. 
Secondly, the opportunities fo r opposition to separation were shaped neither by fully 
functioning democratic nor communist institutions but by the distinctive environment o f 
inherited and newly animated communist institutions combined with nascent democratic 
institutions, such as the multi-party system. This institutional ensemble continued to 
develop and adapt, undisciplined and unpatterned by broadly accepted rules of 
procedure and principle, up to the very day the state was ended. This is not to say that 
there was institutional chaos, a political vacuum without ruling precepts, unfathomable 
institutional flux. Indeed the prominent architects of institutional development between 
1989 and 1993 may be readily identified and their impact assessed. Electorally self- 
serving, short term arguments regarding optimal paths o f reform acted as the 
framework o f party contestation and as the dominant, guiding precepts governing 
parliamentary behaviour. Broad-based public opposition to the separation was 
ineffectual against elite-proclaimed ‘reform imperatives’. Unravelling the political 
interests behind the discourse of ‘transitional reform’ is the most appropriate task for 
understanding the separation.
To sort any such conclusions from the complex evidence at hand it is necessary to 
adopt consistent theoretical lines of inquiry. To this end I have chosen six alternative 
theories of state weakness in the hope that investigating their merits might illuminate 
and ultimately bring to the surface a satisfactory explanation of the state’s demise.
Theoretical approaches
Maurice Vile has pointed out that “[n]o federation has survived with only two or three 
units of government at the lower level. It is indeed very unlikely that such a federation 
could survive, because federal systems operate on the basis of the bargaining between 
shifting coalitions of groups, bringing about compromises because no single group or 
coalition of groups is in a continually dominant position. The danger of an 
irreconcilable confrontation between the units in a two-unit federation is so great that 
sooner or later it would lead to civil war, secession, or both” . Further conditions of 
successful federations, he adds, “would be the requirement that no single member state 
should be in such a dominant positions that it can dictate the policies of the federal
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government” and “the development of a party system which will provide those political 
linkages across the boundaries of the member states, without which the process of 
bargaining and compromise essential to federal politics cannot take place” (Vile 
1982:222). The theoretical arguments set out below explore all of the critical points 
raised in the above statement, but they also explore the possibility that Czechoslovakia 
after 1989 was neither democratic nor federal, but a state in transition.
Vile’s argument raises the crucial question of institutional stability, and the capacity for 
institutions to structure politics, and thus, political conflict. Vile identifies the problem 
of communal intransigence compounded by the structure of the state, and anticipates a 
conflict without any source of arbitration. His assertions that the oppositional 
characteristics of a bi-communal federation doom it to a collapse are, however, 
potentially inadequate to explain our case, as they gloss over many of the distinct 
problems of the communist inheritance and the post-communist transition. The 
theoretical arguments set out below open up the debate to the possibility of an unstable, 
highly manipulable and still developing state.
The six alternative arguments, each framed around the major known facts of the 
Czechoslovak separation, have been chosen for their varying capacity to capture 
systemic change, their necessary depth of time horizon, and for their breadth of 
engagement with all levels of the state, (from the realm of social cleavages to that of 
elite decision-making and beyond to a geopolitical perspective). That said, they are not 
intended to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it will become clear that these 
arguments in various combinations are complementary to one another, despite a 
number of overlaps and contradictions. They are as follows:
1) The inevitability argument - nationalism
This contends that ethnonationalism was at the root of the separation and that the anti­
communist revolution of 1989 did not so much engender conflict as reveal and unleash 
it.
2) The inequality argument - relative deprivation
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Observing that economic relations between the Czech lands and Slovakia had always 
been fraught, and that after 1989 economic reform proved especially controversial, this 
argument suggests that it was Slovakia’s persistent relative deprivation in particular that 
motivated secessionist impulses (in both republics), which in turn led to separation.
3) The démocratisation argument - state-restructuring
This argument contends that there were fundamental differences and incompatible 
notions of what kind of democratic state should be built and consequently, of how the 
state should be restructured. Diverging perceptions of democratising, and of 
concomitant state-restructuring needs among Czech, Slovak and Federal governing 
elites led to growing conflict and the breakdown of common institutions.
4) The institutional argument - path-dependency
This view proposes that once pre-communist, communist and post-communist 
institutions, (in particular, separate party systems and communist constitutional rules), 
were animated in a democratic setting, political interests and contestation were 
structured in such a way as to make consensus building impossible. Divergence was, 
therefore, institution-led.
5) The party competition argument - party autonomy
This argument contends that the process of party formation and the post-election 
fragmentation of the Czech and Slovak anti-communist civic movements into competing 
factions permitted the development of highly oligarchic and autonomous political 
parties, the most successful of which adopted ‘catch-all’ strategies of electoral 
competition. The vagueness of party programmes and campaigns, particularly on the 
alternative models of state-design, left the way open for unaccountable elite action.
6) The realist argument - leadership choices
Following the party autonomy argument, this ‘realist’ account contends that in the 
absence of democratic and representative institutions the fullest rein was given to elite 
decision-making, and the separation was duly concocted by leaders with demonstrably 
rational private power interests in republican independence.
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The inevitability argument
It has been argued that whereas during the Cold War period even weak states could 
survive purely on their international juridicial status, in the post-Cold War era 
secessionist claims were peculiarly tempting and opportune, since eastern bloc states 
found themselves unable to draw upon outside resources with which to halt such claims 
(Bunce 1996:10). Nationalism, one might add, is more powerful in open and 
competitive regimes.
An ‘inevitability’ theory of nationalism has clear exponents among the many who see in 
1989 post-communist Europe a ‘return of history’. As Adam Przeworski warned back 
in 1991: “one should not forget that, except in Bohemia, the political culture that was 
suppressed by communists in the aftermath of World War II was a nationalist, 
religious, authoritarian amalgam that gave rise to several dictatorships during the 
interwar period. This culture was frozen under communist rule: it had no chance to 
evolve in the direction of democracy, as it did in France, Italy and Finland...” 
(Przeworski 1991:93)\ Others have made more positive arguments as to why 
nationalism in particular survived the communist repression. According to Miklos 
Szabo, national self-identification acted as one of the repositories of social autonomy in 
the face of a political system designed to eradicate non-socialist culture, as a welcome 
shield against the loss of cultural identity (in Schopflin 1991:14).
The doom-mongers who anticipate that the nationalist, religious and authoritarian 
politics of the interwar period will once again come to the fore may also draw upon an 
old line of argument within the nationalism literature, one which, unfortunately, has 
blunted our critical understanding of the variety of roles played by nationalism in 
twentieth century Eastern Europe. The popular view that Eastern European nationalism 
is of an unusually vicious variety has its roots in the historic absence there of state 
structures broadly corresponding to political cultures. The region, as a consequence.
' Adherents to this view it should be noted, come dangerously close to ascribing a profound malignancy to 
Eastern European politics. In Przeworski's view “The flare-ups of nationalist ideologies and of ethnic 
conflicts, and a burst of anti-Semitism constitute symptoms o f the vitality of organicist ideologies in Eastern 
Europe” (ibid.).
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has frequently suffered from different nations competing for the same populations, and 
the use of nationhood criteria for the often brutal extension and assumption of political 
power (Schopflin 1991:9). The resulting tangled web of actual and potential conflicts 
has prompted several scholars to condemn the Eastern European impulse to nationhood 
in toto. Hans Kohn (1944) saw Eastern nationalism as entirely negative even while he 
accepted the Western variant as largely positive. He identified the former with 
authoritarianism and irrationality and the latter with democracy and rationality 
(1991:9)^. For my purposes, Przeworski, Szabo and Kohn suggest that national 
sentiment may have remained a vital force in the region, that nationalism ‘will out’ 
whatever history delivers, but also that clear historical precedents exist here of 
opportunists, as well as nationalists, mobilising popular national sentiment as the 
obvious path to legitimacy and power.
The ‘inevitability’ argument contends that ethnonationalism was at the root o f the 
Czechoslovak separation and that the revolution o f 1989 did not so much engender a 
national conflict as reveal it. Following Przeworski, we may view the ‘transition’ as 
when the underlying cultures of the region ‘defrosted’, releasing a long-suppressed 
national self-identification and will to self-determination among Slovaks and a 
reformulation of Czech ideas about common statehood in recognition of the depth of 
Slovak national desires. This argument resembles the official Czech version of the 
causes of separation as offered by Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party. In the closing 
session of the Federal Assembly on the 17th December 1992, Federal Premier Strasky 
(CDP) declared that Czechs had always regarded Czechoslovakia as the state which 
could fulfill their ideas about democracy, whereas the different attitude of the Slovaks 
had always been present, even before 1989, and he congratulated Czechs on their 
recognition of Slovakia’s natural right to independence (Mlada Fronta dnes 1,2, Cesky 
denik 1:18.12.1992).
 ^ That the collapse of Yugoslavia was greeted with fatalism in the West is arguably one of the great 
unintended consequences of this view. The belief that Serbs and Croats were ‘at it again’ blunted the edge 
o f Western moral outrage. Similarly, when Czechoslovakia separated peacefully, the Western reaction was 
one of such relief that the parties involved were rather praised than criticised.
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Given the evidence of the preceding chapter, however, we already have grounds to 
suspect this official Czech account. Meciar’s political acrobatics in the last six months 
of the common state suggest the tactics of an outmanoeuvred opportunist more than 
those of a committed nationalist. The evident shock among Meciar’s colleagues 
following his apparent capitulation to separation also contradicts the Czech claim that 
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was a secessionist nationalist party. The 
Czechs, meanwhile, showed an unmatched will to independence. Without deeper 
investigation of the politics of the preceding two years, however, the impressions of the 
last six months may prove misleading. We have not yet considered the levels of Slovak 
provocation and sentiment which may have driven Klaus to his unyielding attitude. 
Meciar’s capacity for bluff and intrigue, and the basis of his original popularity, 
moreover, clearly require further exploration. Assuming that either Klaus or Meciar (or 
both) had at some time between 1989 and 1993 revealed themselves to be nationalist 
and secessionist therefore, we may offer a simplifying, short-hand version of this 
argument:
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The inevitability argument
Separation
Mobilisation of national rivalries
Latent / frozen national rivalries
1989 Revolution
Election of vigorous rival parties makes the 
federation unworkable
Czech and Slovak national elites 
emerge in democratic conditions
Czechs have electora clout in a centralised 
federation; Slovaks have political clout in a 
confederal world
Evidence in favour of the thesis that nationalism emerged spontaneously onto the 
political scene and caused the split would be i) the more or less rapid emergence of 
political movements which aimed to take and which achieved state power on the basis 
of a more or less separatist nationalist programme, ii) the existence of mobilised mass 
nationalist movements, iii) the existence of strong nationalist and separatist sentiment in 
public opinion data. Evidence against this thesis would be i) the electoral weakness of 
nationalist parties, ii) low levels of nationalist/separatist sentiment in the two republics, 
iii) minimal use of the nationalist card by electorally successful political elites. These 
questions are reviewed in Chapter 4.
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Because we already know from the preceding chapter that the separation was a highly 
elitist affair, with almost no public protest nor public participation in the decision­
making process, for instance, through a referendum, one of the critical questions of the 
thesis as a whole is ‘on what ideological basis did the state-separating elites win and 
exercise power?’. For this reason I am content to adopt Breuilly’s restriction of the 
term ‘nationalism’ to refer to “political movements seeking or exercising state power 
and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1993:2). ‘Nationalist’ 
action and argument are understood here as deriving from a doctrine with three basic 
assertions, that:
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and 
values
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the 
attainment of political sovereignty (Breuilly 1993:2)
As the evidence of the preceding chapter suggests, programmatic nationalism may not 
have dominated the Slovak republic to the extent that Jan Strasky would have us 
believe. Alternatively, the search for nationalist parties may uncover an hitherto 
unsuspected degree of Czech national grievance and national aspiration, previously 
hidden by the communist veneer of unity and the Czech record of national 
complacence. Connor has emphasised that the leaders of nationalist movements may be 
merely opportunistic, motivated not by a nationalist vision at all but by some ulterior 
end - he cites personal gain and class-oriented philosophy (1994:161), which they must 
cloak in nationalist garb in order to mobilise the national sentiments of the masses. 
Clearly, our conflict may still be identified as nationalist in character if the electorate is 
mobilised on that basis, whatever we may conclude about the ‘real’ motives of the 
elites.
Relative deprivation
The image of the nationalist genie leaping from the bottle - or rather from the 
communist fridge - in November 1989 is loaded with assumptions as to the primordial.
97
organic nature of national identity and the capacity of a national conflict to survive 
communist repression unchanged and indeed, invigorated. The argument of nationalist 
revival should perhaps be modified, and more explicitly tailored to post-1989 
conditions as they could be observed. The historical fact of unequal economic 
development between Slovakia and the Czech lands (though also, to a lesser extent, 
between Moravia and Bohemia) and the unique scale of the economic reforms proposed 
in 1990 together suggest that economic factors may have provided fertile grounds for 
the regeneration of the national idea. Among the many theories of nationalism, Ernest 
Gellner’s insight that nationalism springs from modernisation or industrialisation and 
from its uneven diffusion (Gellner 1964:166), may serve as a starting point for 
empirical analysis. Following the principles outlined by Gellner, Tom Nairn’s theory of 
‘relative deprivation’ is particularly suggestive as a platform and sound basis for the 
‘resurrection’ of secessionist impulses in our case.
Nairn proposes that nationalism is, initially at least, the political response of relatively 
less developed i.e. relatively economically deprived areas to the pressures and 
difficulties arising between themselves and more developed societies. Nationalism as 
such he understands to be essentially economic in impulse i.e. not ethno- but eco- 
national (Connor 1994:145). As Naim argues, the intellectuals of a nationalist 
movement must mobilise the masses because, without economic strength (and we may 
perhaps add in our context - without recourse to other equally self-evident social 
cleavages), the “People is all they have got” - the essence, he argues, of the 
“underdevelopment dilemma” (1983:198). As he continues, framing the putative goals 
of nationalism in a way which certainly sits well with our knowledge of historical 
Slovak grievances, “they have to demand progress not as it is thrust upon them initially 
by the metropolitan centre, but ‘on their own terms’. These ‘terms’ are, of course, ones 
which reject the imperialist trappings: exploitation or control from abroad, 
discrimination, military or political domination, and so on” (Nairn 1983:196).
Nairn is otherwise dismissive of the ‘idealist’ (as opposed to the materialist) 
explanations of nationalism: he argues that “nationalism is invariably characterized by a 
high degree of political and ideological voluntarism... It always imagines an ideal
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‘people’ (propped up by folklore studies, antiquarianism, or some surrogate)... Such 
idealism is inseparable both from its creative historical function and its typical 
delusions” (1983:199-200)^. This skepticism too, would seem fitting in the Slovak case, 
given the relative ‘youth’ of the Slovak national identity in the hierarchy of the world’s 
‘historic’ nations.
Confronted as such a theory must be, by the contradictory fact of nationalism within 
well-developed and indeed, prospering regions, Naim admits of a cross-category he 
calls ‘relative over-development’. We in turn might view this as appropriate to the 
Czech case - creating then, a scenario of conflict between two essentially economically- 
motivated nationalisms. Again his category appears resonant with some, if not all of the 
basic facts. Those acting upon their relative over-development are apparently 
“nationalities who stmggled to free their own strong development from what they had 
come to perceive as the backwardness around them - from some larger, politically 
dominant power whose stagnation or archaism had become an obstacle to their future 
progress” . Czechs might, at a stretch, have perceived the Slovak use of the inherited 
right of veto in the federal parliament to be a form of political domination, and at the 
very least as an obstacle to rapid and radical economic reform. Moreover, the typically 
over-developed territories are small, Nairn argues, “and tend to be in ‘sensitive’ zones 
of a larger political economy - alongside or in-between powerful neighbours” 
(1983:201) - in our case, Germany - Germany, Poland and Austria respectively.
The objections that have been weighed against this theory are considerable. One is that 
Nairn discusses the development of nationalism a-historically, as if imperialism and 
anti-colonial nationalism preceded the advent of nationalism in Europe (Breuilly 
1993:412-4). A second and fundamental flaw is identified by Walker Connor in his 
broad critique of relative economic deprivation theory. Connor points out that causal 
connections between economic forces and ethnonationalism should not be inferred
 ^ It should be noted, in fairness to Nairn, that he no longer swears by these maxims. Here, however, he is 
again echoing Gellner, who argues that “the self-image of nationalism involves the stress of folk, folklore, 
popular culture, etc. In fact, nationalism becomes important precisely when these things become artificial. 
Genuine peasants or tribesman, however proficient at folk-dancing, do not generally make good 
nationalists” . According to Gellner it is not until the peasant is educated and urbanised and his interests 
fully vested in the language in which he was educated that folk-dancing takes on the constructive nation- 
building overtones invoked by the movement’s leaders (Gellner 1964:162).
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simply because they tend to coexist (1994:160). The comparative evidence moreover is 
against such an inference, which overlooks two elements in particular. The first is that 
the Taw’ of uneven regional economic development more or less guarantees apparent 
discrepancies between nationally bounded economies, moreover, economic conditions 
on the immediate edge of a national border are likely to shade imperceptibly into those 
on the other, leaving conflict over that particular border unexplained by purely material 
factors. Secondly, the greatest economic discrepancies are those between and not 
within states (ibid.). Comparative data shows that while the economy might constitute 
the exacerbating factor or the battleground of an ethnonational dispute, ethnic identity 
may be shown to stand as the prior, causal element in that dispute. The comparative 
data confirm the following rule: one can remove economic equality or reverse it and a 
national conflict may remain; on the other hand, where one removes the prior 
ethnonational issue while retaining an economic inequality between regions, the conflict 
dissolves (Connor 1994:153)“*.
Yet while we may accept that a theory of ‘relative deprivation’ is unsatisfactory as a 
general paradigm and as an explanation of nationalism per se - ignoring as it must 
many contradictory examples - it is nevertheless at least highly suggestive. If we follow 
Connor’s conclusion that at minimum “economic factors are very apt to serve as 
catalytic agent, exacerbator, or choice of battleground” (1994:161), then Nairn’s 
suggested patterns may at least shed some light upon the mobilising tactics of Czech 
and Slovak nationalists after 1989, and thus upon the transitional political environment 
generally. It may be that given a case o f latent national self-identity, emphasis upon a 
renewal o f sharp economic differences and discrimination provided the optimum 
strategy o f Czechoslovakia’s nationalists elites.
Evidence in favour of this thesis would be i) the existence of strong economic 
grievances - in Slovakia’s case, against Czech economic manipulation; in the Czech
 ^ Accepting this logic has some implications for my thesis. It suggests, for instance, that the Czechs were 
equally damned if they did, and damned if they did not pursue economic equality between the two 
republics. I am not contesting this insofar as I do believe that Czechoslovakia was likely to suffer from 
some form of nationalist conflict after Communism whatever the country’s economic performance, which 
may even, in time, have escalated to the point of causing a separation of the state. This thesis argues, 
however, that it was a not a nationalist conflict which led to the separation of the state.
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case, against Slovakia’s debilitating economic archaism, ii) we should then find these 
grievances translated into separatist nationalist political movements which succeed in 
mobilising mass support, with or without the aid of ‘idealist’ nationalist rhetoric and 
folk-dancing. Uniquely, so the evidence may show, the more complex interests of a 
fully developed and functioning political system could not impinge upon these 
economic arguments, before the state itself was lost. Evidence against this thesis would 
be i) that economic grievances were not translated into separatist nationalist sentiment,
ii) that nationalist or openly separatist parties were seen as performing badly on 
economic issues. The evidence is reviewed in Chapter 4.
The relative deprivation argument
Separation
Politicians mobilise grievances
1989 Revolution
National champions elected 
in Czech and Slovak republics
Divergent economic performance and 
prospects of the 
Czech and Slovak republics
Démocratisation - state-building
Amidst all the talk of democratic ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’, the post-communist 
‘state’ has remained a neglected and ill-defined artifact. While a growing number of 
authors concur on the problems of state ‘weakness’ in this region still others simply 
assume that long after the revolution the state remained a bureaucratic monster, 
needing to be ‘rolled back’ from its former territory. The way in which political
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scientists conceptualise the state is of course hotly contested. The problem of definition 
had nevertheless seemed superficially easier when considering Soviet-type-states, since 
these evolved from totalitarian thinking and along all-too coherent totalitarian lines. 
The blue-print functions of the communist state and even the deviations of practice 
from concept had for many years seemed relatively transparent. More than a few 
observers (Samuel Huntington, Clement Moore and Zbigniew Brzezinski among them), 
felt it reasonable to present unidimensional and collapsed views of their development 
(Jowitt 1992:13). Just as Brzezinski’s critics pointed to the highly varying capacity of 
the Party-states to absorb dissent, however, so did the diverging paths of these states 
after their revolutions confirm that here were structures of diverse legitimacy and 
strength, suffering under different stresses.
If we look back to the Czechoslovak state during its first days of ‘democracy’, with the 
‘leading role of the Party’ struck decisively from the constitution, as the defining 
democratic act, it is evident that a crisis of definition took its place - one that struck at 
the offices of state at every level. Without the Party and the Party’s web of authority 
and its leverage through industry, the military, police, and the welfare state, it was 
profoundly uncertain as to what kind of state was left, not to mention what kind of state 
should take its place^. Without the Party it was unclear what constituted the long 
resented ‘centre’, whether still centralised powers remained strong, and how much less 
the average individual was really encumbered by ‘state authority’. State-restructuring, 
if only as a function of institutional re-defining at the Czech, Slovak and federal levels, 
presented itself as a priority, and for the new politicians charged with this duty, as a 
personal and political opportunity of the first order.
The public accountability of ‘the new state’ furthermore appeared a dreamlike 
aspiration when the powers and status of the bureaucracy and public expectations 
together were a little known quantity, at least in the first months. With the death of the 
communist dictatorship many, particularly at the republican parliamentary level, 
opposed central power ‘in principle’, even though parliamentary deputies could hardly
 ^ That is, beyond a profound longing for broadly accepted civic, i.e. private rather than political norms. As 
the pre-democratic joke had it: ‘democracy is when the doorbell rings at the milkman’s hour - and it’s the 
milkman’.
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possess a clearer picture of where that power lay^. The oppressively centralised nature 
of the previous regime thus left residual political tensions between the centre and both 
of the hitherto largely symbolic republican parliaments even before the pressures of 
future-oriented conflicts, e.g. over constitutional reform and resource distribution, 
impacted further upon republican and federal state relations.
And yet for all the associations of liberation with decentralisation, the bureaucratic and 
ministerial structures of the state were not gargantuan, either at the republican level or 
at the supposedly overbearing federal centre. Since significant quarters were inoperable 
without Communist policy or the Party ‘whip’ the operational and acceptable 
administration was arguably minuscule and in policy-implementation capacity, 
inadequate. To say that democracy engendered conscious and opportunistic ‘empire 
building’ from the very beginning would be to assume too much by the way of 
transparency - as if ministries and their ministers had the information to tread with any 
precision on the newly emerging and rapidly changing preserve of others. It might 
nevertheless be argued that even a patently accidental process of encroachment, most 
notably by republican upon federal responsibilities, would encourage a radical re­
education of Czech, Slovak and federal elite expectations, and evenmally public 
expectations, as to where power should properly reside.
According to the testimony of new, former-dissident hirees brought into many of these 
ministries to be active in their re-design, the dynamically operating administration after 
1989 was a mini-state within a state, huddled around ministers (amongst others) who 
attempted to extend, organise and link up the new web of ‘live’ administration further, 
as they saw fit. Policy formulation and implementation were achieved through 
identifying and marshalling operative centres within each ministry, however tiny - by 
finding efficient networks and fostering them, often necessarily regardless of past 
orders and strict rank. Some ministers were clearly better placed and more adept at this 
than others.
 ^ Coincidentally, Margaret Thatcher’s call to ‘roll back the state’ was made for such occasions, and 
political representatives quickly caught on to its peculiar effectiveness when addressing Western audiences - 
their ear for diplomatic appropriateness being less surprising when one remembers that for decades the high 
political art o f the satellite states had been that of assessing and mimicking the ‘correct line’.
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Vaclav Klaus, the Federal Finance Minister until June 1992, was able, not least 
because of his key to the federal purse and his comparatively strong mandate for 
economic reform, to establish new administrative offices and to assert at least an 
internally coherent scheme of operation. Having assembled an effective arm of 
administrative strength within his own ministry, Klaus aimed in cabinet to give it and 
his chosen economic ministers the kind of executive clout enjoyed, for example, by the 
Treasury in Britain. In such a context the personal clear-sightedness of individual 
ministers was evidently important in determining the form and codes of the new state. 
As party politics developed, moreover, these opportunities for highly entrepreneurial 
political leadership also heightened the party/political content of the conflicts between 
federal, Czech and Slovak republican authorities as to the demarcation of new 
jurisdictions.
Did the machinery of state: the ‘factor of cohesion in a social formation’, the 
‘authoritative allocator of values’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987:6) in the immediate 
post-1989 reality operate under any coherent political scheme, any overriding identity? 
Examining the very first days of democracy there is much to suggest that the state- 
restructuring efforts o f the republics and the federation, and the post-revolutionary 
openness o f the opportunity-structure fo r  competing priorities would together create 
tremendous tensions within a geographically and economically polarised state. In the 
absence o f significant, well-respected constraints, such as a unifying presidency, and 
given the existence o f two quite separate party systems, it looked highly likely that these 
state-restructuring tensions would be resolved most predictably by a state-dissolving 
clash o f interests between these pre-set national boundaries. These national boundaries 
were, it may be remembered, already articulated by separate, inherited administrative 
structures. Evidence in favour of the démocratisation thesis would be i) if the 
observable tensions between centre and periphery, and indeed, between the two 
republics, were formulated as democratising or reform arguments (as contrasted with 
programmatic nationalistic arguments for the nation-state as the vehicle for national 
realisation), ii) if those forging dominating state-building arguments were primarily 
pro-democracy / reformists elites and, iii) if the latter elites argued that democratic
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reform was potentially incompatible with a common state, iv) the prioritisation of 
‘reform’ in public opinion polls, v) a weak presidency and a weak constitutional court. 
Evidence against this argument would be i) that pro-democracy/pro-reform elites 
supported the continuation of a common state as an overriding public good, ii) 
consensus on constitutional reform among pro-democracy/reform elites, iii) the 
prioritisation of common statehood in public opinion polls. The evidence for this 
argument is reviewed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The démocratisation argument
Institutional flux
1989 Revolution
Parties form around 
their entrepreneurs
Klaus and Meciar elected 
on rival reform agendas
Political entrepreneurs define reform 
platforms and constituencies
Klaus and Meciar agree 
to separation rather than 
surrender or compromise 
their rival agendas
Institutional argument - path-dependency
The thesis here is that separation was from the beginning institution-led, specifically, 
that institutions designed to serve one purpose, i.e. the communist federal’
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constitution, served quite another when inherited and put into effect by new, democratic 
political actors. Incentives and strategic choices, this argument contends, were fatally 
determined by the inherited institutional environment.
Many of the political-theoretical assumptions concerning the character of post­
communism have been dismissive of continuity, or rather, of inheritance. David Stark 
has pointed out that the collapse of communism breathed new life into the theory of 
‘transition’, a term which has otherwise tended to designate the crumbling of traditional 
structures (1996:994). Such an emphasis is at least partly due to the fact that, having 
failed to predict the communist collapse, many scholars aimed for the ‘decisive 
account’ post hoc. Most reached the same conclusion on one important point: that the 
revolutions had been coherently ‘against’ the old regime, as opposed to positively for 
some other order, hence an emphasis on dislocation. Now that the academic emphasis, 
following developments on the ground, has turned to the longer-term issue of 
democratic consolidation, the peculiarities attached to the process in each separate 
country are once again becoming evident, and so strikingly evident as to make even 
those who were once comfortable with generalisation more circumspect. At the same 
time as declaring that “If new democratic regimes are to be consolidated, they have to 
deal in some way with transitional problems such as coping with the legacy of 
authoritarianism and establishing effective control of the military”, Samuel Huntington 
goes on to admit that “more persistent challenges come from the contextual problems 
endemic to individual countries” (1991:253).
The contextual problems endemic to Czechoslovakia were apparently monumental. 
Two in particular were striking, the first, the inherited and newly animated 
parliamentary right of minority veto within the Federal Assembly as the most important 
of several institutional guarantees of republican representation, and secondly, the 
development of two almost entirely separate party systems, located within the two 
republics, and the absence of federal parties.
Not everyone has seen the consociational right of veto in the Federal Assembly as 
divisive. Arend Lijphart made a confident categorisation of Czechoslovakia as “a
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textbook example of consociational democracy” published in the last year of the state’s 
existence. Lijphart argues that Czechoslovakia’s use of proportional representation after 
1989 was an integral part of its overall consociational character as a state^. 
“Proportionality” he maintains “is one of the four basic principles of consociationalism, 
and Czecho-Slovakia is also thoroughly consociational in the other three respects: (a) it 
has a power-sharing cabinet including representatives of both the Czech majority and 
the Slovak minority, as well as a Czech president and a Slovak prime minister; (b) it is 
a two-unit federal system consisting of autonomous Czech and Slovak republics with 
their own governments; and (c) it has a mutual veto in the form of a concurrent 
majority requirement stipulating that constitutional amendments and major legislation 
require not only approval by extraordinary majorities but also by such majorities in the 
upper house among Czech and Slovak representatives voting separately” (Lijphart 
1992:217).
The fact that the nominally ‘consociational’ system was inherited from the communists 
is a political hiatus Lijphart just ignores, however, even though it represents a 
potentially crucial contradiction between the ‘formal’ (communist) Czechoslovak state 
as inherited and the ‘legitimate’ (democratic) Czechoslovak state as perceived and 
operated by the new political elite after 1989. History tells us just how important the 
disjunction between formal rules and the operating practices of a regime can be - 
communist Czechoslovakia under one-Party rule was only as dynamically 
consociational as it was democratic: the practice, and not the constitutional rule, being 
the key. In practice, the consociational legacy, precisely because it was communist, and 
precisely because it had never operated in practice, was doubly vulnerable to the new 
‘democratic’ elites.
The need for a careful distinction between inherited institutional problems and those 
contrived by competing political elites is made clear by the more obvious flaws in the 
snapshot form of analysis represented here by Lijphart*. His final diagnoses was that
 ^ Proportional representation was supposed to be an important consociational aspect of the state but of 
course this was merely a carry-over from the First Republic - not a consociational state.
® It is hard to resist the thought that if this had been Northern Ireland in 1974 under discussion Lijphart 
would hardly have dared to dive in and flatly infer the depth of ethnic consensus from institutional 
configurations - as he does here.
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the “[m]aintenance of political unity will probably require an increase in the already 
strongly federal and consociational character of the system” (Lijphart 1992:220) - a 
dubious judgement given that it rests entirely on his own, never justified assumption of 
‘political unity’ concerning the inherited consociational structure he made so much of. 
In effect Lijphart appears to have made two mistakes: he over-determines the basic 
power of institutions by “reading” them in a simplistic way, and secondly, his entire 
assessment seems to have been based on a total misconception that the consociational 
constitution was new, based on and sustained by a current political consensus. His 
more famous theoretical conclusion: that centrifugal tendencies will result when elites 
attempt to compete in deeply fragmented cultures, looks far more appropriate to our 
case. His prognosis as a rule is that the most realistic alternative to consociation is 
partition.
It has been argued elsewhere that to work, consociationalism in fact requires three prior 
conditions; firstly, that rival ethnic segments must not be strongly committed to 
integrating or assimilating the ‘other’ into their nation or nation-state; secondly, 
political leaders must be motivated to engage in conflict regulation and to shore-up the 
consociational system with consensus-building actions^; and thirdly, the political leaders 
of the relevant communities must enjoy sufficient political autonomy to manage 
compromise within their own or constituency territory and to avoid ‘outflanking’ 
political manoeuvres from other quarters’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1993:37)^^. What we 
must assess therefore, is whether any one or all three of these conditions were in 
pivotal respects absent in the Czechoslovak case - absences which would indeed suggest 
that the inherited consociational rules in parliament could act not as expressions of a 
broadly accepted status quo but as deeply antagonistic institutional rules lending 
themselves to dangerously centrifugal forces within the state. These questions are 
addressed in Chapter 6, which examines the legal deadlocks central to the separation.
 ^ In a statement that resonates rather strongly through this thesis, O’Leary and McGarry argue that “the 
moment rival elites believe that the benefits of war exceed the costs of peace a consociational system is 
doomed (1993:37).
McGarry and O’Leary also cite Horowitz’s judgement that consociationalism might only function in 
moderately rather than deeply divided societies (1985:571-2) - the contrived nature o f elite disagreement in 
the Czechoslovak case, where mutual national animosity at the mass level was extremely low, is thus a 
subject of particular interest throughout the thesis.
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The other main institutional argument concerns the state-weakening tendencies we 
might expect to emanate from two separate party systems. This issue fits less easily into 
the category of path-dependency. The competitive multi-party system was new: an 
inheritance if at all, only from the First Republic and the immediate postwar years. The 
inherited fact of separate republican parliaments and governments nevertheless clearly 
provided some institutional underpinning to the early settlement of party politics into 
the respective republican territories. It may also account for a profound skepticism 
toward central authority. In such a significant development there would also appear to 
be intimations of a deeper social separateness - one that was entrenched by, even if it 
did not originally inspire, the formation of purely republican-based parties^\ Clearly, 
the absence of federal parties relieved politicians of pro-federal pressures on several 
levels. Firstly, and in striking contrast to the Canadian example, parties themselves did 
not act as institutions of consensus-building internally, i.e. between their own internal 
national factions. Secondly, in the absence of federal-level competition parties were 
drawn into a discourse framed in the language of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, be it concerning 
either the ‘other’ nation, or the federal centre.
An institutional, path-dependency argument may go far in identifying inherited 
pressures toward conflict, pressures which may have been felt with a particular strength 
in conditions where party agents were necessarily seeking out issues over which to 
fight. Such arguments must nevertheless retain their proper scope. Precisely because 
institutionalism has proved powerful in explaining different policy trajectories in 
different countries there is a tremendous temptation to seek answers in outright 
institutional determinism (Steinmo and Thelen 1992:14). The opportunity for nationalist 
politics it should be noted, however, is not necessarily enhanced by the fact that party 
competition occurs only at the separate national level - ultimately a sufficient political 
will-to-the-common-state on the part of political actors may neutralise the most 
institutionally bifurcated environment, and may certainly reform it.
’ ' Immediately following the revolution Slovak suggestions that a federal level civic movement be formed 
were rejected in Prague, which encouraged consolidation in Slovakia in the form o f the purely Slovak 
Public Against Violence (PAY), the sister movement to the Czech Civic Forum (CP). The reasons for this 
Czech dissident unwillingness to unite with their Slovak colleagues has been attributed to a combination of 
their doubts as to its practicality but also an anxiety on the part of the Czechs that they would be deemed to 
be meddling in Slovak affairs and might thus endanger the PAV’s support.
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Evidence in favour of this thesis would be i) the absence of the prior conditions for 
consociationalism as outlined above, ii) that the minority right of veto blocked and 
foiled constitutional reform and that institutional arrangements otherwise impacted on 
the various processes of legislation and negotiation, prohibiting agreement or 
consolidating predispositions toward conflict with added incentives toward deepening 
that conflict, iii) that the separate structure of the party political system encouraged and 
deepened the conflict by structuring politics toward national competition. Evidence 
against this thesis would be i) institutional weakness/absence to the extent that 
institutional factors clearly failed to structure those political battles which were pivotal 
to the conflict. In the broader setting it is important not to be duped by the accusations 
of politicians who charge that institutions stopped them from advancing to consensus 
when other interests were demonstrably at work. The evidence for the institutionalist 
case is reviewed in Chapters 5 and 6.
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The institutional argument
Separation
1989 Revolution
Institutional deadlock caused 
by anti-consociational elites 
(but not publics)
Communists establish format 
federal and consociational 
arrangements
Multiple parties organise on a 
republican not on a 
federal basis
Party competition is 
centrifugal and 
anti-consociational in 
character
Party competition and party autonomy
Breuilly is unusual in his sober assessment of the situation before the split. He in fact 
identifies an absence of nationalist mobilisation in Czechoslovakia, arguing that it was a 
matter of varying socio-economic development which gave significance to national 
difference. He also observed that “this difference [wa]s more strongly represented in 
political parties than the population as a whole” (Breuilly 1993:353). Taking the 
implications of this observation several steps further, this argument contends that the 
question of economic reform was but one of the issues that parties ovgr-developed for 
the purposes of distinguishing themselves in the emerging party competition. In the
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absence o f other well-defined social cleavages (as distinct from the absence o f such 
cleavages per se, as some o f the early East European transitions literature implied), the 
most competent parties sought 'catch-all’ or constituency-maximising strategies. These 
parties presented themselves as representatives of ‘reform’ or ‘sensitive reform’ as 
such, rather than seeking to. find more precise, but also electorally more risky, policy 
positions. Thus (the argument continues), even as the nature of predominant social 
cleavages and public concerns became more apparent parties persisted in avoiding 
over-identification, preferring to fight on the basis of credibility as the deliverers of 
broadly popular public goods, such as ‘democracy’, ‘prosperity’, ‘security’ etc.
An important consequence of this strategy may have been the equally vague treatment 
of issues of state design or existence. Parties may have been particularly wary of clear 
policy offers on this subject since the majority preference for ‘some kind of common 
state’ was problematically divided between different models. Such a finding would 
obviously contradict Klaus’s claim that the election had functioned as a referendum on 
the future of the state. Indeed, the contradiction would be absolute; as Claus Offe has 
pointed out, “if the options concerning public policy are effectively reduced to one, 
democracy is reduced to zero” (1995:18). Given an unwillingness to compete over state 
models, voter allegiances would necessarily be based on other issues, leaving the 
question of a common state hostage to divergent public preferences on these other 
issues when it came to election time. One does not have to go so far as the more 
conspiratorial elite theorists to see the difficulty: the omission of the state issue would 
not necessarily result from elite collusion - an agreement to gag the issue - but from the 
oligarchic nature of the parties themselves^^, unpressured by grassroots preferences and 
analytical media as they were (see Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987:155-6). Only at the 
very crisis point of the state - the weeks following the election of Vladimir Meciar in
Even without explicit collusion the problem arises when representative elites exercise more control over 
constituencies than constituencies can exercise over representatives - to quote Offe again - “Political 
parties, government bureaucracies, monopolistic associations, and mass media are often able to determine 
the configuration o f ‘critical’ issues, the range of choices o f the electorate, as well as the actual choices 
made, to an extent that makes the “will of the people” appear a virtual artifact of strategic elite action... 
Such a reversal of the direction of control - and the concomitant escape , of supposedly representative elites 
from meaningful accountability - is part of the inherent pathology of democratic regimes. Citizens depend 
on strong representative actors... for their meaningful political participation, but they are also threatened by 
the monopolistic power positions that this dependency can provide to these corporate intermediaries” 
(1995:17).
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Slovakia and Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic - would it become clear what the full 
consequences of this ‘gagging’ of active competition over the state issue might mean, 
namely that the two leaders with irreconcilable visions of the common state might meet 
as the two respective republic heads and opt immediately for separation.
The evidence for or against such an argument would potentially be most enlightening as 
a general finding on the post-communist state. One of the preoccupations of early 
writings on post-communism concerned ‘civil society’, and its alleged non-existence. 
According to this argument however, civil society, as measured by associations, clubs, 
leagues and churches, may have been quite alive, and increasingly animated within 
months of the revolution. The more important absence may in reality have been that of 
a meaningful connection between civil groups and interests and the actions and debates 
of political parties and government, a connection not merely formally democratic, but 
one with some dynamic issue-representational content.
To get at the more general problem of collective, public action against the separation it 
is worth drawing upon certain principles developed within the social movements 
literature, in particular the idea of ‘collective action frames’. If we understand the latter 
as “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social 
movement activities and campaigns” (Snow and Benford 1992 in Gamson 1992:7) we 
might surmise that the effective ‘gagging’ of the state issue within the main democratic 
institution of representation - the party system - might, particularly in the absence of a 
more illuminating media and given the otherwise ‘standing start’ facing political debate 
- have a significant effect on people’s ability to generate such frameworks. 
Alternatively we may fmd that while public opinion was indeed well-formed in many 
respects it remained thwarted by the absence of a clear agency against which to act, in 
order to prevent separation.
By breaking down ‘collective action frames’ into three components: 1) injustice, 2) 
agency), and 3) identity, the difficulty becomes clearer. In addition to an injustice 
component, following Gamson, referring to the “moral indignation expressed in this 
form of political consciousness” and an agency component “referring to the
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consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective 
action”, we may begin to isolate the problematic component in our case. The identity 
component “refers to the process of defining this “we,” typically in opposition to some 
“they” who have different interests or values. Without an adversarial component, the 
potential target of collective action is likely to remain an abstraction... Collective action 
requires a consciousness o f human agents whose policies or practices must be changed 
and a “w e” who will help to bring that change about” (my italics) (Gamson 1992:7-8). 
Whose ‘policies’, we might ask, were to be changed in an electoral system that had 
failed to produce a clear diversity of opinion over the specific form of the future state: 
in which all mainstream actors claimed to be pro-common-state and in which any threat 
to Czech Slovak accord could be attributed to party policies in the ‘other’ republic?
In conclusion, the line of argument presented here is that pro-common state voter 
preferences failed entirely to impact on state development even in conditions of free 
elections. Evidence in support of this thesis would be i) a diversity of public and media 
opinion on the state issue and a uniformity of party policies. This would suggest not 
only a failure of the party system to mediate Czech Slovak relations but a further 
difficulty in creating a social movement able to oppose the separation. Evidence against 
this thesis would be i) open electoral competition on the constitutional question, 
involving a variety of clearly articulated alternative models of the state. The evidence if 
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5.
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The party-competition argument
1989 Revolution
W eak institutions
These elites win elections and to the 
surprise of an unorganised and 
unprepared public 
proceed to separation
Emergent powerful party elites 
avoid direct confrontation on 
salient issues regarding the 
constitution
Leadership choices - the realist argument
When one considers the essentially rebellious nature of the November revolution, a 
revolution against the existing state machinery rather than for a particular vision of the 
future, and when one adds to this the fact that the first free election in June 1990, 
brought to power monolithic ‘civic’ movements in both republics, it seems fair to 
conclude that a blanker cheque has rarely been written for a democratic elite^^. From 
such a starting point a variety of claims as to the nature of governing elite behaviour 
might follow. Following Geddes, the basic assumption of this last theory is that “to 
further their careers, politicians need, above all, to be elected and reelected. They will 
thus prefer institutions - parties, electoral rules, constitutional provisions - that give 
them an electoral advantage over others” (1995:242).
If we adopt even the minimalist Schumpeterian definition of democracy - “an institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means o f a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1944) we might argue that this elite remained 
essentially pre-democratic, since the great majority of pro-democracy forces stood under the umbrella of  
the monolithic civic movements, thus avoiding the more demanding competition witnessed in the second 
election - in June 1992.
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As already explored in the previous argument, one possible theoretical answer to 
apparent elite autonomy - their freedom to choose unhindered - may lie in how issues 
and conflicts are in fact omitted or deliberately excluded from the political agenda as 
presented for election - i.e. public acceptance or condemnation. A complementary 
argument is that the ‘gagging’ tactic was not only manifest in the party system in 
general but that it was used to particular effect by Klaus and Meciar as individual 
political actors. In their hands the loss of the common state was ultimately presented as 
the ‘price’ to be paid for other, allegedly more desirable public goods, such as effective 
economic reform. In circumstances where a common state was in fact compatible with 
these allegedly exclusive goods, this forced trading-off of alternatives may be seen as a 
more sophisticated version of the tactic of issue-omission. Such an account (following 
Schumpeter) in our case does not however immediately explain how or why the elite 
actors involved intended to ‘get away with’ the separation decision after the fact - a fact 
they could hardly disguise - and here we must explain both their incentives and their 
strategy.
Partly following Nordlinger, this argument starts from an assumption that the 
strongest^"^ form of ‘democratic’ state autonomy occurs when elected state officials act 
on their own preferences even when their favoured options clearly and self-consciously 
diverge from society’s preferences - including those o f their own political constituency 
(Nordlinger 1981:11-38, summarised in Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987:191). Accepting 
this, we might suggest that the post-communist Czechoslovak state fulfilled this 
definition, insofar as the decision to separate the state was taken against both the known 
majority will and against the first preferences of a majority of voters for both Klaus’s 
Civic Democratic Party and Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic S l ovak i a^a  will 
which was assiduously persuaded of support after the fact. To make the ‘leadership’
Since the only definitional criteria of democracy fhlfilled appears to be the formal fact o f election it is 
only the possibility of rejecting these ohicials at a future date that keeps the state within the democratic 
category.
According to one account, only 19 per cent of would-be voters for Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia were adherents of an independent Slovakia (Kipke and Vodicka 1993:99). Though no equivalent 
information exists for Klaus supporters there is evidence of an implicit support for common statehood and 
certainly o f their good faith in Klaus as a federalist. 74 per cent of Civic Democratic Party supporters 
believed that the Slovak left and the insufficient will of Slovaks as a whole to maintain the state might lead 
to its division. Civic Democratic Party supporters were particularly hostile to the left and Slovak national 
parties, with less than average agreeing that the Czech right and economic reform might contribute to any 
splitting of the state (Mlada Fronta 22.5.1992).
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case in full we might usefully examine whether Vladimir Meciar and Vaclav Klaus had 
wielded extraordinary leverage over the future state arrangement and the development 
of party politics and political discourse generally, even before their election to the head 
of government in June 1992, we might also inquire as to the sources of this leverage, 
and whether this leverage had been exercised to serve coherent, self-serving ends.
A ‘pure’ version of this argument is that entrepreneurial politicians, both o f them party 
leaders, may be identified as having built dichotomous arguments fo r state and ‘other’ 
reforms. They then persuaded the electorate that they must separate the state to pursue 
their rival reformist platforms. The separation was an outcome on which they colluded. 
In the absence of the ‘blocking’ rival Klaus and Meciar could steer their ‘own’ states 
more completely along their own desired paths whilst removing the most significant 
threats to their continuation in power. As Bunce has it, “the economic and political 
interests of the two leaders, while opposed, were nonetheless easy to reconcile”
The issue of the leaders’ power of decision following their election is of course 
complex. The assertion that the machinery of state - the parliament and civil service 
included - was ultimately co-opted into the hands of two party-leaders is, however, less 
outrageous when one remembers the difficulties of state definition. The most plausible 
line of argument regarding leadership strategies is not that our political entrepreneurs 
finally brought a strong state to heel, but that they effectively redefined the state, or 
rather the conflict over the now entirely ambiguously defined state, in a way which 
served their own ends. Having persuaded others of the validity of their state visions 
they brought effective decision-making power into their own personal hands. In this, 
they might have been greatly assisted by the atmosphere of imminent crisis prevailing 
in post-communist countries, an atmosphere extremely conducive to the accretion and 
legitimation of overarching authority.
It is difficult to apply many of the conventional empirical tests of existing elite theory as 
developed for liberal democratic states. Czechoslovak institutions in no way possessed
She concludes that “the dissolution of the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states could be construed 
less a story in its own right than as the final chapter in the unravelling of state socialism” (Bunce 1996:28- 
30).
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the structural stability to be found in the West. The relevant evidence in support of this 
thesis rather concerns i) identifiable opportunities uniquely available to political actors 
in conditions of top-down party development and institutional flux, ii) the domination of 
the policy-defming and policy-making process by these two leaders before June 1992, 
iii) opinion poll data which supports the claim that separating the state was in the self 
interest of both Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, iv) evidence of collusion between 
Klaus and Meciar. Evidence against this argument might include i) examples of 
collaborative, consultative and/or consensus-seeking behaviour on the part of either 
Klaus or Meciar, ii) seemingly irrational risk-taking on the part of Klaus and Meciar,
iii) strong attachment to the common state idea on the part of either leader. From this 
we might begin to generate an essentially elite theory account of state power in the 
transition, if not a theory of persistent authoritarianism in post-communist 
Czechoslovakia. The evidence for this thesis is reviewed in Chapters 5 and 7.
The realist argument
1989 Revolution
Revolution in elites + 
weak institution milieu
Power-seeking elites 
agree on separation 
rather than compromise
Party elites profess rival 
visions of reforming the 
state
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Conclusion
David Stark notes that within the notion of ‘transition’, “the present is studied as an 
approximation of a designated future (Blanchard, Froot and Sachs 1994), risking an 
underlying teleology in which concepts are driven by hypostasized end-states 
(1996:994). We need to consider whether a discernible academic shift from studies of 
communist collapse to the study of democratic consolidation has resulted in a 
misreading of the peculiarities of ‘transition’ politics. By conceiving of events 
teleologically, as either ‘transitional’ or as indicative of an expected consolidation, 
observers miss and will continue to ignore essential elements that might prove causally 
critical in recent and future regime collapses. In this particular case, the distinctive 
political environment of post-communism constitutes not only a significant part of our 
explanation for Czechoslovakia’s separation, but also one of the gravest potential 
threats to deeper democratic consolidation in the two independent states. Rather than 
assuming that Czechoslovakia had automatically embarked upon a ‘transition to 
democracy’ in 1989, this thesis assumes that the value of the democratic order derives 
from the significant accountability of the political elite to the masses in their care, i.e. 
beyond the fact of mere election, and categorises political behaviour between 1989 and 
1993 on this observable, rather than teleological basis.
The argument I propose, and which I hope to test via the six arguments outlined above, 
is that Czechoslovakia was partitioned by its own governing elite despite the absence of 
significant nationalist movements. Specifically, the state was partitioned by the Czech 
right as a natural corollary to their technocratic approach to the state and to social 
reform, which the Slovak political establishment found electorally unsustainable. The 
Klausite rationalist plan of transition had the same functional effect as a strong Czech 
nationalism, and Vaclav Klaus rose to power and secured the separation through a 
deliberate exploitation of the state’s institutional weaknesses, including those of the 
party systems in both republics. Despite the fact of ‘free’ election after 1989, Czech 
and Slovak citizens may be shown to have remained subject to authoritarian - in this 
case, technocratic authoritarian - modes of control.
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My argument
1989 Revolution
The rise of the technocratic 
Czech right-wing elite
Technocratic reform agendas 
prove electorally 
unsustainable in Slovakia
Vaclav Klaus, leader of 
the technocratic elite, opts 
for a Czech partition of 
Czechoslovakia
Capture of state-wide 
economic and constitutional 
reform agendas by the 
technocratic elite
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Chapter 4
The Weakness of Nationalism in the 1992 Elections
Introduction
Before investigating the disruptive effects of the post-communist transition upon Czech- 
Slovak relations it is necessary to assess the more conventional, and in our case 
apparently well-grounded explanation for separation - that here was a fully-fledged 
national conflict just waiting to erupt. Jiri Musil has argued that a ‘Czechoslovak 
society’ was never created in the state’s seventy year life, despite growing structural 
homogeneity and the best attempts of social engineers on both sides (Musil 1995:77). 
Moreover, entrenched national stereotypes, the historically deep conflicts over 
resources and political culture, and the alacrity with which terms and conditions were 
eventually settled - in just six months in 1992 - are all supportive of a case of fa it 
accompli. Musil’s argument supports the argument that the anti-communist revolution 
did not so much engender problems as reveal them, casting into daylight the fact that 
political interest in the federation was dead by 1989, if not long before. This chapter 
will consider the merits of a nationalist conflict analysis.
By adopting a simple definition of ‘nationalism’, and trawling with it across the period 
between 1989-1992, this chapter aims to show the weaknesses in the nationalist case, 
be it attached to the theory of released national conflict after November 1989, or the 
relative deprivation theory of regenerated and ultimately fatal nationalist conflict based 
on perceived economic disparities - the two theoretical arguments set down in Chapter 
3. The chapter is structured to survey rather than explain levels of nationalism existing 
after 1989.
What is nationalism?
There is a sizeable interdisciplinary literature devoted to theorising over what 
nationalism is, what its origins are, and how it has appeared across the world. The 
result has been a proliferation of functionalist theories arguing for any number of 
functions that nationalism has ‘really’ served (Breuilly 1993:418-9): e.g. as an 
instrument of class interest or as a response to ‘relative deprivation’ /
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underdevelopment, or as furnishing a need for a communal identification in the face of 
modernisation and urbanisation. The Czech and Slovaks with their mutual 
apprehensions of economic exploitation and religious differences have been taken to 
exemplify more than a few of these accounts'.
More striking than the variety of these competing functional explanations are their 
deeper common weaknesses when it comes to providing convincing or generalisable 
reasons as to why nationalism, as oppose to some other idea, has served the functions 
accredited to it (ibid.). As Anthony Smith has argued: it is a working definition 
“stripped of essentialist notions, that is the only possible and fruitful one in the 
empirically indistinct field of nationalism” (1983:165-6). Addressing this need, Breuilly 
has argued for the importance of understanding nationalism as a form of politics, 
emphasising that politics in the modern world is concerned with the attainment and 
maintenance of power in general but with power over the state in particular (Breuilly 
1993:1). Following this observation, Breuilly has offered a simple and deliberately core 
proposition, restricting the term ‘nationalism’ to nationalistic political action. 
‘Nationalist’ action and argument are set down as derived from a doctrine with three 
basic assertions, that:
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
(b) The interests and values of this usually nation take priority over all other interests 
and values.
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the 
attainment of political sovereignty (Breuilly 1993:2).
For my purposes it is not necessary to resolve the deeper questions of what caused this 
nationalism in the first place, so Breuilly’s definition of nationalism has the merits of 
both coherence and parsimony, even though he may be criticised for assuming that the 
masses are not (or not especially) nationalist unless manipulated by political elites. I am 
looking only to identify “political movements which aim to take state power on the
' See, for example, Hans Kohn’s Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (1955:82), E. J. Hobsbawm’s Nations 
and Nationalism Since 1780 (1990:135), or Anthony D. Smith’s Nationalism in the Twentieth Century 
(1979:23).
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basis of a nationalist programme or which use state power in certain, specifically 
nationalist ways (to destroy ‘sub-national’ identity, to make irredentist claims beyond 
present state borders)” .^ This then excludes inter-ethnic conflicts which do not produce 
movements or organizations aiming to take state power as well as any assertive foreign 
or domestic policies pursued by governments of nation-states” (Breuilly 1993:421).
It may appear that the very parsimony of Breuilly’s definition makes it insensitive to 
nationalism’s more subtle manifestations. The Czech tendency to regard 
‘Czechoslovakia’ and ‘Czech’ as synonymous is particularly awkward. After 
anguishing over their own national status since their respective mid-nineteenth century 
national revivals, both the Czech lands and Slovakia considered Breuilly’s first trait, 
(a), and some would argue (b) also, to be axiomatic. But on this point Breuilly is again 
clear, since he insists that his criteria be applied strongly he will accept only those 
statements “which make the idea of a peculiar nation explicit; make this assertion the 
foundation of all political claims; and which are the central ideological statements 
deployed by a political movement or organisation” (Breuilly 1993:3). A more loose 
interpretation of these rules would evidently be biased to turning up positive results.
To take an important hypothetical example, where an economist bent on saving 
particular economic conditions or a programme of reform proves willing to lead his 
‘nation’ out of a federation to preserve that programme, we are now able to set some 
rudimentary thresholds. Under a loose application of (a), (b) and (c) this man is a 
nationalist. Under the recommended strong application, I can say that as a manic 
economist, with no explicit thought for the nation, but motivated by his professional 
beliefs and reputation, he should be counted out. Should his notion of economic health 
be pegged explicitly to his deeper and politically all-defining concern for his nation and 
its independence, on the other hand, then we can count him in. If he is somewhere in- 
between the possibility of his partial exploitation or mobilisation of nationalist feeling.
 ^ This definition is close to Smith’s. According to Smith ‘nationalism’ is “an ideological movement for the 
attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose 
members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ like others” (Smith 1983:171). Arguing for the 
persistence o f nationalism in the absence of a state Smith points out that “for the nationalist, the state is, as it 
were, the protective shell for their nation, and a sine qua non of its political self-realisation, especially in the 
modem world. He therefore aims at communal self-government and native political institutions. But he does so  
in the interests o f another, higher entity - the potential or existent ‘nation’ (my italics) (Smith 1983:178).
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particularly if smuggled through the long-harboured notions of a single Czechoslovak 
identity or ‘national interest’, must be investigated. Breuilly is equally specific in 
distinguishing between opposition and government nationalism. Domestically, he 
suggests, one could describe as ‘nationalist’ “actions taken against specific groups or 
individuals and justified on the grounds of the anti- or non-national character of these 
groups or individuals” e.g. state-sponsored anti-Semitism (Breuilly 1993:8).
As the remainder of this chapter aims to show, nationalist parties as set within 
Breuilly’s definitional limits were by no means decisive in Czechoslovakia after 1989. 
Those parties which more successfully took up the issues of social and economic 
reform, indeed of social and economic grievances demarcated in national terms, prove 
too eclectic and populist in their political agendas to be placed meaningfully within the 
‘nationalist’ category.
The verdict on the federation at the end of the 1980s?
The legitimacy of the state was not a strong suit in communist Czechoslovakia at the 
end of the 1980s. Though the deficit was clearly profound, the exact nature of that 
illegitimacy was unclear. Friction at the elite and counter-elite level was more 
transparent than the attitudes of the politically incarcerated masses, and assessments of 
the prevailing biases of Czech and Slovak national identity through the 1970s and 
1980s remain unevenly informed. Free intimations of a nationalist or oppositionist self- 
identification were by definition restricted to dissident circles: a very particular cross- 
section of the religious, artistic and intellectual elite of the two republics. When these 
same dissidents came to power through the anti-communist revolution of November 
1989, their perceptions of national tension became deeply significant, even while the 
character of public opinion, particularly as regarding future and possible national 
relations, remained mysterious.
Though reliable data is recognised to be limited on this issue, the evidence suggests that 
the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s manipulation of national relations since 1968 had 
resulted in a remarkable shift in public perceptions. In a survey conducted by Radio 
Free Europe based on 1,200 interviews conducted among Czech and Slovak visitors
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temporarily in Western countries between 1974 and 1975, the traditional, i.e. inter- and 
immediately post-war roles appeared to have been reversed. The sense of being 
discriminated against - so important to pre-1968 political developments in 
Czechoslovakia - was encountered more among Czechs than among Slovaks. 72 per 
cent of Czechs as set against 81 per cent of Slovaks considered the federal government 
to treat both republics ‘equally’. 17 per cent of Czechs as against 2 per cent of Slovaks 
felt the government favoured Slovakia whereas only 12 per cent of Slovaks felt the 
government favoured the Czech lands, as against 1 per cent of Czechs. Not 
surprisingly, the opinion that the Federal government played no favourites ran highest 
among the small minority of pro-Communists (91 per cent) and lowest among the self- 
confessed ‘conservatives’ (63 per cent). The perception of equality was also markedly 
higher amongst those below the age of 25^. What is striking in this data is that less than 
ten years after the trauma of the Soviet invasion and the national rancour allegedly 
stirred by the fédéralisation of 1968, public antagonism over the nature of the state 
seemed slight.
While it appears that national feelings were thus running low, with hindsight, the 
limited Radio Free Europe data reveal an attitudinal time bomb for the constitutional 
debate of 1989/90 - a latent conflict. A majority of Czechs in the sample thought that 
fédéralisation had equalised Czech and Slovak conditions already in the mid-1970s, 
even before the achievement of economic parity was routinely claimed in Party 
propaganda*^. Thus any subsequent Slovak appeals for a deeper, more substantive 
fédéralisation would be perceived as an attempt to become the dominant republic, at 
least in political rights. A poll taken in March 1990, though vaguely worded, also 
suggests that Slovak complacence was short-lived, since by then some 68 per cent of
 ^ The survey was carefully weighted to counteract the over and under-representation of certain groups, so that 
it closely approximated the socio-economic composition of the Czecho-Slovak population above the age of 14 
(Radio Free Europe 1977).
As Leff points out, following the recentralisation of the early 1970s, the concept of two national economies 
was treated as a “rightist heresy propagated to disintegrate the state” (Leff 1988:248) - the declaration of full 
economic parity would have to follow and it duly appeared as the latest achievement of socialism. Political 
‘achievements’ were hardly to be attempted following the invasion, making Czech/Slovak economic parity one 
o f the few available foci of Party propaganda. Under normalisation economic achievements had to fulfill the 
legitimating role normally ascribed to the entire panoply of government - an unsustainable social contract as it 
turned out.
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Slovaks polled thought that Czech and Slovak relations in the past had relied on a 
preferential treatment of the Czechs (Prace 16.3.1990).
What we know of the respective dissident elites, the democratic party leaders of the 
future, is that they acted as a repository of some of the most comprehensive national 
stereotypes, uninhibited by any open ethnic conflict or palpable weakness in the state. 
Their respective national views, already established by 1968, were greatly reinforced 
by the diverging development of anti-communist protest between the two republics 
under normalisation. When the dissident Charter 77 was founded in a desperate effort 
to hold the communist regime to its commitments to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 
those that risked everything to sign it were disproportionately Czech. Among the first 
243 signatures collected when the charter was created, only 1 was that of a dissident 
living permanently in Slovakia (Wehrle 1994:254) - a fact which did not go unnoticed 
in either republic. As Frantisek Kriegel^ complained to Die Welt in 1977: “The Slovak 
minority exercises power over the Czech majority, although the federation meant to 
establish parity. But today, Slovaks hold all the key positions, and considerable 
financial resources are flowing to Bratislava. They [the Slovaks] have thus 
accomplished much more than they had been aiming at, and therefore, they will also 
not identify with our cause [Charter 77]” {Die Welt February 17,1977 in Radio Free 
Europe 1977).
Alexander Dubcek, ever the federalist, described the Charter as “a courageous 
initiative in the tradition of Czech political and cultural defiance going back to Austria- 
Hungary” (Dubcek 1993:264). The overbearing ‘Czechness’ of its organisation, 
however, was later cited by others as accounting for Slovak non-participation. The 
Slovak writer Vladimir Minac went so far as to call the Chartist movement 
“Czechoslovakising” (in Nevraty kprevratu, quoted in Kirschbaum 1995:248). Indeed, 
no Slovak input into the Charter had been sought before its release (Leff 1988:266) - as
 ^ One of the first signatories of Charter 77 Kriegel had been a close follower of Dubcek in 1968 and was one of 
the six leaders taken to Moscow for interrogation following the Warsaw Pact occupation on August 21st. 
Following his statement to Die Welt the regime broadcast that he had shown “boimdless hatred against the 
Slovak people”, and emphasised Kriegel’s Jewish origins (Radio Free Europe 1977:10). Kriegel’s statement 
was echoed by others in the movement. The Charter’s spokesman, Jiri Hajek commented on how Slovaks were 
“sufficiently enlightened” to be soft on each other (quoted in Wehrle 1994:254).
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with Ludvik Vaculik’s trenchant Two Thousand Words issued in 1968^ - an important 
reflection of the deep and persistent Pragocentrism of Czech dissidence.
Leff, along with the majority of commentators, nevertheless identifies a systematic 
discrepancy in the level of activism (see also Precan 1983, Wehrle 1994). Of the 
individual instances of regime retaliation against dissidents in the late 1970s, only 4/5 
per cent occurred in Slovakia, and over half of these targeted just two Slovak 
individuals. Though the Slovak proportion of dissident activity increased steadily into 
the 1980s (Leff 1988:264) the advance was evidently both too limited and too late to 
change the basically separate cultures of protest and the national perceptions that 
accompanied them.
Regardless of other plausible and more favourable explanations, the Czech 
interpretation of this unequal national participation in dissident protest was often 
stereotypical. The Czech dissidents’ unfavourable view was bolstered by the belief that 
Gustav Husak, the author of the grayest days of communist normalisation, was 
reasserting through Party favouritism the Slovak nationalism for which he had been 
imprisoned after the Second World War. In the Czech view, the milder punishments 
exacted from the Slovak Party after 1968 and the concentrated efforts of the Soviets to 
promote increased Slovak membership in the federal government in the 1970s (even as 
other ministries and powers were recentralised) was ample proof of Slovak co-option 
and advantage under federalism. Such ‘favouritism’ was eminently reversible, 
however, based unstably as it was on the Soviet expectation of a corrective, disciplining 
Slovak influence at that time and compensation for the otherwise profound 
recentralisation of 1970^. Such tactics were anyway only a minor part of the Soviet’s 
wider plan through the 1970s - the accelerated assimilation of Slovak and Czech 
identity (Connor 1984:447).
® “2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone” was signed originally by selected 
workers, artists, writers, scientists, farmers, sportsmen and engineers before being published in their 
respective journals in June 1968 - interpreted by many as a call for ‘action from below’ (Golan 1971:297).
 ^National representation in government seemed well established by the 1980s; between 1969 and 1983 Slovaks 
received about one-third of ministerial portfolios - a proportionate level hitherto never achieved, though Czechs 
continued to monopolise the head of security and control operations. While the advance was impressive it was 
also due to the persistence of individuals in office. It is thus difficult to separate the changes in ‘principle’ from 
the hard facts of “oligarchic petrifaction” in the last twenty years of the state (Leff 1988:253).
127
The real and unprotected locus of Slovak dissent - persistent religious affiliation* - did 
little to contradict the Czech intellectuals’ recourse to stereotypes. And yet despite the 
regime’s attempts to co-opt the Catholic Church throughout the 1970s, mass 
pilgrimages and religious demonstrations were proof of a profound and sizeable Slovak 
opposition. If the communist regime of the 1970s pursued a carrot and stick policy 
toward religious believers it was always clear, at least to Slovaks, that any independent 
religious initiatives and associations would face the same catalogue of abuses 
experienced by the Chartists in Prague. In a signature campaign in 1988 calling for 
religious freedom some 300,000 of the 500,000 collected names were Slovaks. By way 
of reaction, the regime brutally repressed the subsequent candlelight gathering of 2000 
believers led by Frantisek Miklosko in Bratislava (Kirschbaum 1995:248). That Slovak 
religious protest was disregarded by the Czechs is noteworthy, particularly since Czech 
dissidents were content to view religious protest in Poland as anti-communist and pro- 
democratic.
Clearly, among many in the Czech intellectual elite there was a mistrust of this separate 
religiosity which bordered on the chauvinistic. Religious affiliation was not readily 
accepted as indicative of the liberal yearnings predominant in Prague dissident circles. 
It was instead considered a sign of an essentially unreconstructed and pre-democratic 
political culture, implicitly, the culture of the clerico-fascist Slovak state of the Second 
World War.
The reasons why the limited pockets of liberal dissent in Slovakia failed to produce a 
support or information network, capable of inspiring others to protest, were more 
complex, however. It was not only ‘political culture’ dividing those opposed to the 
Leninist state. Slovakia’s isolation from Czech dissident activity was actively enforced 
by the regime^. Moreover, by focussing on Slovakia’s lack of secular anti-state
Some 55 per cent of the Slovak activities cited by Precan between 1981 and 1982 fell under the rubric of 
religious demonstrations (Precan, Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, quote in Leff 1988:265).
 ^As Miroslav Kusy has testified, Czech dissident visitors to their Slovak colleagues were typically arrested and 
returned back to Prague before reaching their destination. Havel moreover has indicated that Charter 77 was 
exclusively Czech at least at the very beginning so as to ensure against police detection and intervention 
(Wehrle 1994:253).
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organisation as positive evidence of apathy, and by maintaining so low an opinion of 
Slovak political culture, many in the Czech counter-elite unintentionally reinforced the 
regime’s own efforts (see also Wehrle 1994:253).
While “traditional rivalry between Czechs and Slovaks” may thus have been “at an 
encouragingly low ebb in 1974 - early 1975” (Radio Free Europe 1977:9), a 
resurrection of the kind of alliance of the national counter-elites witnessed in the 1960s 
appeared ever more elusive in the 1980s (Leff 1988:262). The Slovak dissident elite 
was particularly isolated, having lost not only the sympathy of the Czechs but the 
strength of their own numbers in 1968, most deliberately divided as they had been by 
the advent of fédéralisation and the softer purges inflicted on the Slovak wing of the 
Party.
As for the regime itself, its last twenty years could be characterised as a phenomenal 
and ultimately unsustainable balancing act. The prevailing post-invasion policy of “no 
surprises” (Leff 1988:254) which emanated from the unchanging, albeit not yet 
decrepit, leadership of normalisation, engaged only minimally with the national 
question and only then predominantly in economic terms. Just over two years before 
the regime’s demise, Leff assessed the limits of the national conflict imposed by 
communism thus: “The current regime still faces the same two choices with which 
earlier leaders have wrestled. The acceptance of political arrangements that honor the 
assumptions of bipolar politics will only serve to institutionalize and reinforce the 
national distinctiveness of each region still further, perhaps irreversibly. Integrationist 
policies, on the other hand, given the current social structure and national sensitivities, 
are out of step with the character of the bi-national society and will thus breed conflict. 
The current regime must therefore either make its peace with decentralized power or 
seek integration in the knowledge that this course is likely to provoke protracted tension 
in the indefinite future. The interests of conflict reduction recommend the former 
course. Yet the pressures for unity inherent in socialist power, Czechoslovakia’s 
vulnerable geographic position, and Czech resentment of Slovak assertiveness all give 
incentive to pursue further integration on key issues. The erosion of some aspects of the
129
federal solutions since 1968 suggests that the question is still open. It is not an enviable 
choice for a regime to make.” (Leff 1988:297).
In November 1989, the entire character of the state was thrown into question by the 
anti-communist revolution sweeping at last across Central and Eastern Europe. Leff s 
‘unenviable choices’ were made pivotal by the collapse of the holding-opération that 
had substituted for nationality policy in the recent past. The so-called ‘Velvet 
Revolution’ not only endeavoured to rubbish the previous rules of the political game 
but it more successfully broke the bi-national political ties sustained by the factional 
balances, personal connections, understandings, obligations and deals maintained within 
the Party. The already ambiguous political relationship between the two republics was 
now reduced to its most unstable institutional basis, a dubiously confederative 
constitution and parliament, a legal framework which, in the absence of the all­
regulating Party was extremely decentralising in some of its provisions and yet 
respected neither by the centre nor the republican periphery.
Without consensually established and binding connections it seemed unlikely that the 
market and democracy would diminish national friction, at least in the short term. On 
the Slovak side it seemed more probable that Slovaks would see démocratisation as the 
opportunity for achieving in practice the deep fédéralisation that until now had existed 
only in the unexamined texts of the constitution. On the Czech side it appeared that a 
dissident government more than others, would treat such overtures with suspicion.
After 1989 the argument that nationalism emerged as a fallback in the absence of other 
ideologies or identities in post-communist Eastern Europe gained currency. Those who 
make such arguments, however, never take the next logical step to look at the fact that 
such ‘fallback’ nationalism might be very weak (Cohen 1997:29). In Slovakia the 
wartime Slovak state had left a deeply tainted past and for the next forty years 
communism attempted to wipe out what remained of Slovak historical consciousness, 
essentially leaving only family stories intact (ibid.:302). This next section demonstrates 
the weakness of nationalism in post-communist Czechoslovakia.
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Slovak and Czech Nationalism 1989-1992
It was not until months after the formal defeat of Communist Party power that 
nationalists raised their heads above the parapet. Though the Slovak National Party 
(SNP) was conceived of as early as December 1989 - its founders saw political 
opportunity in taking on the trappings of the First Republic Slovak National Party - 
their founding Congress was not until May 1990, making them the latecomers onto the 
electoral scene. Nationalism, let alone separatism, had not featured as the predominant 
preoccupation of either the secular or religious Slovak dissidents who had emerged in 
the years before the revolution, though the latter elite, uniquely, retained a still rooted 
nationalist perspective.
Following the revolution tensions eventually arose within Slovakia’s new Catholic 
Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) over such issues as the appropriate place of 
the Slovak L’udak state in the party canon. The cautious Christian Democratic 
Movement leadership nevertheless managed to steer the party’s more nationalist 
factions away from a militant separatist Christian nationalism^^. The Slovak National 
Party meanwhile seemed unable to develop deeper lines of economic and social policy 
to accompany the single and on its own, the strikingly impractical theme of national 
sovereignty. In many respects the most coherently programmatic nationalists arrived in 
Slovakia only in the form of lobbyists from historically militant Slovak emigrant 
organisations (Kusy 1995:143)^\  As returning émigré evangelists moreover, they found 
it hard to gain a foothold in the obvious candidate groups, the nationally-self-identifying 
Slovak National Party and Christian Democratic Movement (see Cohen 1997). Public 
opinion polls at the end of May 1990 gave the Slovak National Party a mere 3.8 per 
cent in popular support (Kirschbaum 1995:255).
The Slovak National Party rose to some prominence in the first June elections in 1990 
by winning a surprise 13.9 per cent of the Slovak National Council vote, making it the 
rival third largest Slovak party in the Council along with the Communist Party, though
Quashing aspiring L’udaks within the Christian Democratic Movement was no easy matter for its leader, Jan 
Camogursky. His father, Pavol Camogursky, had been a member of parliament in the wartime Slovak state 
and he was one of the first in the post-1989 period to call for rehabilitating that state (Cohen 1997:206).
Throughout the period the Toronto-based World Congress of Slovaks remained vocally and militantly 
nationalistic.
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the fourth in the Federal Assembly, following the Communist Party. Following as it did 
the tortuous, and for both sides, disturbing dispute over the renaming of the state^^, this 
result raised eyebrows in Prague, where both expectations and anxieties of Slovak 
separatist nationalism ran high. In Slovakia, however, the Slovak National Party had 
deliberately made no demands for independence until after the elections were over, 
prevaricating instead with evidently popular aspirations to enhanced autonomy. Once 
‘outed’ as separatists, the aim of drawing Slovaks behind the nationalist cause proved 
straightforwardly over-ambitious, and it was further dissipated when small and 
insignificant rival nationalist parties emerged and stubbornly refused to integrate (Kusy 
1995:143).
While the Slovak National Party’s ultimate aim was Slovak independence their 
monothematic programme, ill-developed even at the levels of alternative economic or 
social policy, left them little choice but to campaign on essentially symbolic and racist 
issues: “renaming or preventing the renaming of towns, streets and squares; 
establishing Slovak as the official language ‘without exception’ (by means of the 
‘language law’); repeated attempts to declare sovereignty in the Slovak National 
Council; and seeking and detecting enemies of the Slovak nation among people who 
were not ‘one of them’ or ‘renegades’... i.e. federalists” (Kusy 1995:143). Despite 
their best efforts, as Kusy points out, “the Slovak nation as a whole remained relatively 
indifferent towards this movement; nationalism did not become a mass, nationwide 
movement” . The fracas over the Slovak National Party’s proposed anti-Hungarian 
‘Language Law’, finally defeated in October 1990^^, represented the high point of 
nationalist militant action and provocation. The Slovak National Party thereafter 
endeavoured to join with the recently politicised and now nationalist cultural 
organisation, Matica slovenska (‘Mother Slovakia’), in organising rallies and 
demonstrations. It horrified many in both republics by participating, along with 
members of the Christian Democratic Movement, in celebrations of the First Republic 
populist, AndreJ Hlinka. In Ruzomberok on August 26th 1990, pro-Tiso calls were 
heard, and Christian Democratic Movement leader Jan Camogursky was jeered as a 
moderate (Mlada Fronta dues 27.8.1990:1,2). Having endorsed L’udak heritage thus
For an account of this dispute see Chapter 6.
For an account of the language dispute see Chapter 6.
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far put the Slovak National Party put itself beyond the pale for a sizeable Slovak 
majority, which evidently rejected any sentimental rehabilitation of the fascist Slovak 
state.
A more politically astute response of the Slovak National Party to what was clearly a 
public concern for political stability was its attempt to appeal to ‘Europe’, though 
entirely and openly excluding Hungarian, Roma and Jewish identities and interests^" .^ 
The appeal was to a nineteenth century nationalist ideal of a community of equal 
nations. “An integrated Europe will be stable only then, when all nations which live in 
it will have equal rights and duties. If there were so much as one unhappy nation, it 
would be an instrument of tension”, claimed Slovak National Party leader J. Prokes, 
“for while it is possible to suppress the national factor or a national movement, it is not 
possible to eliminate it” (quoted in Kirschbaum 1995:266).
Public opinion polls nevertheless showed that the vast majority of Slovaks shared very 
different preoccupations. Civic problems such as unemployment and inequality 
regularly topped the league of concerns followed by anxiety over social breakdown as 
expressed through crime, drug abuse, family break-up etc. (Butorova 1993:60). 
Concerns about the environment and health-care surpassed those about Slovak 
sovereignty, and the attempts of the Slovak National Party and the militant Christian 
Democratic Movement breakaway faction, the Slovak Christian Democratic 
Movement, to have Slovak sovereignty proclaimed in parliament provoked remarkably 
little public reaction. When nationalist propaganda failed to accommodate these public 
worries there was a clear falling away in sympathy for the cause in general^^ (Kusy 
1995:143-4).
Kusy rightly includes the breakaway Slovak Christian Democratic Movement within his 
category of nationalist party. This nationalist and leftist faction, which openly supported 
the wartime state, had plagued Camogursky’s moderate brand of religious nationalism 
until breaking away from the Christian Democratic Movement just before the June
It may be noted that there were scarcely 6,000 Jews remaining in the entire federation following the 
Holocaust and communist repressions.
Confirmed hy monthly polls carried out hy the Association for Independent Social Analysis (A.I.S.A.).
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1992 election. Kusy also includes Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia as 
nationalist. But here I would add an important caveat. Meciar was pro-autonomy but 
not separatist, and his position on autonomy was highly changeable, so much so as to 
make a categorisation of Meciar’s party as merely ‘nationalist’ inadequate. After 
splitting off from and thereby demolishing the anti-regime mass movement Public 
Against Violence in April 1991, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia streaked 
ahead of its competitors with a populist programme of quite startling ideological 
elasticity.
Electoral performance o f nationalist parties in the Slovak National Council {% votes)
Parties: in order of separatist militancy June 1990 June 1992
Slovak National Party 14 8
Slovak Christ. Democratic Movement - below 5% threshold
Christian Democratic Movement 19 9
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia - 37
All importantly, for example whereas the Scottish National Party has managed to 
cultivate the perception that its emphasis on ‘Scotland first’ directly assists the Scottish 
economy (Breuilly 1993:322), neither the Slovak National Party nor the Christian 
Democratic Movement achieved such a connection with the Slovak economy. The 
result was a majority feeling in Slovakia that nationalism alone represented an 
inappropriate instrument with which to tackle Slovakia’s ills. In the June 1992 election, 
Slovak National Party support dwindled to 7.9 per cent of the vote in the Slovak 
National Council: almost half its 1990 level. Timoracky has claimed further that in 
Slovakia up until mid-1992 the ratio of those who supported the common state stayed 
basically stable at 8:2, and had hit the ratio 7:3 only at its very lowest point (Timoracky 
1992:89). Of the majority of Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia supporters 
it should be noted some 59 per cent expressed their preference for a continuation of a 
common state even against the offer of a confederation, supported by 22 per cent 
(Butorova 1993:61).
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The distinction between the separatist politics of the Slovak National Party and the 
populist/autonomist politics of the breakaway Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
under Vladimir Meciar is all-important. In autumn 1991, some 30,000 demonstrated 
for the Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia recently announced by the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia, and their rally included speeches from the Slovak National 
Party^^ {Rude pravo 25.9.1991). As is explained more fully in Chapters 5 and 6, 
however, the use of the national issue by Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was 
facile, tactical and un-programmatic, an addition to a populist agenda that had already 
included highly vocal commitments to the federal idea and support for the 
‘Czechoslovakist’ President Havel - a former pillar of the Charter 77 movement. The 
Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia was notable as the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia’s opening shot for the 1992 electoral campaign. It secured public support 
early by promising not independence but a full post-election referendum on the 
constitutional future - an open public choice on the future structure of the state. The 
Slovak National Party meanwhile consistently opposed the referendum option, because 
that would guarantee defeat in any public consultation on the issue. The Slovak 
National Party’s consistent opposition to Havel and the Presidential circle in general 
was arguably one of the better mainstays of limited Slovak National Party support, 
annoyed as many were by Havel’s lapses into Masarykian language and 
‘Czechoslovakist’ perceptions of national identity. The Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia’s later mimicry of these complaints close to the 1992 election, as with the 
‘Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia’, illustrates not programmatic separatist nationalism 
on the part of Meciar’s part but more simply a strategy of vote-maximising on ‘soft’ 
nationalist sentiment.
With the Slovak National Party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Party 
of the Democratic Left (PDL) together in opposition in Slovakia after April 1991, it 
remained important for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia to distinguish itself 
from these nationalist and leftist rivals whilst poaching their strongest electoral issues - 
which did not include separatism. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s rhetoric
A mere 2000 attended the parallel Initiative for a Common State demonstration, also in Bratislava (ibid.)
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of patriotic reform nationalism, with its attendant, scarcely veiled anti-Semitism, was 
but one plank in Meciar’s platform for achieving government power.
In the Czech Republic there existed only a small openly nationalist party of the right, 
the Civic Democratic Alliance, but also a party of the extreme nationalist right led by 
Miroslav Sladek, whose Association for the Republic-Republican Party of 
Czechoslovakia was and remains neo-fascist. Sladek’s political sophistication resembles 
that of Russia’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky more than that of Austria’s Jorg Haider. Formed 
in Bohemia in 1990 the Republican Party set itself the singular policies of political 
disruption, racism and xenophobia, garnering some 6 per cent of the Czech National 
Council vote in June 1992, mainly from the north-western reaches of the country. 
Here, long-unsolved economic and social problems have combined with environmental 
devastation to alienate younger voters in particular from the political mainstream. 
Kostelecky also reports a positive correlation between Republican voters and 
concentrations of the ever-persecuted Roma minority (Kostelecky 1995:87). While 
abusing Havel, Klaus, and Meciar alike, Sladek stayed on the fringes of the country’s 
national problems, kept there at least during the life of the federation, by the 
mainstream Czech right’s refusal to collaborate.
Back within the boundaries of the mainstream there was clearly a discrepancy between 
Czech rhetoric and policy; both right and left within the Czech republic insisted on 
their adherence to the values of ‘federation’, even as they failed completely to produce 
a common policy in constitutional negotiations with their Slovak counterparts between 
1990 and 1992. Programmatically, there was certainly little discernible nationalism 
among Czech parties yet, as Chapter 7 will show, the insistence of Czech federal 
ministers upon a unified reform strategy across the federation and to its most blatantly 
uneven results amounted to a dire provocation in Slovakia.
The intellectual and conservative Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) emerged as the one 
mainstream nationalist party in the Czech republic, but its programme proved 
electorally suicidal. In the June 1992 election the Alliance failed even to cross the 5 per 
cent threshold of entry into the Federal Assembly. Whatever the forms of oppression
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exercised by the Czech republic upon the Slovaks, an explicitly and self-consciously 
nationalist rationale was evidently not acceptable to the Czech electorate. An 
investigation of the 1992 election will show more systematically the lack of nationalist 
ideology extant, even at the very crisis point of the state.
1992 June elections - Hobson’s choice
It was only when constitutional negotiations collapsed that the full weight of party 
attitudes came to bear on the republican conflict. They did so decisively through the 
June election. Victory for Klaus’s right-wing Civic Democratic Party - Christian 
Democratic Party coalition in the Czech Republic and Meciar’s Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia amounted to the presentation of two ideologically 
opposed forces for the purposes of agreeing to a new constitutional arrangement. 
Instead the victors not only chose dissolution within the course of a few weeks, but set 
it in train. Olson, amongst others, has misled subsequent analysts as to their mandate to 
do so. “These elections gave decisive power to one party in each republic, which came 
to embody republic-level solidarity in relation to the other republic” he asserts, 
claiming that “federalism ... became the vital issue in the 1992 election and culminated 
in the dissolution of the common state” (Olson 1994:105-109). The election, he claims, 
became “a referendum on the metapolitical question of ‘stateness’” (Olson 1994:112).
This typical assumption that the elections results remain self-explanatory - that in 
leading to the split they must have expressed some deep nationalistic conflict - obscures 
how the two election victors both claimed to have the best interests of the common state 
at heart. When the rhetoric was about the nation (and so implicitly, about the 
Czechoslovak state) it largely concerned the nation as a willing partner on both sides. 
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia promised national sovereignty and 
emancipation in the same breath as it claimed to aspire only to an equal common state. 
The Czech Civic Democratic Party spoke for ‘Czechoslovakia’. The aspiration to state- 
power defined both sides, but neither side could go all out for national argumentation in 
the absence of a significant nationalist constituency. As it transpired neither the Civic 
Democratic Party nor the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia needed to be 
‘nationalist’ as their defining trait, since there were other profound and less potentially
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alienating interests (albeit nationally encapsulated interests) that could deliver the 
powers of the state into their hands.
The pre-election campaign was not dominated by discussion over federal options, 
indeed, by any specific policy options as such (bemusing detail in macro and micro 
economy policy being the exception). Instead it was republic-centric and characterised 
by repeated statements of ideological belief and normative priorities. The Czech Civic 
Democratic Alliance (CDA) hedged its bets and was possibly the most rhetorical of all. 
Though espousing the benefits of Czech separatism in the face of Slovak intransigence 
the party’s slogans proclaimed; “Nationality principle? in life YES - in politics NO!” 
and “no lasting prosperity without freedom!” (Sociologicke Actuality 5/1992).
Campaigns aimed at mobilising the moral and ideological beliefs of the electorate and a 
judgement as to who might most realistically deliver on their promises. The issue of the 
common state was discussed either fatalistically, ‘it is for the victors to decide’, or 
ingenuously, with parties asserting their own ideal preferences whilst avoiding the 
realpolitik of either achievable compromise or of the implications of their own most 
favoured state arrangement - which for all, bar the Slovak National Party, still centred 
allegedly on a common state. President Havel was moved to castigate “the cowardly 
inability of politicians to say clearly what they are aiming at” (Zemedelske noviny 
13.5.1992:3). The campaigns of 1992 had focussed on other issues.
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The results of the 1992 Election
Elections: 5-6 June 1992 - Federal Assembly o f the Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic
House of the People 
(150 seats)
Votes (%) Seats
House of the Nations 
(150 seats)
Votes (%) Seats
Czech Republic
Civic DP + Christian DP 33.9
Left Bloc 14.3
Czechoslovak Soc. Dem. 7.7
Republican Party 6.5
CDU - Cz. People’s Party 6.0
Liberal Social Union 5.8
Others 25.8
48
19
10
8
7
7
0
33.4
14.5 
6.8 
6.4 
6.1 
6.1 
26.7
37
15
6
6
6
5
0
Total 100.0 99 100.0 75
Slovak Republic
Mov. for Dem. Slovakia 33.5
Slovak Democratic Left 14.4
Slovak National Party 9.4
Christ. Dem. Movement 9.0
HCDM* + Coexistence 7.5
SDP in Slovakia 4.9
Other Parties 21.3
24
10
6
6
5
0
0
33.9
14.0
9.4 
8.8
7.4 
6.1
20.4
33
13
9
8
7
5
0
Total 100.0 51 100.0 75
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Elections to the Czech and Slovak National Councils, 5 - 6  1992
Czech National Council Votes (%) Seats
Civic. Dem. P 4- Christian Dem. P 29.7 76
Left Bloc 14.1 35
Czechoslovak Social Democracy 6.5 16
Liberal Social Union 6.5 16
CDU - Czechoslovak People’s Party 6.3 15
Republican Party 6.0 14
Civic Democratic Alliance 6.0 14
MSD - SMS** 5.9 14
Other Parties 19.0 0
Total 100.0 200
Slovak National Council Votes (%) Seats
Movement, for Dem. Slovakia 37.3 74
Slovak Democratic Left 14.7 29
Christian Democratic Movement 8.9 18
Slovak National Party 7.9 15
HCDM -f- Coexistence 7.4 14
Other Parties 23.8 0
Total 100.0 150
* Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
**Movement for Self-governing Democracy - Society for Moravia and Silesia
Nationalist issues in the election in the Czech Republic
Rather than using the controversial issue of public-sector ‘vetting’, an issue left to the 
allied Christian Democratic Party, Vaclav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (CDF) 
demonstrated its anti-communism by presenting the election as a democratic
140
crossroads. The electorate was asked, frequently at outdoor rallies and in the most 
urgent tones, if it wished to go on or be deflected from the course of democracy as 
such. The Czech electorate was encouraged not to distinguish between their loyalty to 
the political system and their attitudes to the sets of competing politicians, contrary to 
mature competition in an established democracy (Lipset and Rokkan, in Mair 1990:92). 
It was not the nation that was said to be at stake, but the nature of the state - the whole, 
bi-national state. The Civic Democratic Party claimed that it was the one party of the 
democratic state^^. The liberal dissident Civic Movement (CM), formerly the Civic 
Democratic Party’s main rival, was portrayed as a party of crypto-communist Utopians. 
“In a functioning parliamentary democracy”, Klaus argued, “non-political politics 
doesn’t have a chance” (Klaus 3.4.1992 in 1993:9). In early April 1992, Klaus stated 
that together with the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Civic Democratic Party had 
“apprehensions of a distinct upsurge of anti-reformist forces, striving to thwart the 
post-November [1989] development. We are determined not to allow it and strive 
jointly for a victory of the right-wing (Mlada Fronta dnes 3.4.1992:2)” . The 
implication was that anti-November forces included the dissidents of the Civic 
Movement, who had, of course, formed the very nucleus of democratic opposition to 
communism for over twenty years^*.
Regarding the structuring of the state, the Civic Democratic Party stuck to its advocacy 
of a so-called ‘functioning federation’. It called for an end to and reversal of the 
republican erosion of federal powers begun in 1990, and opposed ‘experiments’, 
including confederation {Mlada Fronta dnes 4.6.1992). The right, by 1992, were 
united in Klaus’s view that a federal state was not to be bought at the cost of 
jeopardising any economic reform. Klaus distanced his party from the debacle of the
When Klaus was asked if he was trying to repeat the election of 1990 by threatening the electorate with 
renewed authoritarianism he replied that the obvious rejection of secret police, tinkered margins and leading 
tasks of the party in 1989 was only "a superficial rejection of one type of common system", and that it was 
necessary now for the electorate to decide "in which direction to begin" (Lidove noviny 14.5.1992:6).
The main weapon of the campaign against the real left was the invocation of the ghosts of totalitarianism but 
also its economic other-worldliness. Klaus spoke scathingly of the left “fretting and blaming this government 
that the former Soviet Union no longer buys textiles (Klaus 4.6.1992, in 1993:23)”. The Civic Democratic 
Party rejected any “third way between communism and democracy” (as opposed to between communism and 
capitalism). Klaus nevertheless avoided the word capitalism, employing ‘market economy’ in preference 
{Lidove noviny 29.5.1992:8). The Civic Democratic Party’s strongest resource was clearly the absolute 
association of economic reform with the figure of Vaclav Klaus. In a series of articles entitled: A short guide to 
the ‘election goulash’, Klaus was sufficiently confident to conclude with the following advice - “when deciding 
for whom to vote, it is enough with economic arguments to use your common sense” (5.5.1992, in 1992:17).
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constitutional talks and was outspoken only when explicitly questioned about a Slovak 
‘third way’. The question was thus played down, often not appearing at all in party 
campaign literature. Klaus preferred a strategy of shifting responsibility for the conflict 
entirely onto the Slovak side and claimed that it was now “evident, that votes for the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia are votes for the division of the state... Slovak 
voters, self evidently, have the right to decide this, but not for all days on end {Lidove 
noviny 14.5.1992:6)” . Igor Nemec confirmed that if the party faced “a choice between 
a common socialist Czechoslovak state and two independent states, it would choose the 
latter” (Telegraf2.6.1992).
To call this nationalism would be to lose the heart of the matter: Klaus was and remains 
a rationalist, not a nationalist, and before June 1992 he spoke of the nation as his last 
resort - the state into which he would be forced. Though not a nationalist, and though 
motivated by his vision of a technocratic market utopia, threatened, as he saw it, by 
Slovak nationalists, Klaus took the nation-state - a Czech nation-state - as his next 
available frame of reference. As will be explored further in later chapters, to Klaus, the 
nation’s value was that in encapsulating the idea of a common past and a common 
future it more obviously provided the social homogeneity necessary to sustain a 
difficult economic reform. When the federal state failed, the nation-state suggested 
itself as a more efficient means to an end. The Czech nation-state was not, for Klaus, 
an end in itself. Given the nature of Czech national self-identification, moreover, there 
was an obvious way to finesse this shift toward a state-separation. If Czechs throughout 
Czechoslovak history had laid claim to a superior rationality then this was a uniquely 
post-communist manifestation of that claim: to appeal to the sentiment and value of the 
nation per se was crude and barbaric; to appeal to its integrity as the citadel of 
democratic reform was every good citizen’s duty.
In a survey taken in April 1992, Civic Democratic Party supporters more than any 
others, expressed satisfaction with the course of social and political development (86 
per cent) and the economy (78 per cent). They were the least afflicted with feelings of 
powerlessness, hopelessness and surrender (33 per cent as opposed to the notably high 
55 per cent national average). Another prominent characteristic in an Civic Democratic
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Party voter’s profile was support for the current legal strategy vis-â-vis the communist 
past. Civic Democratic Party supporters were particularly hostile to the left and Slovak 
national parties, and less likely to agree that the Czech right and economic reform 
might contribute to any splitting of the state. 74 per cent of Civic Democratic Party 
supporters stood by the view that the Slovak left and the insufficient will of Slovaks as 
a whole to maintain the state might lead to its division - a result which insured Klaus 
against losing too great a part of his own constituency should he take it upon himself to 
end the federation (Marek Boguszak/AISA in Mlada Fronta dnes 22.5.1992.)^^.
The Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) was ideologically almost indistinguishable from 
the Civic Democratic Party, with which it had an electoral “non-aggression pact” 
{Prostor 12.5.1992:2). Having failed in its repeated attempts to abolish the minority 
right of veto in the constitution, and seizing on the Federal Assembly deadlocks of 
1992, its chairman, Jan Kalvoda, voiced the logical conclusion of the economic right 
and openly campaigned on the benefits of Czech separatism. The Civic Democratic 
Alliance’s strategy to render itself visible relied on this more colourful use of the Czech 
national card and personal attacks against Meciar, which Klaus avoided. Yet even the 
Civic Democratic Alliance, the nearest thing to a nationalist party one could find in the 
Czech mainstream, argued explicitly against using the ‘nationality’ principle as a 
political or even a politicising issue. The Civic Democratic Alliance exemplifies how 
Czech parties had actually abdicated the responsibility of resolving state-legal issues by 
opting to discuss only the most abstract, if not fanciful, idealised models. The Civic 
Democratic Alliance considered optimal “federalism without the nationalistic point of 
view {Prostor 12.5.1992:2)” .
The Civic Movement (CM), despite conciliatory efforts towards the Slovaks for which 
it was frequently criticised, had actually shifted its position towards Klaus's by 1992. 
The anti-communist movement, the Civic Forum had split not least as a reaction to the
Whereas only 13 per cent among those with basic education supported the Civic Democratic Party, among 
high qualified specialists their support reached 45 per cent and among private owners and businessmen, some 
35 per cent (Marek Boguszak/AISA:ibid.). The results were from 1363 respondents from 1 - 9  April. Clearly 
the Civic Democratic Party managed to mobilise the support o f a significant proportion o f the technocratic 
elite, the frustrated class considered among the most potentially destabilising forces within stagnating 
communist regimes.
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power-sharing talks of August 1990 which distinguished those for whom economic 
reform was the highest priority from those who felt the market provided “only the 
means to a working state, preferably a federal state" (Pavel Rychetsky in Hospodarske 
noviny 29.4.1991:1). By June 1992 the Civic Movement clearly no longer felt able to 
campaign on subordinating market ends to the preservation of a common state. What 
distinguished its electoral campaign was the Civic Movement’s preoccupation with the 
integrity of the legal state as a sine qua non of democratic development. They took the 
‘legal state’ and anti-communist ‘vetting’ issues to election apparently as an act of 
defiance {Co ChcemefWhsd We Want). Though the Civic Movement could justly claim 
to be “the most consistent advocate for a common state and referenda over its future” 
the remainder of its programme rang perhaps too resoundingly with noble generalities. 
The Civic Movement claimed to ‘know’ that “the conditions of prosperity and of a 
dignified life are decency and mutual respect, healthy reason, social responsibility, 
health, education, culture and clean air” (Sociologicke aktuality 5/1992). The party 
evidently reduced its own chances of being taken seriously by standing for “radical 
economic reform which must lead to the resolution of all social and ecological 
problems” (Co chceme).
The Civic Movement campaigned for, as opposed to merely acknowledging support for 
the idea of, a common state. It stated frankly that “jeopardizing Czechoslovakia is not 
only nationalistic, but also the dangerous dream of a Unitarian state. We support a 
referendum as the single legitimate condition of the division of the state or its reshaping 
with more members” (Respect 21.5.1992). Federal Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier 
accused Jan Kalvoda of irresponsibly playing the Czech national card. He in turn 
appealed not only to emotional and socio-economic reasons for continuing the common 
state, but, for the first time in two years of wrangling, raised seriously the issue of 
international security (Interview with Jana Smidova noviny 30.4.1992:9). Such a 
late appearance scarcely convinced that Slovakia was indeed the touchstone of Czech 
geopolitical stability (even if the left apparently feared Bohemia's incorporation as a 
sixth new German lander (Wehrle 1994:32). More convincing, given its greater 
currency in the Czech media and immediate resonance, was the rightist innuendo that
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(as in the 1980s) a gradualist Slovakia would arrest Czech development and continue to 
bar it from its ‘European destiny’.
The coalition between the Christian Democratic Union and the Czechoslovak People’s 
Party, (CDU-CPP), carried a broad manifesto essentially endorsing current progress 
including, with little elaboration, its preference for a federal constitution. The 
remaining election successes regarding the Federal Assembly were for the far right 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, led by Miroslav Sladek (53 per cent of 
Republican support stemmed from the under 34s {Lidove noviny 29.5.1992)) - and on 
the left. The Left Bloc (LB) (coalition of the Democratic Left and the Communist Party 
of Bohemia and Moravia) rejected apologetics and hoped that the “expectations of our 
citizens from November 1989 are fulfilled” . They supported a ‘federation’, but, given 
their lack of internal evolution, with all the potentially Marxist-Leninist connotations of 
their use of the term. The Czechoslovak Social Democratic (CSD) programme varied 
little from that in 1990. Honest, if lame on the issue, the party stated: “we consider a 
federal constitution the ideal, but at present difficult to implement” {Mlada Fronta Dnes
4.6.1992). A coalition since 1991, the Liberal Social Union (LSU) represented an 
uncomfortable alignment of Greens, (urban) Socialists and cooperative farm interests, 
as represented by the Agricultural Party^^. There was little common policy ground 
between leftist Agriculturalists and the centrist Socialists (Kostelecky 1995:81) and 
other issues dominated their muted claim to support a ‘federal state’.
Nationalist issues in the elections in the Slovak RepubUc
Slovak liberals in the guise of the Public Against Violence/later: Civic Democratic 
Union, (FAV/CDU), were the major casualty of the Slovak election. Again, however, 
the political scene in 1992 has been misleadingly characterised by Evans and Whitfield 
as displaying, in contrast to the Czechs, only ‘limited dimensionality’; described as 
“redistributive, authoritarian, anti-West versus pro-market, liberal and cosmopolitan” 
(1993:542). In fact the range of opinion represented by Slovak parties comprised of 
pro-federal and pro-reform liberal, Christian Democratic parties of two more or less 
nationalistic shades, a range of minor populist nationalist parties running the gamut of
The Electoral Commission recognised the group as constimting a political movement as opposed to a 
'coalition', to which a higher parliamentary threshold would have applied.
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economic preferences and, finally, a renewed social democratic left. Even Meciar’s 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia carried supporters for rapid economic reform. 
The structure of the state was certainly a dominant electoral issue in Slovakia but as 
already stated it combined, in order of concern, with fears over the standard of living, 
unemployment, health care, social security, crime and the environment (Butorova 
1993:8). The electorate was confronted with a plethora of constitutional options, most 
of which were ill-defined and rarely discussed in relation to what was known to be 
politically acceptable or otherwise to the other partner republic^ \
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) claimed to represent “democracy, 
humanism, a legal state, human rights and free enterprise in a market economy” and to 
aim at the “all-round elevation of Slovakia” . Thus far it based its manifesto squarely on 
what had been the anti-communist civic movement’s, the pro-federal Public Against 
Violence’s 1990 manifesto, called ‘Chance for Slovakia’. In 1992 however, the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia also asserted a “state-legal arrangement on 
confederal principles, the basic social orientation of the economy, complex and 
sovereign development of the national economy and advantageous linkage to European 
integration” {Rude pravo 27.5.1992:2). The presentation of economic policy, as with 
elastic discussions of Czech Slovak relations, illustrated only how the party projected 
itself as the natural party of government whilst evading detaiP^ - it carried the trappings 
of nationalism without actually daring to put them on. The Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia depicted itself as championing a transition appropriate to Slovak national 
specifics with answers for pro- and anti-federalists alike. It took an important step just 
before the election and called for the proclamation of the sovereignty of Slovakia as a 
subject of international law, even though it had up to then effectively blocked such calls
This phenomenon has been described as “confusion and cognitive helplessness, evident in persistent 
misconceptions on issues related to the constimtional arrangement (Butora and Butora 1995:118)” . However, 
the same authors put it down to ‘brainwashing’ that Slovaks "failed to appreciate that economic prosperity 
could best be achieved through the existing economic reform programme”. The Czech media represented the 
Slovak electorate as fatally mesmerised by Meciar’s populism. One campaign manager claimed that "in a 
political campaign in Slovakia we would work with emotion.. .Slovakia needs personality, it needs its Janosik" 
(chief of Mark/BBDO marketing agency quoted in Cesky denik 28.5.1992). In fact a pre-election A.I.S.A. poll 
showed that 64 per cent of Czechs surveyed would prefer to vote for personalities than parties, as against 54 
per cent in Slovakia {Mlada Fronta dnes 13.5.1992:14).
 ^ In contrast to Klaus's rejection of the economic mafia as a hangover of communist practice however, Milan 
Knazko located this problem as at the heart of the privatisation process, which he depicted as “the cheap selling 
off of national property to foreigners and the concentration of ownership in the hands of a narrow 
group”(ibid.).
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from Slovak Nationalists and nationalist Christian Democrats within the Slovak 
National Council. Within the manifesto the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
nevertheless hedged by offering to follow the introduction of a Slovak constitution with 
a referendum on the form of appropriate coexistence with the Czech republic, resulting 
in a treaty {Mlada Fronta dnes 8.4.1992:2). Crucially it claimed not to be fighting for 
any ‘true Slovak path’ so much as for the right of Slovaks to choose freely that path, 
whatever it should turn out to be. In this sense Meciar succeeded in making a virtue out 
of his very lack of programmatic principles. In an equally populist move Meciar 
announced that he would not support Havel’s candidacy for re-election as President. He 
exploited the suspicions felt against Havel’s clique in both republics and attributed this 
decision as much to Havel’s choice of advisors as to his mistakes in office (ibid.). On 
14th May Meciar stated that after elections he would not assume any federal post 
(Czech Sociological Review 1993:136). In so doing Meciar signalled an intention to 
maximise the leverage power of the Slovak National Council in any further talks. 
According to Meciar’s promises, the direction of these talks would be dependent upon 
the results of a referendum.
The confident election style of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia played upon a 
clear wave of support. In 1991, the attitudinal profile of those supporting the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was still unclear. By April 1992, however, it was 
obvious that supporters more than usually rejected the direction Slovakia had taken 
since November 1989. More than three quarters stated that Slovakia’s post-November 
development brought great disappointment (as against a high 64 per cent in the whole 
Slovak population) and 71 per cent judged the economic reform too radical or basically 
misconceived; 84 per cent believed that other conceptions of economic reform would 
be better than those currently in place. As to the state-legal arrangement 79 per cent of 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s supporters judged that Czechs insufficiently 
understood Slovakia and that this was a crucial factor in ‘coercing’ Slovaks towards 
independence (68 per cent in the whole population). Less than half, 48 per cent, stated 
that for the population of Slovakia it was more important to slow the pace or at least
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change economic reform, than to maintain the common state (41 per cent in the Slovak 
population as a whole)^^.
Clearly the stresses of post-communism were highly important in drawing support 
behind Meciar. The election, however, demonstrated only that Meciar was a populist 
skillful in pooling as many constituencies as possible. Within his party stood key former 
Public Against Violence figures opposed to overtly nationalistic sentiments and as 
shown in Chapter 2, these people were absolutely dismayed, as initially Meciar was 
too, by the pace of dissolution talks following the June election.
The Party of the Democratic Left’s (PDL) shift to west European social democracy and 
its social orientation had allowed for a resurrection of the former Communist Party’s 
fortunes since 1990. Remarkably, by 1992, the Christian Democratic Movement was 
held in greater suspicion as a potential threat to democracy (35 per cent), compared to 
20 per cent for the Slovak Democratic Left (Butorova 1993:63-65). The Slovak 
Democratic Left argued that the election would decide both the form of the common 
life of Czechs, Slovaks and other nationalities, and that it would set the future priorities 
for the economy and society. For the former, the party proposed a “loose federation 
with elements of confederation”, thus managing to escape suspicions either of Slovak 
nationalism or Czechoslovakism.
When Jan Camogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) 
could get beyond defending his views on liberalism he explained that his vision was for 
a strong, stable and ultimately independent Slovakia and that national consciousness 
could grow slowly into a stable identity {Lidove noviny 21.5.1992). The Movement was 
nevertheless embattled by the intense aversion felt against them by a portion of the 
population. Of eight negative characteristics pertaining to parties the Christian
Sociologically, there were parallels in Civic Democratic Party and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
support. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia support was strongest among both those threatened by 
reform - the lowest qualified and high-school educated population, but also among high qualified specialists 
where support reached beyond 50 per cent (data from A.I.S.A. survey conducted by Marek Buguszak 1 - 9  
April from sample of 1363: Mlada Fronta 22.5.1992). Again it seems reasonable to argue that the 
‘technocratic elite’, or ‘grey zone’, constituted an important body of support. Their support could rationally 
follow their expectation of professional benefits arising from a party that championed the Slovak economy 
without, so it could yet seem, rejecting links to the Czech republic.
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Democratic Movement scored highest on six: only pretending to support the common 
state, use of devious political tactics, poor quality personnel, elitism, a poor defence of 
economic standards, and the likely introduction of totalitarianism. They scored 
positively only in their perceived tolerance of national minorities (Butorova 1993:63, 
64), even while many Czechs considered the Christian Democratic Movement, with its 
echoes of L’udak clericalism, the epitome of nationalist intolerance.
The Civic Democratic Union (CDU) (formerly the Public Against Violence) projected 
itself as a “liberal and conservative party of the centre. It stands behind rapid economic 
reform and the dignified station of Slovakia in the common state” {Hospodarske noviny
1.7.1992). Any doubts that the affinities of this party were largely with those on the 
Czech right, inclusive of support for lustration, were nonetheless dispelled by the 
electoral coalition with the Czech Civic Democratic Alliance, the most recognisably 
‘Czechoslovakist’ and the most unwilling to see change in the structure of the common 
state of all the Czech parties.
The right-wing coalition between Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party and Slovakia’s 
Democratic Party (DP) - a former communist satellite party - targeted businessmen and 
the intelligentsia in Slovakia. The Democratic Party supported a common state with the 
two republics joined in ‘some form of common contract’ {Hospodarske noviny
1.7.1992) but echoed to a policy the manifesto of the Civic Democratic Party. That 
Klaus assisted in splitting the liberal vote in Slovakia is perhaps less significant than the 
value of the coalition in underpinning subsequent Civic Democratic Party claims to 
have gone to the limit of its powers to secure a common state.
The small Social Democratic Party in Slovakia (SDPS f.l918), obscured by the 
increasing popularity of the Slovak Democratic Left, had nevertheless received the 
fillip to its electoral chances by the recruitment of Alexander Dubcek as party 
chairman. It sought a moderate left image and the political stability of Slovakia within a 
federation.
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The Slovak National Party (SNP) proposed immediate Slovak statehood, the single 
other acceptable possibility being a confederation of three subjects (Bohemia, Moravia, 
Slovakia). Even in June 1992 it remained a single-issue party (Butora and Butorova 
1995:15). It was the only party (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia included) to 
clearly attract those against a common state. Where 44 per cent of Slovaks (compared 
to 57 per cent for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) viewed the Slovak 
National Party as a defender of Slovak interests, another 37 per cent ascribed to them 
the negative characteristic of inciting racial tensions.
Conclusions
The avoidance of nationalist programmes and the fact of the end of the state some six 
months hence is surely one of the most startling juxtapositions in the history of Central 
Europe. It conjures up not so much the tortuous developments of European separatism 
observable in present-day Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy but the perfunctory 
decisions of a colonial partition or the pragmatism of the Versailles state-builders. As 
the comparisons imply it was not the existence of rival nationalist populations which 
brought the Czechoslovak conflict to a head, though nationalists existed in both 
republics and though they were politically active. Rather the separation occurred as the 
result of an elite process dominated by reform elites rather than nationalist elites, 
though both Klaus and Meciar successfully exploited soft nationalist sentiments.
As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, a separatist nationalist movement as set 
within Breuilly’s practical definition had only very limited minority support in either 
republic. The most significant nationalist party, the Slovak National Party, garnered 
support that fluctuated between 12 per cent and 15 per cent in the last half of 1991 and 
the first half of 1992 (Wolchik 1995:238), but which fell in the Slovak National 
Council from the first election in 1990 to the second in 1992. Other Slovak parties, 
most notably the Christian Democratic Movement and the Public Against Violence 
faction that would become the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, had taken up 
important aspects of the national cause already in 1990. In the case of the Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia, however, the aim was to strip the national question of its 
separatist implications and to furnish it for more immediate electoral use. In doing so
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the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia remained out of the separatist nationalist 
category even as it legitimated the more militant nationalist parties from which it stole. 
As was argued elsewhere back in 1992: “Nationalist groups that have sprung up in 
Slovakia in the post-revolutionary period, such as the Stur Association, the Slovak 
National Party, and the Slovak National Renewal Party, are strong enough to keep the 
issue alive, buoyed by resentment at the treatment of the 120,000 Slovaks in Hungary 
and what they see as Prague’s patronizing dismissal of Slovak feelings and needs. Local 
support may be less important in maintaining their fervor than the money they can raise 
from the Slovak population abroad (over three million strong), which is especially 
receptive to requests for help in advancing the more extreme nationalist cause” (Judt 
1992:105). The implication is that separatist nationalism as a force capable of seizing 
power had not yet arrived in Slovakia in 1992. Populist forces quite capable of 
assimilating nationalism had nevertheless been elected to government in both republics 
in June 1992.
Nationalisms as old as those within the Czech and Slovak republics should perhaps be 
accepted a§ sliding beneath the radar of Breuilly’s definitions. The very failure of 
programmatically nationalistic parties in both republics might indicate nationalisms so 
mature as to be beyond protesting themselves: commonly understood as implicit in the 
chosen debates on reform, investment, subsidy and the role of church and state, the 
promises of prosperity which might just look like populism to an outsider. The two 
republics appeared to live in political worlds of their own, and each historically, has 
clearly had a case against the other. The apparently expansive appeals by Czechs to the 
good of ‘Czechoslovakia’ were arguably, as they had ever been for Czechs, 
synonymous with appeals for the interests of their own nation.
The problem with trying to account for the persistence of nationalism, particularly 
separatist nationalism, as a dynamic political ideology in this way is that the connection 
between cause and effect ceases to be demonstrable as political and instead becomes 
blandly deterministic. A bi-national federation, where the ‘other’ nation is always the 
opposition, is of course particularly prone to such arguments and inferences. To argue 
that Klaus was ‘really’ elected as a nationalist is to argue for a kind of reclusive
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electoral consciousness that is hardly robust under analysis - historically plausible as it 
may sound, Meciar on the other hand, may be labelled a nationalist with more 
certainty, but one who crafted his position according to electoral expediency, which 
made him a Slovak autonomist and not a separatist.
Clearly the Czechoslovak split was not caused by rival nationalist populations, though 
they existed and though they were exploited. In the proven absence of strong separatist 
nationalist movements the more general analytical question should again be asked as to 
what other weaknesses existed in the state and its political structures as to have made it 
unsustainable in its existing form. Why was broad-based public support for a bi­
national state unable to condition a political settlement?
The peremptory nature of the dissolution in the absence of either heightened nationalist 
feeling, explicit electoral mandate (though the Civic Democratic Party carried a 
tenuously implicit mandate), or the constitutional required referenda in the case of a 
separation all suggest a significant imbalance in the power structures of the state - they 
also suggests a deeply under-developed party system. The unconstrained assumption of 
elite authority following the June election clearly represented the pre-emptive-strike 
option in the treatment of one of Central Europe’s more manageable quarrels. Such an 
approach is equally unimaginable in the developed democracies of Britain, Canada or 
Belgium. It is to the influence and impact of the post-communist transition that the rest 
of this thesis now turns. Though it is sorely tempting to stretch the definition of 
nationalism - to infer a state-splitting nationalist conflict from Czechoslovakia’s 
numerous national conflicts after 1989 - such an argument remains unsubstantiated and 
consequently deeply uninformative of the process of separation as it could be observed. 
It is surely possible, in this post-communist case, to better account for the uninhibited 
power of the governing elite, the unwillingness of federal authorities to soften 
economic reform in Slovakia, and the relative weaknesses of those mediating 
institutions which continued to function well in states more nationalistically divided - 
but more democratic - than Czechoslovakia in 1992.
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Chapter 5
The Impact of Party Development on the Separation of the State 
Introduction
This chapter focuses exclusively on the role played by the new institution of party politics. 
By colouring in the political map of the Czechoslovak inter-election period (1990 - 1992) 
the aim is to demonstrate a party-systemic contribution to sundering the state, specifically, 
to show that identifiably transitional imbalances in the fledgling party system inhibited the 
clear mediation of Czech Slovak relations.
As it turned out, the first free democratic election in June 1990 was a poor indicator of 
public preferences. The electorates were offered only the plebiscite issue of ‘Are you for 
change?’, and only afterwards did the victorious Czech and Slovak anti-regime 
movements splinter into factions which then instituted themselves as parties. Of their 
offspring the two (i.e. centre-right) parties attributing a transcendent value to the common 
state found themselves marginalised but not, so this chapter claims, straightforwardly 
because of their hi-‘national’ views. Czech and Slovak rivalry, though divisive, proved 
useable by party agents only in a highly constrained way, stuck as they were in republic- 
centric party competitions. From 1990 the anti-communist movements, the Czech Civic 
Forum (CF) and Slovak Public Against Violence (PAY), competed within their republics 
and splintered rather on issues of regime-transfer, approaches to state-building, economic 
transformation and the purging of the communist nomenklatura. The Czech and Slovak 
party political scenes moreover, developed according to a different ranking of these 
problems.
Political party development from November 1989 to June 1992:
Ghosts in the party machine - The Czech Lands
A March 1990 opinion poll put the Czech Civic Forum second only to the interim^ 
Federal Government of National Understanding as the most trusted institution in 
Czechoslovakia (Radio Free Europe 6.4.1990:7). At the same time, however, the
' The transition government tmtil the first free elections in June 1990.
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Socialist Party’s youth section launched a complaint that became widespread, that the 
Forum’s all-embracing style gave it unfair advantage over conventional parties {Svobodne 
slovo 12.3.1990). The Civic Forum’s chief goal was indeed sweeping. It was, as it had 
been in 1968, to ‘return Czechoslovakia to Europe’ (Kusin 1971:99), culturally, 
economically and politically. The Socialist youth also had a point in that the Forum’s 
rhetoric of non-partisanship from the very beginning obscured a very real political bias. 
Traditional Czech financial rigour was couched as a call for austerity. Together with 
advocating the rapid introduction of a market economy, the Civic Forum sought to 
describe the ‘reformed’ economic space as entirely beyond government, in the sense of 
‘political’ jurisdiction - to carve out free-market liberal territory.
The June 1990 election campaign evolved around social justice, democracy, the 
confiscation of Communist Party assets, the Party’s future, and implicitly, the need to 
redesign constitutional relations between Czechs and Slovaks. Personalities played a 
prominent role in the subdued campaign; unavoidably, given the few salient differences 
between programmes, and the resulting reluctance to enter a substantial debate. Even the 
Communist Party advocated political pluralism and a market economy, though it balked at 
the abolition of state property (Radio Free Europe 15.6.1990 Peter Martin). The election 
results are displayed in Table 5.1.
Election results: 8 - 9  June 1990 (percentage share o f the vote)
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Federal Assembly Czech/
Slovak
House of House of National
the People the Nations Councils
Czech Republic
Civic Forum (CF) 53.1 50.0 49.5
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia(CP) 13.5 13.8 13.3
Christian & Democratic Union (CDU) 8.7 8.7 8.4
MSD - SMS* 7.9 9.1 10.0
Others 16.8 18.4 18.8
Slovak Republic
Public Against Violence (PAY) 32.5 37.3 29.3
Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) 19.0 16.7 19.2
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CP) 13.8 13.4 13.3
Slovak National Party (SNP) 11.0 11.4 13.9
Coexistence and HCDM** 8.6 8.5 8.7
Democratic Party (DP) 4.4 3.7 4.4
Slovak Green Party (SOP) 3.2 2.6 3.5
Others 7.5 6.4 7.7
Election results: 8 - 9  June 1990 (percentage share o f seats)
Czech Republic
Civic Forum (CF) 68 50 127
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CP) 15 12 32
Christian & Democratic Union (CDU) 9 6 19
MSD - SMS* 9 7 22
TOTAL 101 75 200
Slovak Republic
Public Against Violence (PAV) 19 33 48
Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) 11 14 31
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CP) 8 12 . 22
Slovak National Party (SNP) 6 9 22
Coexistence and HCDM** 5 7 14
Democratic Party (DP) - - 7
Green Party (GP) - - 6
TOTAL 49 75 150
*Movement for Self-governing Democracy - Society for Moravia and Silesia
** Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
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If anything the Civic Forum’s success, paralleled by that of the like-mindedly consensus- 
seeking Public Against Violence and the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) in 
Slovakia, seemed to bode well for the resolution of regional conflicts. A threat to stable 
relations, however, lay in the inevitable disintegrative tendencies of the umbrella civic 
movements and the direction such fragmentation might take, a pattern foreshadowed by 
varying aspirations to economic control and economic autonomy.
The disintegration of the centre: June 1990 - Spring 1992
In the first year after the revolution the role of political parties was deeply contentious. As 
a debate this related not just to the sour experience of one-party rule, but also the strong 
party dependency of deputies in the First Republic. This ambiguous status was reflected in 
the two distinctive characteristics of the Czech party system in 1990: the proliferation of 
single-issue parties (without any hope of scaling the 5 per cent vote threshold for entry to 
parliament) and the persistence of the monolithic Civic Forum, with its ambivalent 
attitudes to party competition^.
It was not only a moral, (i.e. anti-dogmatic) but a pragmatic attitude that dictated the 
Civic Forum’s disorientation, however. To accept that the Forum was apolitical would be 
to ignore the strong factions evident within it but also the practical difficulty of operating 
in sectional terms after an anti-communist revolution. In a society where ideas of class 
had declined in political currency the liberal dissidents and the right-wing within the 
Forum replaced it differently: the dissidents with a hybrid of romantic metaphysics and 
liberal jurisprudence, a philosophy evolved in resistance to the state; the right with an 
individualistic, and economy-driven technocratic answer, to be underpinned by 
Christian/rightist social values. In 1990 there was little incentive for these alternative 
views to brave open competition. When the Civic Forum formally split in 1991 both sides 
still claimed to represent the interests of the whole society, though now thoroughly 
divided by reform philosophy and political strategy.
 ^ An affinity with Polish Solidarity has been remarked along with the observation that such movements are 
essentially ‘pre-pluralist’, insofar as they claim to represent all of society, implying the inferior moral worth of 
sectional interests (Batt 39:1993).
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The partial clarification of political forces in the June 1990 election diminished the Civic 
Forum’s appeal as a ‘broad umbrella’. Accused more and more of opportunism (the 
breakaway Democratic Initiative criticised the Forum’s ‘leftist bias’) any remaining 
illusions of consensus disappeared in October 1990 when finance minister Vaclav Klaus 
was elected as the chairman of the Forum, prompting an immediate paring down of the 
movement. The emergence of an Interparliamentary Group of the Democratic Right, and 
a parallel group of the centrists and centre-left, the Liberal Club, spelled the Forum’s end. 
The liberals protested that the metamorphosis of the Forum into a party was illegal and, in 
transforming the character of the movement, would destroy its popularity. Klaus and the 
Club of the Democratic Right insisted that the days of loose organisation were numbered. 
Klaus argued that ‘ideological indiscipline’ blocked decision-making and allowed 
ministers to pursue personal policies (Radio Free Europe 19.4.1991:9,10), though he was 
clearly motivated by the Forum’s unwillingness to embrace his entire strategy.
The formal division into liberal and Klausite^ camps came at the February Congress. The 
Liberal Club, led by federal foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier, renamed itself the Civic 
Movement (CM) while Klaus’s group became the Civic Democratic Party (CDF). The 
Civic Movement retained the core of the dissident movement and the much disputed loose 
internal structure of the original. The Civic Democratic Party in contrast, declared a 
disciplined internal hierarchy and official party registration. Both agreed to remain in 
coalition until just before the June 1992 election, but as allegiances settled the 
parliamentary caucuses - both federal and Czech - disintegrated"^.
With the Forum fmally destroyed its offspring faced the defining problem of open 
competition. Personal popularity was uncertain grounds for competition if indecisively 
attached to policy. A reputation for the delivery of policy was likewise a long term 
endeavour when basic design remained the immediate task in most policy arenas. Clarity 
in priority setting offered some room for contest, but to divide the economic right and 
liberals a distinctive note was required. It was found in an aspect of those differences that
 ^ The Finance Minister had successfully stolen the intiative from the earlier-formed and more intellectual right 
of the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA).
 ^Other deputies opted between remaining independent or entering one of the various smaller groups which had 
left the Forum in January. On April 2nd, Czechoslovak Social Democracy, which had failed to win 
representation in June 1990, announced that six deputies had joined, or rather, created its ranks.
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had just divided them, namely social tolerance and the approach of society to its 
communist past.
Setting the agenda: cleavages and party development - June 1990 to June 1992
It has been concluded that “regional, religious and ethnic” and only potentially economic 
cleavages “underpinned party diversification in 1990 and 1991” (Wightman 1991:67). 
Though this claim might describe Czech-Slovak differences, these were not the issues to 
dominate Czech party evolution. The only regional difference to spawn a party here was 
the issue of greater Moravian/Silesian autonomy. This one party, having split in Spring 
1991 over whether to seek republican status or simply greater self-management, looked 
set to dissolve altogether in the event of minimal self-administration actually being 
granted. The Catholic church was not consistently divisive; Church heads fought with 
Klaus over the restitution of Church property but Klaus claimed to represent the 
“Christian traditions in Europe” (Mlada Fronta dries 7.1.1991). Finally, ethnic animosity 
toward Slovakia as such (as opposed to conflicts over a constitutional arrangement) was 
discouraged by public opinion poll data, which professed a mutually fraternal regard. The 
Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA), the only Czech party to play openly the ethnic card in 
June 1992 failed to enter the Federal Assembly altogether. That said, the positive value of 
the relationship with Slovakia was reduced in the prevailing political discourse to its most 
utilitarian components. The Czech political right and left held different legal and 
economic conditions as mapping the minimal prerequisites of a common state but across 
the spectrum, with the exception of the Civic Movement, all substantive difficulties were 
assumed to emanate from the Slovak side.
The debate over the reconstruction of the federation was not therefore driven by 
nationalist rhetoric but by the significantly divisive issues of the period, notable precisely 
for their lack of pre-communist roots. Economic reform and questions of anti-communist 
retribution were certainly products of the transition, and products lending themselves 
more to political polarisation than compromise - essential for the election-oriented Civic 
Democratic Party whose main concern remained the need to distinguish itself from other 
urban liberals (the historic urban/rural cleavage being here of little use to strategists). In
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the absence of discernible party constituencies, party-builders had a limited range of 
strategically attractive issues and these pivoted on ideology-based dichotomies.
Not so much a programme, more a way of life
Economic policy dominated general party development in two ways. Firstly, the economy 
was widely considered the linchpin of political stability and thus of the whole 
transformation. Some 73 per cent of Czechs and Slovaks believed that democracy ‘only 
functions in rich countries’ (Beyme 1993:423). Oppression in the 1980s had been political 
and social but also accompanied by the steady decline of living standards. By autumn 
1991, 88.9 per cent of Czechs agreed that a market economy was necessary for economic 
development^ (Kipke 1993:48). Party ownership of the policy seen as most likely to 
reverse these negative economic trends had the potential to capture credibility on the 
delivery of other democratic benefits. More importantly, a party seen to be competent on 
the economy could deprive competing parties of the same essential credibility. Finance 
Minister Klaus laid claim to the authorship of an economic reform package that managed, 
even during formal privatisation, to maintain exceptionally low unemployment in the 
Czech Republic - though not, as we shall see, in Slovakia^.
Secondly, this claim to authorship gave Klaus leverage to discipline the Civic Democratic 
Party and the authority to introduce a unique tone into political debate: decisive, confident 
and pragmatic. In the preamble to a television interview it was commented that “Vaclav 
Klaus functions a little like a man from another world... He is almost the perfect antithesis 
of the long-standing picture of a Czech, not genial, but scathing, not idle, but 
unbelievably hard-working. Not evasive, but direct... he alone declared himself to be a 
conservative. Yet a conservative is he who somehow retains traditions. In this sense Klaus 
is the most radical revolutionary against the Czech character” (Gen 1994:13). The 
charismatic appeal of such a personality was not surprising when 72.8 per cent of the
 ^ In findings from July 1992, 57 per cent of Czechs over 18 endorsed and agreed on the meaning of the term 
‘capitalism’; attributing to it the following, stark, features: private ownership without state restrictions; 
inequality as a natural phenemona dependent upon the ability of individuals; poverty as a result of personal 
inability; minimal intervention of the state into the economy; unemployment as a consequence o f individual’s 
lack of enthusiasm for their occupations; emphasis on rapid economic transformation, specifically a rapid 
privatisation process (Kudematsch 1993:115).
See Chapter 7
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population claimed feelings of anxiety and insecurity when looking into the near future 
(Tucek and Manek 1993:28).
Klaus had indeed claimed, unusually, to be a conservative, thus wedding a natural 
supporting argument for gradualism to a programme of rapid economic transformation. 
The ideological allusion helped to distinguish the Civic Democratic Party from other 
parties of the right, but more importantly, blunted the much feared sharpness of the 
reform project. Self-avowedly ‘Thatcherite Conservatism’ proffered reassurance with the 
argument that all reform, however drastic or innovative, was fundamentally a return to 
the “most valuable social values, formed as the fruit of a thousand year evolution” (Klaus 
1990a: 17). Moving forward into reform (supplemented by de-bolshevisation) was sold as 
a device to regain the positive aspects of the past (the Czech equivalent of Thatcher’s so- 
called “vigorous virtues”) and to return to the western path. Such claims, that the process 
of reform not only generated the strategy necessary for the present but also re-invoked 
what had been known before communism, forged a form of politico-economic mysticism 
that looked remarkably like an inversion of Marxist-Leninist historical dialectic.
Much to the consternation of historians and dissidents the demands of party competition 
and the avowed anti-communism of parties to the right of the Civic Movement led them 
to belittle the events of the Prague Spring. Denying its status as a popular insurrection, 
the events of 1968 were dismissed as an irresponsible contest between Communist Party 
factions. While leading this assault on the country’s history and collective memory, the 
Civic Democratic Party nevertheless expropriated those central tenets of the ‘68 platform 
expressing the historical aspirations of Czech political culture, the most important being 
the aspiration to Europe. In 1968 Milan Kundera, then a leading voice, had fought for the 
re-emancipation, the re-Europeanisation, of Czech cultural life. Under Klaus, aided by his 
Czech role model stature as the ‘skilled engineer’, the Czechs would ‘return’ on solid 
modem ground with a thriving economy abounding with enviable industrial talents. 
Without such an economy he threatened, Europe would remain a mirage. The fact that 
many 1968 reformers had, at one time, been committed Stalinists^, permitted the Civic
 ^ Kundera wrote of 1968 that “instead of the standard pattern of one group of people (a class, a nation) rising 
up against another, all the people (an entire generation) revolted against their own youth. Their goal was to 
recapture and tame the deed they had created, and they almost succeeded" (Kundera 1987:13-14).
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Democratic Party to espouse the traditions that had underpinned the Spring whilst 
damning the reformers of the time (among them the Civic Movement’s leader, Jiri 
Dienstbier) as collaborators, unfit for office.*
From his platform of economic credibility Klaus projected himself as a sympathetic realist 
whilst satirising the rival, intellectual core of the old Civic Forum. According to Carton 
Ash, Klaus displayed an “almost comical desire to be taken seriously as a writer” 
(Garton-Ash 1995:36). In practice, Klaus’s lucid rejection of the priorities of the former- 
dissidents was devastating - he blamed the discursive style of the Civic Forum for delays 
in economic policy and harped on the intellectual elite’s chronic Pragocentrism. By 
projecting the Civic Movement programme to be an apology for the past and a page of 
philosophy in regard to the future, he distinguished the Civic Democratic Party as the 
most forward-looking and efficient heir of the November revolution. Finally, by taking 
early to writing articles outlining his policies and beliefs, often in Havel-style state-of-the- 
nation essays, Klaus pulled a stunt unsuspected by Carton Ash. Imitating dissident 
intellectuals proved a most effective way of framing their esotericism. The right-winger 
Peter Candalovic wrote that “while the inter-parliamentary Club of the Democratic Right 
concentrated right from the beginning on the drafting of legislation towards more radical 
reform, one cannot avoid feeling that the Liberal Club rather produced statements 
suggesting it was the last saviour of democracy, social certainties and culture” {Mlada 
Fronta dues 30.1.1991).
Screening the past
Czech party politics after 1989 were marked by the impulse to exorcise the ghosts of 
communism. Though power had been transferred peacefully, battles emerged 
immediately after the revolution which signalled deep tensions between legal and political 
remedies to old structures and their influence. When the People’s Party was besieged by 
pre-election scandals the liberals in the Civic Forum had risked their reformist reputation 
to insist on a fair hearing for the former Communist Party satellite. Similarly, when a lack
A foreign correspondent, Dienstbier was expelled from the Party in 1969 and fired after participating in anti­
occupation broadcasts. From 1970 he worked predominantly as a stoker, was among the first signatories and 
spokesmen of Charter 77, and was imprisoned between 1979 and 1982.
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of self-redefinition in the Communist Party (CP)^ led the former satellite parties and 
Social Democrats to propose the Party’s banning, many in the Civic Forum objected that 
in a mature democracy the communists and their legacy should be defeated through 
electoral competition and not forbidden legalistically^®. Clearly the liberals, then at the 
head of the Civic Forum, intended to frame their anti-communism in a strictly democratic 
way. With a population more concerned by the threat of instability than the rule of law, 
such a priority proved a poor electoral strategy for the coming competition in June 1992.
The intense party politicisation of anti-communist ‘screening’ {lustrace) in the Czech 
lands may be seen as the fusion of a demonstrated (though not the leading) public 
preoccupation and the intense pressure of party competition within the confines of a two- 
year election cycle. As an issue it possessed rare potential for a display of strong 
government. Victory over the drafting of restitution laws only confirmed Klaus’s evident 
grip on reform. ‘Screening’, in contrast, provided the Civic Democratic Party with 
victory in an area considered the preserve of the dissidents - that of public morality.
Various commissions, notably that investigating the violent events of 17th November 
1989, had had access to state security files and had engaged in a process of vetting public 
officials for past collaborations. This initial process had been criticised by deputies for its 
arbitrary application under the People’s Party Interior Minister, Richard Sacher. Even 
after Sacher’s departure in June 1990 the vetting procedure remained controversial, 
becoming the focus of public concern over continuing communist influence. Public 
disquiet was mobilised by anti-communist groups of the right, notably the Confederation 
of Political Prisoners and the Club of Committed Non-Party Members (‘KAN’). These 
very vocal groups were the heartfelt opposition to continuing communist power and 
stood, militantly, for their disqualification. They found allies both in the press and 
academic commentary^ ^  and, so it transpired, a champion in the parliamentary right.
 ^ Having lost a third of its members, the Party seemed willing only to ‘federalise’ itself by establishing a 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia to complement that o f Slovakia (an action the Slovaks called for in 
1968 to signal some autonomy of the Slovak Party).
The government nevertheless announced that all party property would be confiscated as of 1st June 1990.
Exposing Communist infiltration in the new system was the clearest way for the Czech press, un-purged and 
still under the old titles of Youth Front and Red Truth etc., to rehabilitate themselves as editorially 
independent. Eager for conspiracy, new newspapers, notably Respekt, endeavoured to push de-bolshevisation 
to the fore. Having set out to ‘vet’ public life the press fastened onto personalities with greater rigour than onto 
policy.
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Lustration was never out of the press in 1990 and 1991, the implication being always that 
a coherent communist force remained, larger and more recidivist than the observable 
Communist Party. Newspaper stories in Spring 1991 centred on screening the 
administration, particularly on how parliament could acquire the right to dismiss deputies 
found to have collaborated. In February the Christian Democratic Union and smaller 
parties of the right had demonstrated for ‘universal and legally reliable vettings’ {Mlada 
Fronta dues 26.2.1991). That same month, the head of Prague’s Charles University 
politics faculty and KAN member, R. Kucera, made a straight comparison between 
communism and fascism and called for communism to be criminalised and its 
governmental members condemned. Kucera warned that another ‘victorious February’ (as 
in 1948) awaited in the wings (Kucera 1992:43). It was thus possible to capitalise on the 
issue of screening without appearing driven by revenge, despite liberal appeals for 
reconciliation. The right claimed that political prudence should outweigh civic and human 
rights considerations in this case. The threat was animated by figures such as Vaclav 
Benda who insisted that “former collaborators of state security have relatively high 
representation in the Presidium of the parliament and its Constitutional-Legal 
Committees” {Mlada Fronta dnes 10.1.1991). When Deputy Interior Minister (and 
former Respekt editor) Jan Ruml described changes in his ministry he emphasised “[the] 
dozens of new people, active fighters against the totalitarian regime” {Obcansky denik
5.2.1991).
Non-communist political forces began calling unanimously for a screening bill. The 
reasons for legislating were amplified for deputies by leaks to the media and a general 
increase in the abuse of files for political blackmail through 1990 and 1991^^. On 27th 
June 1991, the federal government approved a bill presented by the Civic Movement 
and at this point the real disunity among those calling for regulation was revealed. The 
original draft had intended to disqualify from public office only those proven to have 
violated human rights. However, on the basis of comments by federal committees 
under pressure by the right, specifically the Civic Democratic Party, fundamental 
changes were made which widened the scope of the draft to an extent making
For detail of a legally tortuous example see Lawrence Weschler (1992).
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endorsement of the bill impossible by any party concerned witH liberal legal norms. 
The bill emerging in September 1991, covered members of state security, registered 
residents, agents or holders of ‘conspiracy flats’, informers or ideological collaborators 
and other deliberate collaborators (Stein and Scarrow 1994:25). The draft was extended 
to cover former Secretaries of the Communist Party at District or higher level, 
members of the Presidium of Central committees who implemented political control of 
the National Security Corps, and members of the security departments of the 
Communist Party Central Committees. By 31st December, 1996 these people were no 
longer to hold elected or appointed positions in state administration bodies, in the army, 
police, the President's office, the Federal Assembly Office, the Czechoslovak 
Government Office, Czechoslovak Radio, Television and CTK (press agency) or 
republican bodies to be delineated by their governments. The ban was to last for five 
years, the duration of the law, but in specifying positions it protected the employability, 
most obviously in the private sector, of much of the old technocratic and political elite 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 5.10.1991).
According to objections by the General Procuratory and other ministries the bill 
contradicted the Charter of Human Rights, the 1958 International Labour Organisation 
convention No. I l l  on non-discrimination in work, it implied collective guilt, and 
intervened in the competencies of the republics. It was also thought profoundly unsafe 
that state security files were to be used as evidence (Marek, T. in Mlada Fronta dnes 
2:4.9.1991). The bill was, nevertheless, approved on October 4th, 1991, with the 
majority composed of the Civic Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance and 
the Christian Democratic Party.
In lustration, the Civic Democratic Party had found an issue against the party they 
perceived to be their main rival, the Civic Movement, who had looked in danger of 
dominating government after the Forum fell apart. Though the Civic Democratic Party 
was the larger parliamentary party, the CDP’s only federal cabinet member was Klaus, 
who single-handedly opposed the moderate impulses of liberal ministers (Stein and 
Scarrow 1994:24), but effectively given his hegemony over economic policy-at-large.
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Before the issue of lustration was raised it was unclear how much value the electorate 
ascribed to Civic Movement’s dissident roots and civic priorities. The latter’s 
determination to institute liberal legal norms clearly set them at odds with the prevailing 
public mood^^. The differences established by lustration were exploited to the full by 
the Civic Democratic Party, even though for Klaus the need for lustration was scarcely 
a deeply held belief. Indeed, his neutrality had earlier provoked consternation among 
the right. The issue waS first pushed by the political right at a joint press conference^'^, 
in which the Christian Democratic Party’s Vaclav Benda argued that they wished to 
change the situation whereby reform communists still controlled various bodies, not as 
a result of free elections but due to the undemocratic policy of the Civic Forum {Mlada 
Fronta dnes 2:19.2.1991). Klaus was thus pushed to endorse wholeheartedly the 
militant supporters of vettings, even if the Civic Democratic Party’s sponsorship of 
lustration situated it plainly in Michnik’s scathing category of the ‘new Party of the 
clean and prudent’. This was a peculiarly post-communist party, made up of those 
prudent people who for years had worked in safety, inside the official legal structures, 
avoiding both Party and opposition activity, only to later express a belated, 
compensatory aggressiveness toward communism and toward anyone who had dirtied 
their hands in the fight for reform (Michnik 1993:20).
The pressure to manipulate lustration was considerable. It was only in April 1991 that 
the Civic Democratic Party had built a public lead over the Civic Movement in 
economic policy. Moreover, public allegiance seemed to be waning for both groups by 
the summer. By mid-1991, polls revealed that fewer than half of the Civic Forum’s 
supporters assigned themselves to either party. Grassroots political activity was 
minimal, and in lustration, best of all, was an issue where the press had already done 
the work of the missing party infrastructure (Stein and Scarrow 1994:24). Until now 
Klaus had wielded the past against the Civic Movement through populist anti-
It would be wrong to characterise those against the lustration law as the former dissidents en bloc (many of 
whom, notably Vaclav Benda were at the fore of the most impassioned called for legalised disqualifications of 
past collaborators).The important distinction was between those strict liberal dissidents that balked at the 
potentially abusive sweep of the law, and those, like Havel, who opted for an anti-Communist line, either out 
of conviction or from the perception that the government had yet to convince the public of its wholehearted 
rejection of past practices.
Attended by the KAN, the Liberal Democratic party, the Civic Democratic alliance, the Club o f the 
Democratic Right Wing, the Republic Union, and notably, the right-oriented Prague Civic Forum Council.
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intellectualism, indicting the unbridled intellectual as a dangerously utopian force in 
politics. What he had lacked was the contemporary evidence to drive this message 
home. The Civic Movement’s attitude to lustration was made to look like proof, not 
only of collaboration, but of this utopianism. In Why I  am an Optimist (1990) Klaus had 
played down the role of the people at large in maintaining socialist order. Where the 
Civic Movement’s Jan Urban talked of the compromises forced on every individual 
under communism, Klaus insisted of the regime that: “it was not ‘we’ who did this. 
None of ‘us’ would ever have had the audacity, for we do not know this type of 
ambition. Behind every arrogant attempt to draw up completely new social institutions, 
there lurks the cerebral and sometimes physical violence of a handful of self-important 
intellectuals... The attempt at socialism... was not some ‘mob rebellion’,., but rather a 
revolt by a group of leftist intellectuals” (Klaus in Literarni noviny 26.3.1990). Such 
asides about the problems of intellectual/bureaucratic sabotage now underpinned both a 
popular policy and a direct attack on the ex-1968 reformers within the Civic 
Movement. This, it has to be remembered, came from the man who at one time 
asserted that “no litmus test exists which could precisely divide good and evil between 
Communists and non-Communists” {Respekt 7,13:1990, in Stein and Scarrow 
1994:25).
Lustration as a party issue badly exposed the liberal ex-dissidents. In plainly crossing 
the fence from the Civic Democratic Party, the Civic Movement acted anti- 
pragmatically, as if responsibility rested with the political parties to establish the 
bedrock of democratic culture, the rule of law being the rock in question. The vote- 
seeking right on the other hand had tapped successfully into a vein of public concern 
not dependent on economic performance^^ and the Civic Democratic Party capitalised 
where it could. Deputy interior minister Jan Ruml was wooed into the party in the 
spring of 1992 - just before the elections. During the official electoral campaign the 
Civic Democratic Party tethered lustration firmly to economic reform, (previously tied 
to the Forum-splitting issue of ‘party’^^ ). They alleged the fundamentally anti-
Anxiety had been fuelled by the attempted coup d ’ Etat in the Soviet Union in August 1991 following which 
the CDP had advertised for the publication of lists of collaborators and as sponsor of the new lustration bill 
(Mlada Fronta dnes 22.8.1991:2).
As early as November 1990 Klaus had argued the “forces which are against economic reform are identical 
with those which are against the formation of a political party” (Lidove noviny 2.11.1990).
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democratic character of those who could both oppose the government’s chosen method 
of screening and have reservations over reform progress. This conventional use of 
‘intellectual terrorism’; where an advocate/enemy of ‘a’ is alleged automatically to 
advocate/oppose also ‘b ’, ’c’, etc. was the Civic Democratic Party’s most successful 
device for destroying Civic Movement who quite failed to retaliate, considering such 
tactics the lowest form of ‘politicking’.
The lustration debate also had a national aspect, though one played out mainly against 
Federal Assembly chairman Alexander Dubcek. The increasingly nationalist Civic 
Democratic Alliance^^ insinuated much from the fact that the Czech right could not oust 
Dubcek for signing the Moscow Protocols in 1968 only because he was too popular a 
figure in Slovakia {Mlada Fronta dnes 3.5.1991:1,2). Dubcek, actually a staunch 
federalist, opposed the vettings procedure for human rights reasons and because these 
damaged the prestige of the Assembly. His popularity, it was not too subtly implied by 
the Civic Democratic Alliance, originated in Slovak preferences for the old regime. In 
July 1991, when Dubcek left the Public Against Violence objecting that it had departed 
the centre ground and had moved rightward, Klaus leapt the hurdle of being too 
apparently anti-Slovak by pointing out that the Slovak Public Against Violence now 
also opposed Dubcek. Klaus’s implication being that ‘good Slovaks’ would follow such 
a line. Polls found that Czechs, far more than Slovaks, felt the legislation to be 
necessary (Stein and Scarrow 1994:26:).
The vote on lustration thus not only set the Civic Movement apart from the Civic 
Democratic Party but aligned it with the forces of Slovak nationalism and the left, who 
abstained with Civic Movement or voted against the bill. According to Vaclav Zak, the 
Civic Movement’s opposition to the bill, particularly to the principle of collective guilt, 
lost it two thirds of its support (Zak 29.3.1995). Despite this most dire warning, the 
Civic Movement insisted on running the 1992 election campaign on a platform ‘for the 
rule of law’ - electorally falling on their own sword in a manner readily imitated by 
their liberal Slovak colleagues.
Having made much of its membership rules excluding ex-Communists the Civic Democratic Alliance 
proceeded to make a few exceptions for popular ministers e.g. Vladimir Dlouhy.
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Slovak party development 1990 -1992: liberalism versus 'the nation'
"There is a direct conflict between the needs o f the Czechoslovak economy and the 
national interests o f most Slovaks" {Rude pravo 8.12.1990). Petr Pithart (Civic 
Movement), Czech premier
The new Slovak ruling elite to emerge from November 1989 was in fact a combination of 
dissidents and ‘laundered’ communists, the latter split between 1968 veterans and those 
who resigned in the wake of the ‘89 revolution (Szomolanyi 1994:63). It was, moreover, 
evident that Slovak preoccupations (at both elite and mass level) centred on matters other 
than purging the past. This relative absence of retributive impulses has prompted some to 
suggest that Slovaks were unrealistic about democracy (Mihalikova 1994:54-55). An 
alternative interpretation, borne out by electoral choices, is that a more recently 
favourable experience under communism had aroused less resentment against its existing 
personnel. Czechs and Slovaks clearly held in common the impulse to defend, if not 
improve, the socio-economic developments achieved in the last twenty years.
To the detriment of their agenda Slovak dissidents^^ possessed an even greater distaste for 
politics than did their Czech colleagues. Led by the sociologist, Fedor Gal, the Public 
Against Violence (PAV) had been the first apparently non-communist movement to 
emerge, but its deep infiltration by 1968 reform communists and the ‘Revival’ groupé* 
soon became apparent. The Public Against Violence was joined by Vladimir Meciar, a 
lawyer who had already managed to get himself elected mayor of Bratislava, and who in 
January became Slovak Interior Minister on Dubcek’s recommendation, an appointment 
which elicited warning letters to Havel suggesting that Meciar would misapply his powers 
(Radio Free Europe 10.4.1992). The Public Against Violence had begun to lose support 
as early as January 1990. The unwillingness of the dissident group to take parliamentary 
seats, let alone government posts, had made them seem both in power and yet antipathetic 
to it. Their reticence allowed for the politically less inhibited, (and to the dissidents.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the repressive conditions of post-invasion ‘normalisation’ (1968 - 1989), 
particularly Communist Party purges, had been more moderate in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Artistic 
and intellectual circles were less violently harrassed and consequently dissident groups were small and isolated, 
not only from the public but from one another, amounting only to what have been termed "islands of positive 
deviation" (Szomolanyi 1994:66).
‘Revival’ (Obroda in Slovak) was founded in February 1989 under the name O'. This political movement 
extolled democratic socialism and the principles of the Prague spring and was legalised in November 1989.
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unknown) former communists, such as Meciar, to lead the Public Against Violence in the 
Slovak National Council, the significant forum of Slovak party development. With 9 per 
cent of public favour at the end of April 1990, Public Against Violence trailed the Green 
Party (SOP), the Democratic Party (DP)^®, the Communist Party, but most of all the 
Christian Democrats, (CDM - under Jan Camogursky)^^ The Public Against Violence’s 
desire to recover their losses consolidated the pragmatic coalition of dissidents and ex- 
Party members. Eventually it prompted the offer of ballot places to the one-time reform 
communists Marian Calfa, Alexander Dubcek and Milan Cic, respectively the first, 
second and third most popular Slovak politicians at the end of April 1990 (Zajac 27-28). 
The most popular non-communist politician ranked ninth overall in a pre-election p o lP  
(Szomolanyi 1994:71).
Slovak party programmes for June 1990 were no less vague than the Czech - sociologist, 
Milan Simecka feared voters might be overwhelmed by their ‘democraticity’ (Simecka 
1990). A majority of Slovaks divided nonetheless clearly between the Public Against 
Violence and Christian Democratic Movement - the Catholic Church having constituted 
the main opposition to Slovak communism since 1968 - results which confound 
Wightman’s claim that Slovaks failed to reject the old regime (Wightman 1995:61). Turn­
out was an impressive 95.4 per cent^^. Havel persuaded Camogursky to put the Christian
The Democratic Party (DP), offspring of the Slovak Freedom Party, a former member of the 'National 
Front'. The DP stressed allegiance not only to democratic values but to a strong federal Czechoslovakia. It was 
led by Martin Kvetko, a returned exile and former leading member of the pre-Communist DP.
At its founding convention at Nitra on 17 February 1990 the Christian Democratic Movement had formed 
around three theses; an ‘Erhard type’ social market economy; two [European Community] stars and seats 
[Czech and Slovak]; and thirdly, if more implicitly, that the Christian Democratic Movement would gain the 
support of the 70 per cent of the Slovak population considering itself Catholic. The first two clearly addressed 
Slovak anxieties about national and economic conditions more explicitly than did Public Against Violence, a 
point not lost on Vladimir Meciar. Its third thesis, linking support with attitudes to the church, proved 
counterproductive. Slovak society had clearly begun to differentiate church and state since 1945.
The Communist Party meanwhile, re-launched itself under the vitalising leadership of Peter Weiss. A  
member of the young Communist intelligentsia which had genuinly intimidated the Party before November ‘89, 
Weiss was determined to drag the Party into line with the progressive Communist and social democratic parties 
of western Europe. In contrast to the Czechs, the Slovak Communists also renamed themselves after the June 
1990 elections. Under their new title the Party of the Democratic Left (PDL) required re-registration of its 
membership in the hope that this might further alienate the die-hards of the old regime. A Slovak National 
Party (SNP) also emerged just before the June election and despite its occasional denials and expressions of soft 
versions of autonomy, was the only party to advocate Slovak independence. The nationalists were the rogue 
element in the election, coming third with 13.9 per cent of the vote, (22 Slovak National Council seats), despite 
only gleaning 3.8 per cent support in opinion polls at the end of May.
Only the DP, and Slovak Nationalists projected unequivocal positions on preferred state-arrangements. 
Radio Free Europe was unusually off the mark when it claimed the issue of autonomy became an electoral 
rallying point (Radio Free Europe 15.6.1990:16).
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Democratic Movement’s 26 deputies behind the federal Public Against Violence/Civic 
Forum governing coalition, believing that the Christian Democrats were likely to outstrip 
the Public Against Violence if Slovakia reverted to its pre-communist clericalism. 
Camogursky himself returned to the Slovak parliament. With only 48 seats out of the 150 
in the Slovak National Council, Public Against Violence premier elect Vladimir Meciar 
was obliged to seek a Slovak government coalition with the Christian Democratic 
Movement (with 31 seats) and the Democratic Party (with 7), in order to secure a 
governing majority. Camogursky became vice premier. Coalition mles were established 
with difficulty, though as we shall see, a majority system would have also mn into 
trouble.
Party diversification 1991 -1992
The Public Against Violence had responded to the break-up of the Forum by promising 
cooperation with all former associates. By 1991 however, the Slovak organisation was 
itself no longer intact. Even the anti-hierarchical Gal assumed the PAV’s right to approve 
their premier’s decisions and to hold him accountable, yet in this it was frequently 
fmstrated by Meciar. By March, the Slovak premier had formed a faction, the ‘Public 
Against Violence - for a Democratic Slovakia’, publicly splitting the Public Against 
Violence in half. Fatally for the PAV the real causes of friction were unclear to the 
broader public until this open conflict.
Assisted by a nervous media, Meciar had in many ways appeared a diligent advocate of 
the Public Against Violence programme. It was obvious to the public was that, in contrast 
to the rest of PAV’s leadership Meciar believed that of the main pillars of the PAV’s 
agreed programme (September 1990) Slovak national issues should receive particular 
priority. Many in the Public Against Violence feared that since August 1990, Meciar had 
adopted too confrontational a style in negotiations with the Czechs, which, combined with 
his known reservations over economic policy would lead to an un-looked for clash. These 
‘pillars’ were supposed to enjoy parity of esteem. Meciar, however, believed that the 
PAV had little choice but to respond to the rising tide of Slovak national sentiment, a tide 
he perceived as behind the growing popularity of the rival Christian Democratic 
Movement.
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At the Public Against Violence’s Congress on February 23rd 1991, Meciar attempted to 
take over the leadership only to be defeated by the incumbent, Fedor Gal. Gal not only 
rejected the possibility of turning the PAV into a party but pointed to the danger of 
populism which “misuses people’s national thinking for the narrow power ambitions of 
individuals” . Josef Kucerak likewise slated Meciar for his rosy portrayal of the Slovak 
economy’s potential under a modified reform {Mlada Fronta dnes 1.3.1992). In March, 
89 per cent of Slovaks nevertheless cited Meciar as their most popular politician, {Lidove 
demokracie 4.3.1991:1) and no doubt emboldened by such support he exacted political 
revenge, accusing the liberal economist Kucerak of state security collaboration on the one 
hand and Gal of censoring his television appearances on the other {Rudepravo 5.3.1991). 
When Gal sought to play down the now deep rift in the PAV, Meciar identified it as 
professional jealousy^'^.
By the end of the first week of March, Meciar and his colleagues, Rudolf Filkus and 
Milan Knazko, had left to form the Public Against Violence - Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (MDS). Declaring to the press that it ‘starts out from the original 
base of the PAV movement’ they co-opted the June 1990 PAV platform Chance for  
Slovakia as they departed {Mlada Fronta dnes 6.3.1991:1,2). Meciar suggested he might 
collaborate with the rump of Public Against Violence if only it could get rid of its 
‘undemocratic working methods’. In the same period some 10,000 demonstrated for 
Meciar in Bratislava and 20 PAV district councils pledged their support {Rude pravo
7.3.1991). Prompt Czech ‘assistance’ destroyed what little chance the Public Against 
Violence had of recovering the situation. Czech Premier Pithart quickly endorsed his 
Slovak liberal colleagues with the unsupported suggestion that Slovaks falling in step 
behind Meciar were less apprehensive of authoritarianism than Czechs, a line guaranteed 
to antagonise Slovaks {Mlada Fronta dnes 8.3.1991:4). Havel’s spokesman, Michael 
Zantovsky, destroyed Gal’s last efforts at damage limitation with the comment that a new 
Slovak coalition had emerged between 1968 reform communists, present communists.
A ludicrous claim given Gal’s keen desire to avoid power beyond the Public Against Violence. The sinister 
aspect of Meciar’s tactic is the spite he reserved for the Jewish Gal and the effect this had on mobilising deep- 
rooted Slovak anti-Semitism. In January 1993, 53 per cent of a representative sample claimed there was 
“excessive influence of Jews on economic and social life” (Butorova (ed) 1993:9)
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separatists “and people who recall the Slovak State as the golden period of the Slovak 
nation” {Mlada Fronta dnes 12.3.1991). In equating Meciar's tactics and support with 
fascism Zantovsky took the shortest available route to comprehensive Slovak indignation.
The Public Against Violence accused Meciar of jeopardising reform with an unwarranted 
nationalist diversion, failing to realise that Meciar’s support lay precisely in his overlaying 
pre-existing national concerns with an economic and social platform. Meciar claimed a 
centrist orientation and that his goal was only to stop the deviation of the PAV to the 
right, a claim endorsed by Alexander Dubcek {Mlada Fronta dnes 12.3.1991). On March 
22nd it was announced that a new caucus had formed in the Federal Assembly and of the 
58 deputies elected for PAV in June, 32 had joined Meciar. An AISA poll found that 65 
per cent of Slovaks replied a ‘definite yes’ to the question; “Is Meciar a guarantor of free 
and democratic development?” and 86 per cent said the current form of the federation 
suppressed the interests of Slovakia, with an unusually high 22 per cent claiming to be 
separatist.
Finally, if elections were to be held in March, 42 per cent said they would vote for the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and 1 per cent for the Public Against Violence 
{Pravda, Lidove noviny 20.4.1991). At this point the PAV committed what could only be 
described as political suicide, and ousted Meciar as premier on April 23rd, 1991, 
releasing him into unfettered opposition at a time of PAV’s lowest ever political 
legitimacy. From here Meciar could pursue freely the politics of ‘overbidding’ (Sartori 
1990:334), introducing massively inflationary demands into the policy arena - from the 
state arrangement to the economy, and foreclosing, in Sartori's terms, any nascent system 
of fair party competition. It has been concluded that, “when [Meciar] was forced into 
opposition, only one path was left for him to fight successfully for a return to power, the 
national one” (Jicinsky 1993:75). Judging by his subsequent strategy, not of playing the 
independence card but of simply bundling constitutional alternatives as the public mood 
dictated, it is more accurate to argue that Meciar, having exited on the tide of PAV 
support took the nationalist card into his eclectic, populist pack.
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Meciar’s ouster inaugurated an unambiguously non-communist Slovak government, a 
coalition between the Christian Democratic Movement and the Public Against Violence 
rump, now under Kucerak’s leadership. It has been claimed, with hindsight, that the PAV 
had only ever won because the names of ‘1968’ politicians “evoked the belief of a 
continuity of reform socialism among the majority of those 29 per cent of voters” 
(Szomolanyi 1994:72). There were nevertheless, significant supplementary reasons as to 
why the remainder of PAV, soon to be renamed Civic Democratic Union, CDU, failed to 
revive. The first, following Szomolanyi, was the result of the electorate’s aspirations to 
continuity and stability. Opinion poll data stressed repeatedly that the public’s overriding 
concern was over declining social welfare and living standards, above all other issues 
(Butorova 1993:60). Having reconciled themselves to a transitional ‘valley of tears’ - as 
an article of liberal economic faith - the metropolitan liberals of the Civic Democratic 
Union rejected as naive any soothing adjustment of economic reform to worsening 
conditions. This rejection might not have been so inflammatory had it not been wedded to 
public knowledge that the reform’s Czech authors governed over markedly different 
conditions. As it was, most Slovaks did not react to growing national inequality with an 
equally zealous faith in the free market.
The second reason concerned ‘the nation’. The main question to arise spontaneously onto 
the political scene, Slovak political equality with the Czech lands had long been, and 
remained, an issue of change. Here the liberals took on the role of conservatives, again 
apparently more sensitive to Prague than to Bratislava. The Public Against Violence/Civic 
Democratic Union overshot its constituency. Goaded by Meciar’s supposed ‘nationalism’, 
they insisted upon an ultra-secular, a-national image than was strictly true of its politics. 
As with the economy, its arguments about the state were read as a pretentious liberal 
monopoly on realism and rationality. By discussing the majority of its citizens as if they 
were Caliban at the gate, the Civic Democratic Union actually appeared to sneer at the 
electorate, an unconventional electoral strategy at the best of times.
Party formation - agenda-setting in Slovakia 1990 -1992: The Language Law
What then, were the issues that allowed Meciar to sustain the kind of support he clearly 
enjoyed after the collapse of Public Against Violence? The evidence is that whereas his
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rivals sought to align or root themselves in ideologies and traditions, Meciar acted from 
the beginning as an ideological property developer, garnering every available coalition 
with little scruple for consistency. In a nascent party system such behaviour might appear 
as sensitive domestically as it appeared populist to the outside world.
What is striking is that Meciar was capable of acting strategically. Two alternative 
language bills had emerged in the Slovak National Council in Autumn 1990. One, drafted 
by the cultural organisation Matica slovenska and sponsored by Slovak Nationalists and 
the nationalists within the Christian Democratic Movement, stipulated the exclusive use of 
Slovak as the official language of the state and clearly discriminated against the sizeable 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia’s south. Meciar defended the government version, which 
made no such exclusionary attempts. On October 25th the Slovak National Council 
approved the latter draft after a 12 hour debate during which parliamentary speeches were 
relayed to demonstrating crowds. Meciar had, nonetheless, opposed ‘irresponsible 
nationalism’ throughout the dispute, even if many in the Public Against Violence felt his 
rhetoric changed drastically according to his audience (Gal 4.4.1995). As with Klaus’s 
pragmatic adoption of lustration, Meciar took into his armoury only those aspects of 
nationalism befitting his needs. At this point, in the middle of talks on Czech-Slovak 
power sharing, Meciar’s first priority was his image as a responsible national 
representative. To cultivate such status he accused those provoking student unrest over the 
bill as irresponsible, threatened legal action against hunger strikers settled in front of the 
Council {Svobodne slovo 7.10.1990:1), and even, on television, berated Matica 
slovenska’s Jozef Markus for his nationalism. Had Meciar sided with the Slovak 
Nationalists he would have been branded a demagogue. Instead, at the end of the month, 
alongside Fedor Gal, Petr Pithart, Jan Camogursky and Vaclav Klaus, he signed an 
avowal that “we shall energetically withstand all attempts to violate the integrity and 
sovereignty of our state” {Lidove noviny 29.10.1990).
Meciar finds a platform
If the Slovaks appeared to be the “motor of the discussions” (Havel, in Kirschbaum 
1995:256) over the reorganisation of the federal state, this, again, had everything to do 
with the fusion of an issue of observable public concern with looming elections. TTie talks
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between the présidia of the National Councils and the federal government were the formal 
locus of the constitutional debate. In party political terms the failing process of the talks 
allows us both to map Vladimir Meciar’s switch to nationalist rhetoric, and to account 
further for the failing credibility of the Civic Democratic Union-Christian Democratic 
Movement coalition. For the sake of clarity it is enough to limit our account to the four 
most significant meetings on constitutional reform which took place between 1990 and the 
June election in 1992. The first in Trencianske Teplice in August 1990, discussed 
provisional power-sharing arrangements and finally concluded in December. The second 
took place m Lany on 10th May 1991 (after preparatory meetings with Havel in February 
and March). The third occurred in Budmerice on May 31st, 1991, and the last in 
Kromeriz on June 17th, 1991.
Trencianske Teplice
The talks at Trencianske Teplice set the tone of premier Meciar’s approach to his Czech 
federal partners. To their surprise he had preempted negotiation by arriving with a preset 
agenda, and though little of the talks was publicised Meciar’s style made the headlines in 
both republics, as did his demands that a re-division of competences between the federal 
centre and the republican parliaments be made as quickly as possible. The Czech response 
was that Meciar practiced the politics of the fa it accompli, and that such serious 
intervention in the state arrangement would disrupt economic reform. This seemed 
suspiciously evasive. The Czechs badly misjudged the depth of Slovak expectations, but 
also Slovak party political reality. When premier of the Public Against Violence Meciar 
kept the national issue away from all talk of secessionism. Having presented himself as at 
the head of institutional change whilst at the same time damning the impulse toward 
separatism, Meciar had warned, to the very echo of his Czech liberal detractors, that: “A 
split in the country must not occur, we see how nationalism develops in the USSR or 
Yugoslavia” {Svobodne Slovo 1,3:20.8.1990). In August 1990 he had made every show 
of aiming at a new, more equal relationship with the Czechs, even adopting a style that 
conceded the frequent Czech illusion to Slovakia as the ‘younger brother’; a phrase 
harped on notoriously by the Czech writer, Ludvik Vaculik. “I want to emphasise” said 
Meciar “that nobody in Europe wants a poor relative he would have to maintain. That
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would be the case of Slovakia if it broke away from the federation” (Svobodne slovo 
7.8.1990:1,2).
By October 1990, when the detailed discussion of a new division of competences began to 
run aground, Meciar’s stance was backed by demonstrations of over 10,000 in Bratislava. 
When agreement was finally achieved the Slovak National Council unanimously approved 
the resulting draft constitutional amendment. To the public eye, and there were 
complaints at the secretiveness of the talks, the more nationalist force to emerge at the this 
time was the Christian Democratic Movement, whose second congress had insisted on the 
right of the Slovak republic to exit the federation; on its ‘full sovereignty’ and on its own 
system of taxes and a separate central bank (Svobodne slovo 5.11.1990). Jan 
Camogursky’s concept of a separate Slovak ‘chair and star’ in Europe, a policy of 
separatism for the propitious moment, seemed bound to irritate nationalists, federalists 
and certainly Czechs, alike
Czech federal comment again only directed Meciar away from the centre. When federal 
minister for the Economy, Vladimir Dlouhy accused Meciar of populism for having 
evoked the “so-called economic dis-advantage of the Slovak people” (Zemedelske noviny 
29.11.1990) the Public Against Violence had the political sense to back Meciar in all 
respects, accusing Dlouhy in turn of violating the “basic principles of coalition 
partnership”. The federal government, exhibiting the tone of transcendent federal 
authority so opposed in Slovakia assumed the moral high ground, claiming Dlouhy had 
not only the right but the duty to use professional but also political arguments to support 
his views (Zemedelske noviny 3.12.1990). Meciar and the PAV represented at this point, 
not only the Slovak government, but also, excepting the diminutive DP, the most 
avowedly pro-federal force existing in Slovakia. When the law on the provisional division 
of competences was passed finally in December, the Slovak National Party commented
Though he envisaged Slovakia entering the European Union in the year 2000 as an independent state, 
Camogursky evidently feared damaging fragile rapprochement with the west by a fractious separation. 
Camogursky's vagueness over exact constitutional conditions (despite being a lawyer) often elicited 
bewilderment from those involved in negotiations. Dagmar Buresova, chair of the Czech National Council 
called the state treaty 'absurd' since it presumed the sovereign status o f the signatories {Hospodarske noviny 
7.3.1991). Camogursky was in fact constrained by two Christian Democratic Movement factions, which 
threatened to come apart over economic policy and the national issue.
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scathingly that: “Slovakia clings by such laws to non-democratic Prague centralism which 
seriously damages Slovak interests” (Lidove noviny 13.12.1990).
As news of disagreements between Meciar and the Public Against Violence filtered into 
the press, it seemed clear whose faction could manoeuvre with public support (IW M  poll 
in Mlada Fronta dnes 25.1.1991:2). At the end of February, Camogursky had made clear 
to Havel that the two republics should draft their constitutions first and then conclude a 
state treaty. Thus in terms of Czech Slovak relations it was again the Christian 
Democratic Movement which proved the divisive force at the second ‘Vikarka’ dinner, 
where the Public Against Violence and Civic Forum positions were close, the dispute 
within the Public Against Violence notwithstanding^^ (Mlada Fronta dnes 8.2.1991:1,2). 
Again, Jicinsky’s claim that Meciar could only opt to take the nationalist path implies the 
PAV split either cut loose a ‘really’ nationalist Meciar, or steered him irrevocably toward 
nationalism. I would argue more simply that Meciar had only to retain his credibility on 
the national issue already won within PAV.
From his ouster in April 1991 onwards, Meciar positioned himself to win on the national 
and economic front by default. Default in the constitutional arena meant avoiding 
identification with the increasingly unpopular new Christian Democratic Movement / 
Public Against Violence governing coalition and distinguishing himself from the already 
established separatism of the Slovak National Party. Meciar immediately embarked on the 
latter by reassuring Havel of his pro-federalism, stating to the Czech Press Agency that 
those in Slovakia against the federation “are no greater than a year ago... a small 
minority” (Zemedelske noviny 11.3.1991:1,2). To position himself in the long term, his 
new Movement for a Democratic Slovakia adopted “appealing emancipation rhetorics 
which aptly blurred the constitutional issue” (Butorova 1993:66). Constitutional talks 
were now entering their most tortuous phase. By the spring of 1991 they were stalemated 
on the issue of whether a state treaty could be a legal document and not just a political 
declaration. Both Czech and Slovak governments had managed to regress the talks to 
impasse over the very same issues to have emerged already in August 1990.
This impression was reinforced when the Slovak National Party took up Camogursky's proposal suggesting 
the new constitution be seen as preparatory to the constitution of a sovereign state, able, o f its own will, to link 
up with other states.
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‘Emancipation rhetorics’ it is important to note, could not be dismissed as less clear than 
the statements of the Slovak government, attempting to explain the repeated deadlock in 
negotiation.
Lany
Before the Lany talks in May 1991, Camogursky had reiterated that while separatism was 
quite unacceptable he would insist on the state treaty {Prace 8.5.1991:2). At Lany it was 
agreed that an accord on the principles of the new constitutional arrangement would be 
signed by the National Councils - the treaty would be inner-state but with state law 
characteristics. Unfortunately, at Budmerice, cross-party representatives fully rejected the 
results. The continuing ambiguity of constitutional arrangements positively invited the 
opposition Movement for a Democratic Slovakia into the fray to suggest that Slovakia be 
a subject of international law and that the state treaty should be concluded on an 
international state level. This appeal was typical of several installments of the policy 
overbidding to come.
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia next ‘intended’ that the delegation of 
competences to a higher centre should be such as in negotiations over a confederal 
Europe {Prace 13.6.1991:3) - thus pushing the state treaty idea yet further beyond the 
pale for the Czechs. Within a few days of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
having raised the state treaty stakes Klaus accused Camogursky’s position of being 
‘hysterical’, even populist {Mlada Fronta dnes 15.6.1991). That Meciar could so easily 
drag Camogursky down with this sniping from the sidelines is testimony, Klaus’s tactics 
apart, to the willingness of Czechs in general to believe that all Slovak politicians 
essentially shared a vision of independence. Klaus had managed to cloak Camogursky in 
Meciar’s colours. This tendency, certainly exhibited by the Czech press, led one Slovak 
commentator in Slovensky narod to object that: “When a Czech identifies with his nation, 
he is considered to be a great patriot - But if a Slovak so much as identifies himself in a 
national way, the Czech political machinery labels him a nationalist, chauvinist, clerico- 
fascist and destroyer of the state” (M. Bohus 14.8.1991 quoted in Kirschbaum 1995:260).
Kromeriz
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In Kromeriz it was of course finally agreed that a federal commission would draft a legal 
treaty between the two republics which could then be passed to the federal parliament for 
approval {Mlada Fronta dnes 18.6.1991), only for the whole package to fail in the Slovak 
National Council, where Camogursky could no longer manage his own party’s vote. 
Talks through that summer and autumn had considered the division of competences, had 
run aground first on the division of economic competences and then again on the state 
arrangement^^. The idea of the state treaty had provoked insurmountable opposition 
among the Czech right wing, particularly the Civic Democratic Alliance. By the 
beginning of 1992 both the talks on the constitutions and the treaty arrangement were 
stalemated, the one waiting resolution of the other in the face of the rapidly approaching 
election. By Febmary 1992, it was again the nationalist faction of the Christian 
Democratic Movement which helped vote down the final text produced by treaty talks at 
Milovy. The governing coalition under Jan Camogursky had been beset by disagreement 
over both the values and interests to characterise the Slovak transition. It has been 
remarked since that this coalition “consisted of politicians who looked as if they had come 
from different historical periods and had spoken political languages of different worlds” 
(Szomolanyi 1994:74). Given the increasing hardships of economic reform in Slovakia 
the Civic Democratic Union - Christian Democratic Movement coalition, profoundly split 
on the issue of nation, was extraordinarily badly placed to take a pro-federal package to 
the electorate by 1992.
A schism in the Christian Democratic Movement
The issue of statehood had been most dramatically played out in the Slovak National 
Council and its presidium. Sovereignty, proposed on three occasions by the nationalist 
faction of the Christian Democratic Movement, was voted down four times between 1990 
and 1992. Szomolanyi has argued that Camogursky “unleashed nationalist forces 
assuming that it was possible to keep them under his control (1994:75)” and certainly he 
primed the issue which Meciar deployed more skillfully through the 1992 election and
Camogursky had outraged Czech opinion in September by asking Foreign Minister Dienstbier to change the 
preamble to the hnminent Czechoslovak-German treaty to include the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state 
from 1918. While he deplored the politics of the clerico-fascist Slovak state, Camogursky proposed its 
existence be acknowledged in deference to the nationals oppressed under communism {Pravda 17.9.1991:1,2). 
This appeal condemned Christian Democratic Movement in the eyes of a Slovak electorate fmstrated by the 
poor progress of talks and now widely suspicious of the Christian Democratic Movement’s potential, as the 
party of the clerical right-wing, to re-introduce black totalitarianism (Butorova 1993:68).
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beyond^*. At the beginning of March 1992 the two factions of the Christian Democratic 
Movement finally came apart, with the nationalist wing led by Jan Klepac, deputy 
chairman of the Slovak National Council, splitting off to form the Slovak Christian 
Democratic Movement^^. The Christian Democratic Movement welcomed the split, 
arguing that it freed the party to present itself as a true right-of-centre Christian 
Democratic party. Unfortunately, by this stage Camogursky’s claims to want to stand 
once again behind a negotiated settlement, including a referendum on the state’s future, 
had few partners in the Czech republic.
A week after the separation of the Christian Democratic Movement, Alexander Dubcek, 
whose popularity rating according to an IW M  survey stood at 75 per cent approval, 
compared to 73 per cent for Meciar, turned his allegiance to the Slovak Social 
Democrats^^. His move confirmed his pro-federal position, and this, because of the 
national esteem in which he was held, seemed to represent a blow to the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia. As a condition of his entry, however, Dubcek had secured a Social 
Democrat promise not to enter into pre-election coalition with the Party of the Democratic 
Left - thus splitting the only realistic opposition to the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (Jan Obrman: Dubcek Joins the Social Democrats in Slovakia Radio Free 
Europe 3.4.1992).
Sovereignty - the issue too far for Meciar
Camogursky’s was an Catholised, holy nation belief in the Slovak nation as repository of Slavic purity, a 
potential core for a new Christian Europe. In a spirit akin to that of the 19th century pan-slavists he rightly 
admitted; “I shall give an argument which might not be well received in the Prague intellectual millieu: The 
Apocalypse of St. John says that on the day of judgement nations will be admitted to heaven. Not therefore 
citizens, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the European Community, or other man-made units" (Lidove 
noviny 3.6.1991:16). Petr Pithart estimated correctly that Camogursky wanted to save his nation from the 
marasmus of consumerist, godless Westem Europen teaching; “the marasmus of the secularised modem 
society that Czechs appear to wish to be” (m Zemedelske noviny 14.8.1991).
Though the two sides essentially acted en bloc through the autunm it was increasingly obvious that 
Camogursky was managing only through an unsustainable level of concession-giving. After Klepac's
supporters voted against the draft constitutional agreement in the Slovak National Council vote of the 13
February 1992 Camogursky presented them with an ultimatum; conform or leave. Thus on the 7 March the 
two factions announced their separate candidacies for June 1992. Eleven o f the Christian Democratic 
Movement's thirty one deputies in the Slovak National Council defected to the Slovak Christian Democratic 
Movement, five from the twenty five federal deputies.
An independent since resigning from the Public Against Violence in July 1991, many had expected him to 
follow his frequent and controversial endorsement of Meciar into the ranks of the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia. Had he joined the MDS Dubcek would have been used as a figurehead. Moreover, he opposed
Meciar manipulation o f the national question. After lustration it was clear that no Czech party of the
centre/right would nominate him, thus mling him out of a federal position.
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Meciar’s manipulation of the sovereignty question represented a simple exploitation of the 
confusion surrounding the issue. Though Meciar claimed that the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia sought all possible forms of ‘sovereign Slovak statehood’, with 
special emphasis on those forms ensuring international legal subjectivity, Meciar 
consistently opposed attempts to declare sovereignty in the Slovak National Council and 
consistently fought shy of the term ‘independence’. His strategy was to leave his options 
open for the post-election negotiations where he believed, erroneously it turned out, that 
the Czechs might ultimately be persuaded into some form of confederation.
Demonstrations for sovereignty and the frequent endorsements from the Slovak National 
Party, Matica slovenska and the nationalist wing of the Christian Democratic Movement 
had kept the issue as a background pressure throughout constitutional talks, but also as 
fuel for the Czech press. In April 1990, 20,000 had demonstrated for an independent 
Slovakia and 20,000 again on 11th March 1991 and September 19th, always under the 
auspices of Matica slovenska. Czechs took these manifestations with the utmost 
seriousness. Sovereignty, as we have already seen, was one of the most profound barriers 
to negotiation, with the Slovak desire to possess at some point a moment of entire legal 
sovereignty - which it would then delegate to a new federation - taken by all Czech 
negotiating parties as either a devious separatist tactic, or as legally nonsensical. To 
complicate matters further, sovereignty as a term in Slovakia was frequently used 
synonymously with autonomy and was increasingly discussed as if various grades of 
sovereignty were obtainable^ \  With such elisions in the terminology it was possible for 
Meciar to take sovereignty into his agenda, but in such a way as left Slovakia’s potential 
legal status completely ambiguous. The document with which Meciar stole the whole 
limelight came with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's Initiative fo r  a Sovereign 
Slovakia launched on 13th September 1991. This promised the achievement of Slovak 
sovereignty and the adoption of a full Slovak constitution by constitutional and democratic 
means {Lidove noviny 14.9.1991) - 30,000 demonstrated in its favour {Rude pravo
25.9.1991). By February Meciar declared that the two republics would declare
This may have originated from the semantic difficulties arising from the existence of two Slovak words for 
sovereignty: zvrchovanost and suverenita, which have the same meaning in a dictionary. Their meanings 
diverged during the constitutional debate, with the first referring to the sovereignty of the nation in 
metaphysical terms. The second meaning is sovereignty as understood in international legal terms (Kirschbaum 
1995:263).
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sovereignty, and then decide through a referendum on alternative state arrangements, but 
above all Czechs should regard Slovakia as a ‘sovereign’ subject {Zemedelske noviny 
6.2.1992).
The last liberal mistake
On 23rd March 1992 the Defense and Security Committee of the Slovak National Council 
released the second part of a report on the activities of the Slovak Interior Ministry. It 
revealed solid evidence of Meciar s collaboration with state security and strong pointers to 
the abuse of his powers as the former Interior Minister. The report, timed just as the 
election loomed, stormed into the Czech and Slovak media. The most damaging 
allegations were that security files, kept in State Security safe houses in Bratislava and 
Meciar’s home town of Trencin, had disappeared. Several pages of registration 
documents concerning Meciar and his appointees had also vanished. The report concluded 
that Meciar had gathered documents on government members, the Catholic Church as 
well as influential journalists in order to harass them. His successor, the Christian 
Democratic Movement’s Anton Andras, had apparently made the mistake of trying to 
dismiss some of Meciar’s recruits and had suffered accordingly (Jan Obrman, Radio Free 
Europe 10.4.1992).
Meciar dismissed the report as a smear campaign orchestrated from Prague and the 
Federal Interior Ministry. A few days later Meciar alleged the Ministry had a master plan 
not only to discredit him, but also, if necessary “to liquidate him physically” {Narodna 
obroda 1.4.1992). Both the Slovak National Party and Party of the Democratic Left 
supported Meciar while Dubcek remained silent. The federal and Czech parliaments, 
wisely, kept a low profile. Unless stripped of his parliamentary immunity, requiring a 
simple majority in the House of the Nations, Meciar could not be prosecuted and even 
had this been secured, the trial would not have taken place before the election (ibid.). The 
chosen timing of the accusation could not have been worse; it came too late to dissuade 
those already persuaded by Meciar’s national and economic promises, and, however 
unfairly, it destroyed the civic credibility of the PAV/Civic Democratic Union as a party 
above the manipulation of information deemed too characteristic of political life. Meciar 
brushed off the affair as being only the first in a series of pre-election slanders {Lidove
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noviny 31.3.1992), portraying a swaggering indifference to the inevitable Czech censure 
that contrasted sharply with the historical self-image of the Slovak and immediately with 
the ultra-Czechophile stance of the PAV/Civic Democratic Union.
The failure of these revelations to dislodge Meciar led the Civic Democratic Union to 
take a step that condemned their election chances. The last remaining strategy for 
‘decapitating’ the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia remained lustration. Believing 
that a strict implementation of the law sometime in the near future might finally purge 
Slovakia of the demagoguery the Civic Democratic Union so feared, it opted for a 
coalition with the Czech party felt to be both intellectually sympathetic and which most 
supported this aspiration, the Civic Democratic Alliance. Having selected as their 
electoral partner the one mainstream voice of Czech nationalism, the Civic Democratic 
Union sealed their electoral fate before the official campaign had even begun^^.
Conclusion
The June 1992 election^^ erected an insurmountable barrier against retaining a common 
state. Its outcome meant that both election victors appeared to possess greater short 
term incentives to separate the state than to seek state-maintaining compromise. 
Consequently, since public opinion had consistently rejected dissolution a referendum 
was not in the interests of either would-be secessionist, making it impossible to 
formulate in the Federal Assembly. Even if by some miracle referenda had been 
secured their likely outcome would have been a demand that the Civic Democratic 
Party and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia form a federal coalition to secure a 
common state - an apparently unhelpful result. In the Czech Republic the status of the 
Civic Democratic Party had depended substantially on its reputation for competence 
and the continuing success of rapid economic reform - a reform threatened in several
In a later interview with Mlada Fronta dnes Klaus cited three major steps toward the separation: The 
meetings of Lnare in April 1990, when the Czech and Slovak Governments began to discuss future relations, 
fatally bypassing the federal authorities. Secondly, the Trencianske Talks in August 1990, when an 
overpressured Federal Government carrying “all the burdens of social and economic transformation” again lost 
the initiative. The third moment, Klaus argued, was in the “failure of the PAV”. “Public Against Violence and 
later the Civic Democratic Union did not manage to produce personalities capable of addressing Slovak 
citizens, to move the Slovak scene in a certain direction. Thus PAV vacated a space for something quite 
different...”. He made no judgement about the causes of PAV’s subsequent electoral failure. {Mlada Fronta 
D n esl:  3.7.1992).
See Chapter 4
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ways by the election of a ‘gradualist’ reform government in Slovakia. In Slovakia, on 
the contrary, Meciar’s power base had grown essentially from his appeal to those 
fearful of too harsh a transition. Given, in addition, the negative attitudes of CDP 
supporters toward the MDS and vice versa, the damage to the popularity of either 
compromising party would have been considerable, possibly fatal to the party leaders. 
For Klaus, in particular, it was both politically and ideologically imperative that the 
Civic Democratic Party entered new talks with the ultimatum ‘federation or bust’ - to 
which it stuck.
Meciar had raised the political stakes enormously high for the purposes of victory, 
however, the paradoxical nature of his visions for the future Slovakia strongly suggests 
his nationalism was secondary, insofar as it was functional, to the aim of achieving 
enlarged, rather than total state powers. His position remained ambiguous and 
opportunistic through to the beginning of negotiations (see Chapter 2) until he was 
confronted by Klaus’s ultimatum. If, as Klaus made it clear, he could win no 
confederal privileges for Slovakia, particularly greater economic powers, Meciar could 
deliver neither on any of his election promises nor his own ambitions. Despite Klaus’s 
professed to willingness to enter negotiations, he had entirely cornered Meciar. The 
threat of imminent political suicide, not surprisingly, overrode Meciar’s evaluations as 
to the good of the common state per se. In terms of his own political career, 
independence was the next most fruitful option, even if it required the high risk 
reorganisation of his own party and the subsequent creation of a post-hoc legitimating 
myth, the dire losses of federal income being made up in the short term by the released 
powers of patronage and coercion in an independent Slovakia.
The apparent duality arising from Meciar’s pure populism - his championing of Slovak 
equality combined with his apparent rejection of all-out independence rhetoric is vital 
when assessing his popularity. The explicitly nationalist and separatist vote was a small 
minority - the Slovak National Party secured a mere 9 per cent in June 1992. Many of 
Meciar’s Slovak supporters could vote for him believing themselves to have protested 
against ‘Pragocentrism’ whilst at the same time expressing their desire to maintain a 
common state (Vodicka 1993:92). According to one account, only 19 per cent of
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would-be voters for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia were adherents of an 
independent Slovakia (April 1992, the Bratislava Centre for Social Analysis, in 
Vodicka 1993:99). Some 50 per cent of MDS supporters had apparently voted for the 
Public Against Violence in the previous election in June 1990 - a clearly pro-federal 
group (Jungmann 1993:69). If this suggests a gulf in information available to Slovaks 
as to the real opinions of Vaclav Klaus and the CDP, opinion poll data rather attests to 
the electorate’s perspicacity on this point. Feelings behind both Czech and Slovak 
voting patterns were marked by frustration. By May 1992, 73 per cent of Czech 
respondents and 86 per cent of Slovaks were either rather or very dissatisfied with the 
overall political situation (from 1320 surveyed by IW M , Prague 2-9.1.1992 in 
Wolchik 1994:171). The election had clearly revealed an elite-level competition 
hopelessly divorced from the public’s aspirations.
Contrary to the subsequent claims of the Civic Democratic Party the 1992 election 
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be taken as a fair referendum on the fumre 
of the state. The electorate was offered no clear range of alternative state arrangements 
and the question as a whole was bound up hopelessly with apparently dichotomous 
choices concerning the political economy of each republic. As if this were not 
manipulation enough, the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia had both always proclaimed themselves ‘in spirit’ for a common state. The 
point at which the spirit would be overcome by circumstances was ultimately something 
the electorate could only guess at since, for each republican electorate, ‘circumstances’ 
would be dictated by the votes of the other republic, without subsequent redress.
Those Czechs who valued current economic reforms had little choice but to vote for a 
party which held only pragmatic respect for the common state, and even less for the 
principles of self-determination - as expressed through the ambition of the majority. 
Those Slovaks who had taken the step of voting for Meciar, a vote possible under a 
wide spectrum of motives, were interpreted by the CDP a priori, and by the majority 
of its supporters, as having voted for the destruction of the state. This interpretation 
freed Klaus’s hand to dissolve the state at his own speed, absolved from blame as the 
CDP would now claim to be. With only 16 per cent if the population supporting
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separation as the best solution in the first week of July 1992 (IW M  poll in Lidove 
noviny 29.7.1992:3), the legitimacy of the separation was nevertheless unresolved 
beyond the borders of the Civic Democratic Party.
The limited time available for the development of a competitive party system emerges at 
the root of many of the problems contributing to the division of the state. At the simplest 
level, the two victorious parties out-stripped all others in political entrepreneurship to an 
extent highly unusual in a developed democratic setting. The party system was evidently 
both unstable and ill-formed. The two victorious parties of June 1992 were scarcely 
‘solid’ and certainly not more ‘real’ than the personalities at their head, Sartori’s 
definition of a structured party system (in Mair 1990:77). Again of comparative interest, 
the intensely abstracted ideological nature of party rivalry up until the very end of the 
state precluded the expressive function normally attributed to parties in a democratic 
system, whilst accentuating the power of political parties to manipulate electoral 
preferences. Thus, party rhetoric bore little resemblance to a “translation of contrasts in 
the social and cultural structure into demands and pressures for action and 
inaction”(Lipset and Rokkan, in Mair 1990:93). Evidence of the underdeveloped state of 
the political scene in both republics can be further seen in the fact that the centre/right 
parties the Civic Movement, the Civic Democratic Alliance, and Civic Democratic Party 
in the Czech republic, and the Democratic Party and Civic Democratic Union in Slovakia 
competed over more or less identical ideological space. All (excepting the victorious 
CDP), with some predictability, failed to even enter the Federal Assembly.
In both republics, programmes originated from the ‘top down’, bypassing the majority 
preference for a common state altogether, complex as these latter preferences were. With 
little incentive to change the system in which they operated, the Civic Democratic Party 
and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia acted appropriately. As fledgling catch-all 
populist parties^^ both built on conditional support rather than on a sense of identification; 
they sought the endorsement of voters rather than their encapsulation (Mair 1990:6). It
^  Kirchheimer’s thoughts on the development of catch-all parties are oddly resonant of the strategies adopted 
by the post-communist successors: "the mass integration party... Is transforming itself into a catch-all people's 
party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to 
the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate 
electoral success" (Kirchheimer, in Mair 1990:52)
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was, as a consequence, possible in the Czech case to offer the electorate the extraordinary 
and only implicit Hobson’s choice of most favoured economic/transition path as 
potentially mutually exclusive of the preferred state arrangement - some form of common 
state. In both republics (and not simply in Slovakia) the electorate was entirely misled, 
and most certainly misrepresented, as to the feasibility of the various constitutional 
choices on offer.
The national dispute impacted on republic-level developments but without evoking any 
parallel mechanisms for its mediation. In Slovakia, the dominance of the national issue 
and the existence of the Czech/Slovak relationship as potential scapegoat for many ills 
inhibited the development of a realistic party political discourse on internal developments, 
leaving many issues untreated until the country awoke to find itself independent on 
January 1st 1993. In the Czech lands the stereotype-ridden images of Slovakia as wishing 
to pursue a gradualist path, unfazed by the prospect of authoritarianism, and simply as a 
backward place, cross referenced into many domestic policy debates. Those Czech 
politicians - primarily those of the Civic Movement - seeking a more graduated and grass­
roots reform, who opposed the draconian lustration law, and who opposed centralised and 
strong executive power in principle, found themselves viewed as recidivist; as having 
entered, in effect, the Slovak orbit.
The party environment seemed slow to develop systemic features precisely because it 
lacked the conditions for party competition. Such conditions were undoubtedly forestalled 
by the electoral strâtegies of both the Civic Democratic Party and Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia. The Civic Democratic Party’s demolition of the dissident 
competition and subsequent reenactment of the 1990 election in June 1992, this time as 
the uncontested ‘democratic’ party, together with Meciar’s well-directed over-promising 
from the safety of opposition, succeeded in provoking defensive reactions and blocking 
debate. By June 1992 the two parties seemed elevated beyond reach, a remarkable 
similarity between them being their adoption of optimistic rhetoric and their avoidance of 
over-identification with specific historic political identities and constituencies. The CDP’s 
rhetoric was not only free market but essentially about the transition - the market as both 
‘natural’ means and end, all other paths being the ‘constructs of ideologists’. Implicitly,
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the process of liberalizing was not only democratic in itself but democratising. The CDP’s 
competitors in the meantime spoke (realistically) of laying foundations and necessary 
conditions and so, gratingly, echoed the unfulfilled promises of the old regime. Meciar 
used a similar technique, only employing the release of Slovak national potential as the 
long-suppressed natural transition path, most recently suppressed, he argued, by the 
policies of the Czech right.
Finally, if one compares the positive rhetoric of the election victors with that of the 
dissident liberals who faced political extinction after June 1992, a last, crude explanation 
for the choice of the electorate immediately presents itself. The Slovak liberal elite in 
particular came too close, too often, to insulting its electorate. One choice phrase amongst 
Slovak dissidents accounting for the public aversion to reform was ‘post-communist 
panic’. The 5 per cent threshold had the effect of eliminating both Czech and Slovak 
liberals - the moderate centre parties in both republics - thus removing many of the post- 
November leaders, the core of the pro-federal elite, from both the Federal Assembly and 
the National Councils (Olson 1994:112). Their brief and economically painful experience 
of liberalism, nonetheless, was not one to encourage the Slovak electorate to change its 
choices.
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Chapter 6
The Legal Deadlock
“Forms are likely to be accorded special normative (legalistic) status i f  a society has 
experienced a deep break-down in conventional order... That is, forms matter to the 
extent that they are needed as surrogates fo r norms in the conduct o f social life”.
(Eckstein 1979:14-15)
Introduction
The post-revolution decision to create new constitutions for both the Czechoslovak 
federation and each of the constituent republics inaugurated a series of inter­
governmental and cross-party talks and even legislative proposals which failed, creating 
an impasse in Czech Slovak relations broken only through the general elections of June 
1992. This chapter investigates the character of the constitutional deadlock. Section one 
provides a detailed account of the major constitution-related events following the 
November revolution. The second considers the institutional and legal obstacles 
inherited form the Ancien Regime, and distinguishes these from more overtly political 
barriers to agreement. The conclusion considers the extent to which the pressures of 
democratic stabilisation established a hard choice in the already complex constitutional 
debate, one in which economic reform and authentically federalising constitutional 
reform were conceptualised as two mutually exclusive possibilities.
Between immediate political needs and the normative goals of démocratisation resided 
some of the trickiest dilemmas facing post-communist states generally. They faced a 
double-bind. On the one hand they wanted to avoid a legal ‘state of nature’, (Arato 
1994:159) a legal vacuum wherein all inherited laws were invalidated as contaminated 
by communism. On the other they faced the difficulty of employing the morally 
bankrupted constitutional rules of the past to produce legitimate constitutions for the 
future\ More problematic still, the competing demands to establish legitimate and 
stable political institutions and an entirely new economic order concurrently encouraged
* As Arato, following Elster, observes, post-communist states had little alternative but to repeat 
Munchhausen’s feat o f pulling himself out of a swamp by his own hair” (Arato 1994:161).
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political polarisation on the form of these public goods. It was possible in post­
communist circumstances to argue that market reforms required ‘energetic’ and 
autonomous state-forms^ (see Maravall 1994).
A further difficulty, and one that remained unresolved beyond the collapse of the 
Czechoslovak federation, was the elusive nature of constitutionalism. It has been 
argued that “a constitution will be coupled with constitutionalism only if mechanisms 
are provided ensuring the compliance of the branches of power with fundamental law” 
(Arato 1994:155), the public expectation of the rule of law being among the most 
important of these mechanisms. Forty years of one-party rule had had nevertheless a 
readily exploitable effect on people’s conception of legitimate government. In an April 
1992 poll for example, 69 per cent of Slovak respondents demanded the accountability 
of members of the government directly to the people and not to parliament. At the same 
date moreover, 66 per cent of Czech and 64 per cent of Slovak respondents considered 
that “there is too much democracy” in the federation: “the government and parliament 
should restore law and order” . The paper presenting these opinions argued that neither 
republic possessed the consensual preconditions of constitutionalism before 1992 
(Butora 1994:324-8) - a situation highly conducive not just to the continuation of strong 
executive power.
That this was the case was self-evident to the former dissidents within the Civic Forum 
(CF) and the Slovak Public Against Violence (PAV/CDU), who dominated the federal 
and republican governments until ousted in June 1992 (see Chapter 5). The dissidents 
abiding concern had been that executive actions should at least encourage and 
exemplify the principles of legitimacy and the rule of law. As the monolith civic 
movements fractured and the party system developed more fully such principles proved 
extremely difficult to sustain, most particularly as the agenda of the Czech right began 
to emerge. As Butora concluded of the dissidents: “[i]t was not only they and their 
parties who lost [in June 1992]: a certain political style was also defeated” (1994:327).
An early controversy: the naming of parts...
 ^ “Federalism, it has been noted “is concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of political power in the 
name of liberty and its concentration on behalf of unity or energetic government” (Elazar 1987:33).
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Political rhetoric in the aftermath of the revolution was dominated by the imagery of 
‘new beginnings’, in the economy, civil society, and in Czech Slovak relations. New 
constitutions were needed to create a legitimate state. Slovakia, stressed Bratislava, had 
to be made more ‘visible’ in international relations, not only because of its past 
humiliations, but because of the competition for foreign economic assistance and 
investment on which the two republics were now embarked. Visiting the already 
revitalised Slovak National Council in January 1990, President Havel acknowledged the 
inadequacy of the communist federal arrangement and anticipated that major 
constitutional revisions would follow the first elections in June. These he warned; 
“must not petrify some outworn structures which exist as the result of an administrative 
conception of federation. The federation was not understood as a friendly cohabitation 
of two integral nations in one state but as one of the forms of totalitarian government” 
(Lidova demokracie 13.1.1990:1,3). Thus far, federalist constitutional redress seemed 
prudently high on the political agenda: the transparent equality of the Czech and Slovak 
nations was prominent in Havel’s new year’s wish list (New Year’s Speech Rude pravo 
2.1.1990:1,3).
The event which signalled conflicting expectations occurred only weeks later. On 
January 23 rd 1990, President Havel availed himself of his right to propose new 
legislation and suggested deleting the term ‘Socialist’ from the state name - the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic^. To the incredulity of domestic and outside observers 
alike, the ensuing disagreement lasted almost four months. The discussion had soon 
engaged with two alternatives: the original name, ‘Czechoslovakia’, or a hyphenated 
version of the same, ‘Czecho-Slovakia’, which according to the Slovak National 
Council implied greater parity. Havel’s proposed ‘Czechoslovak Republic’ prompted 
protests in Bratislava and the objection that it returned the state to the assumptions of 
the First Republic. The Slovak National Council’s approval of ‘Czecho-Slovakia’ on 
the other hand dismayed Czechs who recollected the miserable connection of the same 
name between post-Munich (1938) Czech territory and collaborationist Slovakia. The 
rejection of the Slovak proposal and continuing support for Havel’s ‘Czechoslovak
 ^ Havel was dismayed at the Assembly’s rejection of his proposal and he attacked the Assembly publicly on 
February 25th (Zak 1995:251). This continuation of his tribune-like authority soured the relations between 
Havel and many parliamentary deputies.
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Republic’ by Czech deputies prompted a demonstration of an estimated 20,000 in 
Bratislava, where a petition was handed to the Council chairman demanding talks on 
the full recognition of Slovak sovereignty and independence"^ {Svobodne slovo 
31.3.1990:1,3). The unhappy solution was a compromise in which Slovakia could use 
the hyphen internally, while Czech and federal authorities would adopt the un­
hyphenated spelling (Kirschbaum 1995:255).
Negotiations between the republic-level governments at Lnare on April 1 Ith^ eventually 
produced lasting agreement on the name ‘Czech and Slovak Federative Republic’ 
(CSFR). Reviewing the meeting, Slovak premier Milan Cic called for an end to the 
ambiguity surrounding Slovakia’s constitutional status and insisted that the decision 
represented “a fundamental starting point; we want the federation to be understood as a 
union of two nations on the principle of their independence and original sovereignty” 
{Rude pravo 12.4.1990). For Slovakia, evidently, the hyphen-war represented the 
moment wherein the rules of the future constimtional game would be set - an attimde 
reflecting at least a surviving expectation that the constitution should act as the ultimate 
arbiter of state rights. In the Czech republic, however, the broader implications of the 
debate were clearly unrecognised. The lengthy quarrel had struck Czech press opinion 
as signifying that Slovak deputies in particular were willing to waste parliamentary time 
on purely symbolic wars - ‘sterile linguistic disputes’ according to Lidove noviny, 
whose editor insisted he would use the term Czechoslovak Republic notwithstanding 
{Lidove noviny 12.4.1990).
June-December 1990: Power-sharing talks
 ^ The Slovak National Council’s decision to ban broadcast coverage o f the demonstration invited 
accusations of censorship, particularly damaging before the election (3.4.1990). The following day the 
Czech and Slovak premiers broadcast strikingly contradictory statements: Czech premier Pithart noted that 
“if the arguments and will of the Slovak nation are diverging from the joint road... we have no other option 
than to accept that will calmly”. Slovak premier Milan Cic meanwhile reassured that “the Slovak National 
Council, Slovak govermnent. Public Against Violence and the absolute majority of political parties and 
movements and citizens are unequivocally supportive of the principle of co-existence... in the common 
federation”, rejecting the recent upheaval as rooted in “outworn Czechoslovakism and, on the other side, in 
separatist extremes” {Svobodne slovo 4.4.1990:1,3).
 ^ Where it was also agreed that much of the ‘national’ disputes had their roots in the bureaucratic command 
system of the past. The republican govenunents agreed confidently between themselves that the new federal 
constitution should “emerge” from the Czech and Slovak constitutions.
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The task of constitutional re-negotiation began in earnest after the June 1990 elections^ 
when the new federal government, comprised of the Slovak Public Against Violence, 
the Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, announced 
that new constitutions would be drafted for both republics and the federation before the 
next election - within two years. The simple mechanics of constitutional design looked 
problematic however. Each of the three governments was to undertake drafting and 
ratification with no independent arbitrating force between them, and the two year 
deadline exerted a further polarising pressure upon debate. To make matters worse, in 
these early days in particular, both National Councils, Czech and Slovak alike, sought 
an ostentatious decentralisation from federal authority, which was identified with the 
previous powers of the Communist Party. The post-election programme of the Czech 
National Council was typical in its impulse to redraw the federal contract with free and 
‘clean’ hands: it declared boldly that “the federation will have such authority as granted 
to it by the republics... after mutual agreement” (Council report, July 2-3 1990 p .36 in 
Zak 1995:252). It may be noted that in the Czech press, similar calls from the Slovak 
Council were labelled secessionist. In 1990 the only remotely mediating mechanism 
available to the process was the office of the federal presidency: Havel, and his 
advisors. Not until February 1991 was a constitutional court established and this 
avoided political entanglement altogether before being bogged down by its own 
jurisdictional controversies. The passivity of the constitutional court would prove 
damaging in two respects: not only did it ultimately fail to insist upon the 
constitutionally required staging of a referendum to ratify the dissolution of the state, 
but more pertinently to this discussion, it failed to intervene with clear definitional 
rulings when the negotiating parties, virtually from day one, became bogged down in 
terminological disputes.
The first talks were held at a two day meeting at Trencianske Teplice beginning August 
8th, 1990. Here Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar presented to “astonished federal 
government representatives” a plan for the extensive transfer of power from the
 ^ Few significant changes were made before June 1990 following the removal o f Party rule clauses 
(November 1989). Powers over agriculture, metallurgy and local government were formally devolved to 
the National Councils in July and, on the insistence of Slovak deputies it was agreed to establish 
commissions with a view to further transfers by January 1991.
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federation to the republics (Zak 1995:255)^. According to Zak, Meciar proposed “a 
really fundamental change to the country’s constitution!”, one derived from the so- 
called ‘dual model’ set down in the Public Against Violence election manifesto. Chance 
fo r  Slovakia. In this model the integration of two national states represented the basic 
idea of the federation; federal powers were to be understood as delegated from 
essentially sovereign republican powers (Zak 1995:247-256). In reality, however, 
Meciar’s agenda only reiterated the essentially confederalist principles set down in the 
ill-fated ‘Prague Spring’ constitutional amendment 143/1968, swept aside by the Soviet- 
imposed amendment of 1970. This had stated that the relationship between federation 
and republics was based on cooperation rather than subordination and had based this 
equality on the recognition of the essential sovereignty of the two republics. The Slovak 
proposals in August 1990, that the federation keep defence, currency, foreign policy, 
the legislative framework and overall economic decision-making power (basic 
taxation), and that the republics obtain greater visibility in international-legal 
jurisdiction did not in fact amount to a radical departure from the discussions of the 
sixties*. In their main assumption, the Slovak proposals nonetheless struck Czech 
federal delegates as an assault upon the federal state per se.
What Meciar’s proposals revealed was that the Czech federal right, still largely 
subsumed for the moment within the monolith Civic Forum, adhered not simply to the 
American federalist vision that the centre must be sovereign in its sphere, but to a 
classic view of indivisible nation-state sovereignty, a conceptualisation normally 
associated not with federal but with unitary states (Elazar 1987:34-5). According to this 
view, federal i.e. state authority was prior and indivisibly sovereign not only 
externally, in the eyes of international law, but internally, vis-â-vis the republics. 
Following the state’s formation, as it were, after the contractual fact, the re-diffusion of 
power to the republics according to this logic was a matter of grace and not of right. In 
the immediate aftermath of the talks the right responded with the pseudo-legal objection 
that “it is only possible to speak of the federative nature of the state if the authority of 
both national republics is based on the authority of the federation” (viewpoint of the
’ Prior to the meeting neither the participants nor the likely agenda were disclosed to the public. 
 ^A fact later acknowledged by Czech premier Pithart (1995:209).
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Democratic Right-wing Group at the 9th meeting of the Czech National Council, 28-29 
November 1990, in Zak 1990:256) - as if this was a watertight rejection of the 
principle of intrinsic national sovereignty. Their political reasons for this rejection were 
already clear and would not change: the prospect of a re-negotiation of power in which 
the federal authority could make no prior claim as the legitimate centre vis-â-vis the 
two sovereign nations - the two original ‘contractées’ - was irreconcilable with the 
Czech right’s vision of a rapid reform process, under federal control.
The only consensus at Trencianske Teplice was that negotiations had to continue. 
Federal delegates refused to sign any communiqué. Continuation of the process was 
proposed in the form of three government commissions empowered to draft principles 
on jurisdictional problems - by the end of the month. Though all parties had publicly 
agreed to a “strong republics, strong federation principle” (Svobodne slovo 
10.8.1990:1)^ the respective reports to parliament revealed the deeper clash of 
concepts. Addressing the Federal Assembly, deputy premier Pavel Rychetsky described 
the conclusions of the talks as “both unexpected and problematic” . Slovakia’s 
“surprisingly” unequivocal proposals had included the devolution of powers over 
transportation, power generation, telecommunications and foreign trade and the Slovak 
government had already established its own Ministry of International Relations in 
breach of federal sovereignty. These Slovak steps, supported by separatists^^, he 
maintained drove only to one end: serious intervention into the integrity of the state 
which would have to be withstood. The economic exigencies facing the country as a
 ^ At Lnare in April 1990 the two republican governments had taken the remarkable decision that the 
simplest way to resolve all disputes over who subsidised whom was for each republic to live off the taxes 
collected on its own territory respectively. The federation would receive, from the republics, its necessary 
expenses (Zak 1995:251). Given the current tax and budgetary arrangements the two governments had 
effectively proposed removing the tax-gathering and coordinating powers o f the federation. Vaclav Klaus, 
following his strengthened position after the June election, returned the agenda directly to this issue, aware 
that if legislated, the Lnare agreement and the principles underpinning it would emasculate federal powers 
and authority over reform. To the Federal Assembly he argued “the national governments are working 
towards the dissolution o f the federation, because without an economic centre and autonomy of revenues in 
all three budgets, it is impossible to imagine a unified economy” (Zak 1995:252). At Trencianske Teplice 
the principle o f independent budgets at the Czech, Slovak, and federal levels was agreed - see Chapter 7 for 
detail. This issue nevertheless became a parallel, but critical element in what was to become a conflict set 
out like a musical canon: a piece in which the different parts take up the same themes successively.
The results of Trencianske Teplice were in fact fully rejected at a meeting of ten minor Slovak parties 
convened by the separatist Slovak National Party and Slovak Independence Party {Lidove Demokracie
15.8.1990).
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whole, Rychetsky argued, made this essential {Svobodne slovo and Zemedelske noviny 
14.8.1990).
Czech premier and former dissident Petr Pithart was more sympathetic to Slovak 
aspirations. He had called the talks constructive and insisted there was nothing 
inherently bad in Slovakia holding the initiative (CTK 11.8.1990). Nonetheless he 
assured the Czech parliament that the meeting was purely consultative, a follow-up to 
Lnare {Svobodne slovo, Mlada Fronta dnes 5.9.1990). In both the Czech and federal 
parliament the talks were evidently playing a key role in the fight for the political soul 
of the Civic Forum. Crucially, the rightist preoccupation with the uniformity of 
economic reform across the republics had now clearly produced for the Czech majority 
nation an attractive constitutional corollary. An hostility to re-defining the federation by 
its national characteristics and the assertion of indissoluble federal sovereignty implied 
the retrenchment of Czech political and financial power: it amounted in fact to a 
discrete reassertion of hierarchic majority rule under the guise of centralist federalism. 
Federal non-centralisation, it should be noted, has been conceptualised more 
conventionally “as a matrix of governments, with powers so distributed that the rank 
order of the several governments is not fixed” (Elazar 1987:37). Klaus’s election to the 
chair of Civic Forum in October marked the verdict, a decisive shift in the movement 
rightward {Lidove noviny, Rude pravo 2.11.1990).
Meciar, meanwhile, was buoyed by the commotion, “the Slovak government went to 
Teplice with a comprehensive concept, the Czech government with a partial concept 
and the Federal government with almost no concept at all. From Teplice all left with 
the Slovak government concept” . Though the talks had achieved little concretely he 
pronounced, “we withstand the resistance of the Federal apparatus, which will lose 
jobs; of Czechoslovakists who see it as an imperiling of the state’s integrity; and of 
separatists who consider it as not enough”. “[Njothing else than Federation is feasible” 
he insisted, though his proposals had apparently revealed a definitional conflict of 
remarkable and as it were, ‘instantaneous’ depth. At home the talks at Trencianske 
Teplice nevertheless distinguished Meciar as a stronger Slovak champion than the more 
nationalist-sounding Christian Democratic Movement, which had divided internally on
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the talks. At Meciar’s insistence Camogursky was forced to choose between 
observation of the Slovak government resolution - for an ‘authentic federation’ - and 
resignation from the coalition. The Christian Democratic Movement eventually 
withdrew from the talks and stayed in the government {Lidove noviny 17.8.1990:8).
It was left to Havel to coordinate some preliminary closure to the competences 
question. Meetings duly followed at Piestany on 11th September (after which Havel 
criticised the commissions for producing over-detailed drafts), on October 23rd in 
Prague and October 28th in Slavkov. At these last talks, following nationalist agitation 
at the Slovak Language Law debate in Bratislava, federal premier Marian Calfa, Pithart 
and Meciar together adopted a declaration condemning all attempts to destabilise 
Czechoslovakia, and pledged to continue the federation {Rude pravo 29.10.1990). On 
November 5th, the three met again in Prague and declared that they had resolved most 
of the issues outstanding from the August talks. They had agreed to maintain the 
federal government’s right to make decisions on economic strategy, defence, foreign 
policy, banking and federal taxes and this agreement was submitted, as a draft 
constitutional amendment to the three governments for approval. The Slovak and Czech 
republican governments gave their approval on November the 6th and 7th respectively. 
The federal government agreed “only in principle”, objecting that the draft was too 
decentralising.
Further meetings, described by participants as emergency negotiations, were held in 
Modra on November 10th and 11th, and in Prague on November 13th. Here it was 
agreed that defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, the central bank, taxation and 
customs and price reforms would remain solely under federal authority. The federal 
government would establish its budget through direct federal taxation in both republics 
and the CSFR economy was defined as based on an internal single market and the free 
movement of labour, goods and money. The republics would establish their own 
budgets through a system of local taxation. It was also agreed that all assets originating 
in the republics, not including natural resources (which would be treated separately in 
the new constitution) would remain their sole property and would not be transferred to 
or redistributed by federal authorities. As for international affairs, the republics would
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be permitted to conclude international treaties having gained the permission of the 
central government. Unilaterally, they could also undertake agreements in specified 
fields with other units of other federal states. While every clause remained 
controversial, the last two in particular exposed how the rapid bartering behind the Bill 
had produced jurisdictional principles of such incoherence on the status of the ‘nation’ 
as to make the law inherently unstable^ ^  - a necessary characteristic for many in the 
Federal Assembly who only very reluctantly supported it (Competences Law in 
Svobodne slovo 21.12.1990:20).
Though the whole package looked set to be superseded it was still strongly, if not 
flamboyantly resisted by the federal Czech right^^. Federal economy minister Vladimir 
Dlouhy took the offensive and appeared on state television denouncing Meciar as a 
populist^^. “The federal government” , complained Dlouhy (of the Civic Democratic 
Alliance), “is under constant pressure to retreat from reasonable principles” 
{Zemedelske noviny, Obcansky denik 28.11.1990). Supported by Klaus, his accusations 
managed to alienate even the Slovak right, a considerable achievement given that many 
of the former-dissident members of the Public Against Violence were themselves 
profoundly alarmed by Meciar’s manipulation of nationalist rhetoric. The role of 
peacemaker again fell to Havel. Sensing an imminent second failure of the 
Competences Bill he alerted the Federal Assembly to the potential crisis, on December
" On the evening of the 12th Calfa spoke on state television and laid down a more forthright statement of 
appropriate future federal powers. Amongst other things, Calfa argued that the federation had to have, as a 
matter o f minimal necessity, a unified international policy and must ensure its internal security; it should 
have a single currency, a single monetary system and a unified system of taxes, finance, price and customs 
policies, including the issue of united regulatory price measures; the federation had to he able to finance 
state administration, defence and other federal authorities and create financial reserves; it must have a 
unified concept of economic strategy and of external economic relations; it must have imified power 
generation policy and be economically responsible for its network-creating infrastructures, including crude 
oil and gas pipelines. Finally, he declared “we cannot imagine a Federal state without basic legislative 
competence for affairs which have an immediate impact on the rights liberties and position o f its citizens” 
{Svobodne Slovo 13.11.1990:1,4). Calfa's arrogation o f total responsibility for the welfare o f ‘the people’ 
directly contradicted the basic federal principle that federations are founded upon dispersed majorities, and 
that the two planes of federal power: central and non-centralised [republican] are each possessed equally of 
such powers as have been delegated and guaranteed to them by ‘the people’.
The Slovak National Council approved the draft on the 19th.
Klaus joined Dlouhy in condemning Slovak actions, concluding that “These attempts spring above all 
from the activity of some Slovak Government representatives who demagogically confuse the failings of the 
surviving centralist system with the indispensable unifying role of Federal bodies” {Svobodne slovo, Rude 
Pravo 8.12.1990)
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lOth '^ .^ “The Slovak premier himself”, had “made it quite clear that, if you fail to 
approve the law in the wording submitted by the Slovak National Council, the latter 
might declare the pre-eminence of its laws over the laws of the Federal Assembly” 
Havel announced. By doing so he cast Meciar, without any heed to the federal Czech 
right’s apparent presumption of unitary state rights, as the devious state-wrecker. To 
ward off such an eventuality Havel proposed that the Assembly pass as soon as possible 
two proposals aimed at tackling future deadlocks. The first was to form the 
constitutional court, the second, to provide a law on public referenda. He also asked 
for an extension of his presidential powers. The first two suggestions were greeted 
warmly, the last, less so {Svobodne slovo, Mlada Fronta dnes, Prace 11.12.1990). The 
Federal Assembly finally accepted the Power-Sharing Bill on the 12th December 1990 - 
an antagonistic proposition though it was.
New constitutions
Despite the fact that the power-sharing conflict had exposed fundamental definitional 
disagreement between federal and republican players, the presidiae of the National 
Councils had begun to meet at the end of September 1990 to discuss in earnest the 
creation of new constitutions. Their negotiated agreement was that the federal 
constitution would be drafted by a commission of ten deputies from each National 
Council and fourteen deputies from the Federal Assembly (Zak 1995:258). There was, 
however, no consensus on the most basic issues: the nature of federal power; the 
number of chambers; the continuation of the existing consociational defence against 
majority rule in the federal parliament; the need to ratify constitutional changes in the 
National Councils; the relationship between the federal constitution and a prior 
‘agreement’ that both sides had agreed should ‘symbolise’ a ‘fresh start’ (Zak 
1995:258). Conflicts over the order in which the constitutions might be passed indeed 
looked more than equal to those over the basic division of authority - both required
During the speech Havel drew deputies’ attention to a recent opinion poll showing that 70 per cent o f  
respondents in Slovakia and 74 per cent in the Czech republic considered the possible division of the state 
as an indulgence of politicians which would not reflect the interests of ordinary people.
Meciar responded by pointing out that “in Bohemia there exist quite real and strong currents which think 
in the same way”. The Christian Democratic Movement paper Slovensky Dennik objected that “it is the 
Czech political representation which puts the future of Czechoslovakia at stake when it places political and 
economic interests above the natural efforts of Czechs and Slovak to live together in a democratic and 
economically strong political state” (Slovensky Dennik, Svobodne slovo, Lidove noviny and Obcansky denik
12.12.1990).
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consensus on the rights due the present, let alone the future federal centre, an issue 
around which the republic-centric party systems themselves were clearly still forming.
When the thirty-four selected deputies proved incapable of allocating a coherent 
mission to constitutional lawyers, Havel ordered a draft which might be presented to 
the commissions for discussion. In his next New Year Address Havel appealed for the 
approval of three new constitutions “by the end of the year at the latest” as the basic 
task of 1991 (CTK 2.1.1991). The continuing failure to proceed with drafting 
nonetheless provoked the Federal Assembly into taking its own initiative, changing the 
constitution piecemeal (Zak 1995:258). The result was the Bill of Fundamental Rights 
and Liberties (emerging from National Council drafts), passed on the 9th January 1991 
- formally providing the CSFR with at least a liberal code of civil rights^^. Even so, the 
preamble to the Bill entertained “the right of the Czech and Slovak nations to self- 
determination” . As soon as Havel, intervening again, convened party talks in February 
1991 in an attempt to kick-start the constitutional process^^, this ‘right’ duly took its 
place in republican claims against ‘innate’, i.e. inherently sovereign federal powers.
The issue that can at least be identified as having ‘played the lead’ in undermining the 
next series of party meetings, nicknamed Havel’s ‘touring castles and palaces’ (Zak 
1995:259), was that of a state treaty, suggested by the Christian Democratic Movement 
chairman Jan Carnogursky as a precursor to any new constitution. When Carnogursky 
suggested the idea to the president in January Havel commented that it looked more 
like a confederal than a federal suggestion {Mlada Fronta dues 31.1.1991:1,2), an 
astute observation as it turned out. Contentious distinctions between federal and 
confederal principles, a rerun under different vocabulary of the most basic August 1990
One disputed clause was that on the Rights of Nationalities, which appeared inconsistent with the Slovak 
Language Law passed in October. The failure to approve more amendments protecting minorities provoked 
Hungarian members of Egyutteles and the Christian Democratic Movement to walk out before the final 
vote (Lidove noviny 10.1.1991).
The Federal Assembly subsequently created the constitutional court, and in July 1991 established the 
basic instrument o f a referendum. The bill on referenda was passed at the second attempt, after the Slovak 
National Party and some Christian Democratic Movement deputies were persuaded to approve. The law 
stipulated that referenda could be declared in the solving of basic questions and forms of the state system, 
and when one of the republics proposed to secede from the federation. The referendum would be declared 
by the president at the proposal of the Federal Assembly if seconded by the National Councils. The results 
o f the referendum were valid if voted in favour by more than 50 per cent o f those entitled to vote in each of 
the republics {Svobodne slovo, Mlada Fronta dnes 19.7.1991). Of significance in 1992 was the stipulation 
that a referendum could not be declared in the 5 month period before a general election.
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dispute concerning prior federal versus innate republican rights, immediately 
stalemated this next round of talks, intended though they were to be less formal, more 
flexible pre-negotiations.
The ‘Vikarka’ restaurant meetings
Havel’s first meeting at Vikarka foundered on its own chaotic informality, leaving the 
participating government parties determined to formulate their positions in writing 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 5.2.1991). The tensions between the centre and right within the 
Civic Forum were, in the meantime institutionalised, as the movement declared its 
intention to split into two groups - Klaus-ite right and Dienstbier-ite liberal centre/left^^ 
- the future Civic Democratic Party (CDF) and Civic Movement (CM) respectively. 
The next Vikarka meeting ran more decisively into the obstacle presented by the state 
treaty concept. Carnogursky insisted that a treaty would represent merely another 
incarnation of the preamble to the new (and indeed the old, 1968) federal law. The 
right of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence now together objected that a 
state treaty formulated between the two ‘sovereign’ National Councils actually 
necessitated the prior dissolution of the federal state. The third round at Vikarka (4th 
March) proved a rerun of the second. Though all participants perceived the public 
pressure to achieve some compromise, the subsequent joint statement attempted in vain 
to portray progress.
It was declared that “Czechoslovakia will be a federal state consisting of two sovereign 
and equal republics, linked voluntarily and at the free will of their citizens” , that “the 
two National Councils will approve the declaration on cohabitation on the eve of the 
approval of the three new constitutions” and that “the National Councils will approve 
the respective national constitutions and the Federal Assembly will approve the Federal 
constitution. This will happen simultaneously”. It was noted separately, but all- 
importantly, that while the Christian Democratic Movement agreed that Czechoslovakia 
would be a federal state, it wished to signal its insistence on the conclusion of a treaty 
with the proviso that the treaty would be a legal document and not just a political 
declaration {Svobodne slovo 6.3.1991:1,4). Such an explicit recontracting, with its
** See Chapter 6.
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demonstration of republican sovereignty, remained entirely unacceptable to the political 
right.
Fragm entation on the Slovak political scene - perceptions of crisis 
On the 5th March 1991, the next development in party politics came in Slovakia, where 
Meciar’s faction of the Public Against Violence walked out of the Slovak National 
Council declaring they would form their own platform of the Public Against Violence - 
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS). The event again institutionalised the 
diverging constitutional attitudes of the movement into two distinct streams: the rightist, 
consensus-seeking view for greater republican equality but conceding a strong centre, 
led by the liberal Fedor Gal, and a more indeterminate but apparently confederalist 
view represented by Meciar. It also signalled the end to a stable government majority 
in the Slovak section of the House of Nations within the Federal Assembly, essential 
for passing constitutional legislation.
Havel’s reaction was to warn of imminent disaster: the combination of demonstrations, 
“the constitutional proposals of the Slovak National Party and Matica slovenska, the 
approaching anniversary of the Slovak state on 14th March and at the same time the 
draft declaration on sovereignty [proposed by the Slovak National Party and later 
rejected in the Slovak National Council]” all added up to “a very disturbing situation” 
(Zemedelske noviny 11.3.1991:1,2). At this delicate stage, however, while positions 
were forming around the state treaty idea, such a grim evocation of evils was all too 
evocative of Prague’s own prejudices. Havel’s remarks were likely only to frustrate a 
far larger number of Slovaks, bemused by a presidential recounting of Slovak 
nationalist sins^^ {Mlada Fronta dnes 12.3.1991:2).
When finally submitted to the constitutional commission, the adjustments in Havel’s 
draft constitution were derived, not from Meciar’s popular faction, but from Gal’s now
More melodramatically still, Havel visited army officers in Meciar’s home town of Trencin, where he 
warned; “Our young democracy is experiencing very dramatic movements today... I would like to 
emphasise that our Army must not intervene or enter into this complex process in any circumstances or in 
any way. Nobody should cite such an option as a threat or speculate about it.... I would like to point out in 
this place that the Czechoslovak Army will perform any tasks only as a united Army” {Mlada Fronta, 
Prace 15.3.1991)
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considerably weakened wing of the Public Against Violence (Mlada Fronta dnes 
26.3.1991:2). In Prague, Meciar’s manouevre was evidently misread, if only briefly, as 
having strengthened the liberal rump of the Public Against Violence, an interpretation 
which prompted the most outspoken criticism of Carnogursky’s treaty proposals yet, 
from Dagmar Buresova, Chairwoman of the Czech National Council and even from 
Petr Pithart, who declared it a “legal nonsense” (Mlada Fronta dnes 14.3.1991:1,2). 
Frantisek Miklosko (Public Against Violence), Vladimir Meciar and Jan Carnogursky 
met Havel at Lany on 17th April in order to try and clarify the Slovak position, but as 
Meciar rightly pointed out, the problem was not so much the obscurity of Slovak 
desires but an all too apparent disagreement between the prevailing Slovak notions of 
federal rights and those acceptable to the Czech side.
When Meciar was ousted as Slovak premier on 23rd April, the Czech’s 
misinterpretation of Slovak events was more pronounced still. Pithart suggested that “if 
the non-functioning of the Slovak economy is the reason for this dramatic change in the 
Slovak government, then this change is simultaneously a promise for the seeking of one 
economy, one reform, and that we shall tackle the problem of the state arrangement 
(Obcansky denik, Mlada Fronta dnes 24.4.1991). The ‘non-functioning’ of the Slovak 
economy’ was indeed one of the main political forces separating the Public Against 
Violence but a failure for which the liberal right was held to account. Not only was the 
Christian Democratic Movement’s position in the coalition strengthened, but the 
populist Meciar had been freed to engage in both the constitutional and the economic 
debate as an opposition member, indeed, as the leading critic of the government’s 
performance. Following Meciar’s ouster, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
rallied in opposition with the Slovak National Party (SNP) and the Party of the 
Democratic Left (PDL) and gathered a growing constituency behind its own eclectic set 
of arguments for a federation built “from below”.
The timing could not have been worse for the negotiation process. Talks thus far had 
achieved only a well publicised deadlock over a treaty of undecided status to introduce 
constitutions the actual content of which had yet to be decided or drafted. A permanent 
division within the Slovak governing coalition seemed certain when Carnogursky, as
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the new Slovak premier, confirmed that he favoured an independent Slovak state - 
‘eventually’ {Prace 30.4.1991:3). His pronouncement that Slovakia should remain part 
of Czechoslovakia until it joined the EC (to the Austrian weekly, Profil, quoted in 
Mlada Fronta dnes 3.4.1991:7)^^ assisted only in persuading Slovak voters that of the 
two would-be champions of Slovakia, Meciar was the political realist.
Lany
At more talks in Lany, in May 1991, the thirty assembled representatives of all three 
legislative bodies, governments, parties, government coalitions and legislative experts 
seemed to agree that some form of republican-level accord on the principles of the new 
constitutional arrangement would be recommended to their respective parties. Experts 
would be entrusted to work on the text on the basis of existing proposals. Buresova 
concluded that both sides had made concessions {Hospodarske noviny 13.5.1991:1) and 
indeed they had, but only through the omission of all substantive issues from the talks, 
postponed, yet again for future discussion. The Slovak side by now moreover aspired 
to an inner-state agreement with certain state law characteristics, and this remained in 
dispute, as did the nature of the authority of the National Councils in signing the 
document.
Cross-party talks on the state treaty held at Budmerice, attended for the first time by 
opposition parties, demolished the minimalist consensus at Lany and threatened 
postponement of the upcoming elections. The respective government leaders together 
emphasised the importance of forming a “well-functioning state” , apparently 
intimidated by the opposition’s destructive impulses (Mlada Fronta dnes, Lidove noviny
1.6.1991). It was at this choice moment that Meciar intervened with the insistence that 
the state treaty should be concluded at an international state level. Meciar’s suggestion, 
a logical extension of Carnogursky’s aspirations and a blatant attempt to draw the fire 
back to the Christian Democratic Movement, succeeded insofar as it provided the 
Czech right with easy justification for publicly despairing of the direction the entire
Meciar meanwhile had become embroiled in a dispute over appropriate cooperation with the Federal 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with whom he failed to consult before travelling to the already imploding 
Yugoslavia and the USSR.
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talks process had taken since February 1991. Klaus determined to reassert the basic 
principles of a ‘functioning federation’ at the imminent cross-party talks in Kromeriz^\
Kromeriz
With talks on the brink of collapse, the meeting at Kromeriz seemed to achieve a 
remarkable breakthrough. A 19-point questionnaire prepared by Havel proved 
instrumental in drawing the talks toward consensus and it was agreed that the National 
Councils would prepare a treaty on the principles of the future state arrangement. This 
would formulate the shape of the state, the scope of federal responsibilities, and other 
basic elements of the constitution. The treaty would then be presented to the Federal 
Assembly, which would approve any constitutional law on the approval of constitutions 
or anything similar beforehand. A particular point of breakthrough for the Slovaks was 
that the federal constitution would be subject to ratification by the National Councils - a 
one-off event designed solely for the adoption of the new constitution, after which 
federal decision-making would revert to “another way”. In this way, it seemed, the 
much disputed legal continuity of the CSFR could be maintained and a new federation 
built on the ground of the existing federation {Svobodne slovo, Mlada Fronta dnes
18.6.1991). It was also agreed, under pressure from Klaus, that future debates on the 
constitution would be transferred to the parliaments {Mlada Fronta dnes 18.6.1991).
In the Slovak National Council, however, Carnogursky proved unable to marshal the 
votes of the nationalists within the Christian Democratic Movement, who Joined with 
the opposition in rejecting the Kromeriz line. Presenting a draft state treaty between the 
two National Councils on the 1st July, Gal’s successor as Public Against Violence 
chairman, J. Kucerak concluded that “we have two options - federation or divorce. 
Musing about confederation or union means disintegration of the common state” 
{Zemedelske noviny 2.7.1991:1). Following the collapse of Kromeriz, the now heavily
“The opinion currently expressed by J. Carnogursky that Slovakia wants to be in the federation for the 
moment but that it will withdraw when the time is right is absolutely unacceptable to us. In Kromeriz I will 
put it clearly and bluntly - I will say that the Czech public is fed up with such opinions and that a clear 
barrier must be erected in this matter” {Zemedelske noviny 13.6.1991:2). Regarding Kromeriz, Klaus also 
commented beforehand that the time when it was suitable for the talks to carry on in the extra- 
parliamentary arena was over as voters were under the impression the parliaments were being completely 
bypassed {Mlada Fronta 17.6.1991) - a comment designed to tap into the growing public frustration with 
the negotiated deadlocks, though Klaus was surely aware that neither parliament nor its commissions could 
prove more successful in the absence of a pre-negotiatied consensus.
205
divided Slovak National Council, which had already formed its commission for the 
preparation of its new constitution, decided only to prepare two parallel constitutions: 
one with all the responsibilities of a sovereign state, the second bound by existing legal 
competences.
In these circumstances it was relatively straightforward for Meciar to blur constitutional 
issues still further. Following a Civic Movement ‘goodwill visit’ (by Dienstbier, 
Rychetsky, Pithart and Buresova) Meciar found it necessary to ‘clarify’ his non­
separatist position, and he declared the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s 
opposition to any declaration of sovereignty by the Slovak National Council. Such a 
step, he said, could have no meaning in the process of emancipation of Slovakia which 
needed, above all, a state treaty with the Czech republic and its own constitution. At 
the same time, however, he pointed out that ‘sovereignty’ should be achieved now and 
that speaking about it as a thing for the future was dangerous {Hospodarske noviny 
5.9.1991:2).
Gridlock
At a joint meeting of the two National Council presidiae in Bratislava, the two sides 
reiterated the points of agreement and disagreement already set out at Krotneriz. Once 
again they declared that the process of preparing constitutions would be based on 
maintaining the continuity of the CSFR and on constitutional methods. The Slovak side 
pointed out that they wished to pursue the principle of sovereignty for the Slovak 
Republic in the preparation of the Slovak constitution, and the two presidia “exchanged 
opinions” on the division of competences. Though they agreed a common state required 
a common economic policy its attributes remained to be specified. To this end they 
agreed to form commissions comprising experts and representatives of all three 
governments to prepare proposals on the division of competences - again. These 
conclusions were again rejected by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and 
Slovak National Party {Svobodne slovo, Mlada Fronta dnes and Zemedelske noviny
7.9.1991).
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Meeting with Carnogursky, Klaus argued that in the light of the clear stalemate future 
decisions should be postponed until after the June 1992 elections {Mlada Fronta dnes 
10.9.1991:2). A few weeks later, Carnogursky effectively guaranteed this outcome by 
proposing to foreign minister Dienstbier (Civic Movement) that the provision on the 
legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state be deleted to the pre-amble of the 
Czechoslovak-German treaty, currently under preparation - a continuity guaranteed by 
numerous international treaties establishing the nullity of the 1938 Munich dictât. Not 
only did the request horrify Czechs, but it drove yet another wedge between Christian 
Democratic Movement and its coalition partners Public Against Violence-Civic 
Democratic Union, who objected that only other fascist states had ever recognised the 
Slovak state - a situation they hardly wished to alter now (Mlada Fronta dnes, 
Obcansky denik, Hospodarske noviny 18.9.1991). In the first Federal Assembly session 
of Autumn 1991, Havel warned deputies that they faced the choice of a rapid 
construction of a joint state or dissolution, later admitting that he personally favoured a 
referendum to decide the issue^^ {Hospodarske noviny. Rudepravo 25.9.1991)
From November 1991, the constitutional process entered a period of both 
intensification and further disintegration as parties set out their respective stalls for the 
June election. For Czechs, the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement pushed itself 
further beyond the pale by claiming, quite incidentally, that the attitudes of the 
Christian Democratic Movement and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
were close on many questions, not least in their rejection of liberalism and their 
criticism of the pace of economic reform {Rude pravo 1.11.1991:3). Havel resorted to 
inviting leading government representatives to the pub, “In Hell” , in a desperate 
attempt to thrash out a plan for completing negotiations. Havel himself presented a 
draft treaty, and while his visitors agreed to use it as the basis of future talks, and even 
seemed closer on the substantive division of competences, they remained stuck over the 
question, yet again, of the shape, legal character and meaning of the treaty to be 
concluded between the two republics {Lidove noviny, Hospodarske noviny 4.11.1991).
As o f October, an IVVM poll revealed the following, unhelpful results; in the Czech republic 38 per cent 
favoured a unitary state, 31 per cent a federation, 18 per cent a federal land system (i.e. Bundesrepublik), 4 
per cent a confederation and 6 per cent two independent states. In the Slovak republic 16 per cent favoured 
a unitary state, 34 per cent a federation, 6 per cent a federal land system, 25 per cent a confederation and 
15 per cent two independent states (Mlada Fronta Dnes, Rude pravo  1.11.1991)
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Just over a week later, the Federal Assembly failed to agree on questions that might be 
put to the citizenry in the event of a deadlock-resolving referendum - a debate 
broadcast live on state television {Lidove noviny 14.11.1991:1,12)
On the 14th November 1991, the federal government, for too long, according to its 
representatives, conceded the most minimal political ‘weight’ in the constitutional talks, 
re-entered the fray in some style. It did so by issuing a statement on the talks that read: 
“The federal government refuses further to sanction the perpetuation of the present 
state of affairs because it has extraordinarily unfavourable repercussions on economic 
development, the social situation, relations among people, and the international 
standing of Czechoslovakia” . The Federal government had decided, the statement 
continued:
• to apply all of its power to halting the destruction of legal and institutional pre­
requisites of the functioning of the common state,
• consistently to promote the further transformation of society and tackle pressing 
economic and social problems,
• to prepare draft principles of the new constitutional arrangement in the field of 
legislative and executive power using the results of all negotiations so far and 
submit it to parliaments,
• to request that all three parliaments discuss those principles as soon as possible in 
the presence of members of the governments {Mlada Fronta dnes, Hospodarske 
noviny 15.11.1991)
These requirements were designed not only to force the issue of the common state but 
also to return the debate, in a public and assertive way, to the top-down argument as 
expressed in premier Calfa’s speech just before the December 1990 vote on power- 
sharing.
Havel s last stand
Despairing of the chances for agreement before full-scale campaigning began for the 
1992 election Havel made his last major intervention, declaring on state television his
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intention to submit five new laws to the Federal Assembly. Resurrecting the tribune 
role which he had fulfilled to such great effect in November 1989, he appealed directly 
to the people to “express more loudly than hitherto your longing to live soon in a 
wisely and justly organised, prospering state, and thus to help our hostile parliaments 
find a way from the blind alley in which they find themselves”. His first proposal was 
an amendment to the law on referenda enabling the President to initiate referenda 
unilaterally, if unopposed by the Federal Assembly and supported by 20 per cent of the 
voters in one republic. His second was an amendment to the constitutional law which 
would set the new federal constitution to come into force after ratification by the 
National Councils. The third proposal concerned the conditions of the disbandment of 
the Federal Assembly and the declaration of new elections. This would give the 
President the right to issue law, after the disbandment of the Assembly, through a form 
of decrees, with the proviso that they would be subject to additional approval by the 
newly elected parliament. The remaining bills concerned a constitutional law on the 
new structure of the Assembly and an adjustment to the electoral law {Lidove noviny 
18.11.1991:1,8).
Havel’s speech provoked several days of demonstrations of up to 40,000 in Prague’s 
Wenceslas Square, and brought out the students - ever faithful to Havel, the anti­
communist Club of Committed Non-Party Members, the Civic Movement, 
Czechoslovak Social Democracy and the People’s Party in favour of the changes. The 
Czech right-wing Civic Democratic Alliance and Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party 
meanwhile, though at first internally split moved into a position of discrete opposition 
within a week. In Slovakia the death-knell of the proposal’s legislative chances was 
rung by a Movement for a Democratic Slovakia statement accusing Havel of personal 
ambition and of only deepening the crisis. After prolonged meetings with the president, 
Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party expressed concern that Havel’s efforts had been 
misunderstood by some as an appeal to civil disobedience; Press commentary foresaw 
that the proposals would go the same way as the referendum proposals, voted down in 
the previous week^^ {Mlada Fronta dnes, Lidove noviny, Cesky denik 19.11.1991).
According to an IVVM poll 73 per cent of Czechs and 59 per cent of Slovaks would vote in favour of a 
common state if a referendum took place in November {Mlada Fronta dnes 19.11.1991:2)
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On the 19th members of the now deeply unpopular rightist Slovak government^'^, on the 
initiative of the Public Against Violence-Civic Democratic Union, the Democratic Party 
(DP) and the Hungarian Independent Initiative, issued a statement regretting the turn 
taken by constitutional negotiations. Following Klaus, the statement lamented that the 
dispute had spilled over into economic management: “the unsolved questions are 
concentrated in the budget preparation to such an extent as to make its preparation 
impossible. In this situation the preparation of state budgets for 1992 can trigger the 
split of the federal state rather than be an integrating factor” it argued. Consequently, it 
concluded “the Slovak government is of the opinion that the state treaty must not 
become an extra-constitutional instrument. It rejects any untested procedures and 
experiments and supports only tested constitutional steps and mechanism” . The 
statement was in effect a declaration of loyalty to the existing federal state in Klausite 
terms, over the heads of their own coalition partners, the Christian Democratic 
Movement. Not surprisingly, Carnogursky opposed it as unnecessary and prejudicial to 
further talks (Mlada Fronta dnes, Lidova demokracie, Lidove noviny 20.11.1991)^^. 
Caught up by the generally tense atmosphere, however, the Czech National Council 
reneged on the budget agreements achieved in Bratislava at the end of November 1991, 
apparently in protest against Slovak intransigence on the constitutional question. Their 
action returned the division of the budget to the limelight as both a symptom and 
vehicle of the by now full-blown constitutional crisis.
Amidst the discussion of Havel’s legislative proposals it emerged, in the eyes of many 
Czechs like the visitation of a curse, that the Christian Democratic Movement intended 
to incorporate the republican state treaty into Havel’s parliamentary bills. The treaty, 
Carnogursky argued, should first be concluded and then the constitution should be 
approved by the Federal Assembly and later ratified by the National Councils. The 
problem which the presidia of the National Councils had completely failed to solve thus
In May 1991 - one month after Meciar’s ouster as Premier, only 33 per cent of Slovak respondents to a 
CSA poll agreed that the results o f democratic elections should be binding during the whole electoral 
period, while 54 per cent disagreed (Butora 1994:325).
 ^ As it transpired however, a potentially fractious meeting o f the Financial Council was influenced 
favourably by the Slovak statement and a compromise was for the time-being reached over the division of  
the proceeds of the turnover tax and profit tax. The existing ratio of division (1.6:1 Czech Slovak) would 
be replaced by a level of 1.77:1 - a concession by the Czech Republic which had originally demanded a 
division proportionate to the number of inhabitants (1.95:1) {Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik 21.11.1991)
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entered the Federal parliament, even though the Christian Democratic Movement was 
fully aware that the Czech and Slovak right-wing clubs within the Assembly opposed 
the treaty in principle (Leschtina and John, in Mlada Fronta dnes 10.12.1991:6). The 
Federal Assembly eventually voted to postpone the debate on Havel’s initiatives until 
the January session 1992. By December 1991 only Slovakia had submitted its 
constitutional proposals, despite Havel’s warnings that the process was nearing 
collapse.
On the 21st January 1992, the Slovak section of the House of Nations in the Federal 
Assembly threw out the President’s proposed amendment on referenda as well as his 
Bill on the method of approving the new Czechoslovak constitution - designed as 
deadlock-breaking measures {Lidove noviny 22.1.1992). The next day the opposition 
MDS’s Milan Knazko suggested that “the treaty between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia could replace the Federal constitution” i.e. entirely - a comment timed 
apparently for the sole purpose of irritating Czech deputies before the Federal vote on 
the remainder of Havel’s proposals {Lidove noviny, Lidova demokracie 23.1.1992). 
The Assembly meanwhile postponed future votes until February on the basis that this 
might provide a last window in which the National Councils could reach agreement. 
Their statement to the Councils read, “by interrupting the debate on constitutional 
changes, the Federal Assembly wants to meet the National Councils in their co­
responsibility for the creation of the new constitutional arrangement” {Mlada Fronta 
dnes, Lidove noviny 24.2.1992). On the 28th the Assembly nevertheless rejected 
Havel’s proposal permitting presidential rule by decree. By February electoral 
preoccupations dominated overwhelmingly, calming the constitutional crisis by 
signalling the impotence of further talks. The loss of momentum in the general debate 
influenced the cool response to talks at Milovy, which months earlier might have 
represented a real advance.
At Milovy it was agreed, thanks to a last minute concession on the Slovak side, that the 
treaty could be based on the present constitution and could have the form of a 
constitutional initiative addressed to the Federal Assembly. Commenting on the talks, 
however, federal premier Calfa (Public Against Violence) insisted “the Slovak side has
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reached such a point that it cannot relinquish its intention to promote the establishment 
of a qualitatively new state. On the contrary, the Czech side holds the opinion that the 
principle of sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways: either withdrawal from the 
common state or a voluntary decision to stay in it. Apparently, the future of the Czech 
and Slovak Federative Republic will be decided by the winners of the general election” 
{Mlada Fronta dnes 10.2.1992:1,2). It was the nationalist faction of the Christian 
Democratic Movement (the future Slovak Christian Democratic Movement) which 
finally chose to vote with the Slovak National Party and the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia against the Milovy text - parties which evidently wished to have 
their hands free for a variety of constitutional promises in the oncoming electoral 
campaign. This vote closed all coordinated constitutional episodes, a process formally 
adjourned with some despair by the respective chairs of the National Councils on the 
11th March. Frantisek Miklosko blamed breakdown on the Czech failure to accept the 
principle of the treaty, whilst Dagmar Buresova blamed the Slovak National Council 
praesidium {Hospodarske noviny 12.3.1992:1). This bitter conclusion left the issue at 
the mercy of the electoral battle, which as we have already seen^^, proceeded both to 
distort and bypass the substantive issues of conflict even more than had the actual 
negotiation process itself.
Formal legal barriers and polemical constitutionalism
It has been argued in several quarters that the rigidity of the institutional framework 
inherited in 1989 aggravated in a systematic way the problem of replacing constitution 
legislation (Arato 1993, Batt 1993, Mathernova 1993, Zak 1995:245). The existence of 
a minority veto for constitutional legislation is identified in particular as “the single 
most important institutional roadblock preventing law-makers in Czechoslovakia from 
proceeding with constitutional reform” (Mathernova 1993:64). Though championing a 
path-dependency argument Mathernova nevertheless anticipates the crucial point that a 
consociational voting rule of itself might have proved quite sustainable in conditions of 
elite consensus. She thus concludes that it was specifically the combination of the 
legislative structure and severe political deadlock at the party political level that proved
Chapter 4
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fatal (Mathernova 1993:77). This latter phenomenon is nonetheless left largely 
unexplained.
Though expressing a basic truth of the constitutional crisis such formal accounts of the 
vulnerability of constitutional legislation are inadequate on two counts. Firstly, they too 
baldly identify the Slovaks as the obstructive side in the constitutional process - since it 
was the oppositionist Slovak bloc which vetoed among others Havel’s deadlock- 
breaking Bills of January 1992. Secondly, in locating the source of the conflict so 
cleanly in procedural questions, institutional/path-dependency arguments tend to neglect 
the highly problematic blurring of constitutional and political discourses which 
prevailed during the period in question.
The over-emphasis on institutional rules also brings us to a specific third difficulty, this 
time with Mathernova’s further account of the effect of the legislative set-up. In 
Mathernova’s reading the minority’s ability to paralyse the Federal Assembly meant 
that though the federation persisted, the supreme legislative body lost most of its ability 
to influence constitutional developments to the respective National Councils and their 
governments - an impasse completed in January 1992 (Mathernova 1993:68). With the 
debate essentially in the hands of the Councils the issues allegedly became strictly 
oppositional - in the hands of politicians with national rather than federal ambitions. 
Not only does this argument accept the federal government’s account of events at face 
value, but it also ignores the initial reasoning behind National Council involvement, 
namely the initial aspiration to federal legitimacy prevalent in the Civic Forum / Public 
Against Violence / Christian Democratic Movement governments of June 1990 - June 
1992. More curiously still, Mathernova interprets the shift of debate to the National 
Councils a-historically, as a consequence of already collapsed authority at the centre, 
rather than as an active choice of the post-revolution liberal dissident elite, over- 
optimistic though that choice clearly was.
Though Mathernova’s most plausible-sounding case is that the shift in debate to the 
National Councils was attended by a deepening of the national conflict, scrutiny of the 
talks suggests otherwise. At the end of 1990 it should be noted, the disputes in the
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power-sharing talks between the three governments, the battles in the Federal 
Assembly, and the lack of progress in the constitutional talks between the National 
Councils ran concurrently. More importantly, the disagreements that dogged presidia, 
cross-party and inter-governmental talks right through from 1990 to March 1992 
qualitatively-speaking, did not change.
It is this very lack of movement in the issues under discussion and the constant 
recycling of stalemates in the full panoply of institutional arenas that begs analytical 
attention. The framework of objections established between the Czech right and Slovak 
representatives at Trencianske Teplice marked out the dispute as it continued, and 
eventually collapsed, into 1992. Though certain parties attempted to shift the debate 
onto less intractable issues and into more informal negotiating environments (ending 
“In Hell”), the result was a recitation of the fundamentalist and never-resolved 
positions aired in August 1990.
It is thus unsatisfying to explain the constitutional deadlock merely by looking at the 
fate of legislative proposals. It was, after all, an essentially political impasse which 
translated into a procedural impasse. The right of veto in the Federal Assembly is better 
understood as distinct from the stalemate in every other arena only because it 
represented a nominally final, institutional closure of debate, though one thoroughly 
anticipated by the negotiation-rigamortis induced by the brewing electoral battle. To 
attribute to the Slovak veto the prime role in having prohibited new constitutions is to 
ignore the profound failure of the negotiation process that went before it^ .^ The 
remainder of this section turns to a characterisation of the substantive causes of 
stalemate^^.
The consociational veto was of course originally conceived to restrain the Czech majority (roughly 2:1 in 
the population): to “exclude politically and constitutionally, the possibility of outvoting the Slovak nation as 
far as the state relations between the Czechs and Slovaks and the constitutional status of Slovakia are 
concerned” (p39 Action Programme 1968). To the Czech right, notably the Civic Democratic Alliance, the 
constitutional protection of Slovakia in the Assembly represented an infringement o f the ‘established’ 
sovereign powers of the Federal Assembly. The implication of the objections per se was a habituated Czech 
unitarianism. Czech and federal authority had evidently been synonymous for so long that sections of the 
Czech political elite considered effective Slovak intervention highly nationalistic.
It should be noted that the potential for impasse in the Assembly was significant in the public presentation 
of the conflict - it offered the Czech media evidence for a virulent Slovak nationalism at work in the highest 
representative body. In Literarni noviny no.5 1990 the renowned dissident writer Ludvik Vaculik unleashed 
an article entitled ‘Our Slovak Question’, which effectively broke the taboo of public annoyance at Slovak 
actions, articulated with vigour by the press thereafter. In this Vaculik suggested that the Slovaks had no
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The semantic ‘black hole’ that constituted Czechoslovak constitutional terminology 
after 1989 (Peter Brodsky “v Tatrach bez obcanskych prav” in Mathernova 1993) has 
been exaggerated, implying as it does a hopeless terminological confusion on the part 
of the political actors involved^^. The evidence argues rather the contrary, that what did 
exist was a straightforward and very well understood deadlock on terms and, on the 
part of Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party and Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia, a transparent manipulation of Czech Slovak friction. Though there was 
indeed a proliferation of terms supposedly denoting ‘types’ of federation - ‘true’, 
‘dual’, ‘authentic’ and perhaps the most consistent, ‘functional federation’ it 
nevertheless seems an unsafe assumption to infer that this derived from the 
inexperience of the politicians concerned or even, as Mathernova does, their willful 
adoption of arguments as a “pretense, a playground for political ping-pong” (1993:71).
Rather than assuming either non-comprehension or entrenched, increasingly nationalist 
conflict, the stalemate was exactly as it appeared: a narrowly politically motivated 
stalemate over constitutional terms which brooked of no obvious compromise. Though 
any party may consistently claim to be both federalist and peculiarly concerned with the 
needs of energetic governance, with that extreme of the federal continuum represented 
by concentrated unity, there is little evidence that the Czech federal right felt 
themselves to be speaking from within such a continuum, with recognition of the equal 
claim for the diffusion of powers at the other extremity. Vaclav Klaus’s term 
‘functional federation’, which first appeared in the Civic Forum manifesto for June 
1990, was a concept ever more clearly elucidated - it denoted a federation with a 
sovereign and sufficiently strong centre to legislate and administer unhindered a radical
genuine history of their own and could only be supported with the assistance o f other nations. He also 
claimed that Slovaks had been uncritical of the Slovak fascist state, renewing their adherence to “good 
Czechoslovakia” only when it suited them, and finally, that Slovak complaints about the Czechs were 
“sociopsychological” (Radio Free Europe 7 September 1990). Perhaps most incendiary o f all, Vaculik 
implied that the Slovaks had acted as a Quisling nation since 1968: “Misled by their history, spoiled by 
Czech intervention on their behalf, the Slovaks do not know how an autonomous and proud nation should 
act”, he asserted - a phrase Klaus would use to very precise effect at a later date (see Chapter 3).
For example, as late as November 3, 1991 the Civic Movement (OH) representative and Chairwoman o f  
the Czech National Council Dagmar Buresova was still explaining in talks that “we are certainly willing to 
acknowledge that their must be confederative elements, but in principle to be a federation in must be a 
common state. Mr. Premier [Marian Calfa][has confirmed that] a confederation is not a common state, it is a 
union o f states” (Slovenske Listy 1994:88).
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economic reform package, requirements laid out frequently and ever more explicitly. 
For two years Klaus argued that he was uniquely realistic about the new democratic 
federal state, that less than his arrangement was not a federation at all, and in the run 
up to the 1992 election the Civic Democratic Party platform made explicit a position 
which been implicit throughout. Unless such a federation obtained, the optimum 
solution would be the cessation of all constitutional ties. In the light of such a 
statement, accepting that federalism is a system designed to “prevent tyranny without 
preventing governance” (Elazar 1987:29), one is hard-pressed to recognise a federalist 
in Klaus. The idea of committing to a system of open-bargaining had proved entirely 
alien to his state-building methodology.
By 1991 the position on the Czech right, moreover, clearly underpinned all basic 
deadlock concerning ‘sovereignty’ or state legal personality, including that over the 
state treaty. This development could only deepen the stereotypical assumption on the 
Slovak side, that the Czechs remained Czechoslovakist and on the Czech side, that the 
Slovaks would sacrifice nothing to a common state. As J. Kalvoda (Civic Democratic 
Alliance) insisted, at the end of yet another failed meeting of the National Councils, the 
existence or non-existence of the Slovak wish to live in a common state was the 
cardinal question of the state treaty. He also observed that Slovak politicians who 
favoured an independent Slovakia had simply not yet dared to say it publicly 
{Hospodarske noviny, Mlada Fronta dnes, Cesky denik 13.11.1991). It is the fusion of 
such national stereotypes with highly politicised perceptions of the requirements of 
democratic stabilisation: which we may call state-building arguments, that holds the key 
to understanding the legal deadlock.
A realist argument - the problem with new institutions
In an institutional landscape in which ultimate conflict-regulating power had rested with 
a single Party for over forty years, political representatives after 1989 were faced by a 
relative wealth of potential institutional environments for resolving their differences: 
parliaments, inter-governmental meetings, inter- and intra-party meetings, inter­
parliamentary executive meetings and so on. Through 1990 it was also already evident 
to parliamentary insiders that political affiliations and the political constellations in each
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republic were shifting and unstable entities, providing further scope for future 
coalitions of consensus just as shifting negotiating environments might provide more or 
less conducive conditions for problem-solving. That the main political actors of the 
constitutional debate could be observed repeating themselves to the echo through almost 
two years of negotiations, in various combinations of negotiating fora is in this 
perspective, less surprising.
Rather than indicating persistent cognitive helplessness, the repetitiveness of the debate 
reflected the initial desire for legitimacy and the relative unchartedness of the new 
institutional landscape facing the negotiating parties. It also reflected the reasonable 
expectation that bargaining positions should be sustained and the modification of claims 
resisted given the reasonable prospect of shifting coalitions and the imminence of a 
second election. Far from merely ‘touring castles and palaces’ what we observe is that 
the question of constitutional re-design went on a full round-the-institutions exploratory 
trip - it also engaged phenomenal numbers of political representatives. Together these 
tendencies ran entirely counter to the lessons of successful negotiating processes 
elsewhere, which typically minimise the number of actors involved and which rely on 
the ability of these actors to sell their compromise position to their respective 
constituencies once a full negotiated consensus has been reached. In the Czechoslovak 
case the one major misconception throughout the process, indeed one prolonged by the 
process itself, was the republican deputies’ under-estimation of the persistence of 
federal government self-interest and the identification of the Czech public with their 
position, implicitly majoritarian as it was.
The federal government’s exasperated re-statement of the basic ‘minimum conditions’ 
for the continuation of the state represented a ‘reality check’ for the negotiation 
process. It is clearly from this period in late 1991 onward that the realisation finally 
dawns that institutional adjustments {i.e. negotiating environments and the stabilising 
constellation of political parties) were unable to take the dispute further. If the electoral 
term had been longer it is arguably at this point that fruitful negotiations, as opposed to 
position-taking, would have begun. Instead, from this point on the federal government, 
the Czech government, and lastly, the Slovak government, finally conceded that the
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issues would have to wait on the ultimate shift in political distributions already widely 
expected: the installation in the June 1992 election of the Czech right and Slovak 
national populists (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) in government - that is, after 
a new and potentially decisive vacuum of consensus had been created at the federal 
level.
What then was the substance of these recycled deadlocks between 1990 and 1992? The 
issue of sovereignty was clearly a focal point of conflict. The opposition Slovak 
Nationalist Party clearly aspired to full sovereign international recognition as a fully 
independent state. The Christian Democratic Movement rneanwhile visualised some 
form of transitory relationship with the Czech republic, leading eventually to the full 
flowering of sovereign Slovak statehood within the European Union - an aspiration 
which divided it utterly from its coalition partner Public Against Violence-Civic 
Democratic Union. The less nationalist majority of Slovak deputies on the other hand 
were preoccupied not so much by suverenita (sovereignty) as by zvrchovanost - a right 
to pursue one’s own national life and culture, a metaphysical imperative theoretically 
consistent with a federal common state. Those Slovak sympathetic with the latter 
aspiration endorsed the pursuit of symbolic signifiers - of terms and agreements which 
would indicate the essential ‘equality’ of the two nations. It was for these rather than 
for secessionist reasons that the state treaty idea had resonated favourably with many 
Slovak deputies.
The majority of Slovaks conceived of constitutional reform as an opportunity 
ftmdamantally to redraft the federal contract, this time by two equal, consenting nations 
in conditions of political freedom. To the Czech right the authority of the established 
federation, however flawed in its constitutional detail and however coerced its 
formation and structure, already existed and was, as embodying the international 
sovereignty of the CSFR, superior and binding. Any attempt to assert republican 
sovereignty (the sovereignty of national ‘peoples’ as against the invoked sovereignty of 
‘the people’) if only momentarily and symbolically, destroyed the ‘sovereign rights’ of 
the federation. A state treaty moreover, appeared to leave open even confederal 
options. This was not, however, a purely legalistic objection on the part of the Czech
218
right but an objection inspired by (and dependent upon) the assertion that federal 
powers had to be maintained, uninterrupted, for the purposes of continuing Klaus’s 
state-wide, state-building economic reform, massively resented in Slovakia though it 
was.
Indeed, the extent to which treaty discussions remained mired in formal legal argument 
and abstracted from their underlying political agendas on both sides is one of their most 
remarkable aspects. In this respect moreover stereotypes played a crucial part, 
fortifying the driest legal arguments - the status of the treaty in international law etc. - 
and keeping entirely discrete purely party political motivations. Such a prejudiced legal 
discourse proved a particularly effective method of keeping policy positions stable 
whilst affecting to enter into an argument^^. The recital of stereotypes among Czechs 
emerged as follows: the Czechs - tolerant, conciliatory, but finally robust in the face of 
legal ignorance and absurdity; the Slovaks - irrational in regard to their ‘best interests’ 
(at best romantic), nationalistic, parochial in outlook and inexperienced in the art of the 
possible.
Preston King, qualifying the appropriateness of using a contractual framework to 
characterise federations has pointed out that “[a]ny agreement, which is not derived 
from compulsion, must feature relevant equality among those agreeing” (King 
1982:106). It was clearly a formal expression of this “relevant equality” which 
motivated Carnogursky in his bid for a state treaty. Such a treaty, formally delegating 
republican power to the centre, would have represented a lasting legal caveat to the 
age-old assumption of top-down federalists (and Czechoslovakists before them), that the 
highest legislative body, the Federal Assembly (previously the National Assembly) was 
a priori and indivisibly sovereign. Slovak suspicion of the centre, however, was 
interpreted in Prague as a function of nationalist hostility, and not as deriving from 
their unhappy experiences under Czechoslovakist and pseudo-federal practice. The state 
treaty was thus an opportunity missed on the Czech side, and their hostile response 
forced the pace in Slovakia’s internal political development, greatly to the benefit of 
Vladimir Meciar. What resulted was a sharpening polarisation of debate. The main
For an exploration of the benefits of evasiveness, see Stephen Holmes 1988.
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body of Slovak representatives argued that the new state should be built ‘from the 
bottom up’ and the Czech right in both the Czech Council and Federal Assembly 
insisted the new state could only be built from the top down - as it were by grace and 
not by right - if it was to survive at all.
One final question posed by deadlock was whether there existed outside forces capable 
of altering to more profitable ground, if not ending the political impasse - a role 
conventionally ascribed to president Vaclav Havel. Havel’s most significant power, 
apart from his own standing among the political community, was his independent right 
to introduce legislation. In this, however, he was as subject to the unfavourable 
weaknesses of the Assembly as much as any other legislator - a real obstacle at the 
point at which it was attempted. Havel’s other resource, his prestige, was nonetheless 
always more vital; and had he been able to represent a vision more favourable to the 
Slovak side he might conceivably have mediated more than a pre-election stand-off. 
Havel’s failure resided in his own politics, and his growing allegiance to (indeed, given 
the prospect of an independent Czech republic, his dependence upon), the Czech right. 
In practical terms Havel’s efforts were unceasing and heartfelt - he convened some 
twenty meetings between federal and republican representatives in the space of two 
years, encouraged the Assembly to introduce referenda, and offered his own draft 
constitution. When it seemed the federation was dying on its feet in 1992 Havel 
intervened with an assertive referendum bill and proposals for rapidly completing a 
new federal constitution. In any reading of Havel as the lone reasonable man is 
nonetheless an erroneous assumption that his avowed pro-federalism amounted to an 
ability to act as a disinterested arbiter.
A series of diplomatic mistakes thoroughly doused Havel’s reputation in Slovakia, 
enough to remove the aura of impartiality that had crowned his election to the 
Presidency^ \  His lack of consultation over the naming of the state back in 1990 
(following his first official visit to Germany, rather than Slovakia) was particularly 
alarming to Slovak deputies - though his tribune style annoyed Czechs deputies for
In March 1991 the Slovak nationalist cultural organisation Matica Slovenska agreed to sue Havel’s 
spokesman, Michael Zantovsky, under the Penal Code paragraph 198 outlawing defamation of a race, 
nation or conviction and paragraph 199 - the spreading of alarmist reports {Zemedelske noviny 21.3.1991:1)
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different reasons. In many cases Havel also appeared to veer early toward the laissez 
faire posturing of the Czech right, siding early with the defence of solid central powers 
over macro-economic policy coupled with non-intervention at the micro-level. In 
relation to the state treaty, Havel had accused the Christian Democratic Movement of 
adopting a position that endangered federal institutions, the implication being that the 
stability of the state as a whole was not a Slovak priority. Such an accusation was 
readily reminiscent of the Vaculik view, that Slovakia would typically put parochial 
national interests before those of the state. The loss of confidence in Havel as free of 
partisan allegiance undermined his capacity to act as ‘third force’ even while his 
attempts to bring the two sides together continued to be appreciated. It was unfortunate 
to the minds of many non-Public Against Violence Slovak representatives that “by and 
large, Havel... used his authority to support the [federal] government rather than 
compete with it” (Batt 1993:48).
Conclusion: Placing the federal idea under siege
Economic radicals, notably those on the Czech right, the Civic Democratic Alliance 
and Vaclav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party, nevertheless framed constitutional choices 
not between non-centralisation and centralisation or between liberty and unity; but as 
residing between an ‘optimal’ future, achievable only by strong government 
implementing radical economic and state reform, and an economically ‘sub-optimal 
future’, that is, de-centralised federation. Prerequisites for the ‘optimum solution’ 
comprised of a sovereign and highly responsive centralised executive and strong 
administration, and for purposes of legislative efficiency the absence of disruptive 
constitutional conflict - as if that were possible in the chosen multi-reform conditions of 
transition - if not a consolidated Unitarian constitution. The ascendancy of the Czech 
right’s political agenda (victorious in splintering of the Civic Forum and decisively in 
the June elections in 1992) successfully ‘froze out’ Slovak demands for a deeper 
fédéralisation, seen by the right as injurious to developments in the Czech Republic. 
This never-challenged but simplistic discourse of entirely conflicting economic and 
state-forming constitutional exigencies created irreconcilable goals as perceived by the 
two Republics.
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The constraint, in these terms, produced the main ‘transition effect’ on the 
constitutional dispute. The backlog of state and economic reforming legislation 
accumulating in 1990 certainly required an efficient legislature, more or less 
immediately depending on one’s appraisal of the role of reform and the stability of the 
state. It nevertheless remained particularly unlikely that Slovaks would be persuaded of 
the importance of economic reform so long as they lacked the most basic sense of the 
legitimacy of the system in general, and the dogmatically presented economic reform in 
particular.
It has been argued that the bi-national nature of the dispute ‘over-politicised’ every 
constitutional issue and that no swing vote or third force existed to break the impasse 
(Mathernova 1993:66). The point is well taken but underplays the very particular 
‘transition effects’ of attempting reform of the state and economy simultaneously. I 
would argue the reverse, namely, that the constitutional debate was ‘under-politicised’ 
because the party political as opposed to the supposedly ‘objective reformist’ 
motivations behind the Czech right position of federal ‘realism’, of ‘functioning 
federation’ and ‘federation or bust’ were accepted uncritically into the debate over the 
proper constitutional structure of the state - a conflation of interests compounded by the 
still underdeveloped party system.
Far from ‘the centre’ being too weak, as has been so widely claimed as to have become 
the accepted wisdom, the federal executive retained both the political will and the 
authority to force and define the entire issue of common statehood, as it did with its 
declaration of ‘minimal conditions’ for the continuation of the state in late 1991. As is 
observable in another, but this time relatively stable democratic state, suffering 
simultaneous difficulties with resource distribution and national relations, i.e. Canada, 
far clearer clarity exists here as to the relationship between constitutional and political 
interests - a fact which, while it may not make the problems more tractable, at least has 
cautioned Canadian politicians away from framing constitutional arguments in strictly 
dichotomous and dogmatic terms. More importantly still, the perceived relative stability 
of both the economy and democratic institutions in Canada has tended to mitigate the 
sense of time pressure felt so acutely in Czechoslovakia in 1989 - a sense on which the
222
Czech right largely depended. A strong case can be made that English-speaking 
Canadians and Québécois have not had, and do not have, even in more fraught times, 
high expectations of a full or decisive ‘closure’ of their own constitutional wrangling, 
however desirable this might be in opening those opportunities for radical governance 
closed to a necessarily consensus-seeking centre. Closure would anyway have been 
achievable up to now only by the top-down imposition of a solution - something 
politically inconceivable in a stable democracy.
The exigencies of 1990, particularly as defined by technocratic notions of rapid 
economic reform, installed a profound stalemate of perceived state-building interests at 
the earliest point of constitutional negotiation: a stalemate not fully comprehended until 
the second election. Though significant decentralisation was conceded at the end of 
1990, the evident desire of the federal government to retrench its power clearly divided 
Slovak perceptions of Czech goodwill. Slovak pessimists moreover had reasonable 
grounds for suspicion. As Klaus made clear in November 1991, “the meeting of 
governments at Trencianske Teplice last year began the disintegration of our state in 
which the legitimate federal bodies (both the Federal Assembly and the federal 
government) were in principle isolated and, step by step, pressed away from their 
constitutional rights and responsibilities. The participants in those talks [implicitly 
Klaus’s political rivals from the liberal Civic Movement] began to spread a false 
opinion that this process of weakening the federation represents the only means for its 
preservation. Petr Pithart (CM) cannot rid himself of the responsibility of having been 
one of the initiators and chief protagonists of that process” he argued, though he 
himself had participated at the close of these talks at Hrzan palace in December 1990 
(Lidove noviny, Hospodarske noviny 12.11.1991)^^. The missing (or rather discrete) 
logic in Klaus’s continuing advocacy of a uniquely sovereign and uniformly reforming 
federation unfortunately was that no Slovak partner existed for such a practically
This peculiar ire for Petr Pithart was in retaliation to his highly conciliatory television speech on the 9th 
November. Pithart had acknowledged not only the flaws of Czechoslovakist ideology, declaring that the 
conception of the Czechoslovak federation in 1969 had been “strange and not too democratic” hut he had 
also identified widespread Czech paternalism. Czech Education Minister P. Vopenka lambasted Pithart for 
having “taken over the Communist interpretation of Masaryk’s republic and some inventions of primitive 
Slovak nationalists”. KAN chairman B. Dvorak advised Pithart to resign. Jan Carnogursky of the Christian 
Democratic Movement and Peter Weiss of the Party of the Democratic Left on the other hand thanked 
Pithart for extending “a friendly hand” and for his “sober assessment” respectively {Svobodne slovo, 
Lidove noviny 11.11.1991).
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unitary state. When stalemate in negotiations translated so seamlessly into 
parliamentary deadlock at the federal level, the Czech federal right could nonetheless 
claim to be provoked.
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Chapter 7
Sweetening the Reform Pill - the Uses of Conservatism
Introduction
By the second half of 1990, Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus dominated the 
federal government’s economic agenda, despite being occasionally constrained by more 
moderate ministers. This consequently rightwing-leaning governing coalition produced 
a comprehensive federal package of marketisation and privatisation reforms under 
Klaus’s leadership. The immediate impact of these reforms was, however, far more 
severe in Slovakia. In order to develop arguments already hinted at in previous 
chapters, this chapter concentrates on the national biases of the reform’s negative 
impact, and on its political effect - the isolation of Slovak neo-liberals and the provision 
of the Slovak opposition with a popular, anti-reform platform. The chapter determines 
that the federal government relentlessly undercut Slovak liberals by refusing to 
moderate reform or to accomodate Slovak difficulties - a policy supported with total 
and politically suicidal faith by Slovak liberals themselves. I conclude that the ideology 
of the New Right, as contained in the federal economic programme, impacted 
significantly on the Czechoslovak split; the unnegotiable nature of the economic reform 
and its pro-majority bias provided Meciar with fertile political ground and, 
concurrently, undermined absolutely the credibility of Slovak liberals.
This chapter outlines the ‘Economic Reform Scenario’ passed in September 1990. The 
second section reiterates in the light of economic circumstances why Slovak neo­
liberals alone in Slovakia were blamed for poor economic performance. The third 
section notes assumptions prevalent among Czech economists which influenced reform 
implementation. The fourth discusses the impact of reform in the crucial areas of 
industry policy, privatisation, social policy, employment policy, budgetary and fiscal 
policy.
The scenario
Supported by the Civic Forum, the key economic positions in the post-revolution 
federal ‘Government of National Understanding’ went to the former (Czech) staff of
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Prognost - the Forecasting Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Vaclav 
Klaus, never a Party member, became Federal Minister of Finance, whilst Valtr 
Komarek, returning his Party card, became a Deputy Premier, with overall authority
for reform . Vladimir Dlouhy, one of Klaus’s most important allies in the future, 
headed the State Planning Commission before becoming Federal Minister for the 
Economy following the June 1990 election.
The Slovak’s lack of such an economics team, educated and skilled in liberal theory,
reduced their bargaining power from the beginning. Josef Kucerak of the Public
Against Violence was a liberal economist isolated in too many ways. When the issue of
republican power-sharing came up in the summer of 1990, Kucerak was so concerned
that economic factionalism might paralyse the reforms from Prague he too, along with
Meciar and more nationalistic voices, actually supported devolution of significant
reform powers - a novel version of the national impulse that his Czech federal
colleagues found most unflattering. The liberal credibility of Jozef Markus, the new
deputy premier of the Slovak government responsible for economic affairs, was
tarnished not only by his real nationalist sympathies but also by his ‘positive vetting’ 
2
after the June election . The authorship of federal reform thus appeared distinctly 
‘Czech’.
In 1990 Czechoslovakia saw an overall drop in industrial output of 3.7 per cent. The 
three months following the November revolution had been worse. These conditions 
followed declining exports to the former Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance but also the exit of many enterprise directors and executives, thus 
fracturing, at least temporarily, the personal economic networks of the past. Though 
collapsing output signalled economic breakdown beyond the government’s control 
(Myant 1993:168), Klaus saw that the degree of former state authority over economic 
matters would mean a continuing association of economic failure with political / 
administrative failure. The neo-liberal assertion that people’s economic conditions
1
Having occupied centre stage in the closeted economic debates of the late 1980s, Komarek was quickly 
outflanked after November 1989 by bis professedly neo-liberal colleague Klaus. Komarek recruited Klaus 
from the State Bank to the forecasting institute, Prognost in 1987.
He moved on to lead Matica slovenska (Marcincin 1994:4).
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should be in the realm of the market rather than the political was, fortunately for him, a 
belief that cohered well with the lingering pre-communist Czech self-image - to which 
Klaus hastily began to appeal - and one whereby responsibility and blame might 
mercifully be detached from government. In Slovakia, the confluence of persistently 
declining conditions through 1990-1991 with aspirations to improved status - “an 
explosion of nationalist tendencies” according to Dlouhy's former advisor, Jan Klacek 
(Klacek:interview 8.2.95) - cast an early frost on neo-liberal ideas.
Unable to formulate a sufficiently fresh agenda Komarek quickly lost the confidence of 
his colleagues, even of those opposed to Klaus’s radicalism, and he was replaced in 
April 1990 (after the intervention of President Havel) by Vaclav Vales, a veteran of the 
1968 reforms. Komarek’s fault had lain in his continuing egalitarianism and repeated 
warnings against the shock therapy already underway in Poland. State restrictions 
meanwhile continued to hamper the minimal emerging private sector, and foreign 
investment scarcely trickled in (Myant 1993:170). Komarek had personified other 
obstacles to change, and the expressed public desire to see immediate change was 
increasingly harped upon by the right as a request to rule out all ‘gradualist 
experiments’.
The initiative fell to Klaus, and the macro-economic reform line he had already 
partially developed before the 1989 revolution. For several reasons Klaus believed that 
the secret of reform lay in the macro-economy. He believed that one had to begin with 
equilibrium, and that using macroeconomic tools, it was possible to bring supply and 
demand into equilibrium in all the most important markets. This policy would be 
combined with a change in ownership - to which industrial restructuring and growth 
were essentially secondary (Myant 1993:162). The formal de-etatisation of industry was 
the first objective, and one with obvious political advantages. According to Klaus, 
much would follow from the removal of “easy money”. As he and his colleague Jezek 
agreed: “As true liberals, we should start with a very heavy dose of monetarist 
medicine - with economic policy measures, not with formal institutional reforms - 
because with ‘easy money’ no real changes can be achieved in economic behaviour of 
any agents, private or public” (Klaus & Jezek 1991:39).
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The federal government produced an outline reform strategy in May 1990, together 
with a detailed timetable for implementation. There were however, expert reservations 
within the government over Klaus’s chosen form of ‘voucher’ privatisation, and over 
the pace and ordering of price and import liberalisation. Their doubts held up 
programme approval until after the June 1990 election: a mandate would have freed 
Klaus’s hand in claiming a complete end to the debate. Nonetheless, he ensured that 
only one draft of reform went forward and though it contained some concessions to his 
more cautious Czech colleagues, many of these remained on paper as the finance 
ministry line increasingly asserted itself through 1990 and 1991. It has been pointed out 
since that one reason the left did not return to power in the early 1990s, as they did in 
the ostensibly unlikely cases of Poland and Hungary, was that social democrats were in
power at the beginning in Czechoslovakia - in 1990 . The point is well taken since, as 
we shall see, Klaus ‘borrowed’ much from the moderate liberal cabinet colleagues he 
affected to despise for their economic naivete. Between 1990 and 1992 Klaus would 
make his own several of the suggestions originating from his ‘soft’ political colleagues, 
which had evidently contributed to maintaining the Czech social peace.
This reform draft duly became the basis for parliamentary debate following the Czech 
CF / Slovak PAV / CDM election victory in June 1990. Amidst continuing criticism 
from economics institutes (though Klaus was on record as seeing no benefit in broad 
public discussion {Rude pravo 27.4.1990), the final debate in parliament was handled 
as a confidence vote. Criticism was tantamount to outright opposition - a strategy 
implicitly intended to expose the transition’s ‘Luddites’. At this stage there appeared to 
be few in either republic.
Klaus understood the market intellectually and explained his position rhetorically in 
neo-liberal terms i.e. as a self-regulating system based on the price mechanism within 
which any government intervention was a source of unwanted distortion. His 1990 
programme started from the establishment of equilibrium on all markets, to be followed
3
This point was raised by the sociologist David Stark at the Harvard conference on Eastern Europe, May 
1996.
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by demonopolisation and steps to define ownership - after which prices could be freed. 
As the weeks passed, demonopolisation - the micro-level restructuring of industrial 
enterprises, became an ever lower priority. Competition was to be encouraged at the 
macro-level by a freeing of imports. The dominant themes of reform were the need for 
a restrictive fiscal and monetary policy at the republican and federal levels, and the 
need to avoid inflation - “a socio-economic evil, which must be prevented at any cost” 
{Rude pravo 11.4.1990). The latter agenda formed the basis for deflationary policies. 
Most importantly, the uniform reform preconceived of the federal state as a fully 
integrated single-market, an already homogeneous entity implying uniform reform 
measures and, as far as possible, a nationally undifferentiated strategy and it was 
always presented thus. Institutional changes such as price liberalisation, privatisation, 
exchange rate and foreign trade reforms were all necessarily federation-wide. To a 
broader public unschooled in the assumptions of liberal economics, however the a 
priori requirement of a strong and absolutely decisive federal centre meant that 
economic reform was left a hostage to fortune as far as federal / Slovak relations were 
concerned, and vice versa.
The government’s Scenario for Economic Reform, finally accepted in September 1990, 
comprised of seven sections. The first four represented Klaus’s strategy, the remaining 
three were peripheral to his vision; only the former were fully realised. The first 
concerned the absolute priority of blocking inflation - to be secured by a further 
tightening of monetary and fiscal restraint in 1991. Professional economists largely 
concurred on this point, despite the fact that the inevitability of price rises within the 
programme suggested that inflation itself (as opposed to continuing subsidy) was not 
unacceptable (Myant 1993:177). The second section covered denationalisation and 
privatisation, with the full plan to be approved in October 1990. Small businesses could 
be auctioned or returned to former owners. A commitment to ‘commercialise’ large 
enterprises by the end of 1990 and some variations permitted within a voucher 
privatisation system represented the main concession to Klaus’s rivals (Myant 1993:78). 
Given the neo-liberal domination of the federal finance ministry and both the Slovak 
and Czech ministries of privatisation (after June 1990 the latter were under Klaus’s 
colleague from Prognost, Thomas Jezek), Klaus’s view of privatisation prevailed in
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many respects, the practice tending to secure Klaus’s ultimate ascendency in policy 
design, consolidated by the federal ministry of economy’s dominance of the equivalent 
Czech ministry (Klacek:interview 8.2.1995).
The third section concerned prices, and contained a commitment to continue the 
abolition of negative turnover taxes. January 1st 1991, was set as the date for price 
liberalisation and the establishment of internal convertibility. Monetary and fiscal 
policies were to restrain price rises, as would a restrictive wages policy and some 
regulation of particularly sensitive prices (Myant 1993:179). The fourth section, and 
probably the most controversial at the time, covered internal convertibility, with a 
proposal that enterprises could buy foreign currency but would be forced to sell all 
their foreign currency earnings.
The remaining three sections, brief and apparently of little interest to Klaus, concerned 
agriculture, the social aspects of the transition and structural policy, which did come in 
for some criticism. Structural policy at this stage comprised of cutting armaments 
production and the mining of uranium and some other ores. Academic criticisms 
pointed to an inconsistency, namely the persistent notion of an ill-defined 
(interventionist sounding) structural policy, and the absence of the more usual ‘mixed’ 
economic policies for export promotion or technological advance. The latter section 
anticipated a regional development policy for which finance, perhaps fatally for the 
federation, was never forthcoming, though never as explicitly repudiated as industry 
policy (Mladek:interview 21.2.1995). The Slovak-led (as Dlouhy acceded to the 
Ministry for Economy) Federal Ministry for State Planning, moreover, became an ever 
more moribund and persistantly underfunded organisation (Klacek:interview 8.2.1995). 
The ‘withering away’ of these latter policies was managed discretely. Nevertheless, 
their dissappearance ensured that later, pivotal conflicts in economic policy were by no 
means simply between Slovaks and Czechs, but between moderates, such as Vaclav 
Vales and Petr Miller in the federal cabinet, Vlasak, Kouba and Sulc in the Czech 
parliament, and the Klausite team of the federal finance ministry.
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The Scenario failed to mention specific Czech and Slovak conditions in any form. Such 
differences were considered factually negligible and as providing no grounds for special 
treatment in a neo-liberal scheme. This stemmed not only from the absence of 
disaggregated data (not available until mid-1992) which left claims as to national 
economic conditions notably unsupported, but also from a deep Czech economic 
assumption that similarities were more significant than differences between the two 
republics (Mladek:interview 21.2.1995). Klaus would defend not only the right of the 
federal government to control macroeconomic policy, but would claim as a 
transcendent necessity that all three government policies remain as determined within 
the Scenario’s monetarist strategy, despite an increasing divergence in economic 
performance.
Within the still ill-defined Civic Forum, Klaus argued for three fundamental changes: a 
total commitment to his economic strategy; a total opposition to socialism ‘in all its 
forms’; the conversion of the Civic Forum into a properly organised party - thus 
decisively levering the split of spring 1991. Following the collapse Komarek joined the 
Social Democrats in April. Dlouhy, despite his previous Party membership, was 
welcomed into the neo-liberal Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) in March. The former 
liberal club of the Forum, including many of the dissident core, and the fédérai 
ministers, Jiri Dienstbier, Peter Miller, Pavel Rychetsky and Lubos Dobrovsky, 
meanwhile became the Civic Movement (CM).
Meciar versus the liberals: setting up shop
Whatever conclusion is drawn concerning the parity of Czech and Slovak economic 
performance in the 1980s, significant differences were apparent even in 1989. 
Inequalities prevailed if only because of the different sectoral structure of the two 
republics and more basically still, greater Slovak energy dependency, and the Czech’s 
comparative advantage geographically. Slovakia was, for many reasons, unequally 
equipped to ride out the external shocks engendered by the collapse of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, and the corresponding exposure to world markets and the 
shift to hard currency for Russian fuel. Such was Slovakia’s structural vulnerability 
quite apart from the internal shocks likely to emanate from a rapid reform process.
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One of the most significant ways in which national relations stood at the mercy of 
reform followed from the federal insistence that economic parity - existing economic 
parity - was a precondition of the Federal Reform Scenario. The claim flew in the face 
even of recent communist economic policy, renowned if anything, for its claim that 
economic equality between the two republics stood as one of the lasting achievements 
of socialism. Emergency reforms proposed back in 1988 had indicated crisis precisely 
because they were based explicitly on the conclusion that the ‘equal’ Slovak economy 
was fundamentally less able to absorb investment compared to the Czech. In 1988 even 
the Panglossian Czechoslovak Communist Party had understood crisis management as 
necessitating a reorientation of investment to the more profitable Czechs lands. It was 
hardly surprising then that as Slovak conditions worsened through 1990, Meciar 
quickly reorientated his initially pro-market rhetoric to a reassertion that Slovakia 
laboured under particular difficulties, and that adjustment should be made to the grand 
plan of federal reform.
The economic issue played a key role, not so much in the causes of the political 
divisions within the Slovak Public Against Violence but in the public presentation of 
these differences as early as the latter half of 1990. Through 1990, radical reform was 
backed wholeheartedly by the Public Against Violence’s Jozef Kucerak, but many other 
self-proclaimed liberals in June 1990, such as Jozef Markus, Rudolf Filkus, Augustin 
Huska and Michal Kovac veered increasingly toward Meciar’s arguments for the 
greater adaptation of reform to Slovak conditions. Even Huska, the Minister for 
Privatisation, who had advocated rapid reform at the June 1990 election, joined Meciar 
in his exit from the Slovak Public Against Violence within a year.
Though Public Against Violence’s eventual split in 1991 was unambiguously due to 
Meciar’s struggle for power, he understood that his championing of economic 
adjustment represented the most important platform by which to distinguish himself 
from the liberals he wished to leave behind. The quarrels within the power-sharing 
talks in the autumn of 1990 had established Meciar with the aura of a Slovak champion, 
rather than a Slovak nationalist. It may also be noted that Meciar later described the
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climactic divisions within the Public Against Violence as between two factions, holding 
different views on future constitutional arrangements and on the means of economic 
reform, in which he cited as close to his own heart, the importance to Slovakia of arms 
conversion and unemployment. Though the ex-dissidents understood his motives as less 
public-spirited, Kucerak had in a sense obliged this version of events by lambasting 
Meciar for his rose-tinted presentation of economic alternatives. Meciar revealed his 
real political acuity when he described his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s 
platform as supporting “full self-determination of the Slovak nation (expressed by a 
common democratic federation with the Czech nation and support for social policy)” 
(Zemedelske noviny 11.3.1991:1,2).
The executive move ousting Meciar as Premier in April 1991 was co-led by Jozef 
Kucerak, which again set apart the right-wing economic ‘stall’ from the Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia’s still rather ambiguous, but ‘more sensitive’ other. Next day, 
Kucerak, for his pains, received a vote of no-confidence at the 13th meeting of the
4
Slovak National Council . Meciar’s executive was duly replaced by the Public Against 
Violence /Christian Democratic Movement coalition headed by Jan Carnogursky. 
Carnogursky’s aspirations to an independent Slovakia within the European Union did 
not prevent him from supporting common reform, but he did so without the secular 
liberal convictions of his Public Against Violence colleagues. This ambiguity brought 
him into constant disagreement with Vaclav Klaus and added to the popular perception 
within Slovakia that Carnogursky fell between ideological stools. Kucerak went on to 
lead the liberal rump of the Public Against Violence, (which became the PAV/Civic 
Democratic Union in October), identifying that party once and for all with neo-liberal 
policy. They and the Christian Democrats thus found themselves situated on the 
radical, rightist side of a superficially more polarised debate - ranged against the Slovak 
Nationalist Party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, and the Party of the 
Democratic Left.
4
The Presidium also removed Huska and Knazko, and the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, 
Stanislav Novak, was replaced by the former Deputy Federal Minister, Helena Wolekova. Ministers Kovac 
and Filkus resigned on the 24th April.
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As Carnogursky’s government launched privatisation, the Christian Democratic 
Movement became associated with an unequal distribution of state property, a process 
referred to by Meciar as “the biggest swindle in history” (Marcincin 1994:11). Meciar, 
now in opposition, had with surprising simplicity positioned himself to thrive on the 
progressively more unequal impact of reform in Slovakia, which already looked set to
produce reliable political capital . The Public Against Violence complemented perfectly
the picture of an ‘alien’ reform formulated at the Czech and federal level, and
6
‘imposed’ on Slovakia by co-opted so-called ‘federal Slovaks’ or, more insinuatingly 
still, by Jews such as Fedor Gal. The darker corners of Slovak political life were not 
above recycling haggard anti-Semitic myths of international financial conspiracy.
Cultural differences
That federal neo-liberals overlooked the possibility of adverse Slovak reactions would 
be a weaker point of criticism if the economic parity argument had ever held water. In 
the chaos of transition who could have known the consequences of reform one might 
ask? That Czech neo-liberal economists swallowed the communist declaration of parity 
seems curious to say the least, and here certain cultural assumptions among the Czech 
economic intelligentsia are of paramount explanatory importance. Federal economic 
policy is a less significant factor in Czech accounts of the split than the ‘inherently 
more interventionist’ character of Slovak political economy, apparently borne out by 
their lack of liberal economists. A forthcoming book on the economic aspects of 
separation, authored by Czechs, has the revealing subtitle: “an example of culturally 
different nations” (Dedek: proof).
Following Bulir it seems appropriate to emphasise the heightened importance of public 
expectations over experience in an assessment of radical reform (Bulir 1992:1). Yet 
Bulir’s view is unusual among the bulk of Czech political economy literature, which 
tends not to dwell on the issue of impact and rather operates under a form of cultural
5
The anti-reformists were also backed, academically, by NEZES - The Association of Independent 
Economists o f Slovakia (actually constituted by old-structure economists and later joined by Huska) 
(Hospodarske noviny 19.3.1991). Tbeir findings for Slovak economic sovereignty could, as reform 
progressed, be found echoed in the statements of the post-April 1991 Slovak opposition.
Several prominent federal Slovaks were based in Prague as functionaries beading, for instance, the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Federal Reserve System.
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determinism. By presupposing that the Slovak reaction to reform reflected a more 
‘interventionist’ political culture per se, such papers more or less implicitly discount or 
trivialise Slovakia’s actual experience of reform, and the political adaptation to it. Most 
Czech economic papers also endorse the federal government assumption that “the 
situation of unitary federation [sic] is optimal from the viewpoint of chances of 
achieving the goals of economic reform... it creates preconditions for the formulation 
and realisation of a unified and efficacious economic policy... such a situation is 
transparent for the foreign financial and business sphere, which contributes to greater 
confidence in the Czechoslovak economy” (Capek 1992:10). As Capek has pointed out 
“the blueprint of economic reform was prepared for the situation of unitary federation” 
(ibid.: 10), even though we know from the previous chapter that in the terms of the 
constitutional debate the idea of the unitary federation, effectively the recentralisation 
of the state, was professed by the Czech right only as a goal. It was, as the previous 
chapter made clear, moreover, a goal without a Slovak constituency. This certainly a- 
national and for the Slovaks, historically regressive definition of the state in fact proved 
to be politically dysfunctional for the federation.
What might the implications be of such widespread assumptions? (for its application see 
Svejnar and Dyba 1994, Capek and Sazama 1993, Capek 1992, Dedek (proof)) i.e. that 
Slovak national responses were more historically and culturally than economically 
determined. The prevailing idea seems to have been that Slovakia’s political culture had 
been irrevocably affected by its developmental history under communism, contrary to 
the ‘ancient’ and thus supposedly more resistant cultures of Moravia and Bohemia. For 
example, Capek, (who amongst academic papers tends to be cited as an authority on 
national specificity) refers to the Slovak experience under communism as an “economic 
miracle” to support his assertion that “Slovakia is more inclined to look for a social 
economic model for its future development”, whereas, in the Czech Republic “the 
radical move to the market economy has quite natural support” (Capek 1992:8). This is 
not to gainsay Slovakia’s substantial development under communism, nor even the 
effect this might have had on predisposing Slovak voters to a more favourable view of 
the left. It is nonetheless necessary to point out the intensely provocative nature, in 
party political terms, of equating failing economic conditions with relative cultural
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maturity. As I hope to demonstrate, the grounds for Slovak disenchantment were 
immediate and increasing, resulting from conditions which Czech ministers, including
Klaus, worked assiduously to avoid imposing on their own constituency . The persistent 
federal rejection of adjusting strategy and the pressure it placed on liberal Slovak 
politicians (the 1990 shift in administrative competences notwithstanding), when 
evidence of divergence became blatant, is an outstanding aspect of the separation of 
Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia, the neo-liberals around Kucerak (Public Against Violence 
/ Civic Democratic Union) and the pro-reformists in Carnogursky’s Christian 
Democratic Movement, particularly after April 1991, reaped the results of an 
irretrievably focused public disappointment.
Slovakia suffered the four major negative consequences of economic transition (decline 
in living standards, inflation, unemployment and collapsing industrial output), to a 
greater extent than the Czech Republic. Perhaps more pertinent to the tolerance of such 
divergence was the fact that the prospects of improvement were also significantly worse 
in Slovakia. In this section I will concentrate on the years 1990-1991, since, despite 
some devolution of economic authority to the republics after the power-sharing 
agreement of December 1990, [see Budgets] the crucial differences in performance 
were already discernible by the beginning of 1991, before the advent of the Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia. Crucially for later political developments, 
conditions deteriorated seriously in Slovakia when a relatively strong federal centre and 
the neo-liberals within the respective governments could be perceived as responsible for 
introducing the change. The privatisation process was moreover implemented after 
Meciar’s ouster in April 1991. Henceforth Meciar would depict his de-throning as a 
coup by a club of jealous intellectual liberals against the ‘man of the people’. By 1991, 
Czech GDP per capita was already 24 per cent higher than in Slovakia (Lukas 1992:1).
The impact of reform 
Swords to...
7
This chapter is written with the proviso that any attempt to demonstrate the divisive powers o f federal 
reform policy requires looking through the frequently opaque window of formal jurisdictions, which, in 
themselves unclear, particularly in the chaotic days of 1991, were anyway frequently disregarded in 
practice (Klacek 8.2.1995).
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The case of the federal government curb on arms production in Czechoslovakia is an 
example of a single government policy tailor-made to sour national relations. Arms 
production was a central pillar of the Slovak economy. In 1989, more than two thirds 
of approximately 70 state armaments factories were situated in Slovakia, employing 
(inclusive of upstream enterprises) close on 100,000 workers. Of the 29 billion crowns 
of arms production in 1987 (3 per cent of total industrial output), some 19 billion was 
produced in Slovakia. (Lukas 1992:8)
In 1990 the federal government, through various spokesmen (notably Vaclav Havel) 
and the Scenario for Economic Reform declared the implementation of a policy to curb 
arms production and export, of heavy armaments in particular: the main preserve of the 
Slovak industry. The selling point of the policy was that arms production was an 
indefensible legacy of antiquated Soviet militarism, morally indefensible, and, given the 
state of the technology, economically unsustainable. Perhaps a further selling point, 
though never alluded to explicitly, was that the Slovak’s post-’68 dominance of the 
arms industry and the wealth it produced in the 1970s and ‘80s was an oft-heard Czech 
resentment. Political motivations aside, within two years the federal government action 
had cost more than 35,000 jobs in Slovakia and those conversion projects that existed 
lacked funding. Lukas points out that while the estimated cost of conversion in Slovakia 
were about 26.3 billion crowns, the federal government had made no more than 1.3 
available by 1991. The federal government in fact reneged on the policy piecemeal but 
then first favoured continuing Czech production. Vladimir Dlouhy’s u-turn on the 
principles of production was completed after two years, i.e. just prior to the June 1992 
election, by which time the job-losses, the considerable publicity accruing to them, and 
the neglect of conversion had proved weighty arguments in Slovakia against the 
Czechocentrism of federal policy.
Though they concur that the 1992 output of arms would have been reduced to some 20 
per cent of the 1987 figure, by which time some 50 000 jobs (or 2 per cent of the 
Slovak labour force) would have been effected. Ales Capek and Gerald Sazama argue 
that “rather than being a problem of the republics, the restructuring of the arms 
industry is a problem of the regions” (Capek 1992:19, Capek and Sazama 1993:225).
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Such opinions were echoed frequently by federal ministers and Vladimir Dlouhy in 
particular. Their counter-argument was that Southern Moravia (20 per cent) and Prague
(17 per cent) employed a significant proportion of the armaments labour force. Indeed
8
the issue of unemployment as such was clearly not exclusive to Slovakia but to argue 
for regional responsibility was clearly politically disingenuous in relation to national 
arguments^. Meciar's resonant objection was that the federal government had scored 
international points via a hasty decision at the expense of Slovakia, not simply by 
attacking the arms industry, but specifically those sections of the arms industry most 
concentrated in Slovakia. Moreover, alternative employment in Slovakia did not exist, 
particularly in single industry towns, whereas in tourist-rich Prague, unemployment 
was persistently among the lowest in the country. With its turnover unemployment 
Prague actually absorbed unemployment from neighbouring areas indicating, if 
anything, a labour shortage.
Industry policy
One of the latter sections of the federal government Scenario for Economic Reform, 
industry policy, or rather policy aimed at restructuring industry, was sabotaged from 
the right by 1991. The resulting policy vacuum in this area until 1992 seemed 
particularly ill-attuned to Slovak anxiety over their relative ability to gain foreign 
investment and western markets. The process of restructuring was less an issue for 
Klaus, as already pointed out, than the rapid administration of a transfer of ownership - 
a neglect of micro-level problems which became an important platform for the rival 
Civic Movement. When financial crisis hit enterprises in early 1991 (bank credit 
became ‘real’ after January, carrying a 24 per cent interest rate (Myant 1993:216), 
industry began to pass on bad debt, and primary and secondary insolvency spiralled. 
Though a consolidation bank was established the federal ministry of fmance publicly 
rejected selective help, deliberately leaving this issue to the nominally independent
On 2.3.1991 some 50 000 demonstrated in Brno for the enhanced recognition o f Moravia.
9
Indeed, unemployment also fell disproportionately on women and the young in Czechoslovakia (Brada 
1991:176), but such groups did not, as groups, carry the sanie expectations o f or even aspirations to 
effective political representation as did Slovaks within the federation.
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10
banks to resolve; even a scheme from Jan Vrba (Czech Ministry for Industry) to
11
encourage foreign partners was rejected as too interventionist .
Though the contentious data on industrial performance provides some basis for 
assessing policy, a more telling account of the industrial sector can be gleaned from 
Bulir's survey of ‘expected production’. This measurement is particularly appropriate 
to our analysis since it is interested in precisely the sort of ‘adaptive expectations’ that 
have been underestimated in accounts of the separation. Czech firms were more 
optimistic, apparently with good reason, about both stability and increases in both total 
demand and expected external demand. As far as production was concerned, over 55 
per cent of all firms in the Czech Republic expected an increase in output, by 
comparison with less than one third in Slovakia. Over time moreover, Czech and 
Slovak expectations of stability reflected different conditions: 47 per cent of Slovak 
firms expected a ‘stable output’ - actually a continuing under-utilisation of capacity, 
where the 28 per cent of Czech firms expecting stability assumed a reasonably higher 
output (Bulir 1992:5).
Privatisation
Small scale private activity had been expected to proliferate as legal restrictions were 
relaxed already in 1990. The federal law of October 25th provided for small 
privatisation by auction, with no preferential treatment for employees. By the end of 
1991 of the 1,340,000 registered private enterprises a full 70 per cent remained at the 
preparatory stage or as a subsidiary activity. In 1991 the private sector did little to 
compensate for the decline in activity elsewhere, least of all in Slovakia, which 
accounted for only 23 per cent of all private businesses (Myant 1993:216). Though 
both the Czech and Slovak Ministers for Privatisation were committed to rapid and
10
For an enlightening account of the manipulation of banking networks in Czechoslovakia see Stark and 
Bruszt 1996. As they point out “in this Czech fmance capitalism, voucher privatisation did not sever ties 
between state and economic institutions, it reorganised them. The investment companies are not 
unambiguously private: the foimders o f six of the nine largest funds are predominantly state-owned 
financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) (1996:24).
Klaus supporters answered western queries over the absence of export support with the claim that, of 
course there was an industry policy, it was implicit within the macroeconomic strategy (through devaluation 
of the crown). Not until February 1992 was an agreement reached to establish an export credit agency, 
whose financial support even now, remains negligible.
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comprehensive privatisation for the Slovak, Ivan Miklos (PAV/CDU), installed after 
Meciar's ouster in April 1991, this spelled increasing political isolation. Indeed, by 
December 1991, Miklos was even opposed by the future Slovak Christian Democratic 
Movement deputies within the Christian Democratic Movement, causing Kucerak to 
threaten withdrawing the Public Against Violence - Civic Democratic Union from the 
Slovak coalition {Hospodarske noviny 3.12.1991:2).
Slovak objections to Klaus’s voucher scheme for large privatisation led even the 
basically sympathetic Slovak government to work out a different strategy, which was 
only rejected after some changes to the federal scheme were secured by Czech 
moderate support. The enabling law of 26th February 1991 conceded that vouchers 
should be bought, at the nominal price of 1000 crowns. More importantly, vouchers 
could be used together with alternative forms of privatisation within schemes worked 
out by enterprises themselves and approved by the responsible ministry, V.g. the Czech 
or Slovak Ministry of industry, agriculture or internal trade - a cabinet victory for the 
Civic Movement. This flexibility implied some initiative in the hands of the 
privatisation ministries, which processed plans approved by the responsible ministries, 
except that this came within the context of an extraordinarily short time scale for 
processing voucher privatisation. The list for the first wave - 1,436 Czech and 573 
Slovak enterprises - was to be completed by the end of October with transfer to private 
ownership ready within five months (Myant 1993:236). Myant comments (without 
reviewing his own rejection of Slovak peculiarities) “that the problem was less severe 
in Slovakia where there were fewer really desirable enterprises - average profitability 
of those on offer was half the Czech level - and on average only two (enterprise) 
proposals came forward for each” (ibid. : 239).
In 1991 the federal government had earmarked approximately 6000 large enterprises 
for privatisation, about 4,400 in the Czech Republic, and 1,600 in Slovakia. The 
privatisation process was divided into 2 waves, with each wave consisting of several 
rounds of bidding for the firms that entered voucher privatisation. By late 1992 it was 
evident that Slovak companies had been priced lower than the Czech, despite their 
relatively low indebtedness, and that they had attracted relatively little interest from
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Czech investors, who assumed them poorer investments, in great contrast to Slovak 
interest in Czech firms (Marcincin 1994:32).
Certainly the Slovaks had reason to be concerned by the relatively poor progress of the 
privatisation process as a whole, especially as a method for reinvigorating the 
economy. Slovakia saw poorer participation of foreign capital (few firms were seen as 
internationally competitive), less impressive returns on vouchers and thus relatively 
greater difficulties in implementing the federal programme as a whole. Bulir’s data 
show a significantly lower share of private firms in Slovakia (Bulir 1992:6-7), with the 
gap narrowing in retail, but widening in both construction and industry. By the summer 
of 1992, Czech private firms accounted for one half of all construction works and more 
than one quarter of industry output whilst the same figures for Slovakia were 20 per 
cent and 4 per cent respectively. When looking at firms of over 25 employees, medium 
and large private firms had an almost seven times bigger stake in output in Slovakia.
Another significant feature of the voucher privatisation process itself was that it tended
to maximise the uncertainty of outcomes . It was an intrinsic part of the working 
theory that officials (of the federal coupon privatisation centre) would be able to induce 
equilibrium between rounds by adjusting prices proportionately to excess demand. 
Final prices were thus unpredictable. Officials also increased uncertainty by leaving 
undetermined the number of rounds and according to themselves discretionary powers 
to alter share prices, and remove excess demand firms out of the privatisation process 
as a whole. In practice, officials relied heavily on their own intuition and discretion 
(Singer and Svejnar 1994:44). This could not but add to the Slovak perception that their 
relatively poor performance was not only turning into an inexorable decline, but one 
which, having been designed in Prague was at least partially administratively 
determined. The latter authors confirm in typically ‘rational choice’ language that “the 
behaviour of all agents was very strategic, and the authorities intentionally raised 
uncertainty about the rules of the game and their own future moves” (ibid.:47). In 
laymen’s terms the federal emphasis on ownership change rather than restructuring as
12
For this reason, it was avoided in Poland and Hungary, where more traditional methods nevertheless 
produced unacceptable trends in ownership, so-called ‘nomenklatura capitalism’.
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such appeared to leave Slovak industry relatively stranded - it proved from the 
beginning a less appealing prospect to investors. Nevertheless precious little help 
existed either for small business start-ups or for restructuring in the absence of new, 
modernising ownership.
Next to price liberalisation and currency convertibility, privatisation was probably the 
most visible pillar of the state reform programme. Its success in the Czech Republic 
thus served to bolster the package as a whole - within that republic. In Slovakia 
however the Public Against Violence’s Ivan Miklos had sided with Klaus in his conflict 
with Thomas Jezek, who eventually tired of being scapegoated for all the difficulties on 
the Czech front and complained that Klaus sacrificed proper administration for electoral 
showmanship. In doing so Miklos had become increasingly identified with a 
programme failing to address Slovak difficulties: relative lack of domestic capital, 
uncompetitiveness, unattractiveness to foreign capital etc. - an impression deepened as 
he struggled to consolidate the existing reform before the by now, inevitable defeat of 
the PAV-CDU in the June 1992 election.
Orenstein points out that Vaclav Klaus’s signature as Finance Minister appeared on 
every privatisation voucher, thus clearly associating him personally with the 
programme. In the Czech Republic, he suggests, “it did much to mark him as the father 
of an economic reform programme that was at once relatively fair, popular and 
effective” (Orenstein 1994:21). Stark and Bruszt also concluded that “the consequence 
of the voucher privatisation was not to make popular capitalism but to make Vaclav 
Klaus popular” - pointing out that the June 1992 election followed just weeks after 
millions had registered their investment points (Bruszt and Stark 1996:24). In Slovakia 
we may infer that the omnipresence of Klaus’s signature had something of the opposite 
political effect.
Living conditions
Already in early 1991, various factors in Slovakia were signalling a decline in living 
standards, and a sense of relatively greater caution and anxiety among the population. 
Slovakia’s retail turnover was, and remained throughout 1991-92, below the federal
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average, a consequence of lower average monthly wages and higher unemployment 
(Lukas 1992:21), Slovak consumers were clearly less optimistic and consumer demand 
was effectively flat. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, the rate of saving was
13
increasing , in contrast to Slovakia, where household bank deposits were diminishing 
even as more money was going into circulation. In 1990 dissaving occurred in Slovakia 
for the first time since 1970 (Horakova 1992:39). Bulir suggests (though admitting such 
behaviour is unobservable), that Slovak conditions might have resulted from Slovak 
households hoarding goods from the better supplied Czech Republic (Bulir 1992:1,2). 
Horakova suggests more broadly that the Slovak population remained sceptical of 
further economic developments and sought to rid itself of domestic currency, in 
contrast to a restored trust in the Czech currency. What was observable, was that 
consumers in the two republics began to behave as two different populations after 1990, 
with Czechs spending a higher proportion of their household budget on durable goods 
and less on food than Slovak households (Horakova 1992:39).
Inflation in 1991 stood at 61.2 per cent in Slovakia and 56.6 per cent in the Czech 
Republic, and Slovak purchasing power declined by some 27 per cent. However, 
according to Bulir (1992:15), the inflationary trend was reversed in 1992 due to the 
Slovak government unilaterally beginning to introduce more expansionary fiscal 
policies and lower aggregate demand accompanied by the preservation of some 
subsidies to specific goods and public services. The result was, according to Bulir, a 
deflationary depression of the Keynesian type. Where the Czech government liberalized 
95 per cent of all prices in 1991, or at least relaxed price control and cut many 
subsidies, the Slovaks preserved some of the latter, namely on transport, paid medical 
services, rents etc. Though this served partially to offset other growing pressures to 
social peace in the republic, it was clearly a costly divergence from the federal reform 
line which drew accusations of irresponsibility from the Czech National Council.
Unemployment
According to an appealing if rather general conclusion of Adam Przeworski’s, ‘people’ 
are willing to sacrifice much for the sake of economic reform, but become restless at
13
A mark o f their innately more conservative nature according to Dedek:interview 14.2.1995.
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the point at which their work and future are threatened by unemployment (Przeworski 
1993). In March 1990 the old union structure was replaced by CSKOS - the Czech and 
Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions - a loose coordinating body (with 80 per cent of 
its staff completely new to the job), with no power to dictate policy to affiliated unions 
and a leadership that stressed the need for rapid reform. Chairman Igor Pleskot 
proposed to the sympathetic liberals of the federal cabinet a tripartite council of mutual 
agreements, which would settle yearly ‘General Agreements’ on the social wage. As it 
transpired the unions very gratefully retained rights to activity and strike whilst the 
federal government offered assistance with regional unemployment, in return for which 
the unions would accept cuts in real wages (Myant 1993:194). The first General 
Agreement was signed on 28th January 1991 yet despite an indexation agreement, real 
wages dropped further than expected, well beyond the negotiated level of 12 per cent 
per year, with few enterprises able to adhere to the agreement. As for the agreed 
minimum wage, the federal government unilaterally abolished it on July 1991, with 
only verbal protest from CSKOS. Not surprisingly, Klaus overcame his early
14
scepticism and Joined in praising the process of General Agreements as a means to 
secure a constructive approach from unions (Myant 1993:195-7). Such conditional 
approval hardly made Klaus the closet social democrat that Orenstein implies (1992). 
Rather, it derived from Klaus’s strategy for a more flexible social contract in the 
explicit form of employment for low wages, which as we shall see, was not sustained in 
Slovakia.
Disentangling the relative importance of structural factors as against government 
policies in countering unemployment is a difficult task, nevertheless it was clear that 
most new employment in the Czech Republic was in the private sector, particularly in 
small businesses, effectively replacing jobs lost in the state sector. Orenstein asserts 
moreover (on what basis it is hard to tell), that unemployment in the Czech Republic 
would have stood at least twice as high in the absence of government unemployment 
control policies, which he divides as follows: 1) policies designed to prevent the
14
As early as March, at a speech in West Bohemia, Klaus described the sanctioning of the minimum wage 
as a gross error, which would lead to the dismissal of people earning less than the 2000 crown minimum. 
The measure, he added, “would never have been approved without the help o f the Liberal Club 
representatives in the Government” (Mlada Fronta dnes 2.3.1991; 2).
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bankruptcy of large state-owned enterprises during their privatisation; 2) wage control 
policies designed to keep the marginal labour force employed; 3) active labour market 
policies designed to retrain workers; and 4) employment guarantees elicited during 
privatisation (Orenstein 1994:6).
Should Przeworski’s observation be correct then the Slovak unemployment problem 
alone could have well accounted for Slovak political disenchantment with federal 
policy. The modest growth in employment in the late 1980s became a decline in 1990. 
Unemployment had, of course been an unknown quantity under communism (when it 
took the form of over-employment and the proliferation of paid non-jobs -since the 
condition of unemployment was itself, illegal). Employment in Czechoslovakia as a 
whole decreased by 2.5 per cent in 1990, 12.5 per cent in 1991 and 10 per cent in the 
first half of 1992 (Dyba and Svejnar 1994:105). The dynamic of reduction went as 
follows: first retirement and the legislated termination of guest worker contracts - 
hiring freezes and finally layoffs, with market entrants (the young) being hardest hit at 
first. The response of the federal government’s neo-liberals was to estimate that one 
third of reported unemployment in 1991 was fictitious, covering individuals who were 
gainfully employed but collecting benefit, or not actively seeking work. Though within 
the federal government Peter Miller’s ministry for labour and social affairs acted as a 
bulwark again neo-liberal policy, publishing papers on social justice and (Castle- 
Kanerova 1992:92) acting as a strong advocate of active employment measures, these 
efforts earned Miller the most insidious condemnation from the political right.
The finance ministry’s control of the budget moreover effectively overruled Miller’s 
attempts at consensus building. In 1992, for the first time, the federal budget took on 
unemployment expenditure in order to give the pressured and bickering republics a 
better chance of balancing their budgets (expenditure on unemployment had previously 
fallen to the republics). Legally, republican employment laws adjusted the outline 
federal law on employment / unemployment. The Federal Budget Act for 1992 
however reduced unemployment benefit by halving the eligibility period from 1 year to 
6 months, contributing to a fall in the general {i.e. registered) rate from 6.6 per cent to 
6.5 per cent in the first quarter and 5.5 per cent in the second quarter of 1992. This
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measure alone effectively indicated that the federal state ignored and thus compounded 
the problem of long-term unemployment, building up disproportionately in Slovakia.
Factors frequently cited for the success in keeping state-wide unemployment low are a 
boom in the private sector, active labour market policies and an unwillingness of 
directors to lay off workers before privatisation. Unemployment in Slovakia however, 
rose disproportionately. By the end of 1991 it stood at 4.1 per cent in the Czech 
Republic but 11.8 per cent in Slovakia. In the first quarter of 1992, the Czech 
unemployment rate fell from 4.1 per cent to 3.7 per cent but increased from 11.8 per 
cent to 12.3 per cent in Slovakia, falling back to 11.8 per cent by the end of April 
(Dyba and Svejnar 1994:6). The upshot of this divergence was that whereas the share 
of total employed persons in the Czech and Slovak republics was 69.1 per cent and 
30.9 per cent respectively, the share of Slovak jobless in the total number of 
unemployed in the CSFR rose to 57.7 per cent (Lukas 1992:12). Both the rate of 
unemployment and the total number of unemployed increased more quickly in Slovakia
The latter authors add to their list of explanations the oft-cited belief that there was a 
“more liberal application of unemployment compensation and severance pay in 
Slovakia” . This actually refers to the fact that the concurrent payment of unemployment 
benefit and redundancy payment was permitted in Slovakia. The issue of active 
employment measures was, however, more complex still. In the Czech Republic, active 
employment measures (1.7 billion crowns worth in 1992 (Orenstein 1994:13) proved 
adequate, and according to Orenstein, crucially so. Without them, he believes, the 
unemployment rate in the Czech Republic would have been 80 per cent higher by May 
1993. Such policies were, moreover, an important condition of the 1991 General 
Agreement in the Czechoslovak tripartite council (ibid.). However, according to a 
PHARE report commissioned and submitted to the federal government at the beginning 
of 1992, an imbalance of provision for active employment measures existed, with 
insufficient provision in the Slovak Republic and even an excess in some parts of the 
Czech lands. In particular, Slovak offices were significantly under-staffed compared to 
their Czech counterparts: when set against the level of unemployment, a single member 
of staff was responsible for 57 clients in the Czech Republic and 149 in Slovakia
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(Cranston 1992:116). Significantly, the Federal Budget Act for 1992 and major 
adjustments to the benefit system would rather than rectify (as advised by Cranston), 
continue the scissor-like divergence of performance between the republics, specifically 
by reducing the proportion of money available to Slovakia for pursuing active 
employment measures. The federal reduction came despite Slovakia’s demonstrated 
relative difficulty in creating jobs and its greater problems of long term unemployment, 
in contrast to the Czech Republic where the number of job vacancies rose steadily.
Noteworthy also in this respect, was Slovakia’s receipt of significantly smaller flows of 
foreign direct investment - the proportion of direct investment being roughly 1:9 
(Slovak:Czech) by 1992 (Bulir 1992:9), the massive investment of Volkswagen in 
Czech Skoda making the significant difference. The lack of investment in Slovakia was 
crucial in effecting the relatively sluggish development of the Slovak private sector. In 
the eyes of politicians such as Carnogursky it stood as evidence not only of their 
relative structural disadvantages but also their lack of international visibility. A 
practical justification thus clearly existed for Slovak concerns over visibility and efforts 
to improve it, a case certainly not accredited to the unilateral foreign visits of Vladimir 
Meciar typically viewed by the Czech media as deeply suspicious expressions of both 
personal and nationalist egotism.
Budget and fmance
It should be emphasised that the area of fiscal and other transfers between the two 
republics, as well as being politically charged, was between 1990 and 1992 fraught 
with a basic disagreement over estimates, even of purely budgetary transfers. The main 
source of difficulty in calculation was that there were in fact no explicit transfers 
between the Czech budget and the Slovak budget (though some from federal to 
republican budgets). Transfers rather occurred implicitly, and thus controversially, 
through four main channels: through the allocation of tax revenue to the different 
budgets; through spending programmes with heavier commitments to one republic than 
another; through non-market pricing of some commodities and services and finally, 
through the commercial bank refmancing operations of the State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia (OECD 1994:27). According to Kotulan, the latter, though not
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included in formal budget data, represented significant sums (Kotulan: interview 
9.2.1995). Calculation of the true level of subsidy thus remained an expression of the 
basic state-arrangement arguments stalemated elsewhere, with estimates raging from a
15
transfer of 10 per cent of Net Material Product from the Czech lands to Slovakia 
throughout the 1980s to Slovak arguments that among other transfers, taxes on wage 
bills from Slovak subsidiaries of Czech enterprises made the Czech lands the net 
gainers.
A major problem in analysing distribution also arises from the lack of systematic data 
on the allocation of expenditure, with the overall expenditure of the federal government 
the significant unknown (OECD ibid.). According to the OECD two politically 
sensitive areas, social security and administration, were relatively clear cases of 
directed allocation. Firstly, in the case of the disproportionate strain of higher 
unemployment expenditure (and other related social payments) on the Slovak budget, 
the switch of responsibility for unemployment payments to the federal level in 1992 
supposedly represented a new transfer to Slovakia (OECD 1994:28). Arguably, 
because of the unfavourable adjustments in entitlement that followed, it also 
represented a loss of autonomy, placing Slovak liberals in a particularly difficult 
predicament when federal responsibility failed to resolve the continuing divergence in 
unemployment rates. In Slovak eyes moreover, the general location of the federal 
administration in Prague represented a transfer in the opposite direction.
Raphael Shen argues that the most “delicate sensitivity” was applied to the question of 
federal/republic jurisdiction and general fiscal reform (Shen 1993:103). Under 
communism the federal budget had overwhelmingly dominated the republican, despite a 
debate in 1968 over the assignment of revenues to their origin. The essential 
requirement of any budget revision was thus the introduction of the basic principle of 
self-sufficiency in the respective budgets, taking into account the transition to the 
market. The new law of December 1990 pursued the aims of containing inflation and 
reducing the government role per se in budget-related administered economic activities. 
Sources of revenue and jurisdiction were redefined, and given ground rules for the
15
The centrally planned economy’s nearest equivalent o f GDP.
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three governments’ revenues it was eventually agreed that each state budget, including 
the federal budget, would have its own revenues, defined exactly in the law on 
budgetary rules (Havel 1991:4) - the decision which marked Klaus’s victory over the 
stronger republican proposals of Lnare, back in April 1990.
These ground rules comprised of three main principles which in the existing situation 
were largely impossible to administer with any precision, discrediting the arrangement 
as soon as it was established. Firstly, governments on different levels had to determine 
ex ante their respective incomes, with fiscal independence from other levels of 
government: an objective assuming a jurisdictional clarity which did not exist. 
Secondly, regulatory functions of the federal budget had to be assured on all levels, 
integrating fiscal practices into a market orientated structure for the state’s economy as 
a whole. In essence this corresponded to the principle that federal government should 
be restricted to the level where functioning federalism could be maintained. 
Unfortunately the definition of minimum federal government as reflected in the legal 
division of competences remained uncertain and impossible to agree. Thirdly, for 
practical purposes, existing subsidies to state enterprises would for the meantime 
remain the responsibility of the federal government (Shen 1993:106).
Revenue shares, but also the revenue sources to be shared were supposedly re­
negotiated annually and formalised in the budgetary law - another major source of 
dispute. In practice, the process resembled more a rolling negotiation as often proposals 
agreed at the advisory Council were rejected by the republican governments or 
National Councils, and were returned for renegotiation (Mladek:interview 21.2.1995). 
Each year nevertheless saw a shifting proportion of the three budgets in the overall 
shared revenue on principles “inspired by a policy of aligning of the expenditure per 
capita level in both republics” (Kocarnik, former Deputy Federal Minister of Finance 
1992:14). In effect the “minimal federation” was something thus practically redefined 
at each budget negotiation and each budget Act, but on each occasion toward the 
abandonment of the distributive functions of the state. Had it not been for the fact that 
the budget was negotiated by the three Finance Ministers (republican and federal), 
politically and intellectually behind Klaus, the loose legal defmitions of their relative
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competencies and the aforementioned difficulty in defining real transfers would have 
made budgetary agreement impossible. As it was, budget negotiation was not a clearly 
bounded process and was accompanied by far less consensual non-official positions. 
While Klaus managed to retain both the reins and the whip hand on an extremely 
technical debate, the conflict over allocation was played out vicariously in the 
continuing debate over the constitutional division of competences, that is, until the two 
debates converged dramatically in November 1991.
No taxation...
At the same time as the budgetary law was changed, broad jurisdictions were similarly
adjusted as a consequence of the power-sharing talks concluded in December 1990.
The law declared the economy of the CSFR to be the integrated economy, of the Czech 
16
and Slovak republics , based on a single internal market. The federal government 
retained exclusive powers over defense, monetary policy, federal reserves, foreign 
policy, some infrastructural policies (railways and telecommunications). The federal 
level also retained authority over economic legislation (the legal framework of taxes 
and capital, labour, goods and services markets). Macroeconomic stabilisation policies, 
monetary and fiscal policies were all to be organised at the federal level, though in the 
area of fiscal policy its role was proposed as coordinating and consultative. The 
republican governments had inherited all other competences, notably, the most 
politically fraught areas of agricultural policy, social policy, industrial (structural)
17
policy, energy policy, and the bulk of infrastructure (Kocarnik 1992:15) .
Beyond the ground rules of the law, those revenues raised and disbursed at the 
republican level no longer required approval from the federal authority. Thus according 
to Shen, citing Miroslav Havel from the federal ministry of finance, the “relative 
importance of the two republics significantly increased at the expense of the federal
16
Act 556/1990, ammending the law on the Czechoslovakia federation: Act 143/1968.
17
A point of particular controversy was a suggestion during the power-sharing talks that Slovakia should 
have separate fiscal and monetary policy, with a separate Slovak National Bank -requests obviously beyond 
the pale for Klaus. In fact at the point of Meciar’s removal in April 1991, successors to his ministers found 
no evidence for such a proposal, and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia at the time denied any desire 
to retreat from radical reform as such (Myant 1993:221), suggesting that the talk of separate banks had 
been a bluff.
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government (Havel 1991:3)” - neglecting to mention the practically unitary nature of 
the communist federation. Before 1989, the federal government had been the dominant 
tax collector, making sizeable transfers from the federal to the republican and local 
treasuries. This balance shifted significantly and early, already in 1990, with the federal 
proportion of total revenues declining by 15.1 per cent to 32.7 per cent in 1990. At the 
same time the total revenue share of the two republics rose by 17.5 per cent to 45.5 per 
cent (with several tax collecting functions of local government shifting to the 
republics), denoting a significant centralisation at the republican level (Kocarnik 
1992:16).
A similar shift continued in 1991 when republican budgets became dominant, 
accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total state budget (Shen 1993:105). The shift 
was based partly on the federal level shedding responsibility for the management of 
production organisations to the republics, and partly on re-dividing corporate profit tax 
and turnover taxes from the federal to the republic level as follows: 35 per cent for the 
federal budget, 40 per cent for the budget of the Czech republic, and 25 per cent for 
the Slovak budget (Havel 1991:4). In 1992 the proportion was changed again to 35 per 
cent for the federal budget, 41.5 per cent for the Czech republic and 23.5 per cent for 
Slovakia. Eventually, it was intended that turnover and corporate profit taxes would 
flow directly to the republican governments where enterprises were located. Republican 
authorities would collect the federal government’s share and transmit it to the federal 
treasury.
The government adopted a tight fiscal policy for 1991, with the persistent aim of 
balancing the budget (Shen 1993:106). A preeminent source of expenditure reduction 
was to be phased subsidy withdrawal. The budget aimed at a fiscal surplus of close to 1 
per cent of GDP (8 billion crowns), despite a fall in revenue of some 10 per cent of 
GDP. Backed by the International Monetary Fund, subsidies fell from 13 per cent to 7 
per cent of GDP, however, real consumption, capital and transfer expenditures dropped 
by close on a third, and social security outlays did not keep pace with inflation and 
declining economic activity further depressed government revenues (Kocarnik 1992:4). 
By the end of 1991 the federal government had a 6 billion crown surplus, the Czech
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Republic, a 14 billion crown deficit, Slovakia a 9 billion deficit. Kocarnik, over- 
optimistically in the case of Slovakia, suggests that had revenue from privatisation been 
included in the budgets, they would have been close to balanced. According to Shen 
much of the latter deficits resulted from unplanned subsidies to weakened enterprises, 
problems in securing tax payment and increased government expenditure on active 
employment measures (Shen 1993:107). He points out that, despite price rises in 
transport services, gasoline and heating fuel, real income for Czechoslovaks declined 
by only 1.3 per cent for the fiscal year 1990 (ibid.) - though as we have already seen, 
the real income decline was steeper in Slovakia. Tax collection thus proved a 
disappointment in 1991 and Klaus tried, unsuccessfully, to blame the high spending of 
the Czech and Slovak governments for the shortfall in the 1991 budget.
Though the latter governments could not adjust their commitments for 1991, the federal 
government reacted by substantial cuts in entitlement to state benefit for the 1992 
budget, its solution to the stand-off between the Czech and Slovak National Councils 
over budgets through late November/early December. In a negotiated compromise 
between the three Finance Ministers in Bratislava on November 20th the Financial 
Council had agreed that the existing ratio of the division of turnover and profit tax 
would stand at 41.5:23.5 (1.77:1) - a concession from the Czech Republic which had 
originally demanded a division proportionate to the number of inhabitants (1.95:1). 
However, the Czech National Council reacted to the previous weeks of constitutional 
controversy by opposing Czech Finance Minister Karel Spacek’s agreement as a climb- 
down, only acceptable if the maintenance of the common state could be guaranteed. 
“We must not”, said Petr Pithart “buy the federation for a couple of weeks only” 
(Mlada Fronta dues 22.11.1991:2). Klaus opposed what he saw as the Czechs breaking 
ranks and Anton Vavro, Slovak deputy premier, pointed out that the Czechs were 
playing into the hands of Slovak separatists by insisting on proportionately at a time of 
disproportionate economic difficulty {Hospodarske noviny 3.12.1991). Though 
agreement was finally reached on 5th December via a one-off subsidy to both republics 
from the Federal budget, this was secured by drastic inroads on social benefits, and as 
we have already seen, unemployment benefits in particular (see above).
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In 1990 Klaus had had the foresight to sell proposed public expenditure cuts in the 
yearly state budgets as an effective way to reduce his own powers: “because the market 
understands the division of restricted resources far better than the most democratically 
elected parliament, though it had in its hands the [reform] foundations of the most 
genial finance minister in the world (Klaus 1990a: 18)”, he explained, geniality itself. 
By 1992 the electoral issue was less the reduction of federal power as such, but the 
popular, budget-led impression that the Czech and federal governments (apparently 
incensed by Slovak gestures toward independence) were withdrawing responsibility for 
the decline in Slovak conditions emanating from federal reform. While the federal 
budget had a relatively stable surplus in the first three quarters of 1992 both republican 
budgets were often in the red. Slovak prospects appeared relatively worse at the end of 
the year owing to low profits and flat retail sales. After the June 1992 election both 
budgets were kept relatively balanced through prudential expendimre politics and cuts. 
In the case of Slovakia this behaviour was in clear contradiction to pre-election 
promises (Bulir 1992:13).
Conclusions - reform in the name of the ‘state’
The post-communist aspiration to ‘roll back the state’ held serious implications for 
Czech Slovak relations. The Czech subsidy of Slovakia: the financial ‘engineering’ of 
national relations moreover presented an obvious target, all too easily labelled a 
communist strategy as it was. According to constitutionally enshrined rules (as distinct 
from communist practice), the task of the common state had been the balancing of 
economic and social differences between the two republics. Democratic Czechoslovakia 
duly inherited a constitutional injunction to create the same conditions and opportunities 
for the creation and utilisation of national revenues (article 4, paragraph 4 of Act 
143/1968). While many accepted that such a clause had to be replaced as part of the 
dismantling of the central plan, for the professed market purists, amongst others, 
material subventions to Slovakia were unacceptable in principle. Starting from the view 
expressed discretely in the Civic Forum June draft election manifesto, that “both 
nations are at equal levels of economic development” and that the federal state should 
not, in future, redistribute any part of the national product originating in the Czech
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lands to Slovakia (Radio Free Europe 6.4.1990), the position of the right marked out an 
essential stumbling block of the ensuing conflict.
Five months after the revolution Klaus wrote, apparently addressing the entire 
population, “we must sign together what is termed in the expert literature, a ‘social 
contract’, one which will differ a great deal from the last” (Klaus 1990a: 16). Such a 
contract was nonetheless upheld only in the Czech Republic. Moreover, the frustration 
with existing conditions which lead Slovaks to reject their rightist government, and the 
subsequent parliamentary upheaval was viewed by federal neo-liberals as a constraint 
on ‘imperative’ economic policies rather than as a dispute of any transcendent 
importance: an indicator of what I believe to be a peculiarly dogmatic, ‘post- 
communist’ manifestation of neo-liberal politics.
Given the pervasive post-communist concern that stability had yet to be created, 
Klaus’s conservatism operated successfully within a siege mentality. When one looks at 
just a few statements from the midst of the dispute over competences in late 1990, their 
most striking feature is the belief that there existed an unassailable realm of the 
economic, and that politics, or what Klaus termed ‘classical political disagreement’, 
was subordinate to achieving economic success, or even inhabited a separate realm 
entirely. Though deeply pragmatic in his approach to attaining reform, ‘politics’ for 
Klaus remained the technocratic art of economic facility. The politics of the national 
dispute represented something else: compromise, inefficiency, a potentially fatal threat 
to market reform; the unattractive prospect of, at best, sub-optimal economic and 
political returns.
In November 1990 Klaus was asked if he had any ideas on how to formulate Czech 
policy in relation to the federation. Again his main aim seems to have been to 
distinguish the economic from the political debate, but also to set out the ostensibly 
reasonable condition that unity was only feasible within specific economic parameters. 
“The absence of Czech policy is an objective concern”, he replied. “That is to say that 
Czech parties never had the need to work out an actual policy. Whether it is a big 
mistake will only reveal itself...”, and he concludes that “it would be preferable first of
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all to straighten out economic relations. I believe, that it is then in the political realm to 
clear anything up (Klaus 1990c: 179)” . Once economic relations had been ‘straightened 
out’ according to the reform plan it was implied, they should not be permitted to re­
enter the political, or national debate. The experiences of other federations and the 
history of Czech and Slovak relations together however tell us plainly, that these realms 
cannot realistically be separated.
Orenstein concludes that three sets of attitudes were important in determining Czech 
acceptance of the economic reform programme: 1) optimism about the eventual success 
of reforms and future increases in living standards; 2) expectations about how long the 
period of sacrifices would last, how great the sacrifices would be, and how quickly the 
benefits would come; 3) perceptions of fairness (Orenstein 1994:21). However, what 
clearly passed for interventionist, even social democratic/corporatist forms of 
intervention in the Czech economy proved woefully inadequate in Slovakia, where 
intervention was at disproportionately lower levels and unsupported by a macro policy 
anticipating their relative lack of foreign investment and adaptable industrial structure.
Bulir concludes that one can identify divergent republican economic policy and 
macroeconomic results from the beginning of 1992 (Bulir 1992:1) implying that 
scissoring conditions created a mounting pressure to adjust policy only months before 
the June election mandated such a change. I would argue the reform outline and its 
impact had done its worst already by April 1991, and Meciar’s departure from the 
Public Against Violence. Though the prudent policy of the Czech government was 
accompanied by positive macroeconomic response, even with the mild stimulative 
attempts of the Slovak government, aggregate demand in Slovakia continued to fall. 
Moreover, it had become clear by 1992, that the faltering process of privatisation in the 
Slovak republic could neither absorb unemployment, nor lead to a significant rise in 
output, as Bulir concludes. In their expectation of a victory for Meciar in the next 
month’s election, from May 1992, Czech commercial banks were unwilling to buy new 
Slovak treasury bills and government bonds, moreover the holding of Slovak treasury 
bills in the portfolios of Czech banks declined steadily afterwards (Bulir 1992:12). The 
fact that, even after the June 1992 election, Klaus voiced support for a “strong and
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functional federation” in this light, begins to ring distinctly hollow. Knowing as he did 
that what he was advocating was economically and thus politically impossible, not least 
because of the climate of Czech economic expectations fostered under his rule, he 
effectively levered the ensuing political separation while purporting to play the role of 
federal ‘realist’
It was little wonder that many Slovaks sought adjustments in the pace of reform and 
greater powers of decision when these conditions emerged. Slovakia’s relative 
deprivation was, by 1992, indisputable. Yet, at the federal level the logic of radical 
economic reform was relentless: a functioning free market economy was a given end- 
state of radical reform, to be reached via certain essential measures, but most 
importantly of all, by tight monetary policy and the avoidance of state intervention or 
‘regional’ policy. According to this logic, Slovak failures, given the facile presumed 
starting point of parity, must have emerged from a mismanagement of the economy 
within the administrative parameters afforded the republican government prior to 1992. 
The implication was that Slovakia was not erring from the path as a reaction to an 
intolerable style of reform, but because of irrational Slovak nationalism, administrative 
incompetence and throughout the administrative and political structure a prior 
preference for a different end state, i.e. some form of etatist, interventionist economy.
By way of conclusion we are left with the difficult question of to what extent Klausite 
reform can really be held up as having precipitated a political backlash in Slovakia 
against the political right. Demonstrating absolutely that economic conditions motivated 
the voting behaviour of 1992 is not possible, and yet opinion polls consistently revealed 
living standards and declining economic conditions to be top on the Slovak electorates’ 
list of concerns. It is also impossible to separate absolutely latent Slovak attitudes to the 
federal centre from those produced or even consolidated by federal practice between 
1989-1992. From what we know of federal relations prior to 1989 however it is clear 
that démocratisation represented to many Slovaks the first real opportunity for a redress 
of national grievance. We also know that, remarkably, Slovak nationalist movements 
continued to represent only a minority.
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What we may assess with relative ease is the degree of accommodation to Slovak 
national concerns forthcoming from the federal centre and the likely impact of federal 
behaviour on the reputation of pro-federalist Slovak political representatives. If lurking 
in such a question is the awkward counterfactual - was any other policy route possible: 
feasible, politically or economically? it is perhaps a question to be asked only after 
considering whether the exigencies of state-building as understood in neo-liberal terms 
in themselves created an intolerable strain on national relations.
Could a greater decentralisation of reform, even a rhetorically greater federal 
sensitivity to Slovak conditions have activated political constraints in quite the same 
way? The political economist Gerard Roland suggests that if one assumes the transition 
to the market economy represents a ‘Pareto improvement’ it should be possible to 
compensate losers with the efficiency gains of reform... thus if political constraints play 
a role in designing the programme, this should be related to the difficulty in 
compensating losers (Roland 1994:28). The problem with Roland’s suggestion is that it 
presupposes national homogeneity, since arguably any degree of compensation will be 
viewed as inadequate if a central package of reform is seen to systematically damage 
one national economy more severely than another within a federation - as Slovaks 
reasonably perceived to be the case. In addition to this basic perception social 
compensation in Slovakia was, in many cases both less available and less effective than 
in the Czech Republic. Thus while Slovak voters may have possessed little interest in 
macro-economic indicators, Klaus’s federal vision certainly had little economically, to 
recommend it.
Such diverging levels of ‘aggregate uncertainty’ could not but effect perceptions when 
everyday comparisons were made possible by the media and family ties. That the 
federal government managed to protect reform in the Czech lands against the damaging 
political effects of insecurity (and here Klaus was indebted to his more moderate 
colleagues) is testimony at least to the fact that these effects were not underestimated. 
Why then were they allowed to flourish in Slovakia, and, more importantly, not only 
not recognised and accommodated (if only rhetorically) at the federal level, but actually 
compounded by budgetary allocations and unmodified reform?
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In his discussion of the characteristics of ‘big bang’ reformers Roland suggests they 
concern themselves more with ex post than ex ante (feasibility) political constraints, i.e. 
those that refer to the danger of backlash and the reversal of reform after outcomes 
have been observed. In effect this means such reformers have to create irreversibility, 
or the nearest approximation to it, which normally, though not described so explicitly 
as such, takes the form of a strategy of fa it accompli to constrain a successor 
government by increasing the costs of reversal of policies adopted today (ibid.:29). If, 
for the sake of argument, we step into Klaus’s self-confessed school of thought, and 
apply this to federal government reform in Slovakia, thus referring this theory to a 
partner, rather than a successor state, we can conclude that discontentment in Slovakia 
would have been maximised by two facts. Not only did reform disregard initial 
feasibility constraints (economic specificity) but aggravated the situation by attempting 
to create the irreversibility of programmes many of which had been greeted with 
disquiet in the first place. Moreover, the radical reform assumption that the loss of 
international credibility (in the case of policy reversal) is more costly than domestic 
credibility clearly counts for little at election time: something which Klaus - the 
consummate political operator - must have known.
Roland points out, if somewhat tautologically, that the best scenario for the 
acceptability of reforms is that they would be ex ante acceptable (ibid.:32) and should 
deliver an ex post favourable outcome. Such conditions were largely both sustained in 
the Czech Republic, and not at all in Slovakia, where a ‘critical mass’ of privatisation 
was not achieved. The coincidence of pressured public finance with continuing output 
and revenue falls looked set to destabilise Slovakia’s macroeconomic situation further. 
While conditions improved in the Czech republic, in Slovakia, collapses in industry and 
output were not offset, aggregate demand did not rise and the costs of unemployment 
escalated.
As we have seen, Klausite reform as applied in the Czech Republic looks to have been 
conscientiously state-building. By fulfilling the social contract of low wages in return 
for low unemployment (aided by the tourist boom in Prague) the Czech reform gained
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the characteristic of sensitivity - assisted in no short measure by the moderate Civic 
Forum ministers - allowing time to build support behind existing measures before 
moving on to others. The result was a peculiarly post-communist hybrid of radical neo­
liberal philosophy, conservative rhetoric and practical sozialmarktwirtschaft strategy.
The sense in which institutional reforms and strategy appeared unequivocally radical 
was in Klaus’s outright opposition to attempts at modification, even in the face of 
growing Slovak political hostility. In Slovakia the reform picture looked very different. 
Here, I would suggest, uncertainty over the appropriateness of the initial package was 
converted into rejection, and subsequently resentment by the Slovak electorate. As 
Roland suggests in relation to gradualist approaches: “the ex ante existence of th[e] 
reversal option increases the willingness of the population to engage in the reform 
process - in the case of a successful outcome it also allows for the creation of a 
constituency” (ibid.:30). The consistent and ostentatious rejection of policy 
modification by the federal government maximised the impression of Czech/Federal 
suzerainty over the Slovak economy. The curb on arms production succinctly illustrates 
this point. If one agrees that it is politically prudent under a new federal democratic 
framework to begin with reforms which are advantageous for both constituent units, 
then the prioritised decommissioning of one of Slovakia’s major industries appeared as 
a deliberate provocation.
What was the rationale behind federal persistence? Clearly, in practice the federal 
government was not above reacting to maintain the social peace, as demonstrated by its 
continual postponement of the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law - a signal which 
prompted more generous bank credit in the Czech republic, thus sustaining enterprises 
with high inter-enterprise arrears. If the neo-liberals were thus adequately sensitive to 
Czech pressures, as we observe they were, the thesis that economic dogma as such 
prevented federal adjustments for Slovakia is rather weak. If ideological rigour does 
not account for it, then one is left facing a realpolitik approach. Slovak oppositionist 
objections to current economic policy. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia objections 
in particular, were a priori assumed to come from populist and etatist, rather than 
instrumentalist impulses, even though throughout the second half of 1991 and until their
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defeat in June 1992, Slovakia’s PAV/CDU persisted at the bottom of the opinion polls, 
averaging below 5 per cent support. Publicly, Slovak objections were dismissed as the 
musings of inept and nationalist economists. They were thus rejected.
Contemplating the problem of the credibility of reform in a ‘forecasting’ pre-revolution 
issue of Politicke Ekonomie, back in 1989, Klaus cited rational choice theory to bolster 
his claim that the attainment and retention of social consensus “depends to the decisive 
degree on the integrity of the whole society, on the effectiveness of the social 
mechanisms which facilitate the achievement of an operable consensus forming the 
basis of any long-term positive social activity (Klaus 1989:42)” . Such a belief in 
operation could only leave federal neo-liberals with the second best available option, in 
the event of a society split in two. That is, given the republic-centric political party 
structure, a strategy of deliberately (for credibility required visible commitment) opting 
to please only one constituency. Though reform might be presented in the name of the 
‘state’, Slovak neo-liberal colleagues would have to fend for themselves.
As Klaus wrote with Jezek, again in 1989: “the only reasonable reform is a “negative 
reform”, based on the elimination of different kinds of distortions and obstacles to the 
ever-present human action (in the sense of Ludwig von Mises), whereas an ambitious 
dirigistic reform blueprint based on rationalistic constructivism and on social 
engineering is bound to fail (Klaus & Jezek 1991:27)” . In the June 1992 election the 
logic of neo-liberalism required that voters choose between short term economic 
interests (in terms of prospects of distribution) and a common state.
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Chapter 8
Partition... With Honour?
Introduction
The literature covering ethnic/national conflict and its regulation is conventionally 
concerned with the possibilities open to elite action in mediating profound, mobilised 
and disruptive, societal crises^; such crises being the usual repercussions of state 
separatism in an otherwise peaceful international environment. It is the key observation 
of our case, however, that despite the absence of significant nationalist movements, 
indeed, in the absence of mobilised social movements of any kind, the last governing 
elite in Czechoslovakia acted as if wrestling down a crisis, adopting measures with a 
haste and rhetoric appropriate to a society on the brink of real civil turmoil. In the 
history of separatism, and its accompanying literature, therefore, the Czechoslovak 
case represents a departure.
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the choices of the June 1992 election in 
Czechoslovakia created, uniquely in the history of modern separatism, a crisis more of 
governance than of ethnicity. The choice between a unitary state and a confederation 
certainly represented a choice between the first preferences of the governing elites after 
June 1992, but the position of Czech Prime Minister Klaus derived from his 
understanding of reform needs in the transition, and his implacable opposition to 
compromise along confederal lines was motivated more by economic reform than 
ethnic factors. This governance crisis, moreover, provides us with a window through 
which to examine the peculiarities of the post-communist state: its weaknesses, its 
opportunity structures, and its ruling precepts. The main task of this concluding chapter 
is to assess the relative merits of the remaining four theories of state demise as set out 
in Chapter 3, (the Doomsday theory of mass nationalism and Nairn’s theory of relative 
deprivation have already been excluded in Chapter 4), and to consider what if anything 
was the impact of the post-communist transition upon the state dissolution.
* As Nordlinger has argued, “noumaiiipulable cultural, social and economic conditions may go a long way 
in accounting for the emergence o f an intense conflict but, once it has become severe, its successful or 
unsuccessful regulation will be largely dependent upon the purposeful behaviour of political elites” 
(1972:4).
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This thesis was guided by six potential accounts of the Czechoslovak separation. The 
most plausible accounts, suggesting a nationalist conflict, were abandoned in the first 
half of the thesis on the basis that no nationalist movements nor programmatically 
nationalistic parties appeared to flourish in either the Czech or Slovak republics 
between November 1989 and December 1992. In rejecting the relative deprivation 
thesis, that economic grievances in particular might have motivated nationalist 
allegiance and collective action in the transition period, the conclusion was not that the 
existing evidence of economic grievance and national prejudice should be discounted - 
they were employed by Meciar and Klaus, but rather that their salience could not be 
captured within a nationalist framework.
The evidence of the preceding suggests that each of the four remaining hypotheses: 
institutional/path dependency; the failure of party competition; too-autonomous 
leadership and, lastly, conflicting perceptions of démocratisation needs, encompassed 
much that materially advanced the state toward its final dissolution. Moreover, the 
inherited institutional structure and party competition acted episodically upon the 
dispute - by structuring sudden shifts in the prevailing rules of the game - the issues of 
leadership, reform philosophy, and démocratisation impacted more constantly and more 
pivotally. What follows is a composite account of Czechoslovakia’s demise derived 
from these four explanations.
There were no foregone conclusions
The neatest hypothesis - the ‘path-dependency’ explanation - which argues that the 
institutional structures inherited from the previous regime predetermined the separation, 
fails in one typical and important respect: it underestimates political will and political 
freedom^. Given the ‘blank cheque’ of the June 1990 election, which returned the still 
monolithic civic movements to power, the chosen forms of competition between the 
emerging factions of these civic movements were remarkably unencumbered by
 ^ This seems almost too basic a failing to be credible - immediately following the revolutions in Central 
Europe, however, it was not unusual for western political scientists to ascribe extraordinary powers to 
institutions on the one hand and extraordinary weakness and helplessness to all political actors, on the 
other, a tendency which sometimes assumed the political de-skilling o f elites under communism.
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Structural constraints. Social cleavages as yet remained electorally ‘untested’ and 
unreflected in party competition. More specifically, a full range of opinions for a 
variety of models of a common state existed in the expressed preferences of opinion 
polls. As explained in Chapter 5, the issues over which the civic movements 
disintegrated and on which future competition was based were notable precisely for 
their lack of pre-communist roots, excepting that is, the implicit conflict over the future 
federal structure. Party politics in both republics engaged decisively and with great 
purpose over issues of the transition to capitalist democracy, over approaches to regime 
transfer, state building and the immediate ‘price’ to be paid for a common state, 
economic transformation and the purging of the communist nomenklatura. Those who 
have conceived of events in Eastern Europe as “Modern Mystery” (Jowitt 1992:287), 
or who have emphasised transitional uncertainty and the difficulty of acting strategically 
given the uncertainties attached to procedures, interests and traditional political 
taxonomies {e.g. Tismaneanu 1993, Pridham 1995:5) can thus be challenged by this 
counter argument. The transition process from the beginning offered fertile ground for 
party political distinction in many areas and political elites were free to restructure the 
constitution. Consequently, the path-dependency argument alone cannot hold.
An institutionalist assessment of the opportunities lost through the exercise of the veto 
in the Federal Assembly only scratches at the surface of the conflict in its observable 
dynamic. An oft-cited opportunity lost was that of holding a referendum. However, 
when it was proposed a referendum would have revealed only a highly problematic 
array of preferred models of a state: an array of preferences at least in part moulded by 
the party political debate that had gone before (through 1990 and early 1991) and that 
had precipitated the ‘conflict’. The blockage of Havel’s legislation represented a 
significant revelation of failure in the process of constitutional reform, but as argued in 
Chapter 5, it did not produce any sea-change in the substantive conflict over alternative 
state forms as such, other than signalling the elevation of this conflict from the 
parliamentary to the electoral level. The electoral level, however, turned out to be the 
decisive level given Klaus’s willingness to administer the separation once in power. 
Finally, even if Havel had succeeded in strengthening the presidency, he would not 
have been capable of realigning the governing elite with the preferences of the public.
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Havel’s reputation as a disinterested arbiter between Czech and Slovak interests was 
irreparably damaged by the time of his legislative intervention, a fact which had very 
little to do with institutional constraints (see below).
A better instimtionalist argument, though the institutionalists discussed in Chapter 6 
have not raised it, would be this: the damaging effects of the minority veto went far 
deeper than those resulting from its employment. To many on the Czech right after 
1989 the perception of a perpetual ‘national’ constraint on government was evidently at 
least as problematic as its impact. The Czech Civic Democratic Party under Klaus had 
pressed for the veto’s modification, the Civic Democratic Alliance for its abolition. 
Both objected that the veto was an instrument solely of (Slovak) leftist and nationalist 
recidivists, who wished to hold the state to ransom, using the veto to ‘suspend’ 
parliament. That Meciar was aware of the strategic value of his blocking power in the 
Federal Assembly is certain. That the Czechs were given confirmation for their position 
is nevertheless an argument from hindsight. Even after two years of persistent deadlock 
and disagreement over the very basis of the state the federal state had legislated for 
comprehensive economic reform, the privatisation of small and large scale enterprises, 
an adjustment in power-sharing (blocked initially by the Czechs) and a new 
constitutional law establishing a civil code of liberal human rights.
The Czech federal right’s concern was the prospect of a persistently successful Slovak 
intervention against legislation perceived to run against the Slovak national interest, 
however defined. The right of veto was of course instituted (and recommended during 
the Prague Spring of 1968) for this very purpose. The Czech federal right perceived 
the Slovak veto to be unacceptable and provocative from as early as August 1990. The 
Czech Civic Democratic Alliance actually admitted to objecting in principle to a 
consociational right of minority veto in the federal parliament. To Slovaks, this public 
objection naturally called into question the Czech’s goodwill regarding a common state 
of equal nations, and yet despite this the Slovak nationalist parties failed to thrive. The 
rejection of the veto demonstrated the federal right’s antipathy not only to one of the 
basic tenets of consociational governance but to the underlying principles of 
consociation - power-sharing and the protection of the interests of the minority nation
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against majority tyranny. The Czech right’s objections to consociationalism, however, 
fall beyond the explanatory scope of a purely institutional analysis and so must await 
exploration later in this chapter.
The institutionalist argument may also be applied to the separateness of the republican 
party systems, though whether this is an issue of institutional inheritance can fairly be 
questioned. It may be remembered from Chapter 2 that when a branch of Civic Forum 
was established in Kosice in Slovakia in the early days of the revolution Prague 
activists advised it to join the Public Against Violence in Bratislava, thus ensuring the 
separateness of the civic movement structures. When only months later the Communist 
Party itself federated, the party system as a whole was thoroughly and quite manifestly 
split. At first glance the segregated party system looks to have been deeply 
destabilising: likely to discourage consociational bargaining at the elite level and to 
encourage competitive inter-ethnic relations. Despite the predominance of a republic- 
centric competition, however, it is evident from opinion poll data that lasting electoral 
incentives did exist for forging a consensus between the two separate constituencies. 
The deeper problem of the party system was not therefore the lack of persistent 
federalist electoral incentives - but the failure of political parties generally to compete 
coherently on the issue of alternative state arrangements.
The underdevelopment of the party system, moreover, suggests a flaw in any simple 
theory of institutional path dependency. The centrifugal tendencies of separate party 
competition can only make sense in conditions where party competition actually exists. 
The preemptive strategies successfully employed by both Klaus and Meciar in their 
election campaigns suggest that applying a path-dependency argument to the 
Czechoslovak case is not warranted, because party competition did not yet exist. What 
Klaus and Meciar did was to establish the rules of competition. Nor should this 
occasion surprise. As various sociologists of culture have argued, it is during the 
“unsettled times” that agency or leadership has the greatest impact on social behaviour, 
while institutional structures exercise their greatest constraint in “settled times” 
(Swidler 1986, Sewell 1992). Klaus and Meciar’s skill in forestalling democratic party 
competition is an issue better suited to the leadership thesis (see below), but the critical
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point here is that open competition was indeed undermined, and existing public 
preferences overridden. This being the case, the institutional emphasis upon the divided 
party structure is a red herring. The party segregation argument is inadequate for 
several reasons, but most problematic is that the centrifugal dynamic ascribed to Czech 
and Slovak party competition in the segregated system had not yet developed! In 
addition, of course, the separateness of the two party systems can not account for the 
consequences of the 1992 election, namely that the two victorious parties turned against 
the known majority preference in their respective republics, indeed against the 
supposedly pro-common state ‘spirit’ of their own electoral campaigns, and proceeded 
to organise the dissolution of the state.
An alternative formulation better addresses the failure of the party system to engage 
with public preferences regarding the state. It suggests that the failure of the party 
system may be better understood as a direct consequence of regime collapse rather than 
as an institutional inheritance from the previous regime. In the absence of clearly 
defined social cleavages following the demise of the civic movements, successful 
parties sought catch-all or constituency-maximising strategies (within their own 
republics), concentrating on reform promises whilst avoiding over-identification with 
existing problem-areas, particularly the problematic state question. Parties avoided 
being closely identified with a concrete programme toward the common state, resorting 
to more simple claims to ‘complete allegiance’ to the federal idea, thereby preserving 
an ambiguity that later gave politicians decisive autonomy.
As we have seen, the party political response to the self-evident public desire to see 
some answer to the state question was to avoid the issue entirely, the option of choice 
for the Czech left and the Christian Democratic Union and People’s Party coalition, or 
to compete on the basis of who was most ‘genuinely’ for the common state: a position 
which at least saw some nuanced claims as to what form that optimal common state 
should take. These were nonetheless vague in their institutional outline but also 
unengaged with the debate of the ‘other republic’ - with ‘real’ as opposed to ‘optimal’ 
possibilities. The danger of the Czech Civic Democratic Party’s position in these 
circumstances derived not simply from the fact that they had no need to please the
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Slovak constituency - a product of the segregated party system - but additionally from 
the problem that the Czech constituency remained unaware and uninformed by any 
process of party competition of the true distance between the Civic Democratic Party’s 
proposals and those acceptable to any mainstream party on the Slovak side. To argue 
that it was exclusively the separateness of the party system that allowed the Slovak 
position to be so misrepresented would be to ignore the other, very apparent flaws in 
the existing party system within each republic. In addition to the basic problem of 
segregation one must add the oligarchic structure of parties themselves and their 
deliberate obfuscation of constitutional and reform issues.
In both states it may be remembered, party programmes originated from the top down 
and the party system in general was both highly unstable and ill-formed. The oligarchic 
structure of the parties emerging from the civic movements, in particular the 
tremendous freedom of their leading elites in defining electoral issues, was 
symptomatic. These parties had emerged by way of revolutionary events in little over a 
year. As discussed in Chapter 5, however, a consequence of their autonomy combined 
with the absence of firm public preferences expressed in a competitive election before 
June 1992, was the pervasive absence of pressure to respond to existing public 
preferences on the troublesome constitutional issue.
In the light of polls which demonstrated that public opinion in both republics was 
strongly split between several state-type preferences, mainstream political actors clearly 
felt that other grounds for contestation would prove less risky and more tractable. As 
far as electoral choices went, it was to these other issues that the fate of the state was 
more or less implicitly tied. While the effective gagging of clear electoral debate thus 
holds firm as a theory for the separation in general, it too, along with path-dependency 
institutional arguments, cannot explain to what end the victorious politicians adopted, 
indeed, instigated, these gagging practices, other than for the sake of short-term 
election. Neither theory can answer why Klaus and Meciar proceeded to the dissolution 
of the state. To answer the question of why these leading politicians saw the common 
state to be worth sacrificing, and of how they hoped to perpetrate such an affront to the 
public will and still hold onto power, we must turn to the two remaining theories: the
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‘brutal realist’ argument of too autonomous leadership and a ‘transition as cause’ 
argument.
Leadership - the uses and abuses of pubhc fatalism.
As the preceding argument suggests, one possible answer to apparent elite autonomy 
may lie not in how conflicts are resolved, but in how they are in fact omitted from the 
political agenda as presented for competitive election. Such an account does not 
however explain how, let alone why, the actors involved intended to get away with the 
ultimate decision for separation - a decision they could hardly disguise. An important 
aspect of a leadership argument focussing on Klaus and Meciar is that the issue-gagging 
tactic was not only manifest in the party system generally but was used to particular 
effect by these two protagonists - two leaders bent upon a self-serving dissolution of the 
common state. The latter, it was suggested in Chapter 3, might have colluded on the 
separation of the state, having displayed uniquely entrepreneurial leadership in the 
existing conditions of open political opportunity. Their positive, active leadership 
toward dissolution was, so this argument suggests, an essential part of the state 
separation.
Klaus and Meciar’s personal superiority as political strategists has been demonstrated. 
Their avoidance of the narrow identity and historically-rooted ideological politics 
practiced by their rivals liberated them to act strategically where their rivals sought to 
demonstrate their own integrity by acting on principle. Both populist leaders could 
draw on the support of those Communist Party cadres most able, because of their 
professional skills, to ‘launder’ themselves in the light of the switch from communist 
rule; Both headed powerful post-revolutionary networks, rooted not in the dissident 
movements but in previously integrated sectors of the old regime. In Slovakia Meciar 
was tied into the ‘Revival’ group and evidently forged deeper connections with 
Slovakia’s residual security structures when Interior Minister before June 1990. Klaus 
emerged from the regime’s indispensable, and so always potentially disruptive 
professional ‘grey-zone’ or technocratic elite, and after 1989, headed the school of 
once-thoroughly closeted reform economists in the Czech lands. By his ceaseless self­
marketing he became identified absolutely with the very impulse toward reform. Their
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catch-all identification - what Shari Cohen has called their ‘mass-elite identity’, 
characterised by a lack of connection to a group understanding of the past^ allowed 
Klaus and Meciar alike to freely interpret the past for their own ends.
The ostensible unlikeliness of their early rise to power is testimony to their skills. 
Though before 1989 Klaus was careful never to cross the line into dissent (he was 
allegedly mis-introduced as ‘Dr. W olf by Havel at an early meeting with the still 
incumbent communist government), he forged a position of leadership within the 
dissident-defined Civic Forum. Meciar similarly rose from a position of near-total 
obscurity to the Mayorship of Bratislava and the shadow-premiership, as a 
representative of the Public Against Violence, within six-months of the revolution, 
despite letters to President Havel warning that he would abuse those powers. Both men 
displayed great tactical skill when the respective civic movements were breaking up. 
Klaus’s decision to portray his dissident opponents in the Forum as driven not by 
reasonable idealism but anti-democratic elitism and utopianism; and Meciar’s 
manipulation of his dissident critics’ social isolation, underpinned their progress to the 
leadership of new political groupings. It also revealed their willingness to break 
important social taboos and to manipulate sentiments as morally dubious (but electorally 
efficacious) as public guilt about the respective dissident elites. This conflict ultimately 
deprived the long-suffering, long isolated dissidents of the 1970s and 1980s of any 
credit as the guardians of Czechoslovakia’s democratic traditions. Most cruelly, and 
ironically in the Czech instance, the dissidents were successfully slandered as Utopians 
of the same cloth as the communist hard-liners who had long acted as their persecutors.
Both the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Czech Civic Democratic Party 
succeeded in forestalling a consolidated party political competition before the June 1992 
election. As explained in Chapter 5, the general failure of the party system was due in 
no small part to the hegemonic strategies of these two particular parties. Klaus 
demolished the Czech dissident competition with the allegation that they were recidivist 
social engineers, and claimed in 1992 that his was the party now fulfilling the
 ^ For a thoughtful and detailed analysis o f the roots and competitive advantages of the absence of historic 
consciousness among the victorious Slovak elite behind Meciar, compared to the relative historical 
groundedness of his religious nationalist and liberal rivals, (Cohen 1997).
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democratising mission of the Civic Forum. Meciar over-promised from the opposition 
sidelines. Together these two parties succeeded in blocking assertive (as opposed to 
defensive) campaigning from their respective electoral rivals. To come out against 
Klaus’s position meant publicly subordinating ‘reform’ to the common state, apparently 
at the price of the former, something which only the former dissident Civic Movement 
(CM) dared suggest. Klaus’s was an electoral formulation of ‘if you are not with us you 
are against us’ which successfully warded away any attempt at competition from but all 
but the already doomed, if most manifestly high-principled dissident Civic Movement.
In addition to holding the constitutional issue hostage to the issue of transitional reform, 
both Klaus and Meciar fully exploited the separateness of the party systems in leading 
their own constituencies away from alternatives acceptable to the ‘other republic’. 
Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party’s position in particular, that of a sovereign centralised 
pseudo-‘federation’, clearly lacked any Slovak political partner bar the soon to be 
electorally extinguished Public Against Violence-Civic Democratic Union. The Public 
Against Violence’s electoral death had been predictable since Meciar’s ouster in April 
1991, after which it had struggled to muster 5 per cent of public support from one 
month to another. And yet as part of the right’s campaign in the Czech republic, Slovak 
objections to the unitary state model were presented as premeditated and deliberately 
provocative: as emanating from an ingrained, secessionist and economically irrational 
Slovak nationalism. Voters for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia meanwhile 
were completely misled as to the risks they undertook in following Meciar’s most 
indeterminate but confederal-sounding line. As pointed out in Chapter 5, only 19 per 
cent of would be voters for Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia were 
adherents of an independent Slovakia (April 1992, the Bratislava Center for Social 
Analysis, in Vodicka 1993:99). To make matters worse, the essentially separate press 
in each republic tended to pick their own electoral winners, and to mirror the policy 
arguments of the parties in their own coverage, thus removing the one major alternative 
source of critical information regarding national relations.
That Klaus and Meciar did not collude on the ultimate dissolution, however, is apparent 
from the events of the last six months outlined in Chapter 2. Facing the alternative of
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outright personal political failure, Meciar accepted being coerced by Klaus’s strategy 
when it became clear that the odds on maintaining the state without a full Slovak 
capitulation had collapsed. Meciar’s capitulation points to the perspicacity of Havel’s 
comment that he sometimes had the impression the state ‘belonged’ to the political 
parties, a point made during the dispute over presidential powers for the future 
independent Czech republic (Zemedelske noviny 22.10.1992:3). Following the June 
1992 election, Czech and Slovak voters looked on with frustration but also a palpable 
lack of surprise as their new leaders assumed an electoral mandate to sever the state‘s. 
Public euphoria over the meaningfulness of democratic representation clearly did not 
survive the first election, in June 1990. Whatever the true state of opposition to the 
split, ‘society’ as a protesting, voting or even legislating force was kept largely at bay. 
Whether this was because of the obscurity of the source of the separation, of the ‘it’ 
against which the public could gainfully protest, or because of low public expectations 
of government accountability, can hardly be distinguished. Klaus for his part was 
relatively safe in the knowledge that 74 per cent of his own supporters considered that 
the Slovak left and the insufficient will of Slovaks as a whole to maintain the state 
might lead to its division. As we also know from Chapter 2, however, Meciar’s path to 
a decent excuse was somewhat stonier. His subsequent zigzagging in search of political 
justification cost him the support of several of his most able ministers, but also, once 
and for all, his claims to be a democrat.
When considering Klaus’s and Meciar’s evaluations of political risk it is instructive to 
consider the second-order preferences expressed in public opinion poll data. 
Widespread resignation to the split or something akin to it in fact drove support for 
separation as ‘necessary’ steadily upward after June 1992 - if not to a majority then at 
least to a few percentage points short of a majority by the time of separation. This 
remained in contrast to stated heartfelt (or first order) ‘preferences’ {i.e. most preferred
Zdenek Zboril ascertained in opinion polls as early as January 1991 that more than 80 per cent of Czechs 
and Slovaks believed that political parties interest in the electorate was limited to wirming their support in 
elections, and they felt that attitude was unlikely to change (Zboril 1995:207). Even before June 1992 there 
was thus a strong perception that the system had not yet moved significantly from being ‘delegative’ to 
being ‘representative’.
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options) over the state arrangement, which we might reasonably assume to have stayed 
either stable or to have shifted more gradually toward positive support^
By November 1992, politicians could observe that 90 per cent of both populations 
considered separation ‘inevitable’ even though in July, only 16 per cent of respondents 
in either republic had ‘preferred’ two independent states (Wolchik 1994:180). In 
addition by November, 50 per cent of Czechs as compared to some 40 per cent of 
Slovaks considered the dissolution of the Federation as ‘necessary’. A more ambiguous 
term than ‘prefer’, ‘necessary’ nevertheless captured the all-important sentiment 
expressing resignation to the split: conditional support. Crucially, this conditional 
support among Czechs looked set to overtake the level of their disapproval - 43 per 
cent of Czechs and 49 per cent of Slovaks saw separation as ‘unnecessary’ (IVVM poll 
2/22 quoted in Mlada Fronta dues 1,2 Svobodne slave 27.11.1992:1). Given the choice 
of voting simply for or against the division of the federation in a referendum, 42 per 
cent of Czechs would have voted for division as against 32 per cent of Slovaks (36 per 
cent of Slovaks chose the option ‘don’t know’ (IVVM 2/22:4-9.11.1992). According to 
these polls, both the Civic Democratic Party and to a lesser extent the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia had reasons to believe that a majority of their electorates could be 
convinced after the event of the sad but pragmatic ‘necessity’ of splitting the state and 
that they could adjust their strategies accordingly. Such an upsurge of public fatalism 
provided Klaus and to some extent even Meciar with positive grounds for believing 
they might escape future electoral censure for their unmandated actions. As the various 
press conferences between June and December 1992 reveal, it had been in these terms 
that both parties, but the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in particular, had 
justified their actions to their respective constituencies - sad but objective necessity, 
they maintained, drove them to their undesired conclusions. As the process continued, 
polls showed they might profitably seek to legitimise their actions in the same way in 
the future.
 ^ Precision on this point is thwarted by the lack of systematic opinion taking during the last six months. 
While rVVM took monthly samples they nevertheless changed the phrasing of the questions in such a way 
as to make comparison over time dubious. It appears that following the June election pollsters themselves 
shifted with the available policy options towards comparing simple support for separation with (an 
unprogrammatic) ‘opposition’ to it; ideal preferences and pragmatic endorsements thus became blurred.
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State myths
Klaus’s peculiar genius lay in making a Czech partition look like Slovak secession, 
despite Slovak protestations to the contrary. During the last six months of negotiations, 
concessions were made to Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia only when 
the process looked in danger of succumbing to domestic pressure for broader political 
inclusion - inclusion which would only have slowed, if not sabotaged, the march 
toward separation. Throughout the negotiations Klaus projected the looming split as the 
realisation of an historical Slovak craving for emancipation. These Czech claims 
notwithstanding, the evidence suggests that many Slovaks eventually blamed not only 
the Czechs, but also Meciar for having made them pay such an unlooked-for price in 
the battle over equality. It was and remains therefore the riskiest of achievements for 
Meciar to have called this situation - after the fact of separation - the realisation of 
Slovakia’s national destiny.
The fact of Klaus’s more favourable prospects for turning separation to electoral 
advantage was a message played up to the domestic audience and played down abroad. 
The Civic Democratic Party projected national optimism at home with oblique but deft 
signals, such as its prediction of a balanced Czech budget for 1993. The Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia had more clearly broken its election promises and had this to 
overcome, quite apart from the immediate economic impact on the Slovak economy in 
massive loss of subsidy, and the loss of international confidence so crucial to foreign 
investment. In Slovakia in March 1993, 50 per cent of Slovaks, when asked “Would 
you have voted for the dissolution of the CSFR?” maintained that they would have 
answered ‘no’, (only 29 per cent ‘yes’) (Butorova 1993:3). Had elections been held in 
March, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia would have secured only 18.6 per 
cent of the vote, almost half its June figure (ibid. 1993:25). Only 13 per cent of 
Slovaks said they trusted the Slovak government completely, and 66 per cent judged 
that the current set of politicians had not been ready to face complete independence 
(ibid. 1993:30-31). When asked to name their ‘most trusted politician’, Meciar’s 
support had dwindled steadily from just under 80 per cent in February 1991 to just over 
20 per cent in March 1993 (ibid.:37). If this was a victory for the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia it was entirely conditional on Meciar’s ability to produce a state-
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founding myth strong enough to overcome Slovak disappointment. As we can see from 
his current political style, Meciar’s solution has been to turn to an authoritarian and 
nationalistic style of government.
Though Slovak federal irredentism was clearly not on the cards after 1992 (and 
prohibited within MDS/CDP agreements which carefully barred renegotiation of the 
issue for a minimum of five years), Meciar’s capitulation to separation required that he 
become the deliberate all-out nationalist the Czechs had long supposed him to be, but 
that he had not been before June 1992. By the same token, the more nationalistic 
Meciar’s strategy in Slovakia, the more credibility looked set to accrue to Klaus’s post­
independence strategy of explaining the separation as the inevitable result of 
irreconcilable politics: liberal democratic politics versus nationalist and demagogic rule. 
As Connor has noted; “while myths of unity have a capacity for engendering harmony 
they also have a capacity for accentuating division. And the myths are invoked more 
often for the latter” (Connor 1994:140). The Slovak public, however, was not fooled. 
In February 1992, 45 per cent of Czechs saw a short term worsening of the general 
situation arising from separation, against 18 per cent of Slovaks. In contrast, 54 per 
cent of Slovaks foresaw a long term degeneration as against only 18 per cent of 
Czechs, implying that a majority of the latter remained essentially unperturbed by 
events. As for the dawn of independence 29 per cent of Czechs anticipated rapid 
general advancement, compared to 1 per cent of those supposedly deluded 
secessionists, the Slovaks (IVVM 2/24 8.2.1993).
The argument that, in the absence of democratic institutions, the fullest rein was given 
to elite decision-making, and that the separation was duly concocted by leaders with 
demonstrably rational private power interests in republican independence clearly has a 
core role to play in any explanation of the separation. It must also be noted, however, 
that given the autocratic nature of the decision to split the state, separation was sold at a 
high price. Democratic continuity was supposedly being guaranteed by the transfer of 
power to the republican level, but at the republican level government was dominated by 
these two leaders, who had just amply demonstrated their authoritarian tendencies.
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The nature of their respective visions for their future states: visions which had clearly 
acted as the driving force certainly personally for Klaus, and electorally for both 
leaders, form the subject of the next account of the state’s demise. This argument 
contends that diverging perceptions of democratising, and of the concomitant state- 
building needs among Czech, Slovak and Federal governing elites led to the growing 
conflict, the breakdown of common institutions and finally separation. As the only 
argument really to encompass the ‘politics’ of the separation it is clear that this part of 
the story is an essential addition to each of the above arguments. Without the logic 
contained in the dominant political visions of the time the machinery of government as 
outlined above, however unbalanced, might have worked to secure a different outcome.
The *new* politics: omniscient administration, the economic plan and the bogus 
threat
To what extent were the observable tensions between the federal centre and the 
republics and between the two republics themselves derived from conflicting visions of 
démocratisation, or more simply, of transformation? On whose terms were these 
democratic state-building arguments forged, and by whose definition were these 
interests deemed incompatible with a common state? These were the questions attached 
to the theory of centrifugal state-building outlined in Chapter 3.
By examining the main facets of democratic reform in Czechoslovakia this thesis has 
shown that the political activity of the Czech Civic Democratic Party, the dominant 
force of the separation, had from its inception driven toward establishing its leader, 
Vaclav Klaus, as the unilateral arbiter, not just of the Czech but of the federal state’s 
démocratisation process as a whole, with all that that entailed by way of state-form and 
economy-form. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Civic Democratic Party’s political 
ideology was essentially about the transition - the revitalised market as both the 
‘natural’ means and end to all that Czechs and Slovaks might wish to achieve.
While Meciar’s skill lay in positioning the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia most 
profitably between the early-established fault-lines of the Slovak political scene, Klaus’s 
Civic Democratic Party in many respects acted as the issue-defining motive force of the
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entire Czechoslovak post-communist transition. The Civic Democratic Party’s 
assumption after June 1992 of the status of a sovereign administrator in whom the 
public interest was somehow innately invested, as opposed to that of a government in 
whom the public had momentarily placed its trust, is one of the most remarkable 
aspects of the story I have told. Klaus’s conception of his party’s role brought about 
two further developments, both of them perverse in the light of a transition from 
communism to democracy. Firstly, communist-style ‘Leading Role of the Party’ claims 
were now marketed in liberal capitalist terms. Secondly, Czechs were once again 
demanding that Slovaks subordinate their particular (national) claims to the ‘higher 
interests of the state’ i.e. state-reform.
The preeminence of economic reform underpinned Klaus’s preferred model of the 
state. Its neo-liberal principles carried a distinct constitutional corollary. ‘Politics’ for 
Klaus remained the art of economic facility: the economy in turn, was the engine from 
which all social transformation, including démocratisation, would follow (see Chapter 
7). Technocrats typically believe that there exists and should remain an unassailable 
realm of expertise to which politics (or what Klaus called ‘classical political 
disagreement’) is necessarily subordinate. What is extraordinary in the Czechoslovak 
case was the presumed scope of the technocratic realm and Klaus’s willingness to 
subsume all other values accredited to the common state, including its popularity and its 
ability to unite two nations in a strategically prudent common union, within a 
technocratic vision which also happened to be nationally insensible and politically self- 
serving. While this may imply a tacit, perhaps unconscious Czech nation-statism on 
Klaus’s part, all the available evidence points to both his reasoning and his aspirations 
lying predominantly in the economic, technocratic realm. The constitutional corollary 
of this technocratic model was that the ‘functioning federation’ would have to be 
designed first and foremost as an instrument of reform. It would be established on a 
principled rejection of nationalist and other rent-seeking claims upon the state. Slovak 
oppositionist claims about ‘reform’, its Czech national bias and its social impact were 
rejected on the basis that they were ‘politically’ motivated, and not ‘reform’ motivated.
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In practice if not in intention, Klaus’s reform agenda ‘captured’ the entire state-debate 
in the discourse of reform and of reform imperatives. The strength of the centre was, 
he had written before the revolution, pivotal to achieving the social consensus 
necessary for reform. Social consensus, he concluded, “depends to the decisive degree 
on the integrity of the whole society, on the effectiveness of the social mechanisms 
which facilitate the achievement of an operable consensus forming the basis of any 
long-term positive social activity” . As it turned out, this was not simply the cautious 
genuflection of a state-employed economist to the altar of democratic centralism. The 
practical interpretation of this ‘rule’ after 1989 was that all things confederal must 
necessarily detract from the essential ‘operable consensus’, from the homogeneity of 
society. Confederation required the acknowledgement that there existed not one social 
consensus but two potentially conflicting consensi which would forever have to be 
reconciled at the expense of Klausite principles.
As the substantive chapters of this thesis have demonstrated, Klaus’s vision was really 
of a unitary state. Though frequently referred to as a ‘unitary federation’, the repetitive 
coupling of these two contradictory terms alone could never suffice to give the phrase 
meaning. Klaus’s campaigning call may have been for a functioning federation, one 
which alluded loosely to the American model of individualist liberty enshrined in the 
power of the states of the union and checked by a unifying centre. But his insistence 
that the existing Czechoslovak federal state, the ‘centre’, had already had its unique 
sovereignty bestowed upon it by ‘the people’ was a bizarre supposition given the 
Soviet-led crackdown and amendment of the constitution, not to mention Klaus’s 
otherwise blanket condenmation of the events of 1968. Nevertheless, this claim 
underpinned the Civic Democratic Party’s position that state sovereignty could 
henceforth be delegated to the republics only by act of central ‘grace’; from the ‘top 
down’. It was a far cry from the founding American federalist vision.
When Slovak claims for higher national recognition formed the backbone of the entire 
Slovak party political scene, Klaus’s persistent call for a ‘unitary federation’ or ‘bust’ 
was a fabulously disingenuous message. The projected constitutional status and role of 
the republics was entirely divorced from history, constitutional precedent, and the
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nationally distinct self-identification of the two populations. A ‘unitary federation’ 
absolutely begged the question of why a ‘federal’ state had been formed in 1968 in the 
first place, and, of course, entirely ignored Slovakia’s seventy-odd years of national 
claims.
Once the full implications of Klaus’s basically nation-state model are recognised an 
interesting question arises. Would Klaus have moved to break up the inherited 
federation even if Meciar had failed in the June 1992 election, beaten perhaps by 
Carnogursky’s Christian Democratic Movement, or Peter Weiss’s Party of the 
Democratic Left? In the first case, that of a Christian Democratic victory, the answer is 
almost certainly ‘yes’. Carnogursky’s calls for Slovak independence at the propitious 
moment ‘sometime in the future’ supported Klaus’s depiction of Slovak desires more 
convincingly than Meciar’s constant hedging and pure populism. Carnogursky’s 
nationalism was personally heartfelt and articulate, and his party’s dependence upon the 
votes of aging Slovak L’udaks provided ample basis for dire warnings of a creeping 
return of ‘black’ Slovak clerico-nationalism. Whether the threat was real or imagined, a 
victory for Carnogursky in Slovakia would not have fitted Klaus’s projection of the 
future liberal democratic state.
A victory for the Party of the Democratic Left, the reformist Slovak wing of the former 
Czechoslovak Communist Party, was for Klaus potentially the most problematic of all 
the realistic electoral possibilities. For though the Democratic Left were plagued by 
their past, Weiss had succeeded in dragging the party towards a recognisable Western 
European social democratic position by 1992. Though Weiss was determined that 
Slovakia should achieve some improvements in its status (see Chapter 2) he was 
absolutely unwilling to see the common state forfeited, and would have claimed 
Slovakia’s federal allegiance both loudly and coherently not only in Slovakia but also in 
the Czech lands, where he may have persuaded the still influential former Party paper 
Rude pravo to come to his aid. The dissident opposition would again have entered the 
fray on his side. Would Klaus have dared a necessarily more explicit partition'of the 
state in these circumstances?
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One can but speculate. The bottom line, however, is that the conflict between an 
implacable Slovak ‘threat’ to Czech national reform interests was hardly going to be 
avoided by Klaus. A complete Klausite victory in both republics would have required a 
self-imposed abnegation of Slovak national identity, national interest and of existing i.e. 
inherited confederal constitutional rights - a kamikaze position for a Slovak politician. 
In these circumstances Meciar’s unrelenting personal ambition and egoism made him 
Klaus’s ideal candidate for the June 1992 victory. That the rhetorically outrageous 
Meciar was the only Slovak politician spared the Civic Democratic Party’s withering 
campaign assaults in 1992 was always a curious omission. In this light Klaus’s 
frequently expressed and highly publicised expectation of Meciar’s election victory in 
Slovakia makes perfect sense.
The claim that Klaus desired to maintain the common state is hardly sustainable. The 
principle of two equally valid national perspectives upon the democratic future ran 
counter to his vision. His claims to be a federalist may be seen as electorally facile. He 
had declared a constitutional ultimatum, a vision which carried only one Slovak partner 
- the Public Against Violence/Civic Democratic Union - the former dissident party 
which was going the way of all flesh. Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party campaigned in 
Slovakia, but by doing so it must have known that it would split the already patently 
minuscule liberal vote to below the threshold necessary for a party’s entry into 
parliament.
The decolonising power
A categorisation of the Czechoslovak separation may finally be suggested here. The 
speed with which the final dissolution of Czechoslovakia was settled, within six months 
following the June 1992 election, and the entirely behind-closed-doors nature of the 
decision-making process suggest not so much a separatist struggle, as a de-colonisation, 
with the Czech part acting as the colonial power, Slovakia, the reluctantly unhooked 
colony. The end of the communist system has also been described not only as the end 
of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, but as the end of the ‘internal empires’ of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (Bunce 1996:3). Relative to conflicts in 
the past, and in comparison with conflicts elsewhere in Europe that have not led to
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separation, we might also suggest that Czechoslovakia between 1990 and 1992 hardly 
experienced a period of ‘exceptional’ conflict. Similarly, “[i]nside Africa” it has been 
noted,... “it was hard to find turbulence enough to explain why, having earlier seemed 
so resolved to keep the continent, the colonial powers... now, after the war [World 
War II], seemed so preoccupied with how to get out” (First 1983:210).
Clearly such a comparison may be questioned. The essential institutional continuity and 
the sheer size of the average de-colonised polity on the one hand, and the physical 
distance between the colonised and the colonial power on the other, were at least at 
first glance, worlds away from Czechoslovakia’s experience. Slovakia’s economic 
development under communism and the suzerainty of the Soviet Union over both 
Czech and Slovak republics blurs the claim that Slovakia remained the only colonially 
subordinated polity. And yet, as the history outlined in Chapter 1 suggests, the First 
Republic under Masaryk carried the distinct overtones of colonial rule. Czech 
administrative structures and personnel were imported into Slovakia, the Slovak 
economy was exploited for its raw materials and labour, and the underdeveloped 
Slovak elite was thoroughly divided by pro- and anti-colonial feeling. By the end of the 
Second World War moreover, Slovakia had shown itself a highly rebellious territory, 
and the original Czech strategic interest in a Slovak bulwark against German power had 
been entirely eradicated by the latter’s expulsion following the Nazi defeat. Was a 
Czech ‘withdrawal’ from Slovakia something only delayed and denied by the territorial 
interests of Soviet-enforced Communism, was démocratisation in 1989 its cue?
The analogy is interesting beyond its capacity to make a glib historical point. The 
peculiar outlook of elite actors in the colonising and de-colonising condition is 
instructive to our case. Ian Lustick has pointed out that “decolonisation is almost 
always viewed as resulting from metropolitan calculations, usually belated, that because 
of unrest in the colony, changing international circumstances, or shifting interests or 
economic conditions, the military, political, and /or economic costs of controlling the 
possession outweigh the perceived benefits”  ^ (1993:29). As has also been noted of
® Our case is an apt illustration for Lustick’s discussion o f why traditional distinctions between ‘secession’ 
and ‘decolonisation’ are problematic. Noting that “separation of an outlying territory from an established 
state is usually considered “secession” if the link between the state and the outlying territory is or was
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Africa, imported institutions notwithstanding, “the colonial system functioned in the 
conviction that the administrator was sovereign; that his subjects neither understood nor 
wanted self-government or independence; that the only article of faith on which 
administrators could confidently depend was that all problems of ‘good government’ 
were administrative, and that disaster would follow from attempts to conceive of them 
as political... (First 1983:208)” . This description might equally be applied to the 
Czechoslovak communist system in its last years. Highly constrained administrative 
tinkering was all that was all that remained to Czechoslovak communism, ideologically 
bankrupted by the Warsaw Pact occupation of 1968. The description may also be 
recognised in certain of the presumptions of the Civic Democratic Party: 
“Decolonisation was a move to shore up ‘stabilizing’ forces in restless regions, rather 
than a recognition of the right of peoples to the independence and the freedom that the 
phrases of the UN so eloquently embodied...” (First 1983:213).
The de-colonising analogy is helpful for a deeper reason. It captures Klaus’s 
geopolitical interest in effecting the uncoupling of the Czech lands from the more 
slowly reforming Slovakia and the ‘Asiatic’ and Balkan world beyond and below. The 
geopolitical risks of such a strategy were not negligible, but they fell disproportionately 
upon the Slovak side. Czechoslovakia in 1989 found itself in a period of unique 
strategic vulnerability. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that the state belonged 
to no alliance other than the institutionally weak and unwieldy Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE (now the OSCE) was nothing more than a 
timetable of meetings backed by a skeletal administration - an alliance possessed of no 
military capability whatsoever, and in which every member state had the right of veto. 
With the collapse of Czechoslovakia’s satellite status, diplomatic relations had to be 
built from scratch via bilateral agreements. Both the European Community and NATO 
offered the most fraternal congratulations in 1989 to the liberated ‘other Europe’ but 
insisted then, as the European Union continues to insist, that until the moving goals of 
‘democracy and market’ can be achieved. Western Europe will in no way presume to
presumed permanent and “decolonization” if the link is or was considered temporary” Lustick points out 
that this leaves little terminology to describe problematic relationships, for instance, to describe departures 
in states which have always suffered from ambiguous permanence and identity (1993:23).
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be its brother’s keeper^. It was in these precarious conditions that the state was 
partitioned, leaving Slovak Hungarians particularly vulnerable to the now hegemonic 
Slovak majority, and Slovakia in turn, an island of instability bordering on a still more 
chaotic Ukraine. Under Klaus’s guidance the Czech republic effectively unhooked itself 
from ‘the east’ to become a German peninsula, leaving Slovakia to find its putative 
‘natural home’ in what the West perceives to be the pre-democratic backwater of 
Eastern, no longer Central Europe. This uncoupling did a terrible disservice not only to 
the unprotected Hungarians in Slovakia’s midst but also to the majority of Slovaks who 
identified themselves more consensually and democratically than Meciar, after 1993, 
would allow.
Technocratic authoritarianism
My initial argument - that the separation was not marginally affected but quite 
observably caused by the distinctive politics of the transition - rested upon two basic 
pillars. The first, was that the main barrier to consensus in the constitutional debate 
derived from the Civic Democratic Party position of supporting a functioning, so-called 
‘unitary’ federation. The second was that the structure of political opportunities, in 
particular for public and party political opposition to the separation, was shaped by the 
absence of legitimate and well-functioning political institutions of any stripe - a defining 
trait of the post-communist condition.
My research has indicated, however, that these two pillars are in fact deeply connected. 
The story of the separation is one of a distinct form of technocratic authoritarianism, 
dependent upon the conditions of transition. The point is best illustrated by outlining 
instances where the Civic Democratic Party deliberately and directly suppressed 
opposition to the separation.
Following the 1992 election there were only a handful of demonstrations for the 
federation in either republic, promoted in the main by opposition parties and attended 
more often by hundreds rather than thousands of protesters. In contrast, up to fourteen 
thousand demonstrated on June 11th in support of the Civic Democratic Party rally in
 ^ The phrase has been used by Ken Jowitt, who has written with his usual passion o f the dangers o f the 
Western European neglect of this region (1992).
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the Czech Republic (Lidove noviny 13.6.1992.) The increases in the pragmatic 
acceptance of separation as reported by opinion polling, and the lack of public protest 
against separation need to be placed in the light of public expectations and the lack of 
institutionally recognised conduits for the meaningful expression of ‘public’ feeling. 
Obviously the public’s decision to protest would have been bound up with complex 
assessments of the likelihood of change - the ‘agency’ component in Gamson’s theory 
of collective action. Two of the most important assessments made by the frustrated 
citizenry would have concerned firstly, the extent of the public protest required to 
adjust CDP/MDS behaviour, and secondly, the extent of protest necessary to adjust the 
supposedly dichotomous relationship between economic prosperity and continuing 
coexistence as framed by the party system as a whole. As explored in previous 
chapters, the prospects for adjusting the latter - a basic pillar of party political 
contestation - looked poor. Klaus’s policies were perceived by Czechs as both 
successful and desirable, and yet by Slovaks as incompatible with harmonious national 
relations. The depth of this conflicting view only increased over time; while 61 per cent 
of Slovaks in March 1993 attributed the split to the uncompromising attitude of Czechs, 
an entire 84 per cent identified the cause of separation as the ‘aggravated economic and 
social situation of the Slovak population’ (Butorova 1993:25).
What were the barriers that really countered the public expectation of successful 
collective action insofar as collective action was institutionally possible (broadly 
defined, from street protest to petition, to the lobbying of parliamentary deputies)? 
Robust answers to this question are difficult. Certain objective factors may however be 
identified in our case, namely, the difficulties attached to the possibility of effective 
agency, and also the difficulties attached to what Gamson has called the ‘identity’ 
component of collective action, namely the requirement of a “consciousness of human 
agents whose policies or practices must be changed and a “we” who will help to bring 
that change about” (Gamson 1992:7-8). The early failure to call a referendum sent a 
public message to those 2.5 million citizens active enough to have signed the 
referendum-supporting petition back in 1990/1991. The message was that concerted 
bids for accountability would not be heeded by government - a sense that would have 
been compounded the more adversarial the parliamentary atmosphere became. In
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addition, though a majority of citizens opposed separation, no obvious majority shared 
a common view of an alternative feasible state; opinion was divided between the 
options of a unitary, confederal, land-based republic or federal state. It was thus 
possible for governments to insist that separation was the (popular) second best 
solution, made necessary by the reprehensible actions of the ‘other’ republic. It was 
correspondingly electorally unappealing for parties, but also basically problematic for 
would-be pro-federalist protesters in general, to unite and mobilise public opinion on a 
clearly agreed alternative strategy. Thirdly, fear of the loss of state order, whipped up 
by the CDP, and consequent fears of losing the achievements of the post-November 
1989 years, may have acted as strong disincentives against meaningful protest. This 
thesis has outlined important barriers to representation presented at the state level. That 
over 2 million signed a petition moreover argues for the basic fact that while civil 
society was alive and kicking, little connected it to the political elite. The dissident 
Civic Movement had always been acutely concerned by this distance. Klaus’s Civic 
Democratic Party on the other hand, exploited it to the full.
Passive political culture?
Arguments that there remained a strong continuity in Czechoslovak political culture 
from the communist to the democratic period might invoke several important (and, it 
should be noted, hotly disputed) legacies: society’s lack of vital representative 
structures e.g. articulated common interests and identities, organised interest groups, 
critical press etc.\ the habituated tolerance of authority (as compared to Poland) etc. An 
argument about the continuity of low public expectations could certainly point to the 
short-lived trust in democratic political institutions after 1989. The flaw in these last, 
culture and psychology based accounts of ‘passivity’ unfortunately remains the lack of 
compelling evidence. The fact that 90 per cent viewed the split as ‘inevitable’ does not 
tell us that the electorate was ‘fatalistic’ any more than it tells us that they were realistic 
observers of the events unfolding before them. Similarly, the apparent failure of public 
opinion to translate into persistent protest may tell us that the electorate struggled to 
overcome some inner, psychological passivity, but it may equally tell us that they took 
any number of reasonable decisions that persuaded them against protesting as either 
pointless, too time-consuming given other pressures, or impractical in the light of the
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failure of previous attempts and the location of the adversarial opponent in the ‘other’, 
politically untouchable republic.
Few other issues in ‘democratic’ Czechoslovakia exposed unconstrained executive 
power over the state-arrangement as much as the abstract issue of sovereignty. The 
Czechoslovak state was both perceived and treated as the property of the dominant 
parties and their policies; an indisputable continuity from the communist period. The 
state’s current form proved incapable of delivering the preferred policy of the two 
governing parties. As a result, the leadership of these governing parties acted to change 
it, irrespective of any other (historical, metaphysical, international or strategic) saving 
grace that the state might have had. In assuming absolute authority over the course of 
negotiations, the CDP in particular made every effort to exploit the exposed, 
‘transitional’ weaknesses of the prevailing institutional environment and to close off 
those institutional entry points that might have allowed other elite actors to have 
exacted at least some compromise, an attitude than in itself leant tremendous 
momentum to the dissolution process. It is worth reviewing the systematic closure of 
these important institutional opportunities.
Parliamentary opposition?
In his discussion of the 16th century dispute between the English crown and parliament, 
Breuilly points out that “the new and internally diverse opposition looked to Parliament 
as a means of organising and expressing itself. Parliament came to provide both an 
ideological and an organisational function”, and one which came to inform in a 
reflexive way, the English national consciousness (Breuilly 1993:85). If we stretch this 
not entirely strange analogy to the Czechoslovak federal parliament’s continued 
struggle to influence constitutional developments, we may note that in contrast to 16th 
century England, Czechoslovak federal parliamentarians had little by way of recent 
historical encouragement to believe in parliament as either a unifying or intrinsically 
authoritative force, capable of countering an assertion of authoritarian power. The 
newly animated rights and powers of the federal legislature after 1989 had been almost 
immediately called into question. One of the few concrete achievements of the 
constitutional wranglings of 1990-2 had been to cast doubt upon and bring into
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disrepute the most basic principles of the existing parliamentary structure, in particular 
its strong minority right of veto which had surfaced as a shock, when the communists’ 
paper tiger legislature had come lumbering to life. The result was again to open the 
opportunities for leadership and for the manipulation of institutional authority*.
Excluded from the last six months of negotiation over the separation of the state, the 
Federal Assembly suffered fatally from the lack of precedent that might have dictated 
to Klaus the need to put negotiated settlements to a meaningful parliamentary test, i.e. 
one without the threat of a total loss of authority to the National Councils. On the 
contrary, it followed from the Civic Democratic Party’s assumed electoral mandate to 
create two new sovereign republics that the Federal Assembly’s one remaining role was 
to legislate itself and other federal institutions out of the way. For the Civic Democratic 
Party to have entered into a dialogue with the federal parliament over the future of the 
state would have been to admit to the existence of alternative feasible agendas, 
something the CDP had never officially done. This exclusion of the Federal Assembly 
from entertaining more than an administrative (as opposed to a representative) role in 
the dissolution was of course essential to the separation, as well as being a throwback 
to the communist era. In its single most explicitly nationalistic move, the Civic 
Democratic Party argued that the imminent cessation of the federation removed from 
the Assembly any profound parliamentary responsibility to uphold the federal state, the 
oath of loyalty for the swearing-in of federal deputies notwithstanding. Within the CDP 
logic it followed that the refomist Czech and not the faint-hearted federal government 
had both a unique grasp on but also (and before the fact) parliamentary responsibility 
for, the interests of the Czech people as a whole - a stereotypically ‘nationalist’ 
assertion.
In late August 1992, the CDP/MDS agreements on deputy behaviour in the Federal 
Assembly insisted that the two parties table only those questions pertaining to the 
constitution. The two parties had agreed in addition that the principle be applied to all
The broad claim of historical institutionalists is that institutions structure political battles and in so doing, 
influence their outcomes (Steinmo 1992:3). In our case the failure of political institutions was critical in 
giving autonomy to political leaders. It seems to me that it would be stretching a point to claim this as an 
institutionalist argument; the absence of constraint cannot positively structure a political outcome, but can 
only open up political opportunity.
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other political clubs. This last extension of the agreement represented an explicit 
attempt to limit the legislature as well as the temporarily mandated federal government. 
The CDP clearly saw that it was now possible to manipulate the deepening insecurity 
now felt by federal deputies as to their legitimate legal/political powers and duties. In 
the same vein, opposition initiatives to prevent separation were portrayed as practically 
ultra vires by the CDP, as ever by virtue of its assumed mandate to separate the state. 
In a throwback to the election tactic of imputing anti-democratic credentials to parties 
critical of the CDP programme, the parliamentary opposition were accused not merely 
of a political opposition to the CDP stance, but of a ‘legal’ misdemeanour. The need to 
rescue Czechs from Slovak economic (or by now, synonymously, ‘socialist’) sabotage 
was invoked in a manner implying that obstruction to divorce amounted to a 
treasonable negligence of the interests of the future Czech state. This assumption was 
expressed most concretely by the CDP’s unequivocal and unselfconscious intention to 
exclude the Federal Assembly from the entire separation process, should it fail to ratify 
legislation dissolving Czechoslovakia into two.
The language of crisis was all-important to the weakening of parliament, invoking as it 
did the dangers of a helpless government in the face of threat and the terrible 
internecine conflicts of twentieth century Central Europe, though we know that the 
threat was fundamentally bogus. As Offe has observed “severe turbulences (including 
conditions that are skillfully dramatized as severe turbulences) tend to bring political 
competition to a temporary standstill” (1995:18). An atmosphere of a only-just- 
avoidable-crisis characterised much of the CDP rhetoric throughout the final process; a 
strategy for eliciting shows of cross-party consensus where none, in more routine 
times, would have existed.
The fact that the Federal Assembly was confronted by the ‘bottom line’ of its own 
fragile existence immediately after the election only deepened its already questioned 
efficiency as a legislature. It was given little time to ponder major legislation and was 
disrupted by unreliable and disillusioned attendance, and an unsteady, intimidatory flow 
of information about government intentions. Klaus had contended that a Slovak 
Declaration of Sovereignty could hardly worsen “the absurdities of the 1968
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constitution” but if parliament was beleaguered by ambiguously grounded constitutional 
authority, we can see by now that the executive also disregarded it with a contempt 
strongly reminiscent of the previous, communist regime. Klaus acted under the 
vanguardist assumption that his ‘mandate’ permitted the hollo wing-out of the Federal 
Assembly as a representative institution if this ensured the smooth creation of the new 
ideal state. As even Havel had asked himself, what was to be conceded to the 
representatives of a soon to be non-existent state? Nothing more, it seemed, than what 
was required to secure their legal - formally legitimating - rubber stamp. Those who 
insisted that by ratifying dissolution the Assembly had chosen to uphold ‘political 
culture’ expressed a great historical irony - ratification was a practical admission that 
real power had followed the CDP to the Czech state long before the Czech state had 
been legally or legitimately created.
It is worth noting, though with much hindsight, that the inglorious demise of the 
Federal Assembly did not amount to a pragmatic blip in the Czech right’s respect for 
constitutional law. The punch-line to the story of the dissolution, a study in political co­
option, has been that in the independent Czech Republic the promised second chamber, 
the Senate - the combined carrot and stick that had persuaded Federal deputies to 
abolish the state^ - remained unestablished until 1996, when the electoral mandate of 
the federal deputies finally expired. In effect, Klaus never paid the bribe, though these 
homeless federal deputies, according to agreement by the Federal Assembly Presidium, 
retained their parliamentary immunity from prosecution and a mandate (to serve the 
federation).
The President
Finally, the co-option of Havel - the charismatic leader of the revolution and the tie that 
bound a significant network of emotionally pro-federal groups - can be seen as having 
greatly weakened the prospects for opposition. President Havel’s early decision to place
 ^ At the very end of December 1992, the Czech National Council had refused to shorten its discussion of 
the transfer o f deputies bill (Provisional Senate bill) from 60 to 25 days {Mlada Fronta dnes 
31.12.1992:1,2) - thus leaving the issue unresolved until after independence. With a secure coalition in the 
National Council there was little incentive for the Civic Democratic Party to hasten the enactment o f that 
section o f the new Czech constitution establishing a second chamber. To the bemusement of his opponents 
thereafter, Klaus ignored the Constitution for almost four years.
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his fate in Klaus’s hands can be seen as having greatly bolstered that party’s ability to 
pressurise Czech federal deputies into believing hitherto unsuspected versions of 
parliamentary responsibility. President Havel had represented to many Czechs a 
defender not only of the federation, but also of the right of citizens to be consulted on 
the specific issue of the state’s future through a referendum, Slovaks on the other hand 
had long had cause to be irritated by Havel’s patrician attitude to Slovakia, and by the 
uncensored musings of his advisor Michael Zantovsky, seen by many close to Havel as 
responsible for his leaning ever nearer to Klaus’s more pragmatic views. According to 
Zak “the last nail in the coffm for the idea of possibly transforming the federation” was 
hammered in by Meciar when the MDS blocked Havel’s re-election as President in July 
1992 (Zak 1995:263). More fateful than the end of his Presidency though, was Havel’s 
earlier removal of his own tremendous moral authority from behind the authentic 
federal cause. His acceptance of the separation left the opposition marooned without a 
popular champion. Without Havel, Klaus could point more easily to a conspiracy of 
Czech leftists delaying separation only in order to hang on to Slovak gradualism as a 
bulwark against federal reform. “[N]one of those proposing a referendum mean it 
seriously” he had said, after the Dissolution Bill was defeated on the 18th November. 
The implications were that, by then, a pro-federalist deputy was a deputy with a 
dubious ulterior motive.
Despite his claims that he had no desire to be a ‘paper’ President and that he felt the 
collapse of the federation as a personal failure, Havel had acted to maintain office 
rather than stand up (or rather stand down) for his belief in a federal Czech and Slovak 
state, and the relationship, as he put it, “bound together by thousands of historical, 
cultural, and personal ties” (Havel 1992:34). In line with the arguments he employed 
against continuing parliamentary dissent we may view Havel’s adherence to a common 
Czech front as following perceptions of his own historic destiny, in particular, from his 
belief that an (inevitably) independent Czech republic would fare better with his 
blessing than without it. His switch, however, came within weeks of losing the 
Presidency, and for Czechs who still believed in the federation it represented a 
surprising capitulation from the principle. It was a signal of the public’s disappointment 
that long after independence it was commonplace to hear Czechs single out Havel as
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the individual most responsible for the separation. With Havel lost to the CDP line, the 
role of a state-protecting, state-nurturing Federal President disappeared. Following 
Havel’s departure, the highly symbolic post was discredited utterly by the failure of 
parties to put forward respectable candidates, let alone elect them: a lack of strong 
established political personalities which not only demolished the Presidency months 
before its official abolition but which also typifies the transition even today.
Conclusions
My evidence challenges the complacent assumption common to transition studies, that 
Central European post-communist states are embarked upon a somehow predetermined 
path from revolution to democracy. ‘Transition’ politics in post-communist 
Czechoslovakia was both highly distinct, and significantly, and not momentarily, 
estranged from democratic norms and practice. What I would finally like to emphasise 
by way of a conclusion is the truly remarkable kinship between the structure of the 
Czech Civic Democratic Party’s arguments for state reform - as it were their sociology 
of state-reform - and that of the former ruling Communist Party.
Klaus, it may be noted, is still essentially in power in Czechoslovakia at the time of 
writing (1997). Though without a majority following the improved electoral 
performance by Zeman’s Social Democrats, Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party 
nevertheless remains the single strongest party in the Czech lands and Klaus himself 
remains the single most successful politician in Central Europe. According to the 
following criteria, however, the structure of his political sociology mirrors in 
remarkable ways that of the Communist Party he so publicly despised after 1989.
Thus, as has been demonstrated, Klaus considered the CDP to be a vanguardist party, 
uniquely suited to the task of defining the democratic future by virtue of its 
scientifically superior vision of state development. The construction of the future state 
was projected as a priority: an imperative which might be secured at the cost of the ’ 
state’s immediate democratic functioning. No value was to be ascribed to inherited 
constitutional norms as the knowledgeably charismatic qualities of the party’s vision 
were considered adequate guarantees of the state’s proper administration. The
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administrating state’s definition of public goods was deemed superior to those 
prevailing among the public themselves - and again this was axiomatic in that it was 
backed by scientifically defmed ‘facts of transitional necessity’. Klaus’s understanding 
of nationalist conflict was blankly materialistic insofar as he apparently presumed that 
prosperity - market prosperity - would suffice for the neutralisation, if not the withering 
away, of national sentiment. The prevailing ideology was legitimated as historically 
determined (determined that is by the developmental path and economic culture of the 
First Republic - only momentarily sidetracked by communism) and was also defined 
‘negatively’, i.e. as a ‘defence’ against an exaggerated external threat - not western 
imperialism in this case - but Slovak nationalism. When we look at Klaus in the mirror 
of history, we see a Lenin of the bourgeoisie.
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Appendix I 
Federalism in comparative perspective
Democratic federalism^ - Canada
Canada is a prime example of where evolving processes of government have reflected 
formally federal principles in a highly dynamic way, for the most part successfully 
managing, though not resolving a basically bi-riational conflict. Even though Canada’s 
modern settler nationalities, the French and English, were both peculiarly centralising 
in their own political habits, by the mid-nineteenth century it was accepted by both 
sides that federation was the only route to a Canadian modus vivendi (Elazar 1987:195). 
Canada, like Czechoslovakia, had to invent a sense of common nationality. Yet in 
Canada the option of assimilation, of the smaller nation by the larger, was closed from 
an early date. From its inception, Canadian federalism was informed by an elite 
consensus as to the need for compromise and hard bargaining: indeed, Canadian 
federalism has been and remains directly linked to an explicit struggle to maintain a 
sufficient unity^ (Elazar 1987:66). In other words “Canadians developed the notion of a 
‘federal bargain’, stressing and accepting as a fa it accompli the conflictual relationships 
prevalent at the origin of the federal system (Gagnon 1989:157). The contrast with 
Czech assimilationism is marked. As discussed in Chapter 1, the First Republic in 
particular was founded upon the notion that Czechoslovaks formed a single nation. 
Single nationhood was the identity presented to the outside world and which informed 
many Czech policies within Slovakia itself. Though following the Second World War it 
appeared that Slovak visibility within the state must be enhanced, the Communist 
takeover signalled a move to impulses not simply of assimilation but of the eradication 
of national identities as such.
' “Federations are communities of both polities and individuals and emphasise the liberties of both”... 
“Confederations on the other hand, are primarily communities of polities, which place greater emphasis on 
the liberties o f the constituent polities (Elazar 1987:93).
 ^ It is worth noting that this realism came not from particular far-sightedness on either side but from the 
situation following the conquest of Quebec in 1759. Until well into the nineteenth century the French 
constituted the dominant majority of the population, and the British conquerors had little alternative but to 
forget all hopes of anglicising such a resentful majority. Under the provisions of the conciliatory Quebec 
Act o f 1774 the French were thus guaranteed official recognition and protection of their societal 
peculiarities: their Roman Catholicism, language, customs, seigneurial system of land tenure and civil law 
(Noel 1993:43). As Elazar notes, the resulting mixture of laws has kept the administration of justice 
substantially non-centralised - even in federal courts (Elazar 1987:172).
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Canadian federalism is founded in fact upon two main cleavages: a political/territorial 
division, between ten constituent provinces, and a sociological cleavage, between the 
two dominant nationalities^. Of the strategies adopted to bridge the latter division, made 
complex but undoubtedly more stable by the uneven geographical distribution of the 
two dominant nations, the most successful if not the most popular have been 
consociational in character (Noel 1993:42). ‘Consociationalism’ or ‘power-sharing’ as a 
distinctive system characteristically involves grand coalitions - elite compromise - and 
segmental autonomy, and thirdly, proportionality in political representation and 
appointments etc., and by the guaranteed opportunity for minority veto (Elazar 
1987:27). Thus in the Canadian case “the two provinces that made up the Union were 
functionally separate political subsystems, joined only at the top through a form of 
overarching accommodation between the members of the respective governing elites; 
proportionality was practiced in the distribution of offices and the allocation of 
government benefits; and at least an informal mutual veto existed through the 
convention of requiring concurrent majorities in both sections of the legislature to 
sustain a government in power” (Noel 1993:45).
The Union of the Canadas, created in 1841, respresented a significant step in 
entrenching consociational practices. Though intended at the time to eradicate national 
elite bargaining altogether, by redesigning the constitution such that the French would 
be reduced to a permanent minority in parliament, the British-imposed constitutional 
change had not reckoned with another cleavage in Upper Canada, one which ran not 
along ethnic-linguistic lines but along conservative-reform lines (Noel 1993:45). The 
astute reform elite had realised that a coalition of reformers and French moderates 
might secure a majority in the legislature, and upon this realisation, consociationalism 
again thrived. Rather than risk civil strife the English and French elites negotiated the 
consociational principle of coalition ministries in which the power and patronage of 
office would be shared on a roughly proportional basis' .^ Though rarely invoked as a
 ^ Visualised by Gagnon as eleven elephants in a maze and two scorpions in a bottle (Gagnon 1989:160).
 ^ Thus, each ministry was headed by co-premiers, one English and one French, who were the leaders of 
their respective parties in the governing coalition o f the day (Noel 1993:45).
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doctrine, the principle of duality informed political practice henceforth as a guiding 
rule^.
Once English-speaking Canadians had clearly become the majority nation however, 
emerging aspirations to unqualified majority rule took on a new lease of life. Their 
reasons combined anti-Catholic, anti-French prejudice on the one hand, and hankerings 
after the example of the United States on the other. When the Canadian federation was 
formed in 1867, establishing a parliament based on the principle of representation by 
population, it realised one of the main aims of this increasingly influential group of 
anglophone federalists. Despite attempts to again bypass this constitutional injunction 
the French were reduced to about a third of the seats in the parliament and duality in its 
previous form was rendered unsustainable, leaving the French to settle for autonomy in 
Quebec over a more limited range of powers: civil law, religion, local institutions and 
culture. The French thus lost the institutional support structures for elite bargaining and 
this development encouraged enclave building among the Québécois. As Noel 
concludes “federalism represented a significant shift away from dualism and 
consociationalism as responses to ethnic conflict and towards territorial segregation and 
hegemonic inter-ethnic relations” (Noel 1993:47).
However, despite new institutional practices - co-premiers were replaced by single 
premiers, the Westminster-model dominated parliament - Canadian consociationalism 
proved a hardy plant. Henceforth it was within the party system that the competing 
elites made the compromises and bargains that a significant section of both elites still 
understood to be necessary to maintain order in the state. In practice this meant a 
persistently distributive system of party competition, oriented to the proportional 
sharing of material benefits (Noel 1993:48). Its product was the “composite bi-racial, 
bi-cultural party, uniting both French and English voters” (ibid. 49): the party 
victorious in national elections was and is often the only one able to expand its 
provincial electoral bases to national proportions (Elazar 1987:180). The lack of
 ^ Indeed it may be noted, the capital city, Ottawa, has national significance only in that it represents the 
compromise o f 1866 between Quebec City and Toronto - the centres of French-speaking and English- 
speaking Canada.
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institutional support for this arrangement however has clearly left the principle and 
practice of consociationalism more vulnerable than ever before.
To conclude, Noel argues that today the main unresolved tension of Canadian national 
relations is not between consociationalism and coercive majority-rule, but between two 
equally rooted conceptions of democracy: one which rests essentially on notions of 
power-sharing, another which has at its core the idea of majority-rule (Noel 1993:55). 
The first, essentially conservative idea, accepts the primacy of ethno-linguistic identities 
and believes significant local autonomy is the best guarantor of individual freedoms: it 
understands federalism in confederal terms - a community of communities, in which the 
state best serves its citizens not in a visionary but in incrementalist, distributive terms: 
i.e. in consociational terms. An adherence to majority rule on the other hand is based 
on the principle of liberal individualism and views citizenship as the only legitimate 
basis of political identity. It is in practice, as Noel points out, populist and majoritarian, 
supporting the primacy of ‘national’ goals over ‘local’ particularisms: it sees the federal 
government (or now in the case of Quebec nationalists, the Quebec government) as the 
main bearer of the national vision (Noel 1993:56). The tremendous national friction 
that has arisen from the recent ascendancy of this second democratic model, 
particularly as practiced by the separatist Parti-Quebecois, has since the 1980s thrown 
the continuation of the Canadian state uniquely into doubt. Whether this majoritarian- 
inspired crisis leads only to yet another rebirth of consociational politics remains to be 
seen.
Communist federalism
Though Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had the distinction of being 
the only socialist federations of the eastern bloc, the reasons for the implementation of 
federalism in the first place, its function and management in practice, and finally the 
process of the demise of socialism and federalism were, in each case, very different. 
Their differences do however shed some light upon the nature and significance of 
Soviet hegemony in the region, and the role of the constitution generally under 
communism. The central feature of the constitution in each case, as in the unitary 
states, was the confirmation of power in the hands of the ‘revolutionary’ cadres - the
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P a r t y T o  understand why these systems developed as they did, and to comprehend the 
peculiar nature of the instability that afflicted these states in the late 1980s it is 
necessary to consider the peculiar source and location of power in each of the three 
cases.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing civil war, Soviet leaders were 
evidently mistrustful of Marxism-Leninism’s doctrinal assumption that nationalism 
would wither away. Consequently they managed the ethnic diversity within the Union 
by creating an unprecedented system wherein the state would be federalised and the 
political-administrative sub-units defined in ethno-territorial terms (Suny 1992:28). To 
what extent Lenin intended that national self-determination was to be tolerated or 
gradually extinguished remains a matter of debate (Bunce 1996:11). The evidence is 
however, that the effectively imperialistic and hierarchical power relations established 
under Lenin were thoroughly consolidated by Stalin. Under Stalin, the Union most 
completely became an instrument of Russian chauvinism. The Soviet Union embarked 
upon wholesale cultural Russianisation and became a highly centralised unitary state, 
with the vestiges of power at the periphery extinguished with the forces of police terror 
(Suny 1992:28).
Valerie Bunce has argued that the “system” was “copied by Yugoslavia after the 
wartime revolution and Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring revolution in 1968” . 
She also asserts that, though the federalists everywhere intended that the system would 
eventually obliterate ethnic identity, an entirely unintended consequence of the new 
constitutional structure was in fact “to institutionalise ethnic distinctions and thereby 
make ethnicity a key marker of individual and group identity” (Bunce 1996:11). She 
goes so far with the irony of the institutionalist case as to conclude that in the three 
communist federations, “primordial factors seemed to have played a minor role in the 
development of nationalism and nationalist movements. Instead, ethnicity and its
 ^ Elazar it may be noted has argued that “the maintenance of federalism requires that the conunon polity 
and its constituent polities each have a substantially complete set of governing institutions o f their own with 
the right - within limits set by compact - to modify these institutions unilaterally” (Elazar 1987:182). 
Clearly the Conununist Party dictât, particularly that effecting Czechoslovak politics under occupation, 
meant that the cooperation between federal and republican bodies was severely constrained, and vulnerable 
to coercion.
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politicization seem to have been constructed... by the institutions of federalised state 
socialism” (Bunce 1996:31). By this reasoning not only the Soviet Union but 
communist federal states as such sowed the seeds of their own destruction^. Such an 
argument is however derived overwhelmingly from the Soviet case, and is in fact 
completely misleading as to the real history of federalism not only in Yugoslavia but 
also in Czechoslovakia. Far from politicising ethnicity, as we may accept was the case 
in several of the new national political units of the Soviet Union (Goldman et al 1992), 
federation in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was introduced entirely as an instrument 
for the integration and co-option of an already patently active national politics. National 
claims had already resulted in bitter civil war in the Yugoslav case - and as we have 
already seen in the Slovak case, in anti-state rebellion.
Czechoslovakia’s fédéralisation after 1968 was the Soviet Union’s one immediate, if 
highly imperfect opportunity to legitimate the ‘return to order’ following the Warsaw 
Pact invasion. As an instrument of divide and rule it was a concession entirely for 
Slovak consumption. It differed in this important respect from Soviet federation, which 
was first formed as a preemptive strategy: to weaken and re-structure any initial 
resistance to the new Soviet domination. The Soviet federation after Stalin’s death 
actually functioned as the superstructure upon which to build some ethnic autonomy. In 
contrast, the advantages to be gained from Czechoslovakia’s degraded federalism could 
not be perceived by Czechs and Slovaks but as an explicit zero-sum game: under the 
conditions o f Soviet domination, Czechs would win at Slovakia’s expense, and vice 
versa. The positive benefits of a federal state could hardly be advertised under such a 
system. Many in the Czech elite, moreover, perceived Soviet sponsorship to be all on 
the Slovak side, and this ‘proved’ to them yet again the perversity of the Soviet system. 
For Czechs not only was the Czechoslovak economy being de-developed when 
compared to its interwar sophistication, but the ‘proper’ {i.e. paternal) order of national 
relations in the state had finally been overturned. For Slovaks, the weakening of the 
federal contract after 1969 and particularly after the constitutional amendment of 1970
 ^ “Without federalism, there was no organised alternative to the state, and the state, as a result, survived, 
albeit weakened by the loss o f  the senior partner in its coalition; that is, the party. With federalism, such a 
counterweight existed in the republics, and the state responded by decomposing into its republican sub-units 
(Bunce 1996:16).
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indicated that their position of autonomy was a facade which masked a continued lack 
of political leverage.
In Yugoslavia the federal model was indeed copied voluntarily from that of the Soviets, 
but with an ideological rigour that carried the Yugoslav variant into a category of its 
own. Following as it did a four year, mutually genocidal Serb-Croat civil war, the 
victorious partisan’s nominally federalising constitution of 1946 was built on the 
conviction that re-socialising the population at large was a sine qua non of the state’s 
future stability. The Yugoslav communists thus desired to do far more than generate a 
superstructure for the imposition of the authority of one particular nation, and as still- 
devout Marxist Leninists (see Djilas 1962) they believed more strongly than Stalin’s 
cadres that ethnic identity might indeed be overcome with the equalisation of economic 
conditions. To hasten such a development the 1946 constitution provided but minimally 
for cultural rights, provisions mirrored moreover, by the re-drawing of the republics’ 
internal frontiers. The cohesiveness of this new arrangement was guaranteed by the 
political monopoly of the Party, but more particularly, by the internal authority of its 
leader, Josip Broz Tito. Though both Croats and the largest minority, Serbs, sustained 
losses (through cultural repression in Croatia’s case and through Serbia’s re-division 
into three units), there were otherwise important and stabilising gains for other groups. 
Macedonia in particular, gained recognition as an autonomous republic (Schopflin 
1993:180-1).
A compromise on nationality policy was soon required. When Stalin reprimanded the 
Yugoslavs for their independent behaviour in 1948, the Yugoslav Party was at a loss to 
see the doctrinal justification and disagreement led to a breach with Moscow. The 
mobilisation of pan-state solidarity was necessary at the time for the potential physical 
defence of the state. When the danger of Soviet military intervention passed however, 
the idea of a national communism presented further advantages: a pan-Yugoslav civic 
identity might both legitimate the traumatic split from Moscow whilst offering a 
unifying and less culturally Spartan* vision at home. Indeed the complete repression of
“While the attempt to construct a ‘Yugoslav’ identity through the rewriting o f history and the merging of 
the Serbian and Croatian languages were largely a failure, it did work in one respect - the creation of a 
category of Yugoslav identity within the country allowed individuals to opt out o f rooted ethno-national
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republican national expression and national political claims received some popular 
support (Schopflin 1993:183), quite understandably in light of the escaped brutality of 
the war.
By the 1960s however, the economy was beginning to falter and with these 
developments, and the implicit threat to the prevailing elite, came an end to the 
passivity of the republican ‘machinery’, which had hitherto clearly found more to be 
gained from cooperation and obedience. The republic/centre tensions generated by 
Czechoslovakia’s failing economy existed in even greater complexity in Yugoslavia, a 
federation consisting of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, 
Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercogovina, as well as the autonomous provinces of 
Vojvodina and the autonomous region of Kosovo, within Serbia. In the 1960s the 
reformers were concentrated largely in Croatia and Slovenia and to a lesser extent in 
Serbia, and it was this coalition which now challenged the still pro-centralising elite of 
the Partisan generation (Schopflin 1993:184). What was particularly striking in this 
process was how quickly former alliances among the critical left were fractured along 
national lines, and following this, how rapidly extreme nationalists stepped up to 
challenge the original protesters (Miller 1992:86)
Though for several years this elite competition resulted in deadlock, by the late 1960s 
the Croat leadership resorted to an explicit invocation of the national interest, with a 
confidence that deeply confounded the strategy of the preceding twenty years. As 
Schopflin points out, the threat to restore not only the symbolism of the national world 
but the discourse of nationality and nationalism in its entirety amounted to the most 
profound attack on the communist state, and Tito responded in kind. Observing the 
total outbreak of Croat nationalism in 1971, Tito intervened with a massive purge of 
the Croatian leadership and a threat of military intervention. He then turned the purges 
upon Slovenia, Macedonia and the Vojvodina, and finally upon Serbia in October 
1972, where nationalist sentiment had risen in reaction to that in Croatia (Miller 
1992:86).
identities” (Schopflin 1993:186). The Party itself was also renamed the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia in 1952, as a largely symbolic move from democratic centralism.
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Just as Czechoslovakia’s communists used constitutional reform as an instrument of 
both normative assertion and as a sop to otherwise irrepressible interests^ so too did the 
centralist elite in Yugoslavia. Already in 1969 the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY) in forward-thinking mode, had formed a collective presidency with 
balanced republican/provincial representation, and a rotational chairmanship (Tito 
being the exception - as ‘president for life’). In 1971 a collective state presidency 
mirrored that of the LCY and the system was followed in the major institutions of state 
- though again with Tito the exception (Binns 1989:133). The new constitution of 1974 
sought both to consolidate LCY hegemony and to integrate the forces to have emerged 
in the 1960s. To this end greater powers were given to enterprises and communes in 
the hope that Yugoslavia’s structure of worker self-management might still transcend 
ethnicity as a power structure within the state, and act as the locus of identity and all 
potential political mobilisation; the army was henceforth to be regarded explicitly as the 
defender of ‘brotherhood and unity’ i.e. state integrity and finally, secret police 
pressure, toughened criteria for particular forms of employment, and pro-‘Yugoslav’ 
propaganda were all re-asserted (Schopflin 1993:190).
The result however, was only deeper republicanisation: its instrument, the republican 
right of veto, introduced in practice in 1968, but unrealised in its full potential to divide 
until Tito’s death in 1980. Central authority was henceforth steadily eroded as 
republican attempts at deflecting central initiatives proved successful. Increasingly, 
republican elites “had to legitimate themselves through a mixture of self-managing 
ideology and the republican interest” and despite the attempts to shore up the authority 
of Titoism after the fact, the disintegration of the state accelerated with economic 
deterioration and mounting indebtedness (Schopflin ibid.). By the 1980s not only had 
the legitimating myths of the 1950s and 60s all but worn through - the partisan struggle 
scarcely remembered by a new generation - but authority had moved - or rather - 
returned - decisively to the periphery. By this time the state resembled a decentralised
 ^ A strategy which under communism produced highly contradictory constitutional principles. Though 
masked by the hierarchical and coercive authority of the Party machine for the duration o f communism, the 
inheritance of constitutional paradoxes would prove a major difficulty to the post-conununist successor 
states.
317
federation or confederation^® (Kostunica 1988:79), and within it, Serb nationalism re- 
emerged, embittered by the perceived sacrifices made by Serbs on Yugoslavia’s behalf.
Though Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia represented the full range of 
developmental patterns in the really-existing-socialist experience (Bunce 1996:4) all 
equally failed to create the conditions necessary for intensive, rather than extensive 
economic growth. The technological revolution in the west exposed the stagnation in 
the east, and the development undermined the intrinsically materialist nationality 
policies of each state. In Yugoslavia the Tito-less centre could no longer hold against 
unanswerable republican claims; in the Soviet Union the response to economic crisis. 
Perestroika, unleashed a chain of unforeseen national demands, which in their pressure 
for political opening undid the Party centre entirely. With that, the barriers to 
Czechoslovakia’s démocratisation and long-harboured rejection of the imposed 
constitution were finally lifted.
The national/relational ‘norms’ to which Czechs and Slovaks might appeal after 1989 
could hardly have been more complex however. In Canada, the price of compromise 
has been long debated and is exactly known; in the Soviet Union, Russia’s dominant 
status was hardly to be doubted. In Yugoslavia the forced equalisation of national status 
allowed Serbs in particular to protest, if in nationalist chauvinist terms, the 
communists’ disregard and resentment of their historically dominant and dominating 
role. In Czechoslovakia however, each side profoundly believed the other to have had 
the advantage: both had been subordinated to the Soviet Union, and yet Czechs 
perceived Slovaks to have gained from the relationship both politically and materially. 
Slovaks meanwhile remained acutely aware that the Communist Party - the domestic 
author of power in the communist state - had remained Czechoslovak - unfederalised. 
In the light of Slovak history therefore, even Soviet-domination and state fédéralisation 
had failed to dislodge the persistent connection of real power with the power of the
Binns argues that this was the case as far back as 1971, when the idea of a republican veto was 
effectively legitimised by the institutional innovations introducing leadership rotations and proportional 
representation in the Federal Assembly (1989:nl5). The main evidence for this is that the centre had 
eventually to work through the republics in order to make and implement policy - and to procure resources. 
Ultimately the ever-strengthening set o f republics had accumulated the resources to act as nearly 
independent economic and political units (Bunce 1996:21-2).
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dominant republic - the Czech lands. Just as the Party had never admitted of Slovak 
separateness so too Slovaks believed, the federal parliament most probably remained 
for Czechs, by assumption if not in fact, the Czech parliament.
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Appendix II 
Mainstream political parties 
Czech Political Parties
Association for the Repubhc - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia 
Association of Social Democrats (formerly within the Civic Forum)
Christian and Democratic Union
Christian Democratic Party (formerly part of the Christian and Democratic Union) 
Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People’s Party (formerly part of the 
Christian and Democratic Union)
Civic Democratic Party (formerly within the Civic Forum)
Civic Democratic Alliance (formerly within the Civic Forum)
Civic Forum
Civic Movement (formerly within the Civic Forum)
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovak Social Democracy (formerly within the Civic Forum)
Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy for Moravia and Silesia
Left Bloc (a coalition of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, following
the split with the Slovak wing of the Party) and the minuscule (Czech) Democratic
Left
Liberal Social Union (a coalition of the Agricultural Party, the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Party and the Green Party)
Slovak Political Parties 
Christian Democratic Movement
Civic Democratic Union (formerly the liberal wing of the Public Against Violence) 
Democratic Party (former communist “satellite” party - the Party of Slovak Renewal) 
Egyutteles (Coexistence)
Hungarian Civic Party, (formerly Hungarian Independent Initiative)
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement 
Green Party
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (formerly part of the Public Against Violence) 
Party of the Democratic Left, (formely the Communist Party of Slovakia)
Public Against Violence
Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (formerly part of the Christian Democratic 
Movement)
Social Democratic Party of Slovakia 
Slovak National Party
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Appendix III 
Interviews
Dr. Ales Capek, February 14, 1995. Economist, Czech National Bank.
Ivan Gabal, June 15, 1995. Sociologist, former advisor to President Havel, Head of the 
President's social research unit and 1992 electoral campaign manager for the Civic 
Movement.
Fedor Gal, April 4, 1995. Sociologist and former Chairman of the Slovak Public 
Against Violence.
Dr. Jan Klacek, February 8, 1995. Director of the Economics Institute of the Czech 
National Bank, former advisor to the Federal Minister of the Economy, Vladimir 
Dlouhy.
Dr. Kotulan, February 9, 1995. Economist, Czech National Bank.
Dr. Jan Mladek, February 21, 1995. Former Federal Deputy Minister for the Economy 
and advisor to Federal Minister of the Economy, Vladimir Dlouhy.
Vaclav Zak, June 14, 1995. Former Member of Parliament for Civic Forum and 
Chairman of the Czech National Council (June 1990 - June 1992).
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